When policy and practice collide: A structuration approach examining the failure to unify an organization.

Mr Bret William Slade
Graduate School of Management, La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia
B.Slade@latrobe.edu.au

Mr Stephen Alexander Muir
School of Business, La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia
S.Muir@latrobe.edu.au

Dr Richard Jan Pech
Graduate School of Management, La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia
R.Pech@latrobe.edu.au
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ABSTRACT
Understanding Giddens’ (1984) structuration approach clarifies the complex nature of the interaction between organisations and the policies that guide them. Central to this paper is a consideration of organisational integration and the extent to which this is achieved, as directed within policy bounds. The example of the Australian Regular Army and the Army Reserve demonstrates a failure to integrate under policy direction. In this case study it becomes clear that external events, not policy, lead to organisation change. Content and frequency distribution analyses are used to examine the data supporting this contention.

Key words: Policy, structuration, defence, integration, content analysis
INTRODUCTION

An understanding and consideration of Giddens’ (1984) structuration approach clarifies the complex nature of the interaction between organisations and the policies that guide them. This paper uses as its prime example the pluralist relationship between the Australian Regular Army (ARA) and the Australian Army Reserve (ARES). To aid this understanding it is important to comprehend the nature of the interplay of policy and practice in organisations and how what is often said is not necessarily enacted. Central to this paper is a consideration of organisational integration as measured through policy statement, ARES soldier participation within the ARA, and the extent to which this is achieved as directed within policy bounds. The primary data for this research includes a content analysis of significant government inquiries into the ARA and the ARES, critical policy changes, and quantitative data drawn from the ARA’s central personnel database ARMREC.

Background: Primary Policy

“The continuance of an organisation depends upon its ability to carry out its purpose. This clearly depends jointly upon the appropriateness of its action and upon the conditions of its environment…” (Barnard, C. 1938, p.91)

Forty-six years before Giddens, Barnard’s words would provide a key to understanding what has taken place between the ARA and the ARES up until the turn of the last century. That these organisations had failed to integrate as directed by policy will become clear later in this paper. It will also become apparent that changes in Australia’s strategic environment do have an affect on the rate of participation of ARES soldiers within the ARA.

At a briefing to the Soldier Career Management Agency, and invited guests, on the 19th of February 2001, Lt. Colonel Karl Delaney, Director of Defence Workforce Planning, announced that “the Regular Army could no longer carry out all of the tasks required of it without the use of the Army Reserve”¹. In this presentation, Lt. Colonel Delaney made it clear that the Australian Government through the Minister for Defence, and the Chief of Army, required the Australian Army Reserve (ARES) to be brought up to

¹ Briefing attended by Bret Slade as an invited guest of the Soldier Career Management Agency, St Kilda Defence Plaza, St Kilda Road, Melbourne. February 19th 2001.
sufficient strength and effectiveness to support the Australian Regular Army (ARA). The Army Reserve would be used to “roundout” the Regular Army as the tempo of operations increased through Australia’s growing role in regional security. At this briefing, concerns were immediately raised, by serving Regular Army officers, regarding the deployability of Army Reservists within the professional force. These concerns were centred on the quality of reserve training, fitness of reservists to participate in operations, and the commitment of reserve members. These concerns were not new and have been well documented by the various parliamentary inquiries carried out through the previous century.

The ARA and the ARES have been unable to effectively integrate. Factors contributing to this have included government policy, a lack of activity in Australia’s strategic environment, and disunity between the two organisations themselves. The strategic goals provided to each organisation by successive Government White Papers over the last century have not been implemented. The 13 reviews in the past 19 years examining the state of Australia’s land forces, specifically the Army Reserve, are testament to this.

Circumstances surrounding Australia’s external security environment, and the increasing tempo of military operations in the region have found Australia’s relatively small, and high-tech force stretched in order to cover its security mandate. In the light of this, Delaney’s earlier statement becomes more relevant; the Australian Regular Army must make use of the Army Reserve in order to carry out its regional defence and security functions. Subsequently, an examination of the policy position given to each organisation is critical to understanding why these organisations have failed to integrate.

**Background and National Policy**

A range of policy statements has been made throughout the history of both the ARA and the ARES from the original Defence Act, to Amendments to the Act, to subsequent reports and inquiries. Figure 1 below shows the most significant of these in chronological order:
According to Keppel (1997), the Australian Constitution was framed to prevent military government of Australia. It might be similarly argued that the British Empire influenced constitutional matters to ensure that no professional military force could be raised to affect its relationship with the former colony. It
could also be suggested that armies are expensive, and the newly Federated nation would certainly have had the consideration of the “contradiction between defence and national development” when allocating funds from the country’s coffers (O’Neill, R. 1976, p.34). The subsequently drafted and ratified Defence Act of 1903 created a rigid construct that would, as a result of significant changes in the international security environment, eventually divide the ARA and the ARES.

On first examination, the Defence Act of 1903 clearly sets the mandate for the Citizen Military Force as an organisation specifically designed to defend the Australian mainland. The logic of maintaining a Regular Army component, or training Cadre, to provide support to the Citizen Military Forces in preparation for war, seemed at this time both efficient and effective. The first decade of the 20th century was not one characterised by the blitzkrieg, nor by rapidly moving naval and air forces with the capacity to deploy large numbers of troops and supplies to destination. Rather, this was an era of set-piece battles, and the small, though expensive, and specialised armies written of by von Clausewitz in his 19th Century seminal work, *The Principles of War*.

Successive Australian governments saw fit to reinforce the “Blue Water” theory of defence by creating a Naval force that could support the Australian allies in any military action protecting the Australian mainland. In defence policy, land forces were relegated to the role of passive defence (Long, G. 1952). This had not changed since 1911 when Colonel James Whiteside McKay declared to the Victorian United Services Institute in Melbourne that, “the picture in the mind’s eye of the public is (of) one huge ditch around the Australian coast with soldiers at regular intervals peering over its edge, and gripping rifles with tense hands” (Evans, M. 1999, p.12).

Of interest, is Horner’s (1981, p. 18) contention that by the middle of World War II the members of the Second Australian Imperial Force and the Citizen Military Forces had begun “to think of themselves as belonging to one army”. This of course was due in part to in-theatre operations combining the members of both organisations in shared experience, and in part the fact that many Australian Imperial Force Members had been drawn from the ranks of the citizen forces.
In counterpoint to this Ryan (2001, p.153) states:

“Australia did have a record of maintaining two armies in time of war, but that was a consequence of the disastrous political decision in both wars to raise a volunteer force overseas and maintain a separate part-time home-service force”

As a foundation policy, the Defence Act of 1903 provides both the enablers and constraints dealing with land defence issues across the spectrum of threat (see Figure 2) likely to be faced by the nation, in a time of antiquity, where the nature of armed conflict was quite different to the present day. Inevitably dividing the ARA and ARES, the Defence Act of 1903 not longer matched the environment of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

Figure 2: Spectrum of Conflict (adapted from Hillen 1998)

The mismatch between the Defence Act of 1903 did not go entirely unnoticed by successive governments, however amendment was difficult. The international situation, post World War II, had become one where the requirement for a larger standing regular army could no longer be ignored. What had changed “was the recognition by both military and political circles that the ad hoc mobilisations that had occurred in both World Wars were not appropriate for Australia’s changed strategic circumstances” (Ryan, A. 2001,
The subsequent amendments to the Defence Act of 1903 would see the establishment of a modest regular army that could now be readily deployed overseas. While the Citizen Military Forces remained, they were very much shore-bound, and still constrained by the Defence Act. Later deployments to theatres in Korea, Malaya, and Vietnam over the next twenty five years would see a regular army growing in combat experience, whilst the Citizen Military Forces began an inevitable decline and became caricatured as the “solicitor soldier on the social make” (Ryan, A. 2001, p.156).

The potential for the creation of heated competition through the prosecution of the intent by interest groups to capture resources and dominate their organisational landscape becomes apparent. At the time, according to Ryan, the “professionalisation of the Army led to the growth of bitter rivalry between the CMF establishment and many regular officers” (Ryan, A. 2001, p.156). Stanley (2001, p.53) reinforces this as he describes “the bitterness between the two groups long poisoned relations among the Army’s officers, negating the claims that they served one army.” As recently as the year 2000, the Inquiry into the Army by the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade reached the conclusion that “fundamental and sustainable reform to produce a useful reserve has not eventuated” (JSCFADT 2000, p.135). The Citizen Military Forces became “not the first but the second or even third (after National Servicemen) source of military strength” (Millar, T.B. 1974, p.13). Yet, Millar flagged as early as 1974 that “the Regular Army has to redefine its role, and clearly it must do this in conjunction with the Citizen Military Forces, which despite their many problems, have maintained a dedicated and significant contribution to the security of the country” (Millar, T.B. 1974, p.13). Millar summed the situation between the Australian Regular Army and the Reserve “element” as follows:

“As far as the structure of the Army is concerned, the emphasis has moved from a small regular cadre supporting a large citizen military force, to a regular component which exceeds the reserve element in size. We have seen a progressive deterioration in that reserve component to its present state, which, despite the best efforts of its members, must be regarded as unsatisfactory and in urgent need of reorganisation and rehabilitation” (Millar, T.B. 1974, p.43).

Some seventeen years later, Cheeseman would note the words of the Australian Defence Force’s Chief of the General Staff regarding the state of the Australian Regular Army as, “undermanned and
underequipped,...unable to meet its total training commitments, and its logistics and support elements have been paired almost to the limit” (1991, p.2). The government, at the time Cheeseman was writing, would announce a “Ready Reserve Scheme” that would see the creation of a number of “enhanced reserve personnel” who would be funded at 42% of the cost of their regular counterparts (Cheeseman, G. 1991, p.10). Yet within nine years of Cheeseman writing, Australia would be committing troops offshore to East-Timor, the Ready Reserve Scheme would be defunct, and the bulk of its members gone. Additionally, the residual elements of the Ready Reserve Scheme still participating in the Army Reserve could not be deployed to East-Timor, under the restrictions of the Defence Act of 1903. To reiterate Ryan’s words “the defence force had not run out of ‘high-tech’ capabilities; it had very nearly run out of people” (Ryan, A. 2001, p.151).

To conclude, the Defence Act of 1903 created a restrictive policy framework that was to last almost 100 years. In this paradigm the Australian taxpayer would be required to financially support a military ideology that grew from a militia with a small regular training component, to a standing army with little or no requirement for the formal existence of a militia. That the two organisations could not be united as a result of this deep legislative chasm was as Ryan in (Stanley, 2001) writes:

“a combination of mismanagement by successive governments, political game-playing by Reservist pressure groups and attempts by many members of the Regular officer corps to realise exclusive control over the profession of arms.” (Stanley, P. 2001, p150)

Ryan (2001), in his excellent article “Back to the Future: The One Army Concept in a Time of Change” also provides us with the words of Lt General Vernon Sturdee, Chief of the General Staff dated July 1948:

“There can be no question of unhealthy rivalry or jealousy between the Regular Army and the Citizen Forces. In Australia we have only one Army. The regular and non-regular elements are both essential parts of it, each is complimentary to the other.”

The irony here lies in striking contrast to the thrust of the 1974 Millar Report produced only twenty-seven years later. These words underline the level of atrophy experienced by the Citizen Military Forces as the Defence Act of 1903, internal organisational factors and external strategic factors conspired to make the organisation all but redundant in the latter half of the 20th Century.
STRUCTURATION THEORY

“...ideas and culture are best understood not as autonomous but as embedded in complex social systems shaped by the interaction of material circumstances, institutional arrangements, and strategic choices, as well as by ideas and culture”. Snyder (2001, p.7)

Snyder’s words describe the complex relationship between policy and culture where in the inevitable “chicken and egg” equation, policy plays a significant part in forming culture. Formed by the accepted norms, values, beliefs and practices of the organisation, culture inevitably shapes policy and in the nature of reciprocity, policy in turn affects culture, reinforcing its structures yet defining the attempts to change it over time. Scholars have recognised for some time that policy structures and implementation processes are inevitably affected by culture (Mintzberg, 1993). Giddens’ (1984) discussion of structure and structuration provides valuable insight into the complexity of this notion. According to Staber and Sydow (2002, p.412), Giddens argued that structure and process formed a recursive interplay that dealt “simultaneously with power, cognition and legitimacy as inter-related aspects of the processes through which structures are constituted”.

The Notion Of Discourse

Within the structuration approach posited by Giddens is the notion that human structures are formed through discourse and that these structures have, as part of their infrastructure, rules and resources. To explain this notion further, the rules that form the interplay of accepted social behaviours may be written, or unspoken, yet agreed patterns of behaviour. Taking Giddens’ (1984) view in the context of policy these rules, when seen as structures identifying the direction and process of the organisation, become its formal policy layers and the basis for the normative bounds within which people behave. In turn these frame the procedures of the organisation. They may also, when unwritten, provide the unspoken code to which all members must adhere in order to participate within the legitimised organisational structure.

Actors, Agents And Knowledge

According to Fuchs (2003), Giddens in his discussion of structuration, sees that knowledgeable actors, or agents, are those who have an understanding of the structures in which they act and prosecute their intent in an effort to establish control over resources and therefore their environment. Fuchs (2003, p.144)
describes the agent as a “human being…that can strive toward freedom and create its own history”. The agent’s desire to control organisational resources will inevitably manifest itself in actions carried out by an individual that enable the gathering of power over other individuals. Cassell (1990, p.22) frames the concept as “structures – of signification, domination and legitimation” wherein knowledgeable agents, those who understand the organisational system “may go on and thus alter the world”. Fuchs (2003, p.140) reiterates these elements as the “three structural dimensions of social systems in the theory of structuration” and those essentials with which agents will recursively interact or comply as discourse takes place with other agents forming and changing the systems that surround them.

Action then is inextricably entwined within the concept of agency where the actor as agent has the capacity to “change the world” (Cassell, 1990, p.15) and subsequently achieve signification, domination and legitimation within or across systems or organisations. Giddens’ original point is that actors are situated and positioned in space and time, and that their actions form their identities when routinised and legitimised through their acceptance or approval of the behaviours of other actors. Identities, positions in structures and substructures, and the organisations themselves then “stretch over long space-time distances” (1981, p.28). The potential here is for the creation of policies that reinforce action and subsequently endure. In a consideration of the duality of the historical relationship, and more recently the need for integration between the ARA and the ARES, it becomes increasingly important to consider both action and legitimation over time in order to develop an understanding of how these organisations have become so disparate and how action may be, or has been, taken in moving these structures toward integration.

For those who design policy and must then endeavour to see it implemented, the theory of structuration clarifies a complex problem. If structuration is to be accepted as an approach toward developing an instrument to guide an organisation and its members, and policy development is to take this theory into account, then the policy designer must accept that policies developed to guide an organisation are also the guides for discourse between actors. Additionally, the dialectic notion of discourse suggests that actors through this process may formally or informally change policy during its transmission and
implementation, potentially hijacking its original intent. Worse, actors seeking to prosecute their own ends may, through their ability to effectively articulate language, and the notions it comprises, revise the history of the organisation, or compromise the quality of information being fed back into the system. To place this in the context of the duality of the ARA and the ARES, Ryan’s (2001, p.156) “solicitor soldier on the social make” provides a rich example of the perceived leverage applied to the existing rules and resources of the organisation by agents pursuing an intent not necessarily congruent with the original policy or spirit of the organisation as defined under the Defence Act of 1903.

In turn, Giddens’ (1984) discussion of legitimacy includes an understanding that actors attempting to participate in human systems, or organisations, are constantly striving for acceptance by other actors within the organisational structure. The suggestion here is that behaviour is legitimised by the system, and through recursivity the behaviour expressed by individuals also legitimises the system. In this recursive relationship, the notion of culture as the “accepted material circumstances, institutional arrangements, and strategic choices” (Snyder, 2001, p.7) of knowledgeable actors, becomes an important definition, embedding the concepts of policy and culture within structuration theory.

**Structuration and Culture**

This last point argues for a conceptual discussion of what occurs when organisations with diverse cultures interact. Taking the example of the ARA and the ARES, it can be seen from a search of the literature pertaining to these organisations that their cultures have differed to the point of exclusivity. Cadre members from the Regular Army have always been present as actors within the Army Reserve, and Army Reservists have always been permitted to participate in the activities of the Regular Army as volunteers. Yet neither organisation, according to the literature, has been able to make a demonstrable positive impact upon the other. In fact there has been an increase in animosity between the two over nearly fifty years of interaction and this has been emphasised in the writings of Ryan (2001, p.156), “the growth of bitter rivalry”, and Stanley (2001, p.53) where he described “long poisoned relations among the Army’s officers, negating the claims that they served one army”. The application of structuration theory to this complex problem provides a range of possible exploratory avenues, and these are worthy of note.
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS
To examine the situation between the ARA and the ARES, and demonstrate the pluralist nature of the organisations, qualitative and quantitative research was undertaken. The qualitative research sought to examine significant government inquiries and reports focussing on both organisations, whilst the quantitative research sought to examine the exact number of army reservists participating in full-time service within the regular army, over the period of time in question. The research then sought to draw conclusions from what was stated in policy, against what was taking place in practice.

*Examining Qualitative Data Through Content Analysis: Inquiry Documents And Reports*

The inquiry documents selected for this research included the 1974 Millar Report on the *Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces*; the 1999 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) inquiry into *Suitability of the Australian Army for peacetime, peacekeeping and war*; and the subsequent year 2000 JSCFADT report *From Phantom to Force. Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army Completed Inquiry: The Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War*. These documents were selected because their positioning in time placed them around periods of intense or intensifying activity in Australia’s strategic environment, and they specifically refer to both the ARA and the ARES. As public documents, they lend themselves to examination through the method of content analysis favoured under Scott’s (1990) typology as Open/Published sources of primary evidence.

Of interest to the researchers, and central to this examination, were statements within the documents relating to organisational integration. In pursuing this examination, the word “integration” was positioned as central to the research, and synonyms for it were identified. This is illustrated in the Appendix (Table 2). The researchers sought to identify the extent to which the theme of integration was developed within each of the inquiry and report documents.

The documents were converted to text files, and using QSR’s N6 software, occurrences of the key words were identified. According to Muller (2000, p.49) “Words have no meaning unless they exist within context”. Therefore, occurrences of the key words were examined for meaning and relevance against the
concept of integration and the convergence of the ARA and the ARES into one army. Occurrences out of context were discarded.

Occurrences relevant to the theme of organisational integration were then measured against the total number of text units in the document in which they were found, and the documents compared against each other for relevance to the theme of integration. This is illustrated in the graph at Figure 3.

Figure 3: Context Analysis of Integration Reports

The occurrence of the key theme of integration may be seen as a proportion of the documents examined. As illustrated in Figure 3, the theme of integration, as represented by the word integration and its synonyms does not form a significant proportion of the documents. Comparative use of integration terminology in the documents is illustrated by the pie chart in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Comparative levels of Context in Integration Documents

Figure 4 demonstrates that the 1974 Millar Report had by far a higher proportion of the key words than the documents following it. Significant is the fact that the later documents, drawn from inquiries whose specific intent was to examine the issues of ARES integration with the ARA contained an extremely low incidence of this theme.

Examining Quantitative Data Through Frequency Distribution: ARMREC

ARMREC was, until 2001, the Australian Army’s primary database for tracking the movement of ARES soldiers undertaking full-time service within the ARA. The use of ARES soldiers within the ARA could be measured by examining the time spent in full time service (dwell time) by ARES soldiers within this organisation. This is illustrated in Figure 5.

Data was extracted from ARMREC and converted into ASCII text format. This data consisted of the full time service records for all reservists belonging to the General Reserve List, the Ready Reserve List and the Active Reserve List. Of these three lists, the most significant to the researchers was the General Reserve List, as this list comprised genuine citizen soldiers. The Ready Reserve List consisted of soldiers trained specifically within the ARA, and subsequently moving to part-time service after their initial
training period. The Active Reserve List consisted of ARA soldiers who had ceased to serve in a full-time capacity but had joined the ARES.

Figure 5 demonstrates the following:

1) From 1990 until 1993, a small number of Reservists increased their full time service significantly, on average by 1.5 years. Corresponding to this period of time was the economic recession of 1989 to 1993.

2) A small upward spike appears in the number of Reservists participating in full time service in 1995. This corresponds to the end of the Ready Reserve Scheme, where a large number of Regular soldiers, recruited into this scheme reached the end of their full-time service and transferred to the Reserve.

3) From 1999 to 2000, a significant increase in the number of reservists undertaking full time service is apparent and is seven times higher than any other time shown in the available data. This corresponds
with the increase of activity in Australia’s strategic environment, specifically the East-Timor intervention.

4) Also interesting is that this relatively large peak in the number of Reservists participating in full-time service takes place prior to the passing of the 2001 Enhancement of the Reserves and Modernisation Amendment to the Defence Act of 1903 (the Enhancement) and occurring around the time of the Timor intervention of 1999-2001. It should be remembered that the Enhancement allowed, for the first time in Australian history, the virtually unrestricted use of the Reserve.

5) It can be seen that reservist dwell time does not increase much beyond 200 days. Under the Defence Act, and prior to the Enhancement most reservists could only serve up to 180 days full-time, unless specific approval was given by their Formation Commander. A policy limitation was therefore in force on the maximum number of full-time service days a reservist could undertake.

A further representation of reservist participation in the ARA may be once again seen in Figure 6. In this graph there is a significant surge in the numbers of reservists participating in full time service. It should be noted that this does not mean that these individuals served overseas, but may have been used to backfill local positions left by ARA soldiers who participated in the Timor intervention of 1999-2001. It must be remembered that at this time the Defence Act of 1903 still forbade the use of Reservists for overseas active service.
To summarise, the proportion of the ARA consisting of serving reservists per year is shown in Table 1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Proportion of ARA being reservists by year

These proportions are not high, the ARMREC data shown in the table above does not demonstrate significant numbers of ARES personnel serving in the ARA over the period of time under examination, nor does it demonstrate reservists serving full-time to be a significant proportion of the ARA.
Triangulation of Results
The content analysis of major documents relevant to the theme of integration and the frequency distribution analysis of the ARMREC database indicate that significant integration has not been demonstrated through the participation of reservists on full-time service within the ARA. Further, since 1974 the iteration of the theme of integration has dropped, though the length and volume of inquiry documents directed at this issue has significantly increased. Finally, reservist participation within the Regular Army has suddenly marginally increased as a proportion of that organisation. The increase is significant in relation to previous participation rates, though when compared against inquiry and policy documentation, cannot be said to have occurred as a result of policy change, but does correlate with the change in Australia’s strategic circumstances, specifically the East-Timor intervention. Indications here are that policy requiring the integration of the ARES with the ARA, as directed by ministers and government, has not been carried out in practice.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY CHANGE
Not until the year 2001 was the Defence Act of 1903 altered under the Enhancement of the Reserves and Modernisation Amendment. This allowed the ARES to fulfil the same mandate as the ARA, particularly and most significantly in relation to overseas service. The ARA may now allocate ARES human assets against its own mission and objectives, as designated by the Australian Government. From this point, the practice of acquiring and utilising Army Reserve personnel is now possible and indicates a potential for greater convergence of the two organisations into one army since the World Wars of the last century. However, both the qualitative and quantitative research data examined demonstrates that in the period under investigation no significant integration has taken place. While there is no doubt that under the new legislation reservists can be used in any capacity, for which they are trained and qualified, within the Regular Army. When correlated with the ARMREC data it can be seen that the inquiries and reports focussing on the integration of the ARES with the ARA did not facilitate or enhance the integration of the two organisations. Significant to this research is the finding that the East-Timor crisis and Australia’s subsequent intervention correlates with an increase of participation by reservists within the ARA. The
suggestion here is that external circumstances and contingent demands emanating from Australia’s strategic environment have driven the increase in the participation rates of reservists within the ARA, not inquiry or amendments to policy.

Once again, structuration theory provides a premise for examining this situation. The changing circumstances in Australia’s strategic environment in the latter half of the 20th Century, and most recently the Timor crisis have laid the basis for effective discourse between the two organisations, specifically the contingent need to find and utilise any available personnel. These circumstances have also driven change in the formal policy governing both organisations.

Recommendations for Further Research
The acquisition of data from the Australian Army’s new personnel database, PMKeys, covering the years 2001 to present day, and a measurement of this against the current tempo and variety of activity in Australia’s strategic environment would provide useful data against which to measure this research. It would be useful to identify the extent to which reservists are moving in and out of full time service within the ARA, and in what capacities they are now being utilised. Surveys of ARA and ARES personnel and focus groups investigating the extent to which reservists are fulfilling this enhanced mission and mandate, as described under the amendment to the Defence Act of 1903, would provide triangulation against which such findings could be measured.
## Appendix

### Table 2: Content Analysis of Integration Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root</th>
<th>Derivatives</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Content Analysis Results (percent of document)</th>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Fuse/Fusing/Fusion</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Harmony/Harmonious/ Harmonise/Harmonised</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Incorporate/Incorporating/ Incorporated/Incorporation</td>
<td>Incorp</td>
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<td>Intermix/Intermixing/ Intermixed</td>
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</tr>
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Bibliography


