CHAPTER XIV

NUMBER


Counting.

NUMBER might appear to be one of the simplest natural categories, as simple as 'two and two are four.' Yet on closer inspection it presents a great many difficulties, both logical and linguistic.

From a logical point of view the obvious distinction is between one and more than one, the latter class being subdivided into 2, 3, 4, etc.; as a separate class may be recognized 'all'; while beyond all these there is a class of 'things' to which words like one, two are inapplicable; we may call them uncountables, though dictionaries do not recognize this use of the word uncountable, which is known to them only in the relative sense 'too numerous to be (easily) counted' (like innumerable, numberless, countless).

The corresponding syntactic distinctions are singular and plural, which are found in most languages, while some besides the ordinary plural have a dual, and very few a trial.

Thus we have the following two systems:

A. Countables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notional</th>
<th>Syntactic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>one</td>
<td>Singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>two</td>
<td>(Dual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three</td>
<td>(Trial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than one</td>
<td>Plural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Uncountables.

We can only speak of "more than one" in regard to things which without being identical belong to the same kind. Plurality thus presupposes difference, but on the other hand if the difference

---

1 The substance of this chapter was read as a paper before the Copenhagen Academy of Sciences on November 17, 1911, but never printed.
is too great, it is impossible to use words like two or three. A pear
and an apple are two fruits; a brick and a castle can barely be
called two things; a brick and a musical sound are not two, a
man and a truth and the taste of an apple do not make three, and
so on.

What objects can be counted together, generally depends on
the linguistic expression. In the majority of cases the classification
is so natural that it is practically identical in most languages; but
in some cases there are differences called forth by varieties of
linguistic structure. Thus in English there is no difficulty in
saying “Tom and Mary are cousins,” as cousin means both a male
and a female cousin; Danish (like German and other languages)
has different words, and therefore must say “T. og M. er fætter og
kusine,” and E. five cousins cannot be translated exactly into
Danish. On the other hand, English has no comprehensive term
for what the Germans call geschwister, Dan. søskende. Sometimes,
however, a numeral is placed before such a collocation as brothers
and sisters: “they have ten brothers and sisters,” which may be
= 2 brothers + 8 sisters or any other combinations; “we have
twenty cocks and hens” (= Dan. tyve høns). The natural need for a
linguistic term which will cover male and female beings of the
same kind has in some languages led to the syntactical rule that
the masculine plural serves for both sexes: Italian gli zii, Span.
los padres (see p. 233).

In some cases it is not possible to tell beforehand what to reckon
as one object: with regard to some composite things different lan-
guages have different points of view; compare un pantalon—a
pair of trousers, et par buxer, ein paar hosen; eine brille—a pair
of spectacles, une paire de lunettes, et par briller; en sax, eine
schere—a pair of scissors, une paire de ciseaux.

English sometimes tends to use the plural form in such cases
as a singular, thus a scissors, a tongs, a tweezers.

In modern Icelandic we have the curious plural of einn ‘one’
in einir sokkar ‘one pair of socks’ (to denote more than one pair
the ‘distributive’ numerals are used: tvennir vellingar ‘two pairs
of gloves’).

With parts of the body there can generally be no doubt what
to consider as one and what as two; yet in English there is (or
rather was) some vacillation with regard to moustache, which is
in the NED defined as (a) the hair on both sides of the upper lip,
(b) the hair covering either side of the upper lip, so that what to
one is a pair of moustaches, to another is a moustache: “he twirled
first one moustache and then the other.”

In Magyar it is a fixed rule that those parts of the body which
occur in pairs are looked upon as wholes; where the English
say "my eyes are weak" or "his hands tremble" the Hungarian will use the singular: a szemem (sg.) gyenge, reszket a keze (sg.). The natural consequence, which to us appears very unnatural, is that when one eye or hand or foot is spoken of, the word fél ‘half’ is used: fél szemmel ‘with one eye,’ literally ‘with half eye(s),’ fél lábára sánta ‘lame of one foot.’ This applies also to words for gloves, boots, etc.: keztyű (pair of) gloves, fél keztyű (a half . . . i.e.) one glove, csizma (sg.) ‘boots,’ fél csizma ‘a boot.’ The plural forms of such words (keztyűk, csizmák) are used to denote several pairs or different kinds of gloves, boots.

The Normal Plural.

The simplest and easiest use of the plural is that seen, e.g., in horses = (one) horse + (another) horse + (a third) horse. . . . (We might use the formula: Apl. = Aa + Ab + Ac . . . ) This may be called the normal plural and calls for very few remarks, as in most languages grammar and logic here agree in the vast majority of cases.

There are, however, instances in which different languages do not agree, chiefly on account of formal peculiarities. English and French have the plural of the substantive in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, les siècles dix-huitième et dix-neuvième, while German and Danish have the singular, the reason being not that the English and French are in themselves more logical than other nations, but a purely formal one: in French the article, which shows the number, is placed before the substantive and is not in immediate contact with the adjectives; in English the article is the same in both numbers, and can therefore be placed before the (singular) adjective as if it were in the singular itself without hindering the use of the natural plural in centuries. In German, on the other hand, you have to choose at once between the singular and the plural form of the article, but the latter form, die, would be felt as incongruous before the adjective achzehnte, which is in the neuter singular; if, on the other hand, you begin with the (singular) article das, it would be equally odd to end with the plural of the substantive (das 18te und 19te jahrhunderte), whence the grammatically consistent, if logically reprehensible use of the singular throughout. It is the same in Danish. In English, too, when the indefinite article is used, the singular is preferred for the same reason: an upper and a lower shelf. Sometimes the singular may be used to avoid misunderstandings, as when Thackeray writes "The elder and younger son of the house of Crawley were never at home together": the form sons might have implied the
existence of more than one son in each class. (See other special cases in MEG II, p. 73 ff.)

The English difference between the two synonymous expressions *more weeks than one* and *more than one week* shows clearly the psychological influence of proximity (attraction). The force of this is not equally strong in all languages: where Italian has the singular in *ventun anno* on account of *un*, English says *twenty-one years* exactly as it says *one and twenty years*; thus also a *thousand and one nights*. But German and Danish here show the influence of attraction with peculiar clearness because each language has the plural when the word for *‘one’* is removed from the substantive, and the singular when it immediately precedes it: *ein und zwanzig tage, tausend und eine nacht*; *een og tyve dage, tusend og een nat*.

With fractions there are some difficulties: should one and a half be connected with a substantive in the singular or in the plural? Of course one can get out of the difficulty by saying *one mile and a half*, but this will not do in languages which have an indivisible expression like G. *anderthalb*, Dan. *halvanden*; German seems to have the plural (*anderthalb ellen*), but Danish has the singular (*halvanden krone*) though with a curious tendency to put a preposed adjective in the plural though the substantive is in the singular: *med mine stakkels halvanden lunge* (Karl Larsen), *i disse halvandet år* (Pontoppidan). Where English has *two and a half hours* (pl.), Danish has attraction: *to og en halv time* (sg.).

Where each of several persons has only one thing, sometimes the singular, and sometimes the plural is preferred: Danish says *hjertet sad os i halsen* (sg.), while English has *our hearts leaped to our mouths*, though not always consistently (*three men came marching along, pipe in mouth and sword in hand*; see for details MEG II, p. 76 ff.). Wackernagel (VS 1. 92) gives an example from Euripides where the mother asks the children to give her the right hand: *dot’ ō tekna, det’ aspasasthai mētri dexian khera*.

Plural of Approximation.

I next come to speak of what I have termed the plural of approximation, where several objects or individuals are comprised in the

---

1 Besides connecting different things, the word *and* may be used to connect two qualities of the same thing or being, as in “my friend and protector, Dr. Jones.” This may lead to ambiguity. There is some doubt as to Shelley’s meaning in *Epipsychidion* 492, “Some wise and tender Ocean-King... Reared it... a pleasure house Made sacred to his sister and his spouse” (one or two persons?). Cf. the advertisement “Wanted a clerk and copyist” (one person), “a clerk and a copyist” (two). “A secret which she, and she alone, could know.” German often uses the combination *und zwar* to indicate that *und* is not additive in the usual sense: “Sie hat nur ein kind, und zwar einen sohn.”
same form though not belonging exactly to the same kind. *Sixties* (a man in the sixties; the sixties of the last century) means, not (one) sixty + (another) sixty ... but sixty + sixty-one + sixty-two and so forth till sixty-nine. The corresponding usage is found in Danish (treserne), but not, for instance, in French.

The most important instance of the plural of approximation is *we*, which means I + one or more not-I's. It follows from the definition of the first person that it is only thinkable in the singular, as it means the speaker in this particular instance. Even when a body of men, in response to "Who will join me?" answer "We all will," it means in the mouth of each speaker nothing but "I will and all the others will (I presume)."

The word *we* is essentially vague and gives no indication whom the speaker wants to include besides himself. It has often, therefore, to be supplemented by some addition: *we doctors, we gentlemen, we Yorkshiremen, we of this city*. Numerous languages, in Africa and elsewhere, have a distinction between an "exclusive" and an "inclusive" plural, as shown by the well-known anecdote of the missionary who told the negroes "We are all of us sinners, and we all need conversion," but unhappily used the form for "we" that meant "I and mine, to the exclusion of you whom I am addressing," instead of the inclusive plural (Friedrich Müller). In several languages it is possible after *we* to add the name of the person or persons who together with "I" make up the plural, either without any connective or with "and" or "with": OE. *wit Scilling I and Scilling, unc Adame ' for me and Adam,' ON. *vit Gunnarr ' I and Gunnarr ' (cf. *peir Sigurdr ' S. and his people,' *pau Hjalti ' H. and his wife'), Frisian *wat en Ellen ' we two, I and E,' G. pop. *vrir sind heute mit ihm spazieren gegangen, ' I and he ...,' Fr. pop. *nous chantions avec lui ' I and he sang,' Ital. *quando siamo giunti con mia cugina ' when my cousin and I arrived,' Russian *my s bratom pridem ' we with brother, i.e. I and my brother, will come,' etc.  

The plural of the second person may be, according to circumstances, the normal plural (ye = thou + a different thou + a third thou, etc.), or else a plural of approximation (ye = thou + one or more other people not addressed at the moment). Hence we find in some languages similar combinations to those mentioned above with *we*: OE. *git Iohannis ' ye two (thou and) John,' ON. *it Egill ' thou and E.,' Russ. *vy s sestroj ' ye, (thou) with thy sister."  

The idea that "we" and "ye" imply some other person(s) besides "I" and "thou" is at the root of the Fr. combination

---

1 See, besides the ordinary grammars, Grimm, Personenwechsel 19; Tobler, VB 3. 14; Ebeling, Archiv. f. neu. spr. 104. 129; Dania, 10. 47; H. Möller, Zeitschr. für deutsche Wortforsch 4. 103; Nyrop, Études ed gramm. française, 1920, p. 13.
nous (or vous) autres Français, i.e. 'I (or thou) and the other Frenchmen.' In Spanish nosotros, vosotros have been generalized and are used instead of nos, vos, when isolated or emphatic.

In most grammars the rule is given that if the words composing the subject are of different persons, then the plural verb is of the first person rather than the second or third, and of the second person rather than the third. It will be seen that this rule when given in a Latin grammar (with examples like "si tu et Tullia valetis, ego et Cicero valemus") is really superfluous, as the first person plural by definition is nothing else than the first person singular plus someone else, and the second person plural correspondingly. In an English grammar (with examples like "he and I are friends; you and they would agree on that point; he and his brother were to have come," Onions, AS 21) it is even more superfluous, as no English verb ever distinguishes persons in the plural.

A third instance of the plural of approximation is seen in the Vincent Crummleses, meaning Vincent Crummies and his family, Fr. les Paul = Paul et sa femme; "Et Mme de Rosen les signalait: Tiens . . . les un tel" (Daudet, L'Immortel 160).1

When a person speaks of himself as "we" instead of "I," it may in some cases be due to a modest reluctance to obtrude his own person on his hearers or readers; he hides his own opinion or action behind that of others. But the practice may even more frequently be due to a sense of superiority, as in the "plural of majesty." This was particularly influential in the case of the Roman emperors who spoke of themselves as nos2 and required to be addressed as vos. This in course of time led to the French way of addressing all superiors (and later through courtesy also equals, especially strangers) with the plural pronoun vous. In the Middle Ages this fashion spread to many countries; in English it eventually led to the old singular thou being practically superseded by you, which is now the sole pronoun of the second person and no longer a sign of deference or respect. You now is a common-number form, and the same is true to some extent of It. voi, Russian vy, etc. The use of the "plural of social inequality" entails several anomalies, as the German Sie (and in imitation of that, Dan. De) in speaking to one person, Russian oni, one ("they," m. and f.) in speaking of one person of superior standing; grammatical irregularities are seen, e.g., in the singular self in the royal oursfelf, Fr. vous-même, and in the singular of the predicative in Dan. De er så god, Russ. vy segodnja ne takaja kak včera (Pedersen RG 90) 'you are not the

1 On the German Rosners in the sense 'the Rosner family,' which is originally the genitive, but is often apprehended as a plural form, and on Dan. de gamle Suhrs, see MEG II, 4. 42; cf. Tiselius in Språk och stil 7. 126 ff.
2 On Greek "we" for "I" see Wackernagel, VS 98 ff.
same (sg. fem.) to-day as yesterday.' Mention should also be made of the use of the plural of deference in German verbs, when no pronoun is used: Was wünschen der herr general? 'What do you want, General?' Politeness and servility are not always free from a comic tinge.1

**Higher Units.**

It is very often necessary or at any rate convenient to have a linguistic expression in which several beings or things are comprehended into a unit of a higher order. We must here distinguish between various ways in which this fusion may be effected.

In the first place the plural form may be used in itself. English has a facility in this respect which appears to be unknown to the same extent in other languages; the indefinite article or another pronoun in the singular number may be simply put before a plural combination: that delightful three weeks | another five pounds | a second United States | every three days | a Zoological Gardens, etc. There can be no doubt that this is chiefly rendered possible by the fact that the preposed adjective does not show whether it is singular or plural, for a combination like *that delightful three weeks* would be felt as incongruous in a language in which *delightful* was either definitely singular or plural in form; but the English uninflected form can easily be connected both with the singular *that* and the plural *three weeks.*

A slightly different case is seen in a *sixpence* (*a threepence*), which has been made a new singular substantive with a new plural: *sixpences* (*threepences*). In the corresponding Danish name for the coin worth two kroner the analogy of the singular *en krone, en eenkrone* has prevailed and the form is *en tokrone, pl. mange tokroner.* This reminds one of the E. *a fortnight, a sennight* (fourteen nights, seven nights), in which, however, the latter element is the OE. plural *niht* (the ending *s* in *nights* is a later analogical formation); thus also *a twelvemonth* (OE. pl. *monap*).

In the second place the unification of a plural may be effected through the separate formation of a singular substantive. Thus in Greek we have from *deka* 'ten' the sb. *dekas, L. decas,* whence E. *decade;* in French we have the words in -aine: *une douzaine,* *vingtaine,* *trentaine,* etc., the first of which has passed into several other languages: *dozen, dutzend, dusin.* Corresponding to *dekas* the old Gothic languages had a substantive (Goth. *tigus,* which as is well known, enters into the compounds E. *twenty, thirty,* etc., G. *zwanzig, dreissig,* etc. These were therefore originally sub-

---

1 I forget where I have seen the remark that in Munda-Koh it is considered indecent to speak of a married woman except in the dual: she is, as it were, not to be imagined as being without her husband.
stantives, though now they have become adjectives. Lat. centum, mille, E. (Gothonic) hundred, thousand were also substantives of this kind, and reminiscences of this usage are still found, e.g. in Fr. deux cents and in the E. use of a, one: a hundred, one thousand; cf. also a million, a billion. A peculiar type of half-disguised compounds may be seen in Lat. biduum, triduum, biennium, triennium for periods of two or three days or years.

With these must be classed words like a pair (of gloves), a couple (of friends), and this leads up to words denoting an assemblage of things as a set (of tools, of volumes), a pack (of hounds, of cards), a bunch (of flowers, of keys), a herd (of oxen, of goats), a flock, a bevy, etc.

Such words are rightly termed collectives, and I think this term should not be used in the loose way often found in grammatical works, but only in the strict sense of words which denote a unit made up of several things or beings which may be counted separately; a collective, then, is logically from one point of view "one" and from another point of view "more than one," and this accounts for the linguistic properties of such words which take sometimes a singular and sometimes a plural construction. (On the difference between collectives and mass-words see below.)

Some collectives are derivatives from the words denoting the smaller units: brotherhood, from brother, ep. also nobility, peasantry, soldiery, mankind. There is an interesting class in Gothonic languages with the prefix ga-, ge- and the neuter suffix -ja; Gothic had gaskohi 'pair of shoes'; these formations became especially numerous in OHG, where we have, e.g., gidermi 'bowels,' giknhti 'body of servants,' gibirgi 'mountainous district,' gifildi 'fields, plain.' In modern G. we have gebirge, gepack, gewitter, ungeziefer, and others, partly with changed signification or construction. Geschwister at first meant 'sisters' ('zwei brüder und drei geschwister'), later it came to mean 'brothers and sisters' and even sometimes may be used in the singular of a single brother or sister, when it is desirable not to specify the sex. But in ordinary speech it is now no longer used as a collective, but as an ordinary plural.

Latin familia meant at first a collection of famuli, i.e. 'house-mates,' later 'servants'; when the word famulus went out of use, familia acquired its present European meaning, and as an unanalyzable collective must be classed with such words as crew, crowd, swarm, company, army, tribe, nation, mob.

Some words may develop a collective signification by metonymy, as when the parish is said for the inhabitants of the parish, all the world = 'all men,' the sex 'women,' the Church, the bench, society, etc.
The double-sidedness of collectives is shown grammatically; they are units, and as such can be used not only with a or one proposed, but also in the plural in the same way as other countables: two flocks, many nations, etc. On the other hand, they denote plurality, and therefore may take the verb and the predicative in the plural (my family are early risers; la plupart disent, thus in many other languages as well) and may be referred to by such a pronoun as they. It is, however, worthy of note that this plural construction is found with such collectives only as denote living beings, and never with others, like library or train, though they mean ‘collection of books, of railway-carriages.’ Sometimes a collective may show the two sides of its nature in the same sentence: this (sg.) family are (pl.) unanimous in condemning him. This should be thought neither illogical nor “antigrammatical” (as Sweet calls it, NEG § 116), but only a natural consequence of the twofold nature of such words.

In some instances languages go farther than this and admit combinations in which the same form which is really a singular is treated as if it were the plural of the word denoting the smaller unit: those people (= those men), many people (as distinct from many peoples = many nations), a few police, twenty clergy. In Danish we have this with folk (as in E. with the word spelt in the same way), which is a true collective in et folk (a nation, with the separate pl. mange folkeslag), but is now also treated as a plural: de folk, mange folk, though we cannot say tyve folk ‘twenty people’; there is a curious mixture in de godtfolk ‘those brave people,’ godt is sg. neuter. (Quotations for E. 80,000 cattle, six clergy, five hundred infantry, six hundred troops, etc., are found in MEG II, p. 100 ff.1)

The transition from a collective to a plural is also seen in the Aryan substantives in -a. Originally they were collectives in the feminine singular; we have seen an instance in Lat. familia. In many cases these collectives corresponded to neuters, as in opera, gen. operae ‘work’: opus ‘piece of work’; hence -a came finally to be used as the regular way of forming the plural of neuters, though a survival of the old value of the ending is found in the Greek rule that neuters in the plural take the verb in the singular (see the full and learned treatment in J. Schmidt, Die Pluralbildungen der indogerm. Neutra, 1889, a short summary in my book Language, p. 395). It is interesting to see the development in the Romanic languages, where the same ending still serves to form a plural in

---

1. Note also G. ein paar ‘a pair,’ which in the more indefinite signification ‘a couple’ (i.e. two or perhaps three or even a few more) is made into an uninflected adjunct (mit ein paar freunden, not einem paar) and may even take the plural article: die paar freunde. In Dan. also et par venner, de par venner.
many Italian words (frutta, uova, paja), but has generally again become a fem. sg., though not in a collective sense; cp. It. foglia, Fr. feuille from Lat. folia.

Wherever we have a plural of any of the words mentioned in this section, we may speak of a “plural raised to the second power,” e.g. decades, hundreds, two elevens (two teams of eleven each), sixpences, crowds, etc. But the same term, a plural raised to the second power, may be applied to other cases as well, e.g. E. children, where the plural ending -en is added to the original pl. childer, possibly at first with the idea that several sets (families) of children were meant, as in the Sc. dialectal shuins mentioned by Murray as meaning the shoes of several people, while shuin means one pair only (Dial. of the Southern Counties, 161; see also MEG II, 5. 793). This logical meaning of a double plural (a plural of a plural) cannot, however, be supposed to have been in all cases present to the minds of those who created double plurals: often they were probably from the very first simple redundancies, and at any rate they are now felt as simple plurals in such cases as children, kine, breeches, etc. Breton has plurals of plurals: bugel child, pl. bugale, but bugale-ou ‘plusieurs bandes d’enfants,’ loer ‘stocking,’ pl. lerou ‘pair of stockings,’ but lereier ‘several pairs of stockings,’ daou-lagad-ou, ‘eyes of several persons’ (H. Pedersen, GKS 2. 71). We have a double plural in form, but not in sense, in G. tränen, zähren ‘tears.’ Here the old plural form träne (trehene), zähre (zähere) has now become a singular.

In Latin the use of a separate set of numerals serves to indicate the plural of a plural. Litera is a letter (buchstabe), pl. literæ may stand for ‘letters (buchstaben)’ or for the composite unit ‘a letter (epistle)’ or the logical plural of this ‘letters (epistles)’; now quinque literæ means ‘fünf buchstaben,’ but quinæ literæ ‘fünf briefe.’ Castra ‘a camp’ is originally the pl. of castrum ‘a fort’; duo castra ‘two forts,’ bina castra ‘two camps.’ Similarly, in Russian the word for ‘a watch’ or ‘clock’ is časy, formally the pl. of čas ‘hour;’ two hours is dva časa, but ‘two watches’ is dvoe časov; with higher numerals štuk ‘pieces’ is inserted: dvadtsat’ pjad’ štuk časov, sto štuk časov ‘25, 100 watches or clocks.’

In this connexion we may also notice that when we say my spectacles, his trousers, her scissors, no one can tell whether one pair or more pairs are meant, thus whether the correct translation into other languages would be meine brille, son pantalon, ihre schere, or meine brillen, ses pantalons, ihre scheren. (But when we say “he deals in spectacles; the soldiers wore khaki trousers,” etc., the meaning is obviously plural.) The plural forms spectacles, trousers, scissors, in themselves thus from a notional point of view denote a ‘common number.’
Common Number.

The want of a common number form (i.e. a form that disregards the distinction between singular and plural) is sometimes felt, but usually the only way to satisfy it is through such clumsy devices as "a star or two," "one or more stars," "some word or words missing here," "the property was left to her child or children." In "Who came?" and "Who can tell?" we have the common number, but in "Who has come?" we are obliged to use a definite number-form in the verb even if the question is meant to be quite indefinite. Note also "Nobody prevents you, do they?" where the idea would have been expressed more clearly if it had been possible to avoid the singular in one, and the plural in the other sentence (cf. under Gender, p. 233).

Mass-Words.

In an ideal language constructed on purely logical principles a form which implied neither singular nor plural would be even more called for when we left the world of countables (such as houses, horses; days, miles; sounds, words, crimes, plans, mistakes, etc.) and got to the world of uncountables. There are a great many words which do not call up the idea of some definite thing with a certain shape or precise limits. I call these "mass-words"; they may be either material, in which case they denote some substance in itself independent of form, such as silver, quicksilver, water, butter, gas, air, etc., or else immaterial, such as leisure, music, traffic, success, tact, commonsense, and especially many "nexus-substantives" (see Ch. X) like satisfaction, admiration, refinement, from verbs, or like restlessness, justice, safety, constancy, from adjectives.

While countables are "quantified" by means of such words as one, two, many, few, mass-words are quantified by means of such words as much, little, less. If some and more may be applied to both classes, a translation into other languages shows that the idea is really different: some horse, some horses, more horses—some quicksilver, more quicksilver, more admiration: G. irgend ein pferd, einige pferde, mehr (mehrere) pferde (Dan. flere heste)—etwas quecksilber, mehr quecksilber, mehr bewunderung (Dan. mere beundring).

1 in French most substantives, as far as their sound is concerned, are really in the "common number," but adjuncts often have separate forms, hence such constructions as the following: il prendra son ou ses personnages à une certaine période de leur existence (Maupassant) | le ou les caractères fondamentaux (Bally) | le contraire du ou des mots choisis comme synonymes (ib.). Cf. from German: erst gegen ende des ganzen satzes kommen der oder die tonsprünge, die dem satze seinen ausdruck geben (LPh 241).
As there is no separate grammatical "common-number," languages must in the case of mass-words choose one of the two existing formal numbers; either the singular, as in the examples hitherto adduced, or the plural, e.g. victuals, dregs, lees—proceeds, belongings, sweepings—measles, rickets, throes and such colloquial names of unpleasant states of mind as the blues, creeps, sulks, etc. In many cases there is some vacillation between the two numbers (coal(s), brain(s), and others), and where one language has a singular, another may have a plural. It is curious that while Southern English and Standard Danish looks upon porridge and grød as singulars, the same words are in Scotland and Jutland treated as plurals. Corresponding to the E. plurals lees, dregs, German and other languages have singular mass-words: hefe. With immaterial mass-words it is the same: much knowledge must be rendered in German viele kenntnisse, in Danish mange kundskaber.

The delimitation of mass-words offers some difficult problems, because many words have several meanings. Some things adapt themselves naturally to different points of view, as seen, for instance, in fruit, hair (much fruit, many fruits: "shee hath more hair then wit, and more faults then haires," Shakespeare); cf. also a little more cake, a few more cakes. In a Latin edictum dry vegetables and meat are given as singulars, i.e. as mass-words, while fresh ones are given in the plural, because they are counted (Wackernagel, VS I. 88). Note also verse: "He writes both prose and verse."

"I like his verses to Lesbia."

Other examples, in which the same word has to do duty now as a mass-word and now as a thing-word, are seen in:

- a little more cheese  
  two big cheeses  
- it is hard as iron  
  a hot iron (flat-iron)  
- cork is lighter than water  
  I want three corks for these  
- some earth stuck to his shoes  
  the earth is round  
- a parcel in brown paper  
  state-papers  
- little talent  
  few talents  
- much experience  
  many experiences, etc.

Sometimes the original signification may belong to one, sometimes to the other of these two classes. Sometimes a word is differentiated, thus shade and shadow are derived from different case-forms of the same word (OE. sceadu, sceadowe). As a rule, shade is used as a mass-word, and shadow as a countable, but in some connexions shade is just as much a thing-word as shadow, e.g. when we speak of different shades (= nuances) of colour. Cloth in one sense is a mass-word as denoting one particular kind of material, but as denoting one particular thing (as a
table-cloth, or a covering for a horse) it is a thing-word and has developed the new plural cloths, while the old plural clothes is now separated from cloth and must be termed a distinct word: a mass-word with plural form.

A name of a tree, e.g. oak, may be made a mass-word, not only to denote the wood or timber obtained from the tree, but also to denote a mass of growing trees (cf. barley, wheat): “oak and beech began to take the place of willow and elm.” A corresponding usage is also found in other languages. A related case is seen in the use of fish, not only to denote the “flesh” of fish which we eat, but also the living animals as an object for fishing; this is found in other languages besides English, thus in Danish (fisk), Russian (ryba, Asboth, Gramm. 68), Magyar (Simonyi US. 259). In English and Danish this has been one of the causes that have led to the use of the unchanged plural as in many fish, mange fisk.

Mass-words are often made into names for countables, though languages differ considerably in this respect. Thus in E., but not in Danish, tin is used for a receptacle made of tin (for sardines, etc.). In English, bread is only a mass-word, but the corresponding word in many languages is used for what in E. is called a loaf: un peu de pain, un petit pain = a little bread, a small loaf.

Immaterial mass-words undergo a similar change of signification when they come to stand for a single act or instance of the quality, as when we talk of a stupidity = a stupid act, many follies or kind­nesses, etc. This usage, however, is not so universal in English as in many other languages, and the best rendering of eine unerhört­e unverschämtheit is a piece of monstrous impudence, cf. also an insufferable piece of injustice, another piece of scandal, an act of perfidy, etc. (examples MEG II, 5. 33 ff.). This construction is strictly analogous with a piece of wood, two lumps of sugar, etc.

In one more way mass-words may become thing-words, when a nexus-substantive like beauty comes to stand for a thing (or a person) possessing the quality indicated. And finally we must mention the use of a mass-word to denote one kind of the mass: this tea is better than the one we had last week; and then naturally in the plural: various sauces; the best Italian wines come from Tuscany.

Through the term “mass-word” and through the restriction of the term “collective” to a well-defined class of words, so that the two terms are consistently opposed to one another (the notion of number being logically inapplicable to mass-words, while it is doubly applicable to collectives) I hope to have contributed something towards clarifying a difficult subject. The necessity of a term like mass-word is seen in many places in dictionaries; in the NED, for example, we often read definitions like the following: “claptrap (1) with pl.: A trick ... (2) without a or pl.: Language designed to catch applause”—i.e. (1) as a thing-word, (2) as a mass-word. My own division seems preferable to the two best thought-out divisions I know, those of Sweet and Noreen.
According to Sweet (NEG, § 150 ff.) the chief division is into substance-nouns or concrete nouns and abstract nouns (that is, words like redness, stupidity, conversation). Concrete nouns are divided into

- common nouns
  - class nouns
  - individual (man)
  - collective (crowd)
- material nouns (iron)
- proper names (Plato).

Sweet does not see the essential similarity between his ‘material nouns’ and ‘abstract nouns’; nor is his name ‘material nouns’ a fortunate one, because many names of immaterial phenomena present the same characteristics as iron or glass. Neither can I see the value of the distinction he makes between singular class-nouns (like sun in popular as contrasted with scientific language) and plural nouns (like tree): both represent ‘countables,’ even if there is more occasion in one case than in the other to use the word in the plural.

Noreen’s division is very original (VS 5. 292 ff.), viz.—apart from “abstracts” (= words like beauty, wisdom, etc.)

I. Impartitiva, which denote objects that are not considered as capable of being divided into several homogeneous parts. Such are “individua” like I, Stockholm, the Trossachs, and “dividua” like parson, man, tree, trousers, measles. Even horses in the sentence “horses are quadrupeds” is an impartitive, because it means the indivisible genus horse (the sentence is synonymous with “a horse is a quadruped,” p. 300).

II. Partitiva. These fall into two classes:

A. Materialia or substance-names, as in “iron is expensive now,” “he eats fish,” “this is made of wood.”

B. Collectives. These are subdivided into:

1. Totality-collectives, such as brotherhood, nobility, army, and (2) Plurality-collectives; here such examples are given as many a parson, many parsons, every parson, further ordinary plurals like fires, wines, waves, cows, etc. Plurality-collectives are further subdivided into (a) homogeneous like horses, etc., and (b) heterogeneous like we, parents (the corresponding sg. is father or mother). This last group nearly, though not completely, corresponds to what I call the plural of approximation: it is accidental that Swedish has no singular corresponding to föräldrar ‘parents’ and that Noreen therefore gives father or mother as the singular: other languages have a singular a parent (thus also colloquial Danish en forælder), and the case is therefore not to be compared with We : I, the less so as there is a natural plural fathers, as in “the fathers of the boys were invited to the school,” while a normal plural of “I” is unthinkable. On the whole Noreen’s system seems to me highly artificial and of very little value to a linguist, because it divorces things which naturally belong together and creates such useless classes as that of the impartitives, besides giving too wide an application to the term “collective.” Our first question is surely what notions admit of having words like one and two applied to them, and not what notions or things admit of being divided into homogeneous parts; the whole notion of number, though so important in everyday life, in Noreen’s system is put away, as it were, in a corner of a lumber-room. Accordingly, on p. 298, he starts from the plural, and though he is, of course, right in his shrewd remark that the proper singular of we is one of us, he does not go on to say that in the same sense the proper sg. of the horses is not the horse, but one of the horses, and that the pl. of one of us (one of the horses) is not always we (the horses), but some of us (some of the horses).
CHAPTER XV

NUMBER—concluded


Various Anomalies.

In all languages there are words which serve the purpose of singling out the individual members of a plurality and thus in the form of a singular expressing what is common to all: every, each. There is only a shade of difference between "everybody was glad" and "all were glad" (cf. the neuter "everything" and all in "all is well that ends well" = all things). Note also Lat. uterque vir, utraque lingua, utrumque 'each (either) of the two men, both men, both languages, both things.' A closely related case is that seen in many a man, which individualizes, where many men generalizes; thus also in many other languages: manch ein mann, mangen en mand, mucha palabra loca (Hanssen, Sp. gr. § 56. 6), Fr. obsolete maint homme.

Here and there we find anomalies in the use of number-forms which are difficult to explain, but which at any rate show that people are not absolutely rational beings, thus in OE. the use of the singular with the tens, as in Beowulf 3042 se wæs fiftiges fotgemearces lang 'it was 50 feet long,' ib. 379 pritiges manna mægenecraft 'the strength of 30 men,' thus with some inconsistency, as fotgemearces is sg. and manna is pl.—In Middle English we find the singular a before a numeral, a forty men, meaning 'about forty,' thus very frequently in Dan. en tyve stykker 'about twenty (pieces),' and this may be compared with E. a few (in Jutland dialects æn lile fo); the sg. article here turns the plural words from a quasi-negative quantity (he has few friends) into a positive (he has a few friends). But a few may have been induced by a many, where many may be the collective substantive and not the adjective—the forms of these, which were at first separated, have been confounded together. Fr. vers les une heures (as well as vers les midi) with its numerical incongruity is evidently due to the analogy of other indications of time such as vers les deux heures; it is as if vers-les had become one amalgamated preposition with denominations of the hour. The G. interrogative pronoun wer, like E. who, above 198, is independent of number,
but when one wants expressly to indicate that the question refers to more than one person this may be achieved through the addition of *alles*, in the singular neuter! ‘Wer kommt denn alles?’ (‘Who are coming?’—‘Wer kommt?’ ‘Who is coming?’) ‘Wen hast du alles gesehen?’—implying that he has seen several people. Cf. what is said below under Sex on *beides* and *mehrere* as neuters to the personal *beide*, *mehrere* (p. 237).

The Generic Singular and Plural.

We shall here deal with the linguistic expressions for a whole species, in cases in which words like *all* (all cats),1 *every* (every cat) or *any* (any cat) are not used. For this notion Bréal (M 394) coins the word “omnial” parallel to “dual, plural,” and this would be a legitimate grammatical term in a language that possessed a separate form for that ‘number.’ But I do not know of any language that has such a form; as a matter of fact, in order to express this notion of a whole class or species, languages sometimes use the singular and sometimes the plural; sometimes they have no article, sometimes the definite article, and sometimes the indefinite article. As there is in English no indefinite article in the plural, this gives five combinations, which are all of them represented, as seen in the following examples:

(1) The singular without any article. In English this is found only with *man* and *woman* (man is mortal | woman is best when she is at rest)—and with mass-words,2 whether material or immaterial (blood is thicker than water | history is often stranger than fiction). In G. and Dan. it is used only with material mass-words, in Fr. not even with these.3

(2) The singular with the indefinite article: *a cat* is not as vigilant as *a dog*; the article may be considered as a weaker *any*, or rather, one (“a”) dog is taken as representative of the whole class.

1 "All cats have four feet" = "any cat has four feet"—but this ‘generic’ use of *all* should be kept distinct from the ‘distributive’ *all*: “all his brothers are millionaires” is different from “all his brothers together possess a million.” In the distributive sense ‘all cats’ have (together) an enormous number of feet. Logicians give as example of the difference: “All the angles of a triangle are less than two right angles,” “All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles”; see also MEG II, 5. 4.

2 With mass-words the ‘generic’ idea refers to quantity, not to number proper: “lead is heavy,” i.e. ‘all lead,’ ‘lead, wherever found.’

3 Sweet (NEG § 1) writes: “From the theoretical point of view grammar is the science of language. By ‘language’ we understand languages in general, as opposed to one or more special languages.” It is interesting to contrast this with the way in which a Frenchman expresses the same two notions, using not only two numbers, but two words: “*Le langage et les langues*” (e.g. Vendryes L 273).
(3) The singular with the definite article: the dog is vigilant. Thus also with a (neuter) adjective in philosophic parlance: the beautiful = ‘everything that is beautiful.’ Chaucer said “The lyf so short, the craft so long to lerne,” where modern English has no article (Longfellow: Art is long, but life is fleeting); Chaucer here agrees with Greek (Hippokrates “Ho bios brakhus, hē de tekhnē makrē”), French, Danish and German usage (Wagner in Goethe’s Faust says: “Ach gott! die kunst ist lang; Und kurz ist unser leben”).

(4) The plural without any article: dogs are vigilant | old people are apt to catch cold | I like oysters.

(5) The plural with the definite article: Blessed are the poor in spirit. This usage, which in English is found with adjectives only (the old are apt to catch cold = old people, above nr. 4, the English = the whole English nation), is the regular expression in some languages, e.g. Fr. les vieillards sont bavards | j’aime les huîtres.

One and the same generic truth is differently expressed in the G. proverb “Ein unglück kommt nie allein” and E. “Misfortunes never come singly” (cf. Shakespeare: “When sorrows come, they come not single spies, But in battalions”).—Compare also twice a week with deux fois la semaine.

With these “generic” expressions we may class the expressions for the “indefinite” or better the “generic person”:

(1) The singular without any article. Thus in G. and Dan. man, differentiated from the sb. mann, mand, in G. through loss of stress only, in Dan. also through want of “stød” (glottal stop); in ME we have not only man, but also men (me), which is often used with the verb in the singular and thus may be a phonetically weakened form of man. Further we have Fr. on, a regular development of the Lat. nominative homo.

(2) The singular with the indefinite article. This is frequent in colloquial English with various substantives: “What is a man (a fellow, a person, an individual, a girl, Sc. a body) to do in such a situation?” It is really the same idea that lies behind the frequent use in many languages of the word one, as in English, G. ein (especially in the oblique cases), Dan. en (in standard language chiefly when it is not the subject, but in dialects also as the subject), It. sometimes uno (Serao, Cap. Sansone 135 uno si commuove quando si toccano certe tasti; ib. 136).

(3) The singular with the definite article. French l’on, which is now apprehended as a phonetic variant of the simple on.

(4) The plural without any article. Fellows and people are often used in such a way that they may be rendered by Fr. on (fellows say, people say = on dit), cf. also the ME. men when followed
by a plural verb. When *they* (Dan. *de*) is used in the same sense, it may be compared with the generic usage mentioned above of the plural of a substantive with the definite article.—On the use of *you* and *we* for the generic person see Ch. XVI.

The difference between this "indefinite person" and the generic use of *man* (in "man is mortal") is not easy to define, and seems often to be emotional rather than intellectual. Hence also the frequent use of *man, one, si* as a disguised "I" when one wishes to avoid mentioning oneself, and therefore generalizes what one wants to say: a similar motive leads to the use of *you* in the same sense. But it is worth mentioning as something connected with the "generic" character of the "indefinite person" that *man or on* is not unfrequently followed by a plural word. Dan. "man blev *enige*" | Fr. "la femme qui vient de vous jouer un mauvais tour mais voudrait qu'on reste *amis quand même*" (Daudet, L'Immortel 151). Thus also in It. with *si*: Serao, 1.c. 223 *si resta liber per tre mesi | Rovetta, Moglie S. Ecc. 49 *Si diventa ministri, ma si nasce poeti, pittori*!

**Dual.**

In languages possessing a dual, two different conceptions are found. One is represented in Greenlandic, where *nuna* 'land' forms its dual *nunak* and its plural *nunat*; here "the dual is chiefly used when the speaker wants expressly to point out that the question is about a duality; if, on the other hand, the duality is obvious as a matter of course, as in the case of those parts of the body which are found in pairs, the plural form is nearly always employed. Thus it is customary to say *issai*, his eyes, *siutai* his ears, *talâ* his arms, etc., not *issik, siitik, tatâlik*, his two eyes, etc. Even with the numeral *mardlik* (two), which is in itself a dual, the plural is often used, e.g. *inuit mardlik* two men " (Kleinschmidt, Gramm. d. grønländ. spr. 13).

The other conception, according to which the dual is preferably used in names of objects naturally found in pairs, as in Gr. *osse* 'the eyes,' is represented in Aryan. In many of the older languages of this family duals were found; they tended to disappear as time went on, and now survive only in a few isolated dialects (Lithuanian, Sorb, Slovene; a few Bavarian dialects in the personal pronouns). The gradual disappearance of dual forms in the Aryan languages presents many interesting features which cannot be here detailed.

---

1 Norwegian, quoted Western R 451: En blir lei *hverandre*, naar en gaar *to mennesker* og ser ikke andre dag ut og dag ind.

The existence of a dual is generally (Lévy-Bruhl, Meillet) looked upon as a mark of primitive mentality; its disappearance is therefore considered as a consequence or accompaniment of progress in civilization. (In my own view of linguistic development any simplification, any discarding of old superfluous distinctions is progressive, though a causal nexus between civilization in general and particular grammatical phenomena cannot be demonstrated in detail.)

The Greek dual was lost at an early period in the colonies, where the civilization was relatively advanced, while it was kept more tenaciously in continental Greece, e.g. in Lacedæmon, Bœotia, and Attica. In Homer duals are frequent, but they appear to be an artificial archaism used for poetical purposes, especially for the sake of the metre, while the plural is often used in speaking of two even in the same breath as the dual (cp. collocations like *amphókheiras*, Od. 8. 135). In Gothic dual forms are found only in the pronouns of the first and second persons and in the corresponding forms of verbs, but these latter are few in number; and in the other old Gothonic languages only the pronouns 'we' and 'ye' keep the old distinction, which was later generally given up. (Inversely the duals *við*, *pið* have ousted the old plurals *véir*, *pér*, in modern Icelandic, and possibly also in Dan. *vi*, I.) Isolated traces of the old dual have been found in the forms of a few substantives, such as *door* (originally the two leaves) and *breast*, but even in these cases from the oldest times the forms were understood not as duals, but as singulars. The only words which may now be said to be in the dual are *two* and *both*, but it should be noted that the latter when used as a "conjunction" is often applied to more than two, as in "both London, Paris, and Amsterdam"; though this is found in many good writers, some grammarians object to it.¹

According to Gauthiot, the dual forms Sanskrit *aksi*, Gr. *osse*, Lithuanian *aki* do not properly mean 'the two eyes,' not even 'the eye and the other eye,' but 'the eye in so far as it is double,' thus *mitrā* is 'Mitra, in so far as he is double,' i.e. Mitra and Varuna, for Varuna is the double of Mitra. Similarly we have Sanskr. *áhanā* 'the day and (the night),' *pitárāu* 'the father and (the mother),' *mālārāu* 'the mother and (the father),' and then also *pilárāu mālárāu* 'father and mother' (both in the dual), and, somewhat differently, Gr. *Aiante Teukron te* 'Aias (dual) and Teukros.' Ugro-Finnic has parallels to most of these constructions, thus both words are put in the plural in combinations like

¹ Another extension of the dual is seen when the substantive is put in the dual with a number like 52, as in Odyssey 8. 35 *kouró de dúó kai pentékonta* (also ib. 48, attraction).
“Igen igejen ‘the old man and the old woman,’ tetegen tungen ‘winter and summer.’

In some cases the lost dual left some traces behind it, the true character of which has been forgotten. Thus in Old Norse, the pronoun þau ‘they two’ is an old dual form, but as it happens to be also the neuter plural, it leads to the syntactic rule that the neuter plural is used when persons of the two sexes are spoken of together.

In Russian the old dual in some words happened to have the same form as the genitive singular; cases like dva mužika ‘two peasants’ then led to the use of the gen. sg. in other words, and, curiously enough, after the notion of a dual had been entirely forgotten, even after the words for 3 and 4, tri, četyre: četyre goda ‘four years,’ etc.

Number in Secondary Words.

When Sweet (NEG, § 269) says that the only grammatical category that verbs have in common with nouns is that of number, he is right so far as actual (English) grammar is concerned; but it should be remembered that the plural does not mean the same thing in verbs as in substantives. In the latter it means plurality of that which is denoted by the word itself, while in the verb the number refers not to the action or state denoted by the verb, but to the subject: compare (two) sticks or (two) walks with (they) walk, which is in the plural, but implies not more walks than one, but more walkers than one. In the same way, when in Latin and other languages adjunct adjectives are put in the plural, as in urbes magna, G. grosse städte, this does not indicate any plurality of the adjectival idea, the plurality referring to ‘towns’ and to nothing else. In both cases we have the purely grammatical phenomenon termed ‘concord’ which has nothing to do with logic, but pervaded all the older stages of languages of the Aryan family; it affected not only the number forms, but also the case forms of adjectival words, which were “made to agree” with the primaries they belonged to. But this rule of concord is really superfluous (cf. Language, 335 ff.), and as the notion of plurality belongs logically to the primary word alone, it is no wonder that many languages more or less consistently have given up the indication of number in secondary words.

In the adjectives, Danish, like German, still keeps up the distinction between en stor mand (ein grosser mann) and store mænd (grosse männer), while English is here more progressive and makes no distinction between the singular and the plural in adjectives (a great man, great men), the only survivals of the old rule of concord being that man, those men, this man, these men.—In an ideal language
neither adjuncts nor verbs would have any separate plural forms.\(^1\)

In Magyar there is the inverse rule that number is indicated in a secondary and not in a primary word, but only when a substantive is accompanied by a numeral. It is, then, put in the singular, as if we were to say “three house.” This is termed “illogical” by the eminent native linguist Simonyi: I should rather call it an instance of wise economy, as in this case any express indication of the plurality of the substantive would be superfluous. The same rule is found in other languages; in Finnic with the curious addition that in the subject not the nominative singular, but the partitive singular is used; in the other cases there is agreement between the numeral and the substantive. There is some approximation to the same rule in Danish (\textit{tyve mand stærk}, \textit{fem daler} ‘five dollars,’ the value, different from \textit{fem dalere} ‘five dollar pieces,’ \textit{to fod}), in German (\textit{zwei fuss}, \textit{drei mark}, \textit{400 mann}), and even in English (\textit{five dozen}, \textit{three score}, \textit{five foot nine}, \textit{five stone}; details in MEG II, 57 ff.).

The first part of a compound substantive is in many respects like an adjunct of the second. It is well known that in the ancient type of Aryan compounds the stem itself is used, thus number is not shown: Gr. \textit{hippo-damos} may be one who curbs one horse, or several horses. In E. the singular form is usually employed, even when the idea is manifestly plural; as in \textit{the printed book section | a three-volume novel}. But in many, chiefly recent, formations the plural is found in the first part: \textit{a savings-bank | the Contagious Diseases Act}. In Danish there is a curious instance of both parts being inflected: \textit{bondegård}, pl. \textit{bøndergårde} ‘peasants’ farms’; generally the singular form of the first part is kept in the plural: \textit{tandlæger}, etc.

In verbs, English has discarded the distinction between singular and plural in all preterits (\textit{gave, ended, drank}, etc., with the sole exception of \textit{was, were}) and in some present tenses as well (\textit{can, shall, must} and others, which were originally preterits); where it has been preserved, it is only in the third person (\textit{he comes, they come}), while in the first and second persons no difference is now made (\textit{I come, we come, you come}). In Danish the numerical distinction has been totally given up in verbs, where the old singular form has become a “common number”; it is always so in spoken Danish, and now nearly always so in the literary language.

There seems to be a strong tendency everywhere to use the singular form of the verb instead of the plural (rather than inversely)

\(^1\) Esperanto has the same form in verbs irrespective of the number of the subject (\textit{mi amas, ni amas}), but in adjectives separate forms (\textit{la bona amiko, la bonai amikoj}, while inconsistently the article is invariable). Ido, on the contrary, is strictly logical (\textit{la bona amihi}).
when the verb precedes the subject; the reason may often be that at the moment of his uttering the verb the speaker has not made up his mind what words are to follow. From OE I may quote “Eac wæs gesewen on þæm wage atifred ealle da heargas,” from Shakespeare “that spirit upon whose weal depends and rests The lives of many.” This is particularly frequent with there is (Thackeray: there’s some things I can’t resist). It is the same in other languages. In literary Danish it was the rule to have der er with a plural subject at the time when ere was the form otherwise always required when the subject was in the plural. Similarly very often in Italian (“in teatro c’era quattro o sei persone”). The same tendency to use the singular when the verb precedes is seen in the same language when Evviva is used with a plural subject (Rovetta: Evviva le bionde al potere!)

Those languages which have kept the old rule of concord in secondary words are very often thereby involved in difficulties, and grammars have to give more or less intricate rules which are not always observed in ordinary life—even by the “best writers.” A few English quotations (taken from MEG II, Ch. VI) will show the nature of such difficulties with verbs: not one in ten of them write it so badly | ten is one and nine | none are wretched but by their own fault | none has more keenly felt them | neither of your heads are safe | much care and patience were needed | if the death of neither man nor gnat are designed | father and mother is man and wife; man and wife is one flesh | his hair as well as his eyebrows was now white | the fine lady, or fine gentleman, who show me their teeth | one or two of his things are still worth your reading | his meat was locusts and wild honey | fools are my theme | both death and I am found eternal. All these sentences are taken from well-known writers, the last, for instance, from Milton. Corresponding difficulties are experienced in adjectival forms in those languages which make their adjuncts agree in number (gender and case) with primary words, and a simple comparison of Fr. ma femme et mes enfants or la presse locale et les comités locaux with E. my wife and children, the local press and committees shows the advantage to a language of throwing overboard such superfluous distinctions in secondary words.1

1 Where the subject idea, as is often the case in Aryan languages, is not expressed except in the form of the verb, the indication in the latter of the plural is, of course, not so superfluous as it is where subject and verb are kept apart, thus in Lat. amamus Lætiam, amant Lætiam ‘we (they) love L.’ A special case is seen in It. furono soli con la ragazza ‘he was alone with the girl’ (=egli e la ragazza furono soli, egli fu solo con la ragazza); examples from Fr., G., Slav, Albanian, etc., see Meyer-Lübke, Einführ. 88, Delbrück, Synt. 3. 255. We have a corresponding use of the plural in the predicative in “Come, Joseph, be friends with Miss Sharp,” Dan. “ham er jeg gode venner med.”
Plural of the Verbal Idea.

The idea of "one or more than one" is not incompatible with the idea expressed by the verb itself. I am not thinking here of what R. M. Meyer (IF 24. 279 ff.) terms "verba pluralia tantum," for he speaks of such verbs as G. wimmeln, sich anhäufen, sich zusammenrotten, umzingeln (English examples would be swarm, teem, crowd, assemble, conspire), where the necessary plural idea is not in the verb as such, but in the subject, but I am thinking of those cases in which it is really the verbal idea itself that is made plural. What that means is easily seen if we look first at the corresponding verbal substantives nexus-substantives (see Ch. X).

If the plural of one walk or one action is (several) walks, actions, the plural idea of the verb must be 'to undertake several walks, to perform more than one action.' But in English and in most languages there is no separate form of the verb to indicate this; when I say he walks (shoots), they walk (shoot), it is impossible to tell whether one or more than one walk (shot) is meant. If we say "they often kissed" we see that the adverb expresses exactly the same plural idea as the plural form (and the adjective) in (many) kisses. In other words, the real plural of the verb is what in some languages is expressed by the so-called frequentative or iterative—sometimes a separate "form" of the verb which is often classed with the tense or aspect system of the language in question, as when repetition (as well as duration, etc.) is in Semitic languages expressed by a strengthening (doubling, lengthening) of the middle consonant, or in Chamorro by a reduplication of the stressed syllable of the verbal root (K. Wulff, Festschrift Vilh. Thomsen 49). Sometimes a separate verb is formed to express repeated or habitual action, thus in some cases in Latin by means of the ending -ito: cantito, ventito 'sing frequently, come often'; visito is from a formal point of view a double frequentative, as it is formed from viso, which is in itself a frequentative of video, but the plural idea tends to disappear, and Fr. visiter, E. visit may be used of a single coming. In Slav this category of plural or frequentative verbs is well developed, e.g. Russ. strēlivat' 'to fire several shots,' from strēljat' 'to fire one shot.' In English several verbs in -er, -le imply repeated or habitual action: stutter, patter, chatter, cackle, babble. Otherwise repeated action must be rendered in various other ways: he talked and talked | he used to talk of his mother | he was in the habit of talking | he would talk of

1 Quarrel is another case in point, for it takes at least two to make a quarrel, and if we find in the singular, e.g. "I quarrel with him," this is to be classed with the instances mentioned, pp. 90, 192, 209 n.

2 See on the imperfect, p. 277.
his mother for hours; he talked of his mother over and over again, etc.

Having mentioned the plural of such verbal substantives as walk, shot, kiss, we may remind the reader of the other kind of "nexus substantives," those containing a predicative, such as stupidity, kindness, folly. These also may be put in the plural, though, as remarked above, they are then changed from mass-words into countables (as they are indeed when the singular is used with the indefinite article: a stupidity = 'a stupid act, an instance of being stupid').

Adverbs, of course, have no distinct number, the only exceptions being such adverbs as twice, thrice, often, which may be said to be plurals of once because logically these adverbs are equivalent to 'two times, three times, many times'; the plural idea thus refers to the substantival idea contained in the subjunct, just as in group subjuncts like "at two (three, many) places." Similarly the groups now and then, here and there may be said to contain a plural idea, as they signify the same thing as 'at various times, at various places,' but this, of course, does not affect the truth of the general assertion that the notion of number is inapplicable to adverbs.

APPENDIX TO THE CHAPTERS ON NUMBER.

To indicate place in a series most (all?) languages have words derived from (cardinal) numerals; these are called ordinals. Very often the first ordinals are not formed from the corresponding cardinals in the usual way: primus, first, erst bear no relation to unus, one, ein, but from the beginning denote foremost in point of place or time. Lat. secundus originally means 'following' and leaves it to the imagination to infer how many precede; frequently we have a word for 2nd which at the same time has the vague meaning 'different,' thus OE other (preserved in the indefinite sense in MnE other, while the cardinal has been taken from French), G. ander, Dan. anden. In French there is a new regular formation from deux: deuxième (at first probably used in combinations like vingt-deuxième, cf. vingt-et-unième).

In many cases cardinals are used where a stricter logic would require ordinals; this is due to considerations of convenience, especially where high numbers are concerned, thus in 1922 = the 1922nd year after Christ's birth (Russian here uses the ordinal); further in reading such indications as "line 725," "page 32," "Chapter XVIII," etc., in French also in "Louis XIV," "le 14 septembre," etc.

After the word for "number" (numero, etc.) this use of the cardinal instead of the ordinal is universal: "number seven" means the seventh of a series. Cf. also the indication of the "hour": at two o'clock, at three-fifty.

Note the use of the ordinal in G. drittehalb, Dan. halvtoedie 'two and a half' (the third is only half), and the somewhat different usage in Scotch at half three, Dan. klokken halv tre, G. um halb drei 'at half-past two.'

In many languages ordinals (with or without the word for 'part' added) have to do duty to express fractions: five-sevenths, cing septièmes, fünf siebentel, fem syvendedel, etc. For 1/2, however, there is a separate word half, demi, etc.
CHAPTER XVI

PERSON


Definitions.

In the NED "person" as used in grammar is defined as follows: "Each of the three classes of personal pronouns, and corresponding distinctions in verbs, denoting or indicating respectively the person speaking (first person), the person spoken to (second person), and the person or thing spoken of (third person)." But though the same definition is found in other good dictionaries and in most grammars, it is evidently wrong, for when I say "I am ill" or "you must go" it is undoubtedly "I" and "you" that are spoken of; the real contrast thus is between (1) the speaker, (2) spoken to, and (3) neither speaker nor spoken to. In the first person one speaks of oneself, in the second of the person to whom the speech is addressed, and in the third of neither.

Further, it is important to remember that in this use the word "person" qualified with one of the first three ordinals means something quite different from the ordinary signification of "person" and does not imply "personality" as a human or rational being; "the horse runs" and "the sun shines" are in the third person; and if in a fable we make the horse say "I run" or the sun say "I shine," both sentences are in the first person. This use of the word "person," which goes back to Latin grammarians and through them to Greek (prosōpon) is one of the many inconveniences of traditional grammatical terminology which are too firmly rooted to be now abolished, however strange it may be to an unsophisticated mind to be taught that "impersonal verbs" are always put in the "third person": pluit, it rains. Some people have objected to the inclusion of a pronoun like it among "personal pronouns," but the inclusion is justified if we take the expression "personal pronoun" to mean pronoun indicating person in the sense here mentioned. But when we come to speak of the distinction between the two interrogative pronouns who and what, and find that the former refers to persons and the latter to anything
that is not a person, we might feel inclined to call *who* a personal pronoun,—which would be decidedly awkward.

It is a simple consequence of the definition that the first person, strictly speaking, is found in the singular only; in a preceding chapter (p. 192) mention has already been made of the fact that the so-called first person plural “we” is really “I + someone else or some others,” and in some works dealing with Amerindian languages the figures $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{3}{4}$ are conveniently used to designate “we” according as the others that are added to “I” are of the second or third persons respectively.

For the curiosity of the matter I may quote here a sentence to illustrate the emotional value of the three persons. “With Ruskin the people are always ‘You’; with Carlyle they are even farther away, they are ‘they’; but with Morris the people are always ‘We’” (William Morris, by Bruce Glacier).

In many languages the distinction between the three persons is found not only in pronouns, but in verbs as well, thus in Latin (amo, amas, amat), Italian, Hebrew, Finnish, etc. In such languages many sentences have no explicit indication of the subject, and *ego amo, tu amas* is at first said only when it is necessary or desirable to lay special stress on the idea “I, thou.” In course of time, however, it became more and more usual to add the pronoun even when no special emphasis was intended, and this paved the way for the gradual obscuration of the sound of the personal endings in the verbs, as these became more and more superfluous for the right understanding of the sentences. Thus in Fr. *j’aime*, *tu aimes, il aime, je veux, tu veux, il veut, je vis, tu vis, il vit* are identical in sound. In English we have the same form in *I can, you can, he can, I saw, you saw, he saw*, and even in the plural *we can, you can, they can, we saw, you saw, they saw*—phonetic and analogical levellings have gone hand in hand to wipe out old personal distinctions. These, however, have not disappeared entirely, survivals being found in Fr. *j’ai, tu as, il a, nous avons, vous avez, ils ont*, and in E. *I go, he goes*, and generally in the third person singular of the present tense. In modern Danish all these distinctions have disappeared: *jeg ser, du ser, han ser, vi ser, I ser, de ser*, and so in all verbs and all tenses, exactly as in Chinese and some other languages. This must be considered the ideal or logical state of language, as the distinction rightly belongs to the primary idea only and need not be repeated in secondary words.

1 When “I” (or “Me” or “ego”) is made into a substantive (chiefly in philosophic parlance), it is necessarily of the third person, hence is capable of being used in the plural: “several I’s” or “Me’s,” “Egos.” There is, accordingly, something incongruous in the use of the verbal forms in the following sentence: “The I who see am as manifold as what I see” (J. L. Lowes, *Convention and Revolt in Poetry*, 6).
In English a distinction has developed in the auxiliary verbs used to express futurity: *I shall go, you will go, he will go,* and correspondingly to express conditional unreality: *I should go, you would go, he would go.*

Any imperative (and we might add, any vocative) is virtually in the second person, even in such cases as "Oh, please, someone go in and tell her" or "Go one and cal the Jew into the court" (Sh.), as seen clearly, for instance, by the addition in "And bring out my hat, somebody, will you" (Dickens). In English the form of the verb does not show which person is used, but other languages have a third person of the imperative, in which case we must say that there is a conflict between the grammatical third person and the notional second person. Sometimes, however, the latter prevails, even in form, as when in Greek we find "sigan nun hapas ekhe sigan" where ekhe (2nd p.) according to Wackernagel (VS 106) stands instead of ekhelō (3rd p.): 'everyone now hold silence.' Where we have a first person plural in the imperative, as in It. *diamo,* Fr. *donnons,* the virtual meaning is 'you give, and I will give, too,' and so the imperative here as always refers to the second person. In English the old *give we* has been supplanted by *let us give* (as in Danish and, to some extent, also in German); here *let,* of course, is, grammatically as well as notionally, in the second person, and the first person pl. is only shown in the dependent *nexus us give.*

The local adverb corresponding to the first person is *here,* and where we have two adverbs for 'not-here,' as in northern English dialects *there* and *yonder* (*yon, yond*), we might say that *there* corresponds to the second, and *yonder* to the third person; but very often there is only one adverb for both ideas, as in Standard English *there* (*yonder* being obsolete). The connexion between the first person and 'here' is seen in Italian, where the adverb *ci 'here'* is used very extensively as a pronoun of the first person plural in the oblique cases instead of *ni 'us.'* In German we have the two adverbs of movement, *hin* for a movement towards, and *her* for a movement away from, the speaker.

In his pamphlet *Les Langues Ouralo-Altaïques* (Bruxelles, 1893), W. Bang thinks it incontestable that the human mind before having the conception of "I" and "thou" had that of "here" and "there." He therefore sets up two classes of pronominal elements, one for *here, I, now,* elements beginning with *m,-, n-,* and another for *not-I, there,* elements beginning with *t-, d-, s-, n-,* this again falls into two sub-classes:

"(a) la personne la plus rapprochée, là, toi, naguère, tout à l'heure,

1 Cf. also the three demonstratives in Latin *hic* (1), *iste* (2), *ille* (3).
DEFINITIONS 215

(b) la personne la plus éloignée, là-bas, lui, autrefois, plus tard."

I mention this as an interesting view, though in this volume I generally keep aloof from speculations about primitive grammar and the origin of grammatical elements.

Common and Generic Person.

We have seen above (p. 198) that it is, or would be, convenient in some cases to have a form for a "common number"; in the same way the want of a "common person" is also sometimes felt. As already remarked, we is really a case in point, as it stands for "I and you" or "I and someone else," and the plural you, ye also often stands for "thou and someone else" and thus combines the second and third persons. But this does not cover the instances in which the two persons are not joined by means of and, but separated, for instance, by a disjunctive conjunction. Here we have considerable difficulties in those languages which distinguish persons in their verbs: "either you or I are (or am or is ?) wrong"; see the examples given in Language, p. 335 f. Note also the use of our in "Clive and I went each to our habitation" (Thackeray, Newc. 297), where it would also be possible to say: "... each to his home," and where Danish certainly would use its reflexive pronoun of the third person: "C. og jeg gik hver til sit hjem" (cp. "vi tog hver sin hat"), but a common-person form would be more logical.

A curious case in which a common-person form would have solved the difficulty is mentioned by Wackernagel (VS 107): Uter meruistis culpam (Plautus) 'which of you two has deserved blame?'—uter would require the third person singular, but the verb is put in the second person plural because two men are addressed.

As a "common person" in a still wider sense may be considered what I should like to call the "generic person" as in Fr. on. In the chapter on number (p. 204) I have already considered the use in this sense of the generic singular and plural with or without the article in various languages, and in the chapter on the relation between subject and object I have spoken of the development of It. si and its construction (p. 161); this is the place to point out that for this notional "all-persons" or "no-person" each of the three grammatical persons is, as a matter of fact, found in actual language:

(1) as we know = comme on sait,
(2) you never can tell = on ne saurait le dire,
216 PERSON

(3) one would think he was mad = on dirait qu'il est fou,
what is a fellow to think = qu'est-ce qu'on doit penser ?
(. . . il faut . . .)
they say (people say) that he is mad = on dit qu'il est fou.

The choice between these several expressions depends on a more or less emotional element: sometimes one wants to emphasize the fact that one is included oneself in the general assertion, sometimes one wants to make a kind of special appeal to the person addressed at the moment,\(^1\) and sometimes one wants to keep one's own person in the background, though what is meant is really the first person more than anything else (one, a fellow). But the name "generic person" covers the notion underlying all these uses of various grammatical persons.

It is interesting to notice that in some languages the pronoun for 'we' is disappearing and is being replaced by the generic expression ('one'). Thus in French "Je suis prêt, est-ce qu'on part ?" for . . . nous partons (Bally, LV 59); from Benjamin, Gaspard, I quote "Nous, on va s'batte, nous on va s'tuer" (with strong emphasis of contrast on nous, p. 13), and "Moi, j'attends le ballet, et c'est nous qu'on dansera avec les petites Allemandes" and it is we who will dance, p. 18). In Italian this is quite common: Verga Eros 27 la piazzetta dove noi si giocava a volano | Fogazzaro Dan. Cortis 31 noi si potrebbe anche partire da un momento all' altro | id. Santo 139 la signora Dessalle e io si va stamani a visitare i Conventi | 216 Noi si sa che lui non vole andare.\(^2\) The frequency of this phenomenon in Italian seems to show that the reason for it cannot be that suggested by Bally, i.e., that in the first person plural nous chantons the verb has preserved a special ending which is useless and does not harmonize with those of je chante, tu chantes, il chante, ils chantent, which have become alike in pronunciation (but then what about vous chantez ?). But Bally is probably right when he says that while the forms moi je chante, toi tu chantes, lui il chante, eux ils chantent are perfectly natural, the combination with emphatic first person pl. nous nous chantons is obscure and

---

\(^1\) In Jack London's Martin Eden, p. 65, I find the following conversation which well illustrates the colloquial import of the generic you. Miss Ruth asks Martin: "By the way, Mr. Eden, what is booze ? You used it several times, you know." "Oh, booze," he laughed. "It's slang. It means whisky and beer—anything that will make you drunk." This makes her say: "Don't use you when you are impersonal. You is very personal, and your use of it just now was not precisely what you meant." "I don't just see that." "Why, you said just now to me, 'whisky and beer— anything that will make you drunk'—make me drunk, don't you see ?" "Well, it would, wouldn't it ?" "Yes, of course," she smiled, "but it would be nicer not to bring me into it. Substitute one for you, and see how much better it sounds."

\(^2\) Other examples Nyrop, Ital. Grammatik, 1919, p. 66.
COMMON AND GENERIC PERSON

inharmonious, and that therefore the form nous on has been preferred as more satisfactory to the ear and to the mind.

Notional and Grammatical Person.

In the vast majority of cases there is complete agreement between notional and grammatical person, i.e. the pronoun "I" and the corresponding verbal forms are used where the speaker really speaks of himself, and so with the other persons. Still, deviations are by no means rare; servility, deference, or simply politeness, may make the speaker avoid the direct mention of his own personality, and thus we may have such third-person substitutes for "I" as your humble servant; cf. Spanish "Disponga V., caballero, de este su servidor." In languages of the east this is carried to an extreme, and words meaning originally 'slave' or 'subject' or 'servant' have become the normal expressions for "I" (see, e.g., Fr. Müller, Gr. II, 2. 121). In Western Europe, with its greater self-assertion, such expressions are chiefly used in jocular speech, thus E. yours truly (from the subscription in letters), this child (vulgarily this baby). A distinctively self-assertive jocular substitute for "I" is number one. Some writers avoid the mention of "I" as much as possible by using passive constructions, etc., and when such devices are not possible, they say the author, the (present) writer, or the reviewer. A famous example of self-effacement in order to produce the impression of absolute objectivity is Caesar, who in his commentaries throughout uses Caesar instead of the first pronoun. But it is, of course, different when the same trick of using one's own name instead of the personal pronoun is used by Marlowe's Faustus or Shakespeare's Julius Caesar or Cordelia or Richard II, or Lessing's Saladin, or Oehlenschläger's Hakon (many examples from German, Old Norse, Greek, etc., in Grimm's Personenwechsel, 7 ff.). In some cases this may be a kind of introduction of oneself to the audience, but generally it is the outcome of pride or haughtiness. Still another case is found when grown-up people in talking to small children say "papa" or "Aunt Mary" instead of "I" in order to be more easily understood.¹

Present company may sometimes be used instead of "we," "us": "You fancy yourself above present company."

Among substitutes for notional second person I shall first mention the paternal we, often used by teachers and doctors

¹ When a person in a soliloquy addresses himself as you ("There you again acted stupidly, John; why couldn't you behave decently?") it is really an instance of (notional) second person. On "you-monologues and I-monologues" see Grimm, Personenwechsel, 44 ff.
(“Well, and how are we to-day?”) and denoting kindness through identifying the interests of speaker and hearer. This seems to be common in many countries, e.g. in Denmark, in Germany (Grimm, Personenwechsel, 19), in France (Bourget, Disc. 94 “Hé bien, nous deviendrons un grand savant comme le père?” | Maupassant, Fort c. l. m. 224 “Oui, nous avons de l’anémie, des troubles nerveux”—immediately followed by vous). The usual tinge of protection in this we is absent from the frequent Danish “Jeg skal sige os” (Let me tell you).

Next we have the deferential substitutes consisting of a possessive pronoun and the name of a quality: your highness (= you that are so high), your excellency, your Majesty, your Lordship, etc. It is well known that in Spanish vuestra merced ‘your grace,’ shortened into usted, has become the usual polite word for ‘you.’ In French, Monsieur, Madame, Mademoiselle may be used instead of vous (Monsieur désiré? etc.). In countries in which great stress is laid upon titles the simple and natural personal pronouns have often to give way to such expressions as abound in German and Swedish: “Was wünscht (wünschen) der herr lieutenant?” “Darf ich dem gnädigen fräulein etwas wein einschenken?” etc. In Sweden it is not easy to carry on a polite conversation with a person whose title one is ignorant of or happens to have forgotten; and I am sorry to say that my own countrymen of late years have begun more and more to imitate their neighbours to the South and to the East in this respect, and to ask “Hvad mener professoren?” instead of “Hvad mener De?”

In German it was formerly usual to say er, sie with the verb in the third person singular instead of du, especially in speaking to inferiors, and the corresponding practice (han, hun) prevailed in Denmark until well into the nineteenth century. The third person plural Sie has now become the usual polite word for notional second person (sg. and pl.) in German, and this usage, which Grimm rightly calls an indelible stain on the German language,¹ has been servilely imitated in Denmark: De.

There is a different use of the third person for a notional second person which may be illustrated from Shaw’s play, where Candida says to her husband: “My boy is not looking well. Has he been overworking?” Similarly a lover may say my darling or my own girl instead of you. There is also a petting way of addressing a child as it, which may have originated in the habit of half mentioning, half addressing an infant that is too small to understand what is being said to it. This, too, may be exemplified from Candida,

¹ “Es bleibt ein flecke im gewand der deutschen sprache, den wir nicht mehr auswaschen können” (Personenwechsel, 13).
who says to Marchbanks: "Poor boy! have I been cruel? Did I make it slice nasty little red onions?"

With the English possessive compounds with *self* (*myself, yourself*) we have a conflict between the grammatical person (third) and the notional person (first, second); the verb is generally made to agree with the notional person (*myself am, yourself are*), though occasionally the third person is used (Shakespeare sometimes has *my self hath, thy self is*, etc.).

**Indirect Speech.**

In indirect (reported) speech a shifting of the persons is in many cases natural, a direct first person being turned according to circumstances into an indirect second person or an indirect third person, etc. The various possibilities may be thus tabulated: the direct statement (A speaking to B): "I am glad of your agreement with him" (i.e. C) may become:

1. (A speaking with C): I said I was glad of his agreement with you.
2. (A speaking with D): I said I was glad of his agreement with him.
3. (B speaking with A): You said you were glad of my agreement with him.
4. (B speaking with C): He said he was glad of my agreement with you.
5. (B speaking with D): He said he was glad of my agreement with him.
6. (C speaking with A): You said you were glad of his agreement with me.
7. (C speaking with B): He said he was glad of your agreement with me.
8. (C speaking with D): He said he was glad of his agreement with me.
9. (D speaking with E): He said he was glad of his agreement with him.

It should be remarked, however, that in the cases 2, 5, 8, and 9 clearness would certainly gain by the use of the name instead of one or more of the ambiguous *he's*.

It is a simple consequence of the nature of the plural *we*, that it frequently remains unshifted, as in: "He said that he still believed in our glorious future as a nation."

In English the auxiliary *shall* (*should*) is often used in reported speech to show that the second or third person is a shifted first person: "Do you think you shall soon recover?" "He thought
he should soon recover"—contrast with this the continuation "but the Doctor knew that he would die."

There is a rather unusual case of a shifted personal (possessive) pronoun in the Merchant of Venice (II. 8. 23): Shylock exclaims "My stones, my daughter, my ducats," and when the street-boys mimic him, this is reported: "Why all the boyes in Venice follow him, Crying his stones, his daughter, and his ducats." Here the direct speech would be more natural. In Icelandic sagas it is quite usual to find that the beginning of a reported speech only is shifted, and that after one sentence the rest is given in the exact form in which the speech had been made.

Fourth Person.

Should we recognize a fourth person by the side of the third? This was the opinion of Rask (Vejledning 1811, 96, Prisskr. 1818, 241), who said that in "he beats him" him is in the fourth, while in "he beats himself" himself is in the third person like the subject. (Inversely, Thalbitzer, in Handbook of American Ind. Lang. 1021, denotes by "fourth person" the reflexive.) Yet it is easy to see that if we accept the definition of "person" given above, both these are in the third person, and that no fourth "person" is thinkable, however true it is that the same pronoun or verbal form (in the third person) may refer to different beings or things, in the same or in successive sentences.

Some Amerindian languages have very subtle distinctions, see Uhlenbeck, Grammatische onderscheidingen in het Algonkinsch (Akad. van Wetensch., Amsterdam, 1909): in Chippeway the first time a third person is mentioned this is not especially marked, but the subordinate second tertia persona, also called obviativus, is marked by a suffix -n, and the third tertia persona (called super-obviativus, by Uhlenbeck subobviativus) by the suffix -ini. In "Joseph took the boy and his mother" the boy is the second, and his mother the third tertia persona, and it is exactly indicated whether his refers to Joseph or to the boy. This makes Brinton (Essays of an Americanist, Philadelphia, 1890, 324) regret the poverty of English, where the sentence "John told Robert's son that he must help him" is capable of six different meanings which in Chippeway would be carefully distinguished. Nevertheless, it must be said that nearly always the meaning of such pronouns as he and his will be made sufficiently clear by the situation and context, even in such sentences as these (Alford): "Jack was very respectful to Tom, and always took off his hat when he met him." "Jack was very rude to Tom, and always knocked off his hat when he met him." Sully relates how a little girl of five was much
puzzled by the old hymn: "And Satan trembles when he sees The weakest saint upon his knees."—"Whatever, she asked, did they want to sit on Satan’s knees for?"

Note also the fun that was made of the Kaiser’s telegram (1914) to the Crown Princess: "Freue mich mit dir über Wilhelm’s ersten sieg. Wie herrlich hat Gott ihm zu seite gestanden. Ihm sei dank und ehre. Ich habe ihm eisernes kreuz zweiter und erster klasse verliehen."

In the spoken language extra stress serves in many cases to remove any ambiguity and to show who is meant. In John Stuart Mill’s Essay on Poetry we read: "Shelley is the very reverse of all this. Where Wordsworth is strong, he is weak; where Wordsworth is weak, he is strong." This makes nonsense if read with unstressed he, for that would mean Wordsworth, but it gives perfect sense if read with stressed he, which then comes to mean Shelley; it might even be readily understood if after stressing the first he we substitute a weak he for the second Wordsworth. This clarifying stress is indicated by the italicizing of they in Lamb’s sentence: "Children love to listen to stories about their elders, when they were children." In Somersetshire dialect Bill cut’s vinger means ‘his own,’ Bill cut ees vinger means ‘the other person’s.’

Reflexive and Reciprocal Pronouns.

Many languages have developed reflexive pronouns, by means of which many ambiguities are obviated. Their function is to indicate identity with what has been mentioned before, in most cases with the subject, whence it comes that these pronouns generally have no nominative.

In the Aryan languages we have the pronouns originally beginning with sw-, but their sphere of application is not everywhere the same, so it may be of some interest to give a short survey of their employment in the languages best known to us.

(1) Originally the reflexive pronoun was used in all three persons and without any regard to number, e.g. in Sanskrit and in the oldest Greek. This use is still preserved in Lithuanian and Slav, e.g. Russian ty vrediš’ sebē ‘you hurt yourself,’ my dovol’ny soboju ‘we are pleased with ourselves’ (examples taken from H. Pedersen’s grammar).

(2) In many languages the reflexive pronoun has been restricted to the third person, whether singular or plural; thus Lat. se and the forms derived from this in Romanic languages; further G. sich, ON. sìk, Dan. sig, though, as we shall see immediately, with some restrictions.

(3) In the dialects of Jutland this pronoun sig is used only when referring to a singular subject; when referring to a plural!
subject *dem* is used. This use of *dem* instead of the received *sig* is not at all rare in literary Danish, even in writers who were not born in Jutland; thus Kierkegaard writes, Enten Ell. 1. 294 naar de ikke kede dem.

(4) While in German the polite pronoun *Sie* (notional second person) takes the reflexive *sich*: *Wollen Sie sich setzen*, the Danish imitation *De* is always now followed by *Dem*: *Vil De ikke sætte Dem* (in the eighteenth century sometimes *sig*).

(5) Though the Fr. unstressed form *se* is used of any third person subject in both numbers, the stressed form *soi* is restricted to the singular and is generally used only when referring to an indefinite subject: *ce qu'on laisse derrière soi*, but of a definite subject: *ce qu'il laisse derrière lui*, *ce qu'elle laisse derrière elle* (*ce qu'ils laissent derrière eux*). Exceptions to this rule are found now and then, thus pretty frequently in Rolland, e.g. J. Chr. 7. 81 Il était trop peu sûr de soi pour ce rôle (also ib. 3. 213, 4. 6).

(6) English very early went further than any of the related languages, as the only remnant of the reflexive pronouns—and that only in the oldest period—was the possessive *sin* (see below). The old expressions, therefore, were “I wash me, thou wasthe thee, he washes him, she washes her, we wash us, ye wash you, they wash them.” Survivals of this are found in prepositional combinations like “I have no money about me, he has no money about him,” etc. In many cases the simple verb besides its transitive function has now also a reflexive meaning: “I wash, dress, shave,” etc. But in most cases the reflexive meaning is expressly indicated by the combinations with *self*: “I defend myself, you defend yourself (yourselves), he defends himself,” etc. In this way reflexive pronouns have developed which differ from the original Aryan ones in distinguishing the three persons and the two numbers, and thus resemble those of Finnish, which are formed by means of *ite*, to which are appended the usual possessive suffixes: *itseen* myself, *itsemme* ourselves, *itsesi* yourself, *itsensä* himself (herself), etc. Compare also the later Greek *emauton*, *seauton*, *heauton*, etc., and especially the curious Modern Greek formations *ton emauto mou* myself, *ton emauto sou* yourself, *ton emauto sas* yourselves, *ton emauto tou, tès* himself, herself, *ton emauto mas* ourselves, etc.

The development of the reflexive possessive has followed the same lines, though it has not been completely parallel with that of *se*, etc.

(1) To begin with, it referred to all persons in all numbers. This is still the Russian usage, e.g. *ja vzjal svoj platok* ‘I took my pocket-handkerchief.’

(2) It is restricted to the third person, but may refer to plurals as well as to singulars. This stage is found in Lat. *suus* and in
the old Gothonic languages, e.g. Gothic Lk 6. 18 *gemun hailjan sik sauhte seinaiizo* ‘they came to be healed of their diseases’ | Mk 15. 29 *wipondans haubida seina* ‘shaking their heads.’ The OE. poetical *sin* is found corresponding to ‘his’ and ‘her,’ but only rarely referring to a plural subject, and the pronoun seems to have disappeared pretty early from ordinary conversational language. ON *sinn* may refer to plural as well as to singular subjects; this use is still found in Norwegian: *de vasker sine hænder* ‘they wash their hands,’ and in Swedish.

(3) But in Danish *sin* is used only with a subject in the singular: *han (hun) vasker sine hænder*; *de vasker deres hænder*.

(4) In the dialects of Jutland we have the further restriction that *sin* refers to an indefinite subject only: *enhver (en) vasker sine hænder*, but *han vasker hans hænder, hun vasker hender hænder*.

(5) In some languages this pronoun has lost its reflexive power and is used as a general possessive of the third person singular, thus in French, where *ses mains* can be used in any position, meaning ‘his or her hands.’

(6) Thus also in German, only with the restriction that it means only ‘his’ (or ‘its’): *seine hände* ‘his hands,’ but in the fem. *ihre hände* ‘her hands.’

Considerations of space prevent me from dealing here with the question of the range of reflexive pronouns, which differs widely in the languages possessing them, especially in participal and infinitival constructions and dependent clauses.

Where reference is possible to two different persons in complicated combinations the existence of a reflexive pronoun is in some cases no security against ambiguity, as in Lat. “Publius dicit

1 It may not be amiss at this point to remind the reader that the possessive pronoun in some languages besides indicating the sex (or gender) of the ‘possessor’ also indicates the gender of the substantive to which it is an adjunct. The various possibilities may be gathered from the following translations into French, English, German, and Danish:

Son frère = his brother, her brother = sein bruder, ihr bruder = hans brøder, hendes brøder, sin brøder.

Sa sœur = his sister, her sister = seine schwester, ihre schwester = hans søster, hendes søster, sin søster.

Son chat = his cat, her cat = seine katze, ihre katze = hans kat, hendes kat, sin kat.

Sa maison = his house, her house = sein haus, ihr haus = hans hus, hendes hus, sit hus.

2 A few examples may be given from old Gothonic languages. Goth. Mk 3. 14 *gawaurhta twalif du wisan miJ sis* ‘he made twelve to be with him’ | 3. 34 *bisaihwande bisunjane *Pans bi sik sitandans* ‘looking round at those sitting round him’ | Lk 6. 32 *Pai frawaurhtans *Pans frijondans sik frijond* ‘sinners love those that love them’ | Sn. Edda 52 Útgardaloki *spyrr hvärt hann (þórr) hefir hitt rikara mann nokkurn en sik* ‘U. asks whether he has met any man more powerful than him (U.).’ Cf. also Nygaard NS 338 ff., Falk and Torp DNS 130 ff., Mikkelsen DO 253 ff., Western R 145 ff., Curme GG 187 f.
Gaium se occidere voluisse,” or in Dan. “han fandt Peter liggende i sin seng,” which is no more clear than the E. “he found Peter lying in his bed.” Cf. the German use of dessen, where sein would be ambiguous: “Der graf hat diesem manne und dessen sohne alles anvertraut” (Curme GG 168).

Closely related to the reflexive pronouns are the reciprocal pronouns, meaning ‘each other’: each part of those mentioned as the subject acting upon (or with regard to) and being in turn acted upon by all the other parts. This meaning is often expressed by the simple reflexive pronoun, either alone as in Fr. ils se haïssent or with some addition, as in ils se haïssent entre’eux, Lat. inter se conffigunt, Goth. Mk I. 27 sokidedun mip sis misso, cf. G. sie halten sich gegenseitig, or in Fr. ils se sont tués l’un l’autre (as ils se sont tués might be taken to mean ‘they have committed suicide’). Combinations like l’un l’autre are also used without any reflexive pronouns in various languages, where they always tend to become one inseparable whole, as they have done in Gr. allélous, Dan. hinanden, hverandre, Dutch elkaar, mekaar, G. einander. On the development of the German word see the interesting article in Grimm’s Wörterbuch, which also gives corresponding expressions from various other languages (Romanic, Slav, Lithuanian, Keltic). In English the elements formerly separated, as in Shakespeare’s gazed each on other or what we speak one to another, have now in ordinary language been fused together: gaze on each other, speak to one another. In Russian drug druga is separated by a preposition (drug s drugom with one another), but the tendency to look upon the combination as a unit is shown by the fact that it is used uniformly without regard to gender and number (Boyer and Speranski, M 273). Magyar egy-mas seems to be simply a translation of G. einander.¹

Reciprocal pronouns are sometimes found as the subject of a dependent clause, thus in a recent English novel: “Miss C. and I are going to find out what each other are like.” Similar sentences may be heard in Danish.

Many grammars deal with the theory of reflexives in a chapter about various kinds of verbs, giving “reflexive verbs” as one kind (and “reciprocal verbs” as another). But surely the verb is exactly the same in ‘we hurt him,” “we hurt ourselves,” “we hurt one

¹ The formation of a single inseparable word like einander obviates the difficulty that sometimes presents itself when one has to choose between two numbers. In French it is usual to say les trois frères se haïssent l’un l’autre, but it would be more logical to say l’un les autres or les uns l’autre, and in Ido people have hesitated whether to write la tri frati odias l’unu l’altro or l’unu l’altro or l’uni l’altri; it would therefore be much more convenient to have one single word, and mutu presents itself naturally as a back-formation from mutualia, which then would appear as a regularly formed adjective from mutu instead of being an independent root-word.
another," the only difference being the identity or non-identity of subject and object. Thus also G. "ich schmeichele mir," "ich spotte meiner" contain the same verb as "ich schmeichele dir," "ich spotte seiner." The only cases in which one might fairly speak of a reflexive verb would be those in which a verb is found idiomatically with no other object than a reflexive pronoun, as in E. *I pride myself*, Dan. *jeg forsnakker mig*, G. *ich schäme mich*. The identity of subject and object (direct or indirect) influences the choice of the auxiliary in Fr. *il s'est tué* 'he has killed himself,' *nous nous sommes demandé* 'we have asked ourselves (or one another'). It is a different thing that what is expressed in our languages with a reflexive pronoun may in some languages be expressed by a separate form of the verb, as in the Greek "middle voice": *louomai* 'I wash myself,' etc. (the same form having also a passive signification, see Ch. XII, p. 168). In Scandinavian the reflexive pronoun *sik* has in a reduced form been fused with many verbal forms, which then generally have acquired a purely passive meaning: *han kaldes*, originally 'he calls himself,' now 'he is called.' Sometimes the meaning is reciprocal: *de slås* (with a short vowel) 'they fight (strike one another)'; in this verb there is another form with a long vowel (and glottal catch) for the passive *slå(e)s* 'is struck.' In Russian the reflexive pronoun tends in a similar way to be fused with verbs in the two forms *sja* and *s'* (in spite of the spelling pronounced with a non-palatalized s); on the various meanings (distinctly reflexive, vaguely reflexive, reciprocal, approximately passive) see H. Pedersen RG 190, Boyer and Speranski M 247.
CHAPTER XVII

SEX AND GENDER


Various Languages.

By the term *gender* is here meant any *grammatical* class-division presenting some analogy to the distinction in the Aryan languages between masculine, feminine, and neuter, whether the division be based on the natural division into the two sexes,¹ or on that between animate and inanimate, or on something else. While a great many, probably the vast majority, of languages, have no gender in this sense, there are some languages which divide nouns into gender classes. Only the briefest mention of some of these class-distinctions can here be given, just enough to show, on the one hand the similarities, and on the other hand the dissimilarities with our own system.

In the Bantu languages of South Africa every substantive belongs to one of several classes, each of these being characterized by its own prefix, which is repeated in a more or less weakened form as a “reminder” in all subordinate words referring to the substantive in question, whether adjuncts or verbs. Some of these classes imply the singular, others the plural number, but none of them has any reference to sex, though some are used mainly of living beings and others of things. The number of the classes varies in different languages belonging to the group, the maximum being sixteen, but some of the classes are apt to be confounded, and it is not possible to indicate the ultimate reason for the division. (See *Lang.* 352 ff. and the works there quoted.)

In Tush, one of the languages of the Caucasus, various prefixes are used according as a rational being of the male sex, a rational being of the female sex, or an irrational being or thing is denoted. Thus

- *waśo wa* the brother is
- *bstuino ja* the woman is
- *naw ja* the ship is
- *xaux ba* the pigeon is
- *bader da* the child is.

¹ It is better to keep *sex* and *gender* apart than to speak of “natural and grammatical gender,” as is often done. See p. 55 on the terminological distinction between *male, female, sexless and masculine, feminine, neuter.*
'Heavy' when said of a man is watshi, of a woman jatshi, of a thing batshi, and heaviness correspondingly is watshol, jatshol, batshol. Wašo is brother, jašo sister, woh boy, joh girl.

In the related Tshetshensian 'I am' is suo wu when spoken by a man, suo ju by a woman, suo du by a child (Fr. Müller, Grundriss III, 2. 162).

In Andaman one class comprises inanimate things, another animate beings, which are subdivided into human and non-human. There is a sevenfold division of parts of the human body, but this division is transferred to inanimate things that have some relation to these several parts of the human body (P. W. Schmidt, Stellung der Pygämervölker, 121).

Algonkin languages have a distinction between animate and inanimate, though the distribution presents many points that to us appear strange, as when parts of the human body are generally looked upon as inanimate, while various parts of the bodies of animals are reckoned among animate things. (See J. P. B. Josselin de Jong, De Waardeeringsonderscheiding van Levend en Levenloos, Leiden, 1913, which compares this system and the Aryan genders, and discusses the theories advanced about the origin of the latter.)

In Hamitic languages we have a partition into two classes, one comprising names of persons, of big or important things, and of males, and the other those of things, small things, and females, sometimes with the curious rule that words of the first class in the plural belong to the second class, and vice versa. By interchange of the same prefixes we thus turn man into small man, brother into sister, and he-dog into bitch or small dog; in Bedanyo ando 'excrement' is masculine of a horse, ox, or camel, feminine of smaller animals. A woman's breast is masculine, a man's (because smaller), feminine. (Meinhof, Spr. der Hamiten, 23, and passim; Die mod. sprachforsch. in Afrika, 134 ff.)

The genders of the Semitic languages are generally considered as most similar to the Aryan genders, though there is no neuter, and though in Semitic even verbal forms are made to agree with the gender (sex) of the subject. Thus Arabic katabta 'thou (m.) hast written,' katabti 'thou (f.) hast written,' kataba 'he has written,' katabat 'she has written,' plural 2. pers. katabtum (m.), katabtunna (f.), 3. pers. katabū (m.), katabna (f.); in the first person no such distinction is found: katabtu 'I have written,' katubnā 'we have written.'

Aryan Gender.

Our own family of Aryan languages in the earliest historically accessible forms distinguishes three genders, masculine, feminine, and neuter, the last of which may to some extent be considered
228 SEX AND GENDER

a subdivision of masculine, characterized chiefly by making no distinction between the nominative and the accusative. The distribution of words into these three classes is partly rational, partly irrational. It is rational in so far as many names of male beings are of the masculine gender, many names of females being feminine, and many names of sexless things neuter. But by the side of this we find in some cases names of male beings as feminines or neuters, names of female beings as masculines or neuters, and names of things or ideas without a natural sex as either feminines or masculines.1 I have spoken about various attempts to explain the origin of this singular system or want of system in Language, p. 391 ff.,2 and of the practical disadvantages of it, ibid. 346 ff. It may be possible to assign reasons why some words have a certain gender; thus Handel Jakób has recently pointed out (Bulletin de l'Acad. polonaise des Sciences, 1919–20, p. 17 ff.) that words meaning 'earth' (Gr khton, kor, Lat. terra, Slav. ziemia, G. erde) are made f., because the earth is thought of as a mother producing plants, etc.; similarly names of trees, because these bring forth fruits; he adduces some Semitic parallels. But the main problem remains, why is this classification extended to all words, even where it is not possible to see any connexion with natural sex? Why, to take only one instance, is the common Aryan word for 'foot' (pous, pes, fot, etc.) m., while the various unconnected words for 'hand' are f. (kheir, manus, handus, ruka)? Words for 'table, thought, fruit, thunder,' etc., are in one language m., in another f. It is certainly impossible to find any single governing-principle in this chaos.

Gender is shown partly by form, as when in Latin the nom. and acc. are distinguished in rex regem m., lex legem f., while the two cases are identical in regnum n., but it is chiefly a syntactic phenomenon, different forms of adjectives and pronouns being required with the different genders: ille rex bonus est, illa lex bona est, illud regnum bonum est.3

In the vast majority of cases the gender of words is handed down traditionally from generation to generation without any change; but sometimes changes occur. In not a few cases these are due to purely formal accidents; thus it has been noted that, in French,

1 The sex-distinction recognized by botanists in plants must, of course, from a grammarian's point of view be considered as non-existent; if in French lis is masculine, and rose feminine, this exclusively concerns the gender of these words and has no more to do with sex than the fact that mur and maison have different genders.
2 Besides the literature there quoted see now also Meillet LH 199 ff., Vendryes L 108 ff.
3 As the Russian past tense is in origin a participle, it is inflected in genders: znal 'knew' m., znal f., znal n. This to some extent constitutes a parallel to the Semitic gender-distinction in verbs.
words beginning with a vowel are particularly liable to changes in
gender, because there the form of the definite article is the same
in all cases, viz. l' (the indefinite article un, une, too, was formerly
pronounced [yn] before a word beginning with a vowel). Words
ending in the feminine -e (or, we might say in conformity with
actual pronunciation, words ending in a consonant sound) tend
to become feminine. Both these causes operate together in making
énigme, épigramme, épithèse f. instead of m. In other cases the
change of gender is due to the meaning of the words. There is a
natural tendency to have the same gender in words of related
meaning (such words being, moreover, often mentioned in close
succession), thus Fr. été from f. becomes m. on account of the other
names of the seasons, hiver, printemps, automne (the last of these
in former times vacillating between the original m. and f.); la
minuit under the influence of le midi becomes le minuit. In the
same way G. die mittwoche 'Wednesday' has become der mittwoch
after der tag and the names of the other days of the week.

Similarly the gender of new words (or newly adopted foreign
words) is in many cases determined by formal considerations, as
when etage in German is fem. (in Fr. it is m.), but in others by sense-
analogies, as when in G. beefsteak becomes neuter (after rindfleisch),
and lift masculine (after aufzug) or when in Danish we say et vita
(after et liv), en examen (after en prøve), etc., the same word being
even sometimes treated differently in different senses, e.g. fotografi
'photography' (after kunsten), fotografiet 'photograph'
(after billedet), imperativen (måden), det kategoriske imperativ
(buddet). When the metrical system was introduced, gram and
kilogram (kilo) were made neuter after et pund, et lod, but we
say en liter after en pot, en peegl, and en meter after en alen, en fod.

We see the influence of accidents of form on a broader scale
in the way in which the original trinity of Aryan gender has been
reduced to a duality in some languages. In the Romanic languages
the distinctive features of masculine and neuter were obliterated,
chiefly through the loss of any distinction in the sounds of the
endings, while the ending of the feminine with its full vowel -a
was kept apart, the consequence being that there are two genders
only, masculine and feminine (on the remains of the old neuter
see below). In Danish, on the other hand, the distinction between
the masculine and feminine articles (ON. enn, en or inn, in, einn,
ein, etc.), was lost, and thus the old m. and f. were fused together
in one "common gender" as in hesten, bogen, den gamle hest, den
gamle bog, as distinct from the neuter as in dyret, det gamle dyr.
But in those Danish dialects in which the old final -nn and -n are
kept phonetically apart (the former having a palatalized form of
the nasal) the old trinity of m., f. and n. is preserved.
In the following remarks I am chiefly concerned with the relation between notional (that is, in this case, natural) and grammatical categories, and shall try to show how here and there languages have in course of time developed other and more rational groupings than the old traditional ones.

Sex.

Though, as has been remarked above, there are many examples of incongruity, still the correspondence between male and masculine on the one hand, and female and feminine on the other hand, is strong enough to be very actively felt, and combinations which are sometimes necessary, like G. *eine männliche maus, ein weiblicher hase*, will always be felt as inharmonious and as containing a contradiction between the form of the article and the meaning of the adjective. In a comic paper I find the following illustration: "L'instituteur. Comment donc ? Vous êtes incapable de faire l'analyse grammaticale de cette simple phrase: 'L'alouette chante.' Vous avez écrit dans votre devoir : Alouette, substantif masculin singulier. —L'élève. Sans doute. Et je maintiens energiquement 'masculin': chez les alouettes, il n'y a que le mâle qui chante."—Cf. also from Sweden: "Hvad heter den här apan ? —Hon heter Kalle, för det är en hanne" (Noreen VS 5. 314, i.e. What is the name of that ape ? She is called Charles, for it is a he. In Swedish *apa* is feminine). And from North Jutland *i honkat nóiwne wi àse me haj* (Grönborg *Optegnelser* 72, i.e. we say he of a she-cat; *kat* is m., as shown by the article *i*).

There is therefore a natural tendency to bring about conformity between gender and sex.¹ This may be achieved in the first place by a change in form, as when Lat. *lupa* was formed instead of the earlier *lupus* which had been used, for instance of Romulus's she-wolf (Havet), or when much later Sp. *leona*, Fr. *lionne* and It. *signora*, Sp. *señora* were formed from Lat. *leo*, senior, which did not distinguish sex. In Greek the old *neania* 'youth' adopted the masculine ending -s to become *neanias* 'young man.' Or else the form is retained, but the syntactic construction is changed, as when Lat. *nauta*, *auriga* when applied to men (a 'sailor, charioteer') become masculine (i.e. take adjectives in m.): originally they were abstracts and meant 'sailing, driving'; or when the Spanish say *el justicia* 'the judge,' *el cura* 'the curate,' *el gallina* 'the coward,' *el figura* 'the ridiculous fellow' (*la justicia* 'justice,' *la cura* 'curacy,' *la gallina* 'hen,' *la figura* 'figure'). Thus also Fr. *le trompette* 'the trumpeter' (*la trompette* 'the trumpet'); cp. also *la jument* ¹

¹ An Italian child asked why *barba* was not called *barbo* (Sully, after Lombroso).
'the mare.' In Sw. statsråd ‘councillor of State,’ orig. ‘council,’ is still neuter, but an adjective predicative is generally put in the form common to masculine and feminine: statsrådet är sjuk (not sjukt); in Danish the word in this sense has definitely given up its neuter gender: statsråden er syg. Thus also Dan. viv, which formerly was n. (like G. das weib, OE. þæt wif, Sw.ivet) is now of the common gender, and instead of the old gudet, trollet ‘the god, the troll’ we say now guden, trolden.

**Common Sex.**

It is often desirable, and even necessary, in speaking of living beings to have words which say nothing about sex and are equally applicable to male and female beings. Such a word is German mensch, Dan. and Norw. menneske, Sw. människa, though it is curious that grammatically mensch is masculine (whence Germans in some connexions hesitate to use it about a woman), människa is feminine, and menneske neuter. In English man has from the oldest times been used for both sexes, but as it may also be used specifically of the male sex, ambiguity and confusion sometimes result, as seen, for instance, in Miss Hitchener's line, which so much amused Shelley:

All, all are men—women and all!

Note also such quotations as the following: Atrabiliar old men, especially old women, hint that they know what they know (Carlyle) | the deification of the Babe. It is not likely that Man—the human male—left to himself would have done this. . . . But to woman it was natural.—The generic singular man sometimes means both sexes (God made the country, and man made the town) and sometimes only one (Man is destined to be a prey to woman), see many quotations MEG II, 5. 4. This is decidedly a defect in the English language, and the tendency recently has been to use unambiguous, if clumsy, expressions like a human being ("Marriage is not what it was. It's become a different thing because women have become human beings," Wells) or the shorter human, pl. humans (frequent in recent books by Galsworthy, W. J. Locke, Carpenter, and others). Note that the derivatives manly, mannish, manful as well as compounds like man-servant refer to male man, but manlike and manhood generally to both sexes (manhood suffrage, etc.). The old compound mankind (now stressed on the second syllable) comprises all human beings, but the younger mankind (stressed on the first syllable) is opposed to womankind. (The stress-difference, as made in NED, is not, however, recognized by everybody.)
French \textit{homme} is just as ambiguous as \textit{E. man}, and one is therefore sometimes obliged to say \textit{un être humain}; in scientific books one finds even the long-winded \textit{un être humain, sans acception de sexe}, where other languages have simple words like \textit{mensch}, by the side of \textit{mann}, Greek \textit{anthrōpos}, by the side of \textit{anēr}, etc. (Cf. Meillet LH 273 ff.)

While a great many special names for human beings are applicable to both sexes, \textit{e.g. liar, possessor, inhabitant, Christian, aristocrat, fool, stranger, neighbour}, etc., others, though possessing no distinctive mark, are as a matter of fact chiefly or even exclusively applied to one sex only, because the corresponding social functions have been restricted either to men or to women. This is true of \textit{minister, bishop, lawyer, baker, shoemaker} and many others on the one hand, \textit{nurse, dressmaker, milliner} on the other. It is curious that some words have in course of time been restricted to women, though originally applicable to men as well, thus \textit{leman} (Oe. \textit{leof-man} ‘dear man,’ in Chaucer and even in Shakespeare of a man, later only of a woman, now obsolete), \textit{bawd, witch, girl}.

Where it is desired to restrict common-sex words to one sex, this may be done in various ways, thus \textit{man-servant or servant-man, maid-servant, servant-girl, a he-devil, a she-devil, her girl-friends, a poetess} (but it is a higher praise to say that Mrs. Browning was a great poet, than to call her a great poetess). \textit{Author} is still to a great extent a common-sex word, though the word \textit{authoress} exists, but there is no corresponding formation to denote the female \textit{teacher} or \textit{singer}. Most languages present similar inconsistencies, and in many cases linguistic difficulties have been created through the recent extension of the activities of women to spheres that used to be reserved for men.\footnote{An example from long before the days of the emancipation of women, Laxd. saga 54. 11 \textit{Þorgerðr húsfreyja var ok mikill [m.] hvatamaðr}, at Þessi ferð skyldi takaz ‘she was a great instigator (instigating-man) of this raid.’}

Of the artificial languages there is only one that has successfully tackled the problem of having on the one hand common-sex words and on the other hand special-sex words, namely Ido, where all denominations without any special ending are applicable to both sexes, while male is denoted by the ending \textit{-ulo} and female by \textit{-ino}, \textit{e.g. frato} brother or sister, \textit{fratulo} brother, \textit{fratino} sister, \textit{frati} G. geschwister, \textit{homo} mensch, \textit{homulo} mann, \textit{homino} woman, \textit{sposo} spouse, \textit{sposulo} husband, \textit{sposino} wife, and thus \textit{dentisto, dentistulo, dentisitino}, etc.\footnote{Nations differ very greatly in the extent to which they have designations for married women according to the rank or profession of their husbands (Duchessa, Swed. \textit{professorska}, G. \textit{frau professor}). But details would be out of place here.}

In the plural there is naturally even greater need for common-sex words than in the singular, but it is only few languages that
can use the plural masculine in the same way as It. *gli zii* ‘uncle and aunt’ (lo zio e la zia), *i fratelli* (il fratello e la sorella), *i suoceri* (but not *i padri* instead of *i genitori*) or Spanish *los padres* ‘father and mother,’ *los hermanos* ‘brother(s) and sister(s),’ *sus dos hijos*, *Juan y Perfecta* (Galdós, D. Perf. 29).

With regard to animals, only those few that have the greatest importance to men have separate common-sex and special-sex words or forms (as *horse, stallion, mare*); from these we have several gradations (e.g. *dog, he-dog* or simply *dog* for the male, *bitch* or *she-dog*; *sparrow, cock-sparrow, hen-sparrow*) down to animals whose sex has no interest to ordinary speakers (*fly, worm*).

In pronouns and adjectives, where a common-sex form is not available, as it is in *somebody, everybody, each*, the masculine is most often used, as in Fr. *quelqu’un, chacun*, Jean et Marie étaient très contents d’eux-mêmes; some incongruity is inevitable in sentences like “Was Maria und Fritz so zueinander zog, war, dass jeder von ihnen am anderen sah, wie er ungücklich war” or “Doña Perfecta . . . su hermano . . . pasaron unos pocos años sin que uno y otro se vieran” (Galdós, D. Perf. 32).

It seems to be of special importance to have a common-sex interrogative pronoun, because in asking “Who did it?” one does not know beforehand whether it is a he or a she; hence most languages have only one form here (not infrequently a form which has a masculine ending), thus Gr. *tis*, Goth. *hwæs* (the fem. form *huo* given in grammars, probably never occurs as an interrogative primary), OE. *hwæ*, E. *who*, G. *wer*, Du. *wie*, Dan. (*hvo*), *hvem*, Russ. *kto*, etc. Exceptions are ON. m. *hverr*, f. *hver*, m. *hvárr*, f. *hvárd* and Lat. m. *quis*, f. *que*, but in modern Icelandic the difference has disappeared, at any rate in the nominative (*hver, hvo*), and in the Romance languages only the masculine form survives as a common-sex form: It. *chi*, Fr. *qui*, Sp. *quién*.

In the personal pronouns for the third person *he* and *she* are distinguished in English as in the other languages of our family; when a common-sex pronoun is wanted, *he* may be used instead of *he* or *she*, but colloquially the pl. *they* is often used (“Nobody prevents you, do they?” etc., Lang. 347, MEG II, 5. 56). In the plural most Gothonic languages have now generalized one form for both sexes (E. *they*, G. *sie*, Dan. *de*, etc.), which is very natural as one has very often to talk of groups of persons of different sex. Thus also in Russian except in the nom., where *oni, one* are kept apart. In the Romance languages the two sexes are kept apart: *eglino, elleno*; *ellos, ellas*; *ils* (*eux*), *elles*, except in the dative: *loro, les, leur*, and in the Fr. acc. with verbs: *les*. ON. has separate forms in the nom. and acc.: *pær, pær*; *pá, pær*, but not in the dat.: *peim*; in the nom. and acc. it has also a separate form for
the neuter: \textit{pau}, and this is also used as a common-sex plural, a phenomenon which is generally accounted for from the accidental fact that the old dual (which would often be used for 'he and she') came to be phonetically identical with the neuter plural. If that is so, the use of the neuter \textit{singular} as a common-sex form may be transferred from the dual-plural; an example of both is found in Laxd. S. 59. 20 Eptir \textit{þetta skilja pau Guðrún talit, ok bað hvárt þeira annat vel fara} 'after this G. and he (Snorri) stop talking, and bade each other farewell' (\textit{pau} n. pl., \textit{hvárt} and \textit{annat} n. sg.). On the corresponding rule in Gothic and OHG see Willmanns DG 3. 768, Streitberg GE 166. Old Dan. Jysk 1. 4. 3. \textit{hvæt lengær liuær mothær æthe barn} 'which lives longer, mother or child.'

\textbf{Animate and Inanimate.}

A distinction between living and lifeless, or animate and inanimate, or sometimes between human and extra-human, personal and non-personal (things which are not always easy to keep apart), pervades many parts of the grammars of many languages, sometimes in close connexion with sex-gender, sometimes independent of sex-gender. This distinction may be shown grammatically in the most different ways, and I cannot claim that the following survey is complete even for the languages with which I am most familiar.

In English the distinction is shown most clearly in the pronouns, as seen in this survey:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textbf{animate.} & \textbf{inanimate.} \\
\textit{he, she} & \textit{it} \\
\textit{who} & \textit{what} (interrogative) \\
\textit{who} & \textit{which} (relative) \\
\textit{somebody, someone} & \textit{something} \\
\textit{anybody, anyone} & \textit{anything} \\
\textit{nobody, no one} & \textit{nothing} \\
\textit{everybody, every one} & \textit{everything} \\
\textit{all} (pl.) & \textit{all} (sg.) \\
\textit{the good} (pl.) & \textit{the good} (sg.) \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

From the oldest times there has been a strong tendency to use the pronoun \textit{it} (OE. \textit{hit}) to represent things. It was so even when the old threefold gender, m., f., n., was still living and showed itself in the forms of adjuncts (articles, pronouns, adjectives). Thus (to give some of the examples adduced in the interesting article "Grammatical and Natural Gender in Middle English," by S. Moore, Publ. Mod. L. Ass. 1921) \textit{hlæw} . . . \textit{heorhtne} (acc. m.) . . . \textit{hit} | \textit{anne arc} . . . \textit{hit} | \textit{æanne calic} . . . \textit{hit} | \textit{þisnæ calic},
hit | peos race...hit. From the Ancrene Riwle: pene kinedom
...hit|peo ilke schedewe...hit|pene drunch...hit. (In
Moore’s article this phenomenon is mixed up with the use of heo
(she) when referred to such words as the neuter wif, megoden or
the masculine wifman, or of he referring to the neuter cild; it
would have been better to treat these things separately: the latter,
but not the former usage is pretty frequent in Modern German.)
This use of it quite naturally became even more predominant after
the old distinctions of case and gender in adjunct pronouns and
adjectives had disappeared, and about 1600 it led to the creation
of a new genitive case its, where formerly his was in use both for
the masculine and the neuter; its also superseded the dialectal
gen. it, which had begun to be used in Standard English.

It is, however, impossible to draw a hard and fast line of demarca-
tion in English between an animate gender, represented by he
or she, and an inanimate gender, represented by it. For it may be
used in speaking of a small child or an animal if its sex is unknown
to the speaker or if his interest in the child or animal is not great:
the greater personal interest one takes in the child or animal, the
less inclined one will be to use it, and he or she is even used in many
cases of an animal independently of any knowledge of the actual
sex of the individual referred to (a hare...she, a canary-bird
...he, a crocodile...he, an ant...she, etc.). On the other
hand, things may, in more or less jocular style, be mentioned as
he or she, by way of indicating a kind of personal interest. The
best-known and most universal example of this is the sailor’s
she of a ship; in Dickens a coach is she, and this is nowadays the
fashion among motorists in talking of their cars.

A country may from different points of view be treated either as
inanimate or animate. On the one hand, in speaking of France, we
may say “it certainly is smaller than Spain, but then it is much
more fertile,” and on the other hand, “I do not approve of her
policy in the reparations question”: in the latter case France is
viewed as a personal agent, hence the sex-indicating pronoun is
chosen, and if this is in the feminine in spite of the fact that the
political leaders are (still!) men, this is due to literary tradition
from French and Latin, where the names of countries happened
to be feminine. In German and Danish, where this influence is
not so strong, states even as political agents are mentioned in the
neuter, es, det (though we may sometimes substitute the personal
name Franskmanden, the Frenchman and say “Ja, Franskmanden,
han veed nok hvad han vil” without having any individual French-
man in view).

A somewhat similar case in seen with heaven, which may be
referred to as he, when it is a veiled expression for God. Nature
when viewed as an agent is *she* from the Latin (and Fr.) gender, and this is transferred to *Fate* by Browning ("Let fate reach me how she likes") in spite of the Latin gender.\(^1\) When the sun is mentioned as *he*, and the moon as *she*, this has very little to do with a real feeling of them as animate, but is purely artificial literary tradition from Latin: it is well known that in OE. as in the other Gothonic languages the sun was f. and the moon m.

There can be no doubt that the poetic tendency to personify lifeless things or abstract notions, for instance to apostrophize Death as if it were a living being, and the related representation in plastic art of such notions, are largely due to the influence of languages with sex-gender, chiefly, of course, Latin. But it has been justly remarked (among others by Jenisch, 1796) that such personification is more vivid in English than it can be, for instance, in German, because the pronoun *he* or *she*, where everyday language has *it*, at once draws attention to the idealization, which in German is not so noticeable because every chair and every stone is *er*, and every plant and every nose is *sie*. English poets have also greater freedom to choose which sex they will attribute to such notions.\(^2\) Thum compares Shakespeare’s passage “See how the morning opes *her* golden gates, And takes her farewell of the glorious sun,” in which the morning is the mistress who takes leave of her lover, with Schlegel’s translation “Sieh, wie *sein* tor der goldene morgen öffnet, Und abschied von der lieben sonne nimmt,” where the relation has been inverted on account of the gender of *morgen* and *sonne*. In Milton, *Sin* is talking to Satan who has begotten on her his son *Death*; this is rendered impossible in a French translation, because *le pêché* cannot be the mother, and *la mort* cannot be the son. Note also Brunot’s remark (PL 87) “*le hasard des genres a créé aux artistes de grands embarras. La Grâce, la Beauté, la Science, prenaient facilement figure de femme, mais la Force!* On a eu recours à *Hercule!*”

Some of the distinctions tabulated on p. 234 are comparatively recent; thus the relative *which* down to the beginning of the seventeenth century might be used of a person. *When this* and *that* are

\(^1\) “Donnerwetter! was ist doch manchmal diese verdammte Welt niederträchtig schön! Man sollte gar nicht glauben, dass sie dabei einen so hundsgemein behandeln kann!”—“Kein wunder,” meinte Hermann Gutzeit, “es heisst ja die Welt!”—“*Frau* Welt!” rief doktor Herzfeld und lachte (G. Hermann). This flippant remark is made possible only because the German word *Welt* is of the feminine gender and means (1) the whole exterior world or nature—which is neither male nor female—and (2) mankind—which comprises male and female beings. It would not be possible either in French (*le monde*) or in English or Turkish.

\(^2\) Thy wish was *father*, Harry, to that thought (Shakespeare).—Your wish is *mother* to your thought (Galsworthy, *Loyalties*, Act II).—It is small wonder—the wish being *parent* to the thought—that some accepted the rumour (McKenna, *While I Remember*, 149).
used as primaries, they are inanimate; note also the difference in such dictionary definitions as "Rubber—one who, or that which rubs." When the prop-word *one* is anaphorical (i.e. refers to a word mentioned already) it may be either animate or inanimate (this cake . . . the only one I care for), but when it does not in that way refer to a word just mentioned, it is always personal ('the great ones of the earth'). All these things are dealt with in greater detail in MEG, Vol. II, passim.

It is also worth mentioning that collectives can take the verb in the plural only if they denote living beings (*family, police*), but otherwise always take it in the singular (*library, forest*). It is also noteworthy that the genitive (in -s) is extinct except in the case of names of living beings (*the man's foot, but the foot of a mountain*)—apart from some survivals of set phrases (out of harm's way | a boat's length from the ship).1

In German the distinction between animate and inanimate is not so marked as in English: many things are referred to as *er, sie, dieser, jene*, etc., that is, by the same pronouns as are used for persons. Yet there are some indications of the difference besides the obvious instance *wer* and *was*: the datives *ihm, ihr*, are not often used of things, and instead of *mit ihm, mit ihr, in ihm, in ihr*, etc., the compounds *damit, darin*, etc., are used. There is a greater inclination to use *derselbe, dieselbe* of inanimates than of living beings; the possessive pronoun *sein* is generally reserved for living beings: *sie legte die hand auf den stein und empfand dessen wärme, or die wärme desselben* (Curme GG 168). The old dative has disappeared from the neuters *was, etwas, nichts*, and the compounds with *wo- (*womit, wovon*) are used where with animates we have *mit wem, von wem*.

- How important the neuter conception is in some cases is shown by the curious fact that it has been allowed to override the idea of plurality in *beides*, which means 'both things' as distinct from *beide 'both persons'; thus also *mehreres 'several things,' but mehrere 'several persons,' and in pretty much the same way *alles* (cf. Lat. *omnia* pl. n.), to which we have, of course, parallels in other languages: E. *all sg. n.* (which tends to be superseded by *everything, all* being reserved when used alone for persons in the pl.), Dan. *alt, etc.* Dan. *alting* was originally a pl. 'all things,' but is now used as a neuter sg.: *alting er muligt*. Cf. also *much* (*viel, vieles*) = *many things* (*viele dinge*).

In Danish the distinction between animate and inanimate is not well-defined grammatically. But we have the interrogative

---

1 "If we substitute the expression 'England's history' for the more usual 'the history of England,' we indicate that the name of the country is used with some approach to personification" (Bradley ME 60).
pronoun hvem of human beings and hvad of things corresponding to who and what, and instead of using begge 'both' alone as a primary there is a tendency to use begge to of two persons and begge dele of things, corresponding to alle (allesammen) 'all' (pl.) and alt (alting) 'all, everything.' The sex-indicating pronouns han, hun 'he, she' are used of human beings and of such of the higher animals as the speaker takes a personal interest in; other animals are referred to as den or det according to the gender of the word: lammet, svinet . . . det, hesten, musen . . . den 'the lamb, swine, horse, mouse'—exactly as the same pronouns refer to things, e.g. huset . . . det, muren . . . den 'the house, the wall.' As in English, though not to the same extent, there is some disinclination to use the genitive in -s with names of inanimates: we say taget pa huset, træerne i haven more often than husets tag, havens træer 'the roof of the house, the trees of the garden.'

Swedish literary language has retained much more of the old gender system than Danish, but the tendency is towards the same use as in Danish of den instead of the older m. and f. han, hon, in speaking of things, see the extremely able discussion in Tegner, Om genus i svenskan, 1892.

In French we have, of course, qui (qui est-ce qui) over against que (qu'est-ce que) and quoi; further en refers to something inanimate, where with animates the possessive pronoun is used: j'en connais la précision in speaking of a watch, je connais sa précision in speaking of a man (but there are instances in which son is necessary even of a thing, and the relative corresponding to en, viz. dont, is used of both classes).

In Spanish we have the rule that the object takes the preposition á before it if it denotes a living being: he visto al ministro 'I have seen the minister,' but he visto Madrid. In Russian and the other Slav languages the rule prevails that with names of living beings the genitive is used instead of the accusative. In some of the modern languages of India, such as Hindustani, the object form with living beings is marked by the ending -ko, while in names of inanimate things the object has the same form as the nominative (S. Konow in Festskrift til A. Torp, 99). In various languages, therefore, a distinction between these two classes is seen reflected in their manner of indicating the object, but as the means by which this is achieved are entirely different, we seem here to have a trait that has its root in the psychological sameness of men all over the world. (Cf. also the Aryan nominative ending -s if that was originally characteristic of the names of living beings—which, however, is more than doubtful, as on the one hand -s is found in inanimates like Lit. naktis, L. nox, and on the other
hand many animates seem never to have had -s, e.g. pater, G. kuôn.)

The distinction between animate (or personal) and inanimate (or impersonal) is sometimes shown indirectly in the way in which some case-forms are allowed to survive while others disappear. The dative is more often used in words denoting living beings than with inanimates; hence the acc. forms found in the oldest English, mec, pec, usic, eowic were early ousted by the dat. me, pe, us, eow (now me, thee, us, you), and somewhat later the old datives hire (her), him, hem (mod. 'em), hwam (whom) displace the old accusatives heo, hine, hie, hwane; them also is a dative. On the other hand, in the neuter it is the old accusatives hit (it), that, what that are preserved at the cost of the datives. Similarly in Dan. the old datives ham, hende, dem, hvem have ousted the accusatives (though it is true that in mig, dig the acc. has outlived the dative); in North German wen instead of wem, in Fr. lui, It. lui, lei, loro (when not used with a verb) we see the same tendency, while the acc. has carried the day in G. was, Fr. quoi, etc.

In substantives the old nominative has sometimes prevailed over the oblique cases in names of living beings, while the inverse is the case in names of inanimates. Thus it has been remarked by Behaghel, Bojunga and Tegnér that in the G. n-declension the old nom. without -n has held its own in names of living beings only: bote, erbe, knabe, while inanimates have generalized the oblique cases: bogen, magen, tropfen. In Swedish similarly the acc. has prevailed over the nom. in words like maga, båga, strupa, aga, vana, while names of persons have retained and generalized the nom. in -e: gubbe, granne, bonde (Tegnér G. 221). Another nom. ending has likewise been preserved in names of persons only: slarver, spjuver, lwver (ibid. 225). Old French had a distinction between a nominative and an oblique case; generally the latter has been generalized, but it has been remarked by Bréal (MSL 6. 170) that all the old nominatives that have been preserved denote human beings, e.g. traitre, sozur, fits, maire.

As lifeless things are naturally reputed inferior in value to living beings, and as the neuter gender in those languages that have one is preferably used of things, this gender comes to have a certain depreciatory tinge when applied to human beings and animals: in Dan. it is noteworthy that many terms of abuse are neuter: et fjols, pjok, fæ, bæst, drog; some words for animals that are chiefly used in a depreciatory sense, have in historical times changed their gender and have become neuter: øg, asen, aisel, kreatur. This may be compared with the well-known fact that diminutives in various languages are often neuter, even if the words from which they are derived have another gender: Gr. paidion 'little boy'
from *pais*, G. *fischlein*, *fräulein*, *bübcben*, *mädchen*, etc.¹ I suppose that when Italian has so many diminutives in *-ino* from feminines they were originally not real masculines but neuters: *casino*, *tavolino*, *ombrellino* from *casa*, *tavola*, *ombrella*, also *donna*, *manina*, by the side of *donna*, *manina*, and I venture the conjecture that it is the same deprecatory neuter that is behind the curious occurrence of some forms in *-o* for smaller things by the side of words in *-a* for bigger things: *buco* ‘a small hole,’ *coltello* ‘a small knife,’ by the side of *buca*, *coltella*, etc. In the dialects of South-Eastern Jutland some names for young animals, which otherwise in Danish are of the common gender, have become neuter: *et kalv*, *hvalp*, *gris*, *kylling* (M. Kristensen, *Nydansk*, 1906, 57). In Swedish *individ* is always *en* if used of a human being, often also of higher animals, but in speaking of a lower animal *ett individ* is said (Tegner G. 39); in Danish it is always neuter as Lat. and G.

Here and there we find a tendency to establish a grammatical distinction between thing-words (countables) and mass-words (uncountables) apart from the difference dealt with in the chapter on Number (XIV, p. 198 f.). In the south-western dialects of England “full shapen things” are referred to as *he*, acc. *en* (from OE. *hine*) and take the pronominal adjuncts *théâse*, *thik*, while “un-shapen quantities” are referred to as *it* and take *this, that*: Come *under théâse tree by this water | goo under thik tree, an zit on that grass* (Barnes, *Dorset Gr.* 20, Ellis EEP. 5. 85, Wright, *DiaL. Gr.* § 393, 416 ff.). In other languages there is a tendency to use the neuter gender preferably with mass-words, thus G. *das gift*, *das kies* ‘poison, gravel’ has taken or is taking the place of the older *die gift*, *der kies*. In the same way we have now in Danish *støvet* for older *støven* ‘dust.’ But in Danish this is carried further. Neuter forms of adjuncts are used to indicate quantity with mass-words even where these in other respects are of the common gender. Thus we say *mælken*, *osten* ‘the milk, the cheese,’ but *alt det mælk*, *noget andet ost* ‘all that milk, some other cheese’ (as mass,—‘another cheese’ as thing-word is *en anden ost*); *jeg kan ikke nøjes med det te* ‘I cannot rest content with that (much) tea,’ but . . . *med den tea* if the kind or quality is meant. Many dialects in Jutland go still further, all mass-words being made neuter without regard to the original gender, and in Hanherred a complementary change has taken place, all thing-names having been made of the common gender: *iset*, *jordet*, *skiben*, *husen* ‘the ice, earth, ship, house,’ where Standard Danish has *isen*, *jorden*, *skibet*, *huset*.

¹ It is curious that when these endings, which are otherwise always neuter, are added to proper names, it is possible to use the feminine article with *-chen*: *die arme Gretchen*, but not with *-li* (diaL.): *das Bäbeli*, though with male names one can say *der Jaköbl i* (Tobler VB 5. 7).
Before concluding this chapter on gender we still have to consider something which for want of a better name I propose to term "the conceptional neuter." It might be said to be the real or notional or universal neuter in opposition to the specified or concrete neuter which we have when in English we refer to a previously mentioned house or worm, etc., as *it*, and to the arbitrary neuter which we have when in German we refer to a previously mentioned *haus* or *mädchen* as *es* because the word happens to be of the neuter gender. It will appear from the following paragraphs that there are certain natural or notional functions for a neuter gender to fulfil, even though in many languages, which have not otherwise a neuter gender, there is nothing but a few pronominal forms to show the existence of this neuter in their grammatical system.

The first application of this unspecified or conceptional neuter is seen in such sentences as E. *it* rains, G. *es* regnet, Dan. *det* regner, Fr. *il* pleut (colloquially *ça* pleut), further *it* snows, thunders, etc., where it is difficult or impossible to define what *it* stands for: the whole situation of the atmosphere, if you like, but at any rate something thought of as definite in the same way as we use the definite article in "the weather is fine" or "the day is bright." Many languages here have no pronoun, Lat. *pluit*, It. *piove*, etc., and Brugmann and others see in the use of *it* a purely grammatical device, called forth by the habit of always having an express subject (*he* comes, *il* vient, where Lat. or It. has often merely the verbal form *venit*, *viene*). There is undoubtedly much truth in this consideration, but it does not give the whole truth, and Grimm (Wörterbuch) is not wholly wrong when he speaks of "das geisterhafte, gespenstige, unsichtbare, ungeheure" as expressed in the "impersonals"; Spitzer uses the expression "das grosse neutrum der natur," and thinks that this *it* is just as much an outcome of man’s mythopoetic imagination as *Juppiter tonat.*

I may here adduce on the one hand the following bit of conversation from one of Bennett’s novels: "It only began to rain in earnest just as we got to the gate. Very thoughtful of it, I’m sure!" and on the other hand, from a totally different sphere, Brownings use of *That* with a capital letter as a synonym for God: "Rejoice we are allied To That which doth provide And not partake, effect and not receive!" (Rabbi Ben Ezra) and Hardy’s similar use of *It*:

1 In an article "Das synthetische und das symbolische neutralpronomen in französischen" in Idealistische neuphilologie, Festschrift für Karl Vosler 1922. The great neuter of Nature is seen also (without any pronoun) in Russian *otca derevom ubilo* ‘it killed my father with a tree, my father was struck by a tree’ (Pedersen RG 110).
"Why doth It so and so, and ever so, This viewless, voiceless Turner of the Wheel?" which he justifies by saying that "the abandonment of the masculine pronoun in allusion to the First or Fundamental Energy seemed a necessary and logical consequence of the long abandonment by thinkers of the anthropomorphic conception of the same" (The Dynasts).

I find the same unspecified or conceptual it (though not the great neuter of Nature) as an object in idiomatic combinations like to lord it | you are going it! | we can walk it perfectly well | let us make a day of it, etc. In the following sentence a comic effect is produced by the ambiguity of it as specified and unspecified: He never opens his mouth but he puts his foot in it.

Corresponding uses are found idiomatically in other languages, for instance G. sie hat es eilig | er treibt’s arg | Dan. han har det godt, sidder godt i det | han skal nok drive det vidi | Fr. l’emporter, le prendre sur un certain ton. In Dan. the n. det curiously interchanges with the common-gender form den: ta den med ro ‘take it easy’ during recent times has supplanted ta det med ro, and den is found in many idiomatic phrases: brænde den a, holde den gående, etc.

Note here also G. es klopf an der tür, Dan. det banker på døren, corresponding to E. someone is knocking at the door (there is a knock at the door) and Fr. on frappe à la porte.

Next we have a conceptional neuter in words like what, nothing, everything, something, and it is interesting to notice that in Danish, where ting is of the common gender, ingenting and altting ‘nothing, everything’ take the predicative in the neuter gender: den ting er sikker, but ingenting er sikkert, etc. We see the same in the Romanic languages where the Lat. neuter has been merged in the masculine, but where these words, even those which were originally feminine, are treated as masculines, i.e. neuters. Thus Fr. rien from the Lat. f. rem: rien n’est certain, further quelquechose de bon. In It. qualche cosa, ogni cosa, che cosa (and the abbreviated interrogative cosa = che cosa) take the predicative in the masculine, i.e. neuter: che cosa fu detto? Thus also nulla fu pubblicato | una visione, un nulla che fosse femminile (Serao, Cap. Sansone 87, 123).

A conceptional neuter is also found in connexion with adjectives in the generic the beautiful, i.e. ‘everything beautiful,’ the good, etc. Note that Spanish here has retained the Lat. neuter in the form of the article: lo bueno, different from the masculine el bueno ‘the good one.’

A further function of the conceptional neuter is to represent a predicative as in: All men my brothers? Nay, thank Heaven, that they are not (Gissing, cf. MEG II. 16. 377) | you make him into a smith, a carpenter, a mason: he is then and thenceforth
that and nothing else (Carlyle) | Marian grew up everything that her father desired (Gissing) | his former friends or masters, whichever they had been (Stevenson) | She had now become what she had always desired to be, Amy’s intimate friend (Gissing) | she treated him like a tame cat, which is what he was (McKenna) | What is he? Just nothing at all as yet. Sweet NEG § 212 has not understood this function of what when he speaks of it as “used in a personal sense”; note that the answer to the question “What is he?” may contain any predicative: “a shoemaker” or “kind-hearted,” etc.


A notional neuter is also found where a pronoun represents a verb or a nexus: Can you forgive me? Yes, that is easy enough | The Duke hath banished me. That he hath not (Sh.) | I’ll write or, what is better, telegraph at once. Infinitives and whole clauses also always take articles, adjectives, etc., in the neuter gender in those languages which have one: Gr. to pinein, G. das trinken; Lat. humanum est errare, etc.

1 Cf. also the use of that in “Are there not seven planets?—That there are, quoth my father” (Sterne).
CHAPTER XVIII

COMPARISON


Comparative and Superlative.

In all ordinary grammars we are taught that there are three "degrees of comparison,"

1. positive: old
2. comparative: older
3. superlative: oldest

dangerously
more dangerously
most dangerously.

This tripartition no doubt corresponds with the actual forms found in the best-known languages, in which the "positive" is the fundamental form from which the two others are derived either by means of endings or by the addition of adverbs (subjuncts) like more and most. In some well-known instances the two higher degrees are taken from other stems than the positive: good, better, best; bonus, melior, optimus, etc.

Let us now look a little more closely into this system from a logical point of view. In the first place, it does not require much thought to discover that the "positive" cannot strictly be called a "degree of comparison," for when we speak of a horse or a book as old, we do not compare it with any other horse or book; the form, then, is rather "negative of comparison" than "positive," as the old grammarians termed it with their curious scorn of a good or consistent terminology. The term does not, however, do much harm, as it cannot very well be confounded with positive in the sense 'not negative.'

The way in which the three degrees are generally given makes us imagine that they represent a graduated scale, as if old: older: oldest formed a progression like, say, the numbers 1:2:3 (arithmetical progression) or 1:2:4 (geometrical progression). But this is only exceptionally the case, as in "The clowne bore it [my sonnet], the foole sent it, and the lady hath it: sweete clowne, sweeter foole, sweetest lady (Sh.) | We dined yesterday on dirty

1 Some adjectives and adverbs are incapable of comparison, e.g. other, several, half, daily, own. On comparison of substantives see p. 80.
bacon, dirtier eggs, and dirtiest potatoes (Keats). This way of placing the three forms together\(^1\) may really be due to the teaching of grammar; but it is important to insist on the fact that in ordinary usage the superlative does not indicate a higher degree than the comparative, but really states the same degree, only looked at from a different point of view. If we compare the ages of four boys, A, B, C, and D, we may state the same fact in two different ways:

A is older than the other boys, or  
A is the oldest boy (the oldest of, or among, all the boys).

In both cases A is compared with B, C, and D; but the result is in the former case given with regard to these three (the other boys), in the latter with regard to all the boys, himself included. The comparative must thus be supplemented by a member (expressed or understood), added by means of than and different from the object compared, hence the frequent use of the word other. This kind of supplement is not possible in the case of a superlative, which, on the other hand, is often followed by of or among all. But as both forms really express the same idea, we should not be surprised to find a rather frequent confusion, resulting in such blendings as the best of all others; see, e.g., a king, whose memory of all others we most adore (Bacon) | parents are the last of all others to be trusted with the education of their own children (Swift).

Now we can see how easy it was for languages that formerly possessed a real superlative, to give up this form and content themselves with the comparative. In the Romanic languages the only expression for the superlative idea is the comparative rendered definite either by the article or by some other defining word: le plus grand malheur | mon meilleur ami, etc. (Sometimes no defining word is required, as in "la vie, dans tout ce qu'elle a de plus intensif"). In Russian, the comparative similarly is often used as a kind of superlative, which is facilitated by the fact that the second member of comparison is added in the genitive, and that the same case is used as a partitive and thus corresponds both to Eng. than and of: lùčše vsegò = 'better than all' or 'best of all' | bogóše vsëx = 'richer than all' or 'richest of all.' (Besides, the superlative may be expressed by nai- placed before the comparative or by sàmyj 'self' (H. Pedersen RG, p. 89; cf. Vondrák SG 1. 494 and 2. 71 ff.)

We have what might be called a limited superlative meaning 'better (etc.) than all the others with the exception of one (two,\(^1\) In which the superlative denotes what is otherwise indicated by still: still sweeter, still dirtier.)
etc.) in the next best, the largest but one (two, etc.), the third best, etc. Similarly in Danish and German, where, however, no expressions exist corresponding to the English ones with but. There are many languages, on the contrary, which have no such easy ways of expressing this kind of superlative.

In German a curious confusion arises when a superlative is qualified by 'possible,' this word being put in the superlative form instead of the other adjective (adverb); both expressions are combined in a speech by Professor Jodl "das problem der grösstmöglichen glücksbefriedigung für die möglichst grosse zahl"; in English it would be "the greatest happiness possible for the greatest number possible."

**Equality and Inequality.**

If, then, we disregard the superlative as being really a kind of comparative, we may establish the following system of virtual comparison:

1. (> ) more dangerous (better) than — superiority
2. ( = ) as dangerous (good) as — equality
3. (< ) less dangerous (good) than — inferiority.

Obviously 1 and 3 are closely connected, as both denote inequality. English uses than with 1 and 3, and as with 2, while other languages use the same word in all three cases, thus Fr. meilleur que, aussi bon que. Danish distinguishes end and som as E., but some parts of Denmark (Fyn) use som even after comparatives. In the same way some parts of Germany use wie in all three kinds of comparison, while other parts of Germany use wie for equality only, and als with the comparative. Hence it is possible in Fr. to say, for instance, "il a autant ou peut-être plus d'argent que moi," where other languages have no such easy expression, for the sentence "he could box as well or better than I" (Wells) is felt as somewhat slipshod English.

In many cases our languages provide us with two expressions of opposite signification, which allow us to some extent to reverse the relation between stages 1 and 3: worse than means the same thing as less good than. As old and young are opposites, we may establish the following equations:

1. older than = less young than
2. as old as = as young as
3. less old than = younger than.

But in practice the expressions with less are naturally little used; besides the two forms sub 2 are not exact synonyms: it would obviously be impossible to say as young as the hills instead of as old
as the hills. This is a natural consequence of the fact, that old, besides having the neutral signification (as vox media) of ‘having (this or that) age’ as in “baby is only two hours old.” Also signifies ‘having a great age, advanced in years’; it is, indeed, in the latter sense that it forms a contrast to young. In some languages the two senses are kept distinct, as in Fr. âgé de deux heures | vieux, in Ido evanta du hori | olda.

Similarly, though more unkind than = less kind than, the terms as unkind as and as kind as are not synonyms, because the former implies that both persons compared are unkind, and the latter that both are kind. Comparison by means of as is therefore generally by no means neutral or indifferent, though it may occasionally be, as in “I don’t think man has much capacity for development. He has got as far as he can, and that is not far, is it?” (Wilde).

On the other hand, comparisons with than are as a rule indifferent or neutral; “Peter is older than John” does not imply that Peter is old, and the comparative may really therefore indicate a lesser degree than the positive would in “Peter is old.” Nor does the sentence “Peter is older than John” say anything about John’s being old; but that is implied if we add the subjunct still: “Peter is still older than John” (thus also: Pierre est encore plus vieux que Jean | Peter er endnu ældre end Jens | Peter ist noch älter als Hans — by the way an interesting parallel development in different languages, for this use of still is not at all self-evident; it is also found in Russian.

If we negative stage 1 (Peter is not older than John), the meaning may be either stage 2 (equality) or 3 (inferiority); in English a curious distinction is made between not more than, which is indistinct and may mean either 2 or 3, and no more than, which implies stage 2, equality. A negative stage 2 takes the form not so old as and practically always means stage 3 ‘less old than, younger than’; a negative with as is not so frequent and may sometimes mean stage 1 if it has extra emphasis on as, as when the assertion “A is as old as B” is contradicted: “Oh no, not as old as B, but much older.”

Weakened Superlatives and Comparatives.

There is a natural tendency to exaggerate by using the superlative for a very high, instead of the highest, degree. This is sometimes termed the “absolute superlative,” sometimes the “elative.” Thus “with the greatest pleasure,” “a most learned man,” etc. This has become the rule in Italian and Spanish to such an extent that the old Latin superlative form is never used.
as a real superlative; It. bellissimo 'very fine,' Sp. doctísimo 'very learned,' etc.1 In colloquial Norwegian we have the same with a negative: ikke så værst 'not so very bad.' In Danish a difference is made between the uninflected and the inflected superlative form, the former alone (without the article) meaning the real superlative, the latter the elative: med størst veltalenhed (more eloquently than anyone else) | med største veltalenhed (very eloquently indeed).

Sometimes the comparative form is similarly used without implying a comparison, as Dan. "en bedre middag" (a good, or a pretty good, dinner). Thus also E. rather, e.g. "Does it rain?—Rather!"

A similarly weakened comparative is found in Dan. flere, as in "ved flere lejligheder," where E. generally says more explicitly more than one, a plural of one. Curiously enough in this case, in which there is no comparison, some languages have a double comparative ending, G. mehrere (this could formerly take als, which is now impossible), late Lat. plusiores, whence Fr. plusieurs—which, in spite of its form, is really weaker than the 'positive' viel, beaucoup.

**Latent Comparisons.**

In some linguistic expressions the comparative idea is latent. Thus in the verb prefer: I prefer A to B = I like A better than B (je préfère A à B | ich ziehe A dem B vor); in Ido the ordinary comparative connective is in this case used: me preferas A kam B = me prizas A plu kam B. This may be found very rarely in English, too, as in Thackeray Sk 138 preferring a solitude, and to be a bachelor, than to put up with one of these for a companion.—Further we have a latent comparative in too (trop, Dan. for, G. zu), which means 'more than enough,' or 'more than decent, or proper, or good.' Here, also, the distance may be indicated: an hour too late | en time for sent | eine stunde zu spät | trop tard d'une heure.—Cf. also outlast = 'last longer than,' outlive (survive), Dan. overleve, G. überleben; exceed.

As latent comparatives must also be considered before and its opposite, Fr. avant, après, G. vor, nach, etc.; note that E. after and Dan. efter are also formal comparatives; the indication of distance is seen in "an hour before sunrise | une heure avant le lever du soleil | eine stunde vor dem sonnenaufgang," etc. But when we say "after an hour he came back" and similarly "après une heure il rentra," etc., we have really a confusion of the indication of distance and the object of the preposition, as it means

1 Note also It. medesimo, Sp. mismo, Fr. même from metipseimus; Sp. even mismisimo.
'an hour after (his departure, or whatever was mentioned).’ This may be compared to what has taken place in the mathematical use of *plus* and *minus* = augmented (lessened) by, cf. the translations “four less two,” “quatre moins deux,” “vier weniger zwei.”

Fr. *cadet* and *ainé* are also latent comparatives, *il est mon cadet de deux ans* = ‘he is two years younger than I (me).’ Cf. also “il avait un frère cadet, de dix ans moind àgé, ingénieur comme lui” (Rolland). A similar syntax is seen in English with some words taken over from Latin comparatives, though from a formal point of view they cannot in English be considered as comparatives; thus “he is my senior by two years,” etc.

The irrationality of grammatical expressions is seen in the following facts. While Lat. *post* and *ante* are, as we have seen, virtual comparatives, they take *quam* only when the second member of comparison is a whole clause; this is expressed in ordinary grammatical terminology by saying that *post* and *ante* are prepositions, but *postquam* and *antequam* are conjunctions; but it is easy to see that this is not the usual function of *quam*, which here corresponds to E. *that* rather than to *than*. E. *after* and *before* can take both words and clauses (are both prepositions and conjunctions), cf. “he came after (before) the war” and “he came after (before) the war was over.” In Danish the two words are treated differently, for *efter* requires the addition of *at* in order to be made a conjunction: “han kom efter krigen” | “han kom efterat krigen var forbi,” while no *at* is required with *for*: “han kom for krigen” | “han kom for krigen var forbi”; in both cases *førend* may be substituted (*end* means “than,” the connective after comparatives), but vulgar speech inclines to add *at* to make it into a conjunction; “han kom førend at krigen var forbi.” In G. the dative case of the demonstrative-relative pronoun *dem* is required to change the preposition *nach* into the conjunction *nachdem*, while *vor* (früher als) is the preposition corresponding to the conjunction *ehe*. In Fr. we have *aprés* and *avant* as prepositions, *aprés que* and *avant que* as conjunctions, where it is impossible to tell whether *que* is ‘than’ or ‘that’; cf. also It. *pocia che*. (With an infinitive, French has, or had, the following constructions: *avant que de partir, avant de partir, avant que partir, avant partir.*)

**Formal Comparatives.**

On the other hand, we have a class of words which are, formally considered, comparatives, but are not notional comparatives in so far as they cannot take *than*: *upper, outer* and its doublet
utter, former, etc. These have probably at no time had the true comparative functions; but latter and elder, which now share the same inability to take than, were formerly true comparatives of late and old, and we still in Shakespeare find elder than. These, then, may be called ex-comparatives.

Other is a formal comparative, though there is no corresponding positive; it can take than (thus also in other languages autre que, etc.). In English other sometimes infects its synonym different, which then takes than instead of the regular from, for instance: things will be made different for me than for others (Wilde); inversely one may find from after another: I hope to be another man from what I was (Dickens).

There are other well-known words in our languages formed with the same ending and still less to be considered as comparatives, namely pronominal words relating to the number of two like Lat. uter, neuter, OE. ægær, hwæðer, E. either, neither, whether, etc.

It may be doubtful, perhaps, whether this Aryan suffix -ter- belonged originally to these pronominal words referring to two or was from the first a comparative ending. But however that may be, we find in many languages the rule that when there is no direct comparison (with than) the comparative is used if two, and the superlative if more than two are referred to; cf. Latin major pars if something is divided into two parts, maxima pars if there are three or more parts. In English we have, correspondingly, e.g. “If Hercules and Lychas plaie at dice Which is the better man, the greater throw May tume by fortune from the weaker hand ” (Sh.), but apart from some set phrases like the lower lip and the upper end the natural tendency in modern English is to use the superlative everywhere, as in “whose blood is reddest, his or mine” (Sh.), see MEG II, 7. 77. This tendency has completely prevailed in Danish. It is curious to note that German here has a form composed of an old superlative with the comparative ending superadded: ersterer, and that the English equivalent the former is similarly formed from the OE. superlative forma ( = primus) and the comparative ending -er.

Indication of Distance.

With comparisons of inequality the degree of difference (the distance) is often indicated, e.g. “he is two years older than his brother ”; also with by; in Latin the ablatival is here used, in G. frequently um, etc.

1 Cp. the fact that in Finnic the interrogative kumpi ‘which of two’ and the relative jompi ‘which of two’ are formed and inflected like comparatives.
It is, accordingly, possible to combine the two kinds of comparison as in the sentence “She is as much better than her husband as champagne is better than beer” (cf. she is as superior to her husband as champagne is to beer; the distance between her and her husband is like that between, etc.).

The distance with a comparative is in some instances indicated by means of the form the from the OE. instrumental case ᵇ. This is a demonstrative pronoun in such combinations as “I like him all the better on account of his shyness” | “that makes it all the worse” | “so much the better” (in the two last examples all and so much also indicate the distance in addition to the, which is hardly felt to be more than an unmeaning expletive). But in “the more, the merrier” and similar collocations of two members, the first the is relative, while the second the is demonstrative; the first member may be called the determinant, and the second the determined. In ordinary E. the two members have exactly the same construction, and there is nothing to show which is the dependent and which the principal clause in “the more he gets, the more he wants” ; but in Dan. and G. (and formerly also in E.) the word-order in such cases shows that the first is the determinant, and the second the determined; cf. “jo mere han fär, des mere ønsker han” and “je mehr er bekommt, desto mehr wünscht er.” The same relation between the two is sometimes indicated by the addition of that after the former the, e.g. The nearer that he came, the more she fled (Marlowe).

In the Russian construction with ⱅ ⱪ ... Ɑ, the former is shown by the form to be a relative, and the latter a demonstrative pronoun in the instrumental denoting difference. But in French there is as little formal difference between the two as in English, and there is not even a word like the: “plus on est de fous, plus on rit.” The two parts are therefore, even more than in English, felt to be grammatically on an equality, and this often manifests itself in the insertion of et as between two independent sentences: “plus il a, et plus il désire.”

The English (Old English) and similarly the Russian expression would seem to indicate exact proportionality (‘by how much more . . . by so much more’); but in practice no such exact proportion exists, and the only mathematical formula to render such a combination as, for instance, “the more books he reads, the more stupid he becomes” would be something like

\[ S(n + 1) > S(n) \]

1 Thus also in It.: ma più ti guardo, e più mi sento commuovere (Serao). Cf. on the other hand: Quanto più ti costa, tanto più devi parlare (Giacosa). On earlier expressions in French with que plus, quant plus, etc., see Table; VB 2. 59 ff.
where $S(n)$ means the degree of stupidity found after reading $n$ books.

In most cases the determinant is placed first, and it is this nearly fixed custom which allows of the grammatical conformity between the two members in English and French. If the order is reversed, other more explicit or more clumsy formulas than the usual ones must be used in F. "la figure est d’autant plus admirable qu’elle est mieux proportionnée" (= mieux la figure est proportionnée, plus elle est admirable) | "Si la vie réalise un plan, elle devra manifester une harmonie plus haute à mesure qu’elle avance plus loin" (Bergson). In English a change in the word-order generally is all that is required to make the sense clear: they liked the book the better, the more it made them cry (Goldsmith).

There is an interesting sub-class of these expressions of proportional correlation, in which the determinant is the length of time, but is not explicitly expressed as such. Different languages have different ways of indicating this: the usual English way is by means of a repeated comparative, as in "it grew darker and darker" (= the longer it lasted, the darker it grew) | he became "more and more impatient," etc. Similarly in Danish and other languages. Poets often substitute the positive for the first comparative, as "and swift and swifter grew the vessel’s motion" (Shelley); another expression is seen in "her position was becoming daily more insecure." A third expression is by means of ever: he spoke ever more indistinctly. This is rare in English, but the corresponding formula is the usual one in German: es wurde immer dunkler | er sprach immer weniger. The usual French equivalent is de plus en plus (de plus en plus obscur | il parla de moins en moins, etc.). The idea here is that it was already at the starting point darker (than previously) and that it then became darker still (but ‘still’ is not expressed).

Secondaries and Tertiaries.

The comparison is in the vast majority of cases between two primaries as in "John is older than Tom | this house is bigger than ours | I like claret better than beer." But sometimes two secondary or tertiary notions (‘qualities’) may be compared as in "his speech was more eloquent than convincing | he spoke more eloquently than convincingly." Here English requires the periphrasis with more ¹ (similarly in Danish and German), while Latin has the well-known illogical expression with the comparative

¹ Cf., however, the dictionary definition of oblong: longer than broad. Somewhat differently: Aunt Sarah, deafer than deaf.
in the second adjective (adverb) as well as in the first: *verior quam gratior*.

Two verbs may also be compared: he felt rather than saw her presence in the room. This really implies a stylistic rather than a real comparison, and means something like "*felt* would be a more correct expression than *saw*." A similar idea is at the bottom of such expressions as "this rather frightened him," where the second term of comparison is left unexpressed, but where the original idea is "*frightened* is a more adequate expression than any other verb." This then leads us to such expressions as "there are some things which I *more than dislike*," where the first term is omitted: *dislike* is too weak an expression.
CHAPTER XIX

TIME AND TENSE


In this chapter we shall deal with the linguistic expressions for the natural (or notional) concept "time" and its subdivisions. In many languages we find time-indications expressed in verbal forms, the so-called "tenses," and this has appeared to many grammarians so natural that they have considered tense-distinction the chief characteristic of verbs (hence G. \( \text{zeitwort} \)). But there are languages whose verbs do not distinguish tenses, and even in English, which ordinarily distinguishes tenses, we find such verbs as \textit{must}, \textit{ought}, which in the modern language have only one "tense"; on the other hand, time is often indicated by means of other words than verbs, and this way of indicating time is often much more precise than that effected by means of verbal forms can ever be, as when we say "on the third of February, 1923, at 11.23 p.m."

Let us, however, confine ourselves in the first place to those time-distinctions that find expression in the verbs of the best-known languages. The first question then is, can we establish a scheme of "tenses" of universal application?

In Madvig's \textit{Latin Grammar} we find the following system. Anything said may be referred either simply to one of the three chief tenses, present, past, and future, or be indicated relatively with regard to some definite point (past or future) as present, past or future at that time. Thus we get the following nine divisions, which I mention here in Madvig's terms and with his examples, adding only the numbers I, II, III and 1, 2, 3 for later references.

\begin{tabular}{lll}
I præsens & II præteritum & III futurum \\
1 scribo & scripsi & scribam \\
in præterito & 2 scribem & scripseram & scripturus eram (fui) \\
in futuro & 3 scribam & scripsero & scripturus ero \\
\end{tabular}

\[1\] Chapters XIX and XX are a re-written, re-arranged, in many parts shortened, in other parts expanded edition of a paper "Tid og tempus" in \textit{Oversigt over det danske videnskabernes selskabs forhandlinger}, 1914, 367–420. 

254
The first line has no special designation; parallel to the others it should be “in præsenti.”

Closely connected systems with three times three tenses are found in other works (by Matzen, Kroman, Noreen, see details and criticism in Tid og tempus, 374) and are there given as purely logical systems without any regard to the way in which those nine categories are represented in actual language. Madvig probably meant his system as an empirical one for Latin exclusively (in his Greek Syntax he does not give the scheme and would have had difficulties in finding a place for the aorist in it), but even as a description of the Latin tenses the system has certain drawbacks. Scribam is found in two places, as præsens in futuro (I 3) and as futurum in præsenti (III 1) while other forms are given only once. In the III series it would be natural to expect 1. scripturus sum, parallel with the other forms, and the reason for the discrepancy evidently is that scripturus sum implies a near future, and Madvig did not want to have the element of distance in time mixed up with his system. It is, however, difficult to keep this element, of nearness apart from the other composite forms with scripturus, and in his Greek Syntax, § 116, Madvig applies the terms futurum in præsenti and futurum in præterito to the combinations with mello and emellon, which admittedly imply nearness in time, and the same element is also present in the III-series as given by Kroman and Noreen. If, on the other hand, this element is discarded, there is no necessity for having both a præsens in futuro and a futurum in præsenti. These must be regarded as one, represented by scribam, but then analogy would require us to identify also I 2 præsens in præterito with II 1 præteritum in præsenti: the difference between scribebam and scripsi is not indicated with sufficient precision by their places in the system, as shown incidentally by Madvig’s placing scripturus eram and scripturus fui at one and the same place (III 2). These two are not synonymous, being distinguished exactly in the same way as scribebam and scripsi, but the distinction, to which we shall have to revert, has really nothing directly to do with the other time-distinctions contained in the scheme. It would be best, therefore, to reduce the scheme from nine to seven places, merging into one I 2 and II 1 and in the same way I 3 and III 1.

Seven Tenses.

If now we want to arrange these seven tenses in a consistent scheme we encounter first the difficulty of terminology. It would be best to have two separate sets of terms, one for the notional or natural divisions of time and one for the grammatical (syntactic)
tense-distinctions. In Danish, and also in German, it is very convenient to use native terms for the former, and Latin terms for the latter; thus nutid, fortid, fremtid (jetztzeit, vorzeit, zukunft) of the three chief divisions of time, and praesens, praeteritum, futurum for the three verbal tenses. But in English we cannot do exactly the same thing, because there are no native (Anglo-Saxon) words corresponding to present and future, which thus must be used both for natural time and for grammatical tense (for it would hardly do to distinguish between present and praesens, between future and futurum). We may, however, reserve the word past (past time) for the notional past and use preterit about the corresponding tense. Wherever it is required for the sake of clearness, I shall say present time or present tense, future time or future tense respectively. For subdivisions I would propose the employment of the prefixes before and after as notional and the prefixes ante and post as syntactic designations (e.g. before-past, ante-preterit).

The next question that arises is how to arrange the seven "times" recognized above? One method would be to place them in a triangle:

```
  present
 /     \
|      |
past   future
|      |
\     /  
before-past  after-past  before-future  after-future
```

But this arrangement is not satisfactory, and it is much better to arrange the seven "times" in one straight line. Before-past is evidently "past in past," and in the same way after-past becomes "future in past," and analogously before-future is "past in future," and after-future is "future in future," to use clumsy terms reminding one of Madvig's system.

We thus get a system which avoids Madvig's two serious logical errors, (1) that of a tripartition of "now," which as a point has no dimensions and cannot be divided, and (2) the even more serious mistake of arranging time in a two-dimensional scheme with three times three compartments. For there can be no doubt that we are obliged (by the essence of time itself, or at any rate by a necessity of our thinking) to figure to ourselves time as something having one dimension only, thus capable of being represented by one straight line.
The three main divisions of time accordingly have to be arranged in the following way:

A past  B present  C future

The insertion of the intermediate "times" gives us this scheme, in which we place the notional terms above, and the corresponding grammatical terms below, the line which represents the course of time:

This figure, and the letters indicating the various divisions, show the relative value of the seven points, the subordinate "times" being orientated with regard to some point in the past (Ab) and in the future (Cb) exactly as the main times (A and C) are orientated with regard to the present moment (B).

The system thus attained seems to be logically impregnable, but, as we shall see, it does not claim to comprise all possible time-categories nor all those tenses that are actually found in languages. It will now be our task to go through these seven divisions, taking first the main ones and then the subordinate ones, and to examine how they are actually expressed in various languages.

Main Divisions of Time.

(A) Simple past time.—For this there is in English one tense, the preterit, e.g. wrote. Other languages have two tenses, e.g. Lat. scripsi, scribebam; on the difference see below, p. 275. While in these languages the distance of time from the present moment is quite immaterial, some languages have separate preterits for the distant and for the near past. The latter is expressed in French by means of the periphrasis je viens d'écrire.

1 A somewhat similar arrangement, in which an attempt has been made to comprise a great many distinctions, which according to my view have nothing to do with the simple straight time-line, is found in Sheffield GTh 131. For criticism see "Tid og Tempus," 383 f.
Among expressions for the simple past we must here also mention the so-called historic present, which it would be better to call the unhistoric present, or, taking a hint thrown out by Brugmann, the dramatic present. The speaker in using it steps outside the frame of history, visualizing and representing what happened in the past as if it were present before his eyes. As Noreen has it, it serves to produce an artistic illusion. But however artistic this trick is, it must not be imagined that it is not popular in its origin; one need only listen to the way in which people of the humblest ranks relate incidents that they have witnessed themselves to see how natural, nay inevitable, this form is. Yet Sweet thinks that in English it is due to literary influence from French and Latin, and that in the Icelandic sagas, where it is extremely frequent, it was borrowed from Irish (Philol. Soc. Proceedings, 1885–87, p. xlv, NEG § 2228). Einenkel and others think that its use in Middle English is due to Old French. But in Middle English it is especially frequent in popular poetry, where foreign influence of a syntactic character is highly improbable. The non-occurrence or rare occurrence of this present in Old English must, I think, be explained by the fact that Old English literature gives us none of those vivid narratives in natural prose for which Iceland is justly famous. On the whole the dramatic present belongs to that class of everyday expressions which crop up comparatively late in writing, because they were looked upon as being below the dignity of literature. It is never found in Homer, but is frequent in Herodotus. Delbrück is no doubt right when he says that it is "gewiss uraltvolkstümlich" (Synt. 2. 261).

(B) Simple present time.—For this those languages that have tense distinctions in their verbs generally use the present tense.

But what is the present time? Theoretically it is a point, which has no duration, any more than a point in theoretic geometry has dimension. The present moment, "now," is nothing but the ever-fleeting boundary between the past and the future, it is continually moving "to the right" along the line figured above. But in practice "now" means a time with an appreciable duration, the length of which varies greatly according to circumstances; cf. such sentences as "he is hungry | he is ill | he is dead." This is exactly what happens with the corresponding spatial word "here," which according to circumstances means very different things (in this room, in this house, in this town, in this country, in Europe, in this world), and with the word "we," which may embrace a varying number of individuals beside the speaker, the only thing required being (with here) that the spot where the present speaker is at the moment, and (with we) that the present
speaker, is included. With regard to the present tense all languages seem to agree in having the rule that the only thing required is that the theoretical zero-point, “now” in its strictest sense, falls within the period alluded to. This definition applies to cases like: he lives at number 7 | knives are sharp | lead is heavy | water boils at 100 degrees Celsius | twice four is eight. With regard to such “eternal truths” it has sometimes been (wrongly) said that our languages are faulty because they state them only in reference to present time without having means to express that they were equally valid in the past and will be so in the future. The remark loses its sting when we take into consideration that most or all of our pronouncements about present time necessarily concern some part of what belongs strictly to the past and to the future. If “present time” is defined as is done here, it is applicable even to intermittent occurrences like the following: I get up every morning at seven (even when spoken in the evening) | the train starts at 8.32 | the steamer leaves every Tuesday in winter, but in summer both on Tuesdays and Fridays. In the last sentence the present moment falls within the limits of what is spoken about, for the saying concerns the present arrangement, valid for the present year as well as for the last few years and presumably for the next few years as well.

This manner of viewing things seems to me preferable to that adopted by Sweet, who writes (NEG, § 289) that “for the purpose of such statements (as the sun rises in the east, platinum is the heaviest metal) the present is best suited, as being in itself the most indefinite of the tenses”—why indefinite? Still less can we call such sentences “timeless” (zeitlos), as is often done. It would be better to speak of “generic time” in the same way as we have spoken of “generic number” and “generic person.” If for such statements the present tense is generally used, it is in order to affirm that they are valid now. But other tenses may occasionally be used: we have the so-called “gnomic preterit” as in Shakespeare’s “Men were deceivers ever” (cf. the Greek gnomic aorist)—a sort of stylistic trick to make the hearer himself draw the conclusion that what has hitherto been true is so still and will remain so to the end of time. On the other hand, the future tense is used “gnomically” in Fr. “rira bien qui rira le dernier,” where the corresponding proverbs in other languages

1 If we represent each act of getting up (at seven) by a dot, and the present moment by O, we get the following figure, which shows that the condition for using the present tense is fulfilled:

... . . . . O ... , etc.

2 Brunot says: “la terre tourne autour du soleil présente une action située hors du temps” (PL 210) and “Les actions situées hors du temps s'expriment au présent” (ib. 788).
use the present tense: the reason for the French tense is that the proverb is most often quoted when somebody else is laughing and the speaker wants to say that he will laugh later and that that will be better.¹

(C) *Simple future time.*—It is easy to understand that expressions for times to come are less definite and less explicit in our languages than those for the past: we do not know so much about the future as about the past and are therefore obliged to talk about it in a more vague way. Many languages have no future tense proper or have even given up forms which they had once and replaced them by circuitous substitutes. I shall here give a survey of the principal ways in which languages have come to possess expressions for future time.

(1) The present tense is used in a future sense. This is particularly easy when the sentence contains a precise indication of time in the form of a subjunct and when the distance in time from the present moment is not very great: I dine with my uncle to-night. The extent to which the present tense is thus used is different in different languages; the tendency is strongest with verbs denoting ‘go’: I start to-morrow | ich reise morgen ab | jeg rejser imorgen | je pars demain | parto domani, etc. Gr. εἰμί ‘I go’ nearly always means ‘I shall go.’ The present tense is also extensively used in clauses beginning with *when* and *if*: “I shall mention it when I see him (if I see him)”; in French with *si*: “Je le dirai si je le vois,” but not with *quand*: “quand je le verrai.”

(2) Volition. Both E. *will* and Dan. *vil* to a certain degree retain traces of the original meaning of real volition, and therefore E. *will go* cannot be given as a pure ‘future tense,’ though it approaches that function, as seen especially when it is applied to natural phenomena as *it will certainly rain before night.* There is also an increasing tendency to use *will* in the first person instead of *shall*, as in *I’m afraid I’ll be soon* (especially in Sc. and Amr.), which makes *will* even more the common auxiliary of the future. In German *wollen* has to be used in “es scheint regnen zu wollen,” because the usual auxiliary *werden* cannot be used in the infinitive. The future is, expressed by volition also in Rumanian *voiu canta* ‘I will (shall) sing’; cp. also occasional It. *vuol piovere* (Rovetta, Moglie di Sua Eccel. 155). In Modern Greek the idea of volition seems to have been completely obliterated from the combinations with *tha*: *tha graphô* and *tha graψô* ‘I shall write’ (regularly, or once); *tha*, formerly *thena*, is derived from the

We may have a generic past time: last year the early morning train started at 6.15. This is not the place to discuss some interesting uses of the present tense, as in “I hear (I see in the papers) that the Prime Minister is ill | I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him,” etc.
third person the = thelei + na 'that' from hina and has now become a pure temporal particle.¹

(3) Thought, intention. ON. mun. This cannot easily be kept apart from volition.

(4) Obligation. This is the original meaning of OE. sceal, now shall, Dutch zal. In English the meaning of obligation is nearly effaced, but the use of the auxiliary is restricted to the first person in assertions and to the second person in questions, though in some classes of subordinate clauses it is used in all three persons.² The meaning of obligation also clung at first to the Romanic form from scribere-habeo 'I have to write,' which has now become a pure future tense, It. scriverò, Fr. écrirai, etc. Under this head we may also place E. is to as in "he is to start to-morrow."

(5) Motion. Verbs meaning 'go' and 'come' are frequently used to indicate futurity, as in Fr. je vais écrire, used of the near future, E. I am going to write, which sometimes, though by no means always, has the same nuance of nearness, and finally with out that nuance Swed. jag kommer att skriva, Fr. quand je viendrai à mourir, E. I wish that you may come to be ashamed of what you have done | they may get to know it. (But Dan. jeg kommer til at skrive denotes either the accidental or the necessary, either ‘I happen to write’ or ‘I (shall) have to write’.)

(6) Possibility. E. may frequently denotes a somewhat vague futurity: this may end in disaster. Here we may mention those cases in which an original present subjunctive has become a future tense, as Lat. scribam.

(7) There are other ways in which expressions for futurity may develop. G. ich werde schreiben according to some is derived from a participial construction ich werde schreibend, but this is not always recognized; it is not mentioned in Paul Gr. 4. 127 and 148, where the treatment of the future is very unsatisfactory. The Gr. future in -sō (leipsō, etc.) is said to have been originally a desiderative.

A notional imperative necessarily has relation to the future time. Where, as in Latin, there are two tenses in the imperative, both really refer to the future, the so-called present imperative referring either to the immediate future or to some indefinite time.

¹ In It. sta per partire 'he is going to start' the notion of future seems to be due to per denoting an intention ('in order to'); cf. also la bottega è per chiudersi 'the shop is going to be closed.'

² In German sollen is sometimes used as an auxiliary of the future, as in "Es handelt sich hierbei freilich meist um dinge, die erst werden sollen" (Bernhardi), where werden werden would, of course, be awkward. In French I find: "L'ouvrage semble devoir être très complet et précis" (Huchon, Hist. de la langue angl. vii, in speaking of a work of which he has only seen one instalment): devoir être stands for the missing fut. inf. = 'sera, à ce qu'il semble.'
in the future, and the so-called future imperative being used chiefly with regard to some specially indicated time. A "perfect imperative" also refers to future time, the use of the perfect being a stylistic trick to indicate how rapidly the speaker wants his command executed: *be gone!* When we say *Have done!* we mean the same thing as "Stop at once!" or "Don't go on!" but this is expressed circuitously: 'let that which you have already done (said) be enough.'

**Subordinate Divisions of Time.**

Next we come to consider the subordinate divisions of time, i.e. points in time anterior or posterior to some other point (past or future) mentioned or implied in the sentence concerned.

(Aa). Before-past time. This requires to be mentioned so frequently that many languages have developed special tenses for it: ante-preterit (pluperfect, past perfect), either simple as Lat. *scripseram* or periphrastic, as E. *had written* and the corresponding forms in the other Gothonic and in the Romanic languages. In OE. before-past was often indicated by means of the simple preterit with the adverb *ær*: *past pe he ær sæde* 'what he had said,' literally 'that which he before said.'

The relations between the two "times," the simple past and the before-past, may be represented graphically thus, the line denoting the time it took to write the letter, and the point *c* the time of his coming:

\[
\text{I had written the letter before he came = he came after I had written the letter: } \quad \text{— — c.}
\]

\[
\text{He came before I had written the letter = either I finished writing the letter after he had come, or I wrote the letter after he had come: } \quad \text{or c — — .}
\]

(Ac). After-past time. I know of no language which possesses a simple tense (post-preterit) for this notion. A usual expression is by a verb denoting destiny or obligation, in E. most often *was to*: Next year she gave birth to a son who *was to cause her great anxiety* | It was Monday night. On Wednesday morning Monmouth *was to die* (Macaulay) | he was *not destined to arrive* there as soon as he had hoped to do (Kingsley). Similarly in other languages. Dan.: *Næste år fødte hun en søn som skulde volde hende store bekymringer* | G. *Im nächsten Jahre gebahr sie einen sohn, der ihr grosse bekümmernis verursachen sollte* | Fr. *Quand Jacques donna à l'électeur Frédéric sa fille qui devait être la tige des rois actuels d'Angleterre* (Jusserand) | *Je ne prévoyais point*
tous les malheurs qui allaient nous frapper coup sur coup (Sarcey). Sometimes in Fr. the future is used, which corresponds to the dramatic present: Irrité de l’obstination de Biron et voulant donner à la noblesse un de ces exemples que Richelieu multipliera, Henri IV laissa exécuter la sentence. Gr.: τέν ήδη de emellen ennoi kaka kēde’ esesthai (Od. 6. 165 ‘the expedition that was to bring about sufferings’; cf. ibid. 7. 270, 8. 510).1

(Cs). Before-future time. The corresponding tense (the ante-future) is usually termed futurum exactum or the future perfect. Lat. scripsero, in our modern languages periphrastic: I shall have written (he will have written), er wird geschrieben haben, il aura écrit, etc. In Dan. the element of futurity is generally left unexpressed: Hvis du kommer klokken 7, har han skrevet brevet (. . . har vi spist, . . . er solen gået ned). Thus also in E. and G. after conjunctions of time: I shall be glad when her marriage has taken place | ich werde froh sein wenn die hochzeit stattgefunden hat.

As above, under Aa, we may here give a graphical representation of the time-relation:

I shall have written the letter before he comes = he will come after I have written (shall have written) the letter :

He will come before I (shall) have written the letter = either I shall finish writing the letter after he has come, or I shall write the letter after he has come :

Cc). After-future. This has chiefly a theoretic interest, and I doubt very much whether forms like I shall be going to write (which implies nearness in time to the chief future time) or scripturus ero are of very frequent occurrence. Madvig has an example from Cicero: “Orator eorum, apud quos aliquid aget aut acturus erit, mentes sensusque degustet oportet,” but it will be seen that here the future aget, which drags the after-future along with it, is really a generic present, put in the future tense on account of oportet: it is (now and always) the duty of the orator to consider those before whom he is talking or will talk (is going to talk). Otherwise it must be said that the natural expression for what at some future time is still to come is a negative sentence: If you come at seven, we shall not yet have dined (. . . the sun will not yet have set) | si tu viens à sept heures, nous n’aurons pas encore dîné (. . . le soleil ne se sera pas encore couché). In Dan. generally with the element of futurity unexpressed: hvis du

1 The use of came in the following quotation from Dickens is to be compared with C nr. 5, p. 261 above: the influence for all good which she came to exercise over me at a later time . . .
kommer kl. 7, har vi ikke spist endnu (... er solen ikke gået ned endnu).¹

Economy of Speech.

Languages differ very much in their economy in the use of tenses as well as in other respects. Those languages which admit sentences like “I start to-morrow” use one sign for the future time (the adverb) where other languages force their speakers to use two, as in “cras ibo” (I shall start to-morrow). This is parallel to the economical expression in “my old friend’s father” with only one genitive mark as compared with “pater veteris mei amici,” or to “ten trout” as against “ten men” or “decem viri.” Latin is often praised for its logic in such things, as when Weise writes: “Der gesunde menschenverstand befähigte den römer besonders zu genauer scheidung der begriiffe, schärfe der darstellung, klarheit und durchsichtigkeit der rede... Der gebildete römer ist peinlich sorgfältig in der tempusbezeichnung: ‘Ich werde kommen, wenn ich kann’ heisst bei ihm: veniam, si potero; ‘wie du sahest, so wirst du ernten’ : ut sememtem feceris, ita metes; ‘so oft er fiel, stand er auf’ : cum ceciderat, surgebat.”

English and Danish in these matters generally agree with German. But it must be remembered that it cannot be called illogical to omit the designation of what goes without saying: situation and context make many things clear which a strict logician in a pedantic analysis would prefer to see stated. Nor should it be forgotten that Latin in other cases is economical enough. Postquam urbem liquit: here the before-past time is expressed by the combination of postquam (before) and liquit (past); English allows both the shorter and the more explicit expression: after he left the town, after he had left; Danish and German requires the double expression: efterat han havde forladt byen | nachdem er die stadt verlassen hatte. Latin is also economical in omitting the mark of past time in hoc dum narrat, forte audivi ‘while she was telling this tale I happened to overhear it.’ There are really two (relative) time-indications saved in Shakespeare’s “our vizards wee will change after we leave them” (after we shall have left them, Ca), and in “you must leave the house before more harm is done” (= shall have been done). Such savings of time-indications in the tense of the verb are particularly frequent after conjunctions of time and of condition; note thus the difference between the two when-clauses: “We do not know when he will come, but when he comes he will not find us ungrateful”—the first when is interrogative,

¹ It is clear that we have not after-future, but simple future in “(Tomorrow he will go to Liverpool, and) not long after that he will sail for America.”
and the second a relative adverb or a conjunction. In French with quand we should have il viendra in both clauses, but if we substitute if, we see the same difference as in English: "Nous ne savons pas s'il viendra, mais s'il vient il ne nous trouvera pas ingrats."

Non-temporal Use of Tenses.

What is usually a grammatical sign for a time relation may sometimes be used for other notional purposes. Thus a future tense is often used to express a mere supposition or surmise with regard to the present time: il dormira déjà = he will already be asleep = er wird schon schlafen (I suppose that he is asleep) and in the same way il l'aura vu = he will have seen it = er wird es gesehen haben (he has probably seen it). It is true that we can assert nothing with regard to a future time but mere suppositions and surmises, and this truth is here linguistically reversed as if futurity and supposition were identical. Or it may be that the idea is this: "it will (some time in the future) appear that he is already (at the present moment) asleep," in the same way as we may use hope, which implies the future, with a subordinate clause in the present or perfect: "I hope he is already asleep," "I hope he has paid his bill," i.e. that it will turn out later that he is now asleep or has now paid.

The most important non-temporal use of preterit forms is to indicate unreality or impossibility. This is found in wishes and in conditional sentences. If we want to find a logical connexion between this use and the normal temporal use of the preterit, we may say that the common link is that something is in all these cases denied with regard to the present time. "At that time he had money enough," "I wish he had money enough," and "If he had money enough"—each of these sentences is in its own way a contrast to "he has money enough."

"I wish he had money enough" expresses by its preterit a wish with regard to the present time, and at the same time its impossibility or unreality (unfortunately he has not money enough); in the same way the ante-preterit in "I wish he had had money enough" expresses a wish with regard to some past period and at the same time denies that he had money enough then. But with regard to future time it is not as a rule possible to deny anything so categorically, and the corresponding tense-shifting (would instead of will) therefore merely serves to express uncertainty of fulfilment: "I wish he would send the money to-morrow," whereas "I hope he will send the money to-morrow" expresses the wish without saying anything about the probability of its fulfilment.
In conditional clauses we see the same shiftings. "If he had money enough" has reference to the present time and denies that he has; "if he had had money enough" has reference to the past and denies that he had money enough; "if he should have money enough" has reference to the future, but instead of denying it only leaves it uncertain whether he will get it or no. But the last form may be used also to express a doubt with regard to the present time: "if he should be innocent"—meaning perhaps in most cases "if it turns out (fut. time) that he is (now) innocent," etc.—In speaking of the future the simple preterit (without should) may also be used: "It would be a pity if he missed the boat to-morrow." ¹

We may sometimes, chiefly in colloquial speech, meet with a further shifting, the ante-preterit being used not only of the past, but also of the present time, simply to intensify the unreality irrespective of time. Thus we may say: "If I had had money enough (at the present moment), I would have paid you," and "I wish I had had money enough (now) to pay you."

It is also interesting to observe that the use of the preterit to denote unreality at the present time leads to the consequence that it may be used in speaking of the future, as in "It is high time the boy went to bed."

In wishes and conditions the unreality or impossibility was not originally denoted by the tense-shifting in itself, but required also the shifting from the indicative to the subjunctive, as still in German. But in Danish there is now in the preterit (and ante-preterit) no formal distinction between the two moods, and the modification of meaning is thus made contingent on the tense only. It is the same in English in more than 99 per cent. of the cases, as the old preterit subjunctive is identical with the indicative, except in the singular of the one verb be, where was and were are still distinct. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the instinctive feeling for the difference between these two forms cannot be vivid enough to prevent the use of was, where were would have been required some centuries ago. Since ab. 1700 was has been increasingly frequent in these positions: I wish he was present to hear you (Defoe) | a murder behind the scenes will affect the audience with greater terror than if it was acted before their eyes (Fielding). In literary language there has recently been a reaction in favour of were, which is preferred by most teachers; but in colloquial speech were is comparatively rare, except in the phrase "if I were you," and it is worth remarking that was is

¹ The tense-shifting is also found in cases where the hypothetical character of the clause is not indicated expressly by means of such a conjunction as if: Fancy your wife attached to a mother who dropped her h's (Thackeray).
decidedly more emphatic than *were*, and thus may be said to mark the impossibility better than the old subjunctive form: "I'm not rich. I wish I was" | "I am ill. If I wasn't, I should come with you"—thus often in the negative form. In this way we get a distinction between "If he were to call" with weak *were*, denoting vaguely a future possibility, and "If he was to call" with strong *was*, denying that he is to call (now), with the use of *is to* which is nearly synonymous with *has to*, *is bound to*: "If I was to open my heart to you, I could show you strange sights" (Cowper) | "If I was to be shot for it I couldn't" (Shaw).

In French we have the corresponding use of the preterit and ante-preterit in conditional sentences, and here too the indicative has prevailed over the subjunctive, though the forms were more different than was the case in English and Danish: "s'il avait assez d'argent, il payerait," formerly "s'il eût . . ."

I have here spoken of the tense in the conditional (subordinate) clause only, but originally the same rules applied to the conditioned (principal) clause as well. Thus we have: "But if my father had not scanted me. . . . Yourselfe, renowned Prince, than *stood* as faire As any commer (Sh.) | She *were* an excellent wife for Benedick (Sh.). Correspondingly in the ante-preterit: "If thou hadst bene here, my brother *had not died*" (A.V.). But just as there is a strong tendency to express the future more clearly in principal sentences than in subordinate clauses (which in English is effected by the use of *will* or *shall*), in the same way the shorter expression has in these conditioned sentences been supplanted by a fuller one with *should* or *would*: *you would stand* | *she would be* | *my brother would not have died*, etc. *Could* and *might* are still used in the old way in principal sentences because these verbs have no infinitives and thus cannot be combined with *should* or *would*; e.g. How *could* I be angry with you? | *He might* stay if he liked. In French we witness a similar development, *il *vînt* (venait)* in a conditioned sentence having been ousted by *il viendrait*, which originally denoted an obligation in the past ('he had to come'), but is now chiefly used as what is generally termed "le conditionnel," e.g. in "s'il pouvait, il viendrait." Similarly in the past: *mon frère ne serait pas mort, s'il l'avait su.*

Special applications of the preterit of unreality are seen in the use of *should* and *ought* to indicate an obligation or duty, etc.,

---

1 To designate the use of the preterit indicative to denote unreality the terms "modal past tense" (NED) and "mood-tense" (Sweet) are sometimes used; they do not seem adequate, as moods have no fixed notional value: at any rate one does not see from the term what mood the tenses stand for.
in the present time, and in the "modest" use of could for can. (Could you tell me the right time), of would for will (Would you kindly tell me . . .) and of might for may (Might I ask . . .). It has finally led to the change of must from a preterit into a present tense; cf. also Swed. måste. Further details must be left to special grammars.
CHAPTER XX

TIME AND TENSE—concluded

The English Expanded Tenses. Terms for the Tenses. Time-Relations
in Nouns (including Infinitives). Aspect.

The Perfect.
The system of tenses given above will probably have to meet
the objection that it assigns no place to the perfect, have written,
habe geschrieben, ai écrit, etc., one of the two sides of Lat.
scripsi, and in Latin often called perfectum absolutum or "perfect
definite." This, however, is really no defect in the system, for
the perfect cannot be fitted into the simple series, because besides
the purely temporal element it contains the element of result.
It is a present, but a permansive present: it represents the present
state as the outcome of past events, and may therefore be called
a retrospective variety of the present. That it is a variety of the
present and not of the past is seen by the fact that the adverb
now can stand with it: "Now I have eaten enough." "He has
become mad" means that he is mad now, while "he became
mad" says nothing about his present state. "Have you written
the letter?" is a question about the present time, "Did you
write the letter?" is a question about some definite time in the
past. Note also the difference of tense in the dependent clause
in "He has given orders that all spies are to be shot at once"
and "He gave orders that all spies were to be shot at once." We
may perhaps figure this by means of the letters BA or B(A)—
the letters A and B being taken in the sense shown on p. 257 above.

It is highly probable that the old Aryan perfect was at first
an intensive present or "permansive"; this view is advocated
very cogently by Sarauw (Festschrift Vilh. Thomsen, 1912, p. 60):
"The perfect originally denoted the state: odi I hate, memini:
I remember, hestēka I stand, kektēmai I possess, kekeutha I contain
hidden within me, heimai I wear, oida I have before my eyes.
The meaning of perfect was gained by an inference: he who
possesses has acquired; he who wears a garment has put it on."

The two sides of the perfect-notion cannot easily be main-
tained in a stable equilibrium. Some of the old perfects are used
exclusively as real presents, e.g. Lat. *odi, memini*; in the Gothonic languages the so-called *praeteritopraesentia*, which would be better called *perfectopraesentia*, e.g. E. *can, may*, Gothic *wait*, corresponding to Gr. *oida*, ON. *veit*, OE. *wat*, obsolete E. *wot*, etc. But apart from these what were perfects in the Gothonic languages have lost the present-element and have become pure preterits, as E. *drove, sang, held*, etc. To express the perfect-meaning compounds with *have* were then formed: *I have driven, sung, held*, etc. In quite recent times one of these combinations has become a pure present (thus a new perfectopresent verb): *I have got (I've got): the retrospective element is quite absent in I've got no time | you've got to do it.*

The Latin perfect, which originated in an amalgamation of old preterits (aorists) and perfects, combines the syntactic functions of those two tenses. In Romanic verbs, however, we witness the same development as in the majority of the Gothonic verbs, the old perfect forms having lost their perfect-function and having become pure preterits, though with this difference from the Gothonic verbs, that they are aorists (now termed *passé défini, passé historique, past historic*), because side by side with them there are imperfects (see below). The real perfect as in Gothonic is expressed periphrastically: *ho scritto, ai écrit, etc.* (On *have* as an element in the perfect of many languages see Meillet LH 189.)

Now, in spite of the employment of the present-tense form *have* in these new perfects, it appears difficult to keep up the sharp distinction between the idea of the present result of past events and that of these past events themselves: the perfect tends to become a mere preterit, though the tendency is not equally strong in all languages. English is more strict than most languages, and does not allow the use of the perfect if a definite point in the past is meant, whether this be expressly mentioned or not. Sentences containing words like *yesterday* or *in 1879* require the simple preterit, so also sentences about people who are dead, except when something is stated as the present effect of their doings, e.g. in *Newton has explained the movements of the moon* (the movements of the moon have been explained—namely by Newton). On the other hand: *Newton believed in an omnipotent God. "We can say 'England has had many able rulers,' but if we substitute Assyria for England the tense must be changed"* (Bradley ME. 67).

German is much more lax in this respect, and South German tends to use the compound perfect everywhere: *ich habe ihn gestern gesehen.* On the other hand, Germans (North Germans ?)

1 E. *must* is a real preteritopresent verb, while its old present *mot* was a perfectopresent.
2 Anglo-Irish has a curious perfect: *he is after drinking = 'has drunk.'*
3 *Dixi* is an old *s-aorist, pepuli* a reduplicated perfect.
will often say: *Waren Sie in Berlin?* where an Englishman would have to say "Have you been in Berlin?" When an Englishman hears a German ask "Were you in Berlin?" his natural inclination is to retort: "When?" Danish steers a middle course between the strictness of English and the laxity of German; a Dane, for instance, will always ask "*Har De været i Berlin?*" but has no objection to combinations like "jeg har set ham igår" (I have seen him yesterday). If, however, the indication of time precedes, the preterit is required: "igår såe jeg ham" —the psychological reason being that in the former case the sentence was at first framed as it would be without any time-indication, and the indication is as it were an afterthought, added to sentence when virtually completed "jeg har set ham," whereas if we begin with "yesterday" the tense naturally follows suit.

In Spanish the distinction seems to be accurately observed; Hanssen (Sp. gr. 95) has examples corresponding to the English ones given above: *Roma se hizo señora del mundo* | *La Inglaterra se ha hecho señora del mar.* But in French the feeling for the distinction is lost, at any rate in present-day colloquial Parisian and North French, where the passé défini is entirely disused: *Je l'ai vu hier* | *ils se sont mariés en 1910.* The transition from a perfect to a preterit seems to be due to a universal tendency; at any rate we meet with it in so remote a language as Magyar, where *irt* 'has written' in the ordinary language has supplanted *tra 'wrote' (Simonyi US 365).

A retrospective past time, bearing the same relation to some period in the past as the perfect does to the present, cannot be kept distinct from the before-past (ante-preterit) mentioned above: *had written.*

In the same way what was above called before-future (ante-future) cannot be kept apart from a retrospective future: *will have written.* The periphrasis with forms of the verb *have* seems to indicate that people are inclined to look upon these two tenses as parallel with the perfect rather than with the simple preterit; hence also the terms "past perfect" and "future perfect."

### Inclusive Time.

Not infrequently one may need to speak of something belonging at once to the past and to the present time. Two tenses may be

---

1 R. B. McKerrow (Engl. Grammar and Grammars, in *Essays and Studies by Members of the Engl. Assoc.*, 1922, p. 162) ingeniously remarks that "Caesar had thrown a bridge across the Rhine in the previous autumn" generally means that there was a bridge at the time of which the historian is speaking but that this inference would be neutralized by some addition like "but it had been swept away by the winter floods." In my own terminology *had thrown* in the former case would be a retrospective past, but in the latter a pure before-past.
combined: I was (then) and am (still) an admirer of Mozart | I have been and am an admirer of Mozart. But if an indication of duration is added, we can combine the two into what might be called an inclusive past-and-present. On account of the composite character of this idea some languages use the perfect, like English and Danish, and others the present tense, like German and French: I have known him for two years | jeg har kendt ham i to år | ich kenne ihn seit zwei jahren | je le connais depuis deux ans. Note the difference in the preposition used in the different cases. In Latin we have the same rule as in French, only without a preposition: annum jam audis Cratippum. It is evident that this time relation renders it impossible to find a place for it in our time-series above; but it might be expressed by means of the letters B&A.

Corresponding expressions are found with reference to the past and to the future time: in 1912 I had known him for two years | i 1912 havde jeg kendt ham i to år | in 1912 kannte ich ihn seit zwei jahren | en 1912 je le connaissais depuis deux ans | | next month I shall have known him for two years | næste måned har jeg (vil jeg ha) kendt ham i to år | | im nächsten monat werde ich ihn seit zwei jahren kennen | le mois prochain je le connaîtrai depuis deux ans. It goes without saying that these latter expressions are not very frequent.

Passive Tenses.

It will be well to keep in mind the double-sided character of the perfect when we come to treat of the tenses in the periphrastic passive of the Romanic and Gothonic verbs. In classical Latin, where we had the real present passive in -r: scribitur, the composite form scriptum est is a perfect 'it is written, i.e. has been written, exists now after having been written.' But in the Romanic languages the r-passive has disappeared, and the meaning of the periphrasis has been partly modified. This subject has been treated by Diez (GRS 3. 202) better than by anybody else. He quotes from early documents examples like qua ibi sunt aspecta for aspiciuntur, est possessum for possidetur, and then goes on to divide verbs into two classes. In the first the action is either confined to one single moment, e.g. catch, surprise, awake, leave, end, kill, or imply a final aim (endzweck), e.g. make, bring about, adorn, construct, beat; here the passive participle denotes the action as accomplished and finished, and the combination with sum in Romanic as in Latin is a perfect. Ex. il nemico è battuto, l'ennemi est battu = hostis victus est ; era battuto, io sono abandonato, sorpreso ; la cosa è tolta via. Diez calls these verbs
perfective. The second class (imperfective) comprises verbs denoting an activity which is not begun in order to be finished, e.g. love, hate, praise, blame, admire, see, hear, etc. Here the participle combined with sum denotes present time: egli è amato da tutti, il est aimé de tout le monde = amatur ab omnibus; è biasimato, lodato, odiato, riverito, temuto, veduto. In Romanic as in Latin the participles of the first class by losing their temporal signification tend to become adjectives (eruditus est, terra ornata est floribus). If now the notion of past time has to be attached to those participles which tend to become adjectives, the new participle of esse is used for that purpose: il nemico è stato battuto, l'ennemi a été battu. For the present time the active construction is preferred: batton il nemico, on bat l'ennemi. In It. and Sp. venire may also be used as an auxiliary of the passive for present time.

The distinction between two classes, which Diez thus saw very clearly, has been developed by H. Lindroth in two excellent papers (PBB 31. 238 and Om adjektivering af particip, Lund 1906). Lindroth for the first class uses the term 'successive' (with the subdivisions 'terminative' and 'resultative'), and for the second the term 'cursive.' Even at the risk of seeming needlessly to multiply existing terms I venture to propose the names conclusive and non-conclusive.

In German and Danish, where there are two auxiliaries, werden, blive on the one hand, and sein, være on the other, it does not matter very much whether one or the other is chosen with verbs of the second class (non-conclusive): er wird geliebt (ist geliebt) von jedermann, han bliver elsket (er elsket) av alle = jedermand liebt ihn, alle elsker ham. But with verbs of the first class (conclusive) the auxiliaries denote different tenses: er wird überwunden, han bliver overvundet = man überwindet ihn, man overvinder ham; but er ist überwunden, han er overvundet = man hat ihn überwunden, man har overvundet ham. In the latter case it is possible to denote the perfect passive more explicitly by means of the composite er ist überwunden worden, han er blevet overvundet.

In English the old auxiliary weorðan, corresponding to G. werden, has disappeared, and matters are now pretty much as in French. If first we consider non-conclusive verbs (Diez's second class), we see that when participles like honoured, admired, despised

1 With some non-conclusive verbs there may be a shade of difference in the meaning according as the one auxiliary is used or the other. In Danish we also have the passive in -s: elskes, overvindes, which gives rise to delicate shades of signification in some verbs. —Where venire is used as auxiliary in It., it corresponds to G. werden, Dan. blive: viene pagato is different from è pagato.
are used as adjuncts as in *an honoured colleague*, they say nothing about time and may according to circumstances be used about any time (an honoured colleague of Bacon). The combination *is honoured, is admired*, etc., therefore belongs to the same (present) tense as the simple *is*.

It is different with conclusive participles like *paid, conquered, lost*, etc. In adjunct-combinations they denote the result of past action: *a paid bill, conquered towns, a lost battle*. Combinations with the auxiliary *is* may have two different meanings, according as the perfect-signification inherent in the participle or the present-signification of *is* comes to predominate; cf. the two sentences: his bills are paid, so he owes nothing now (sind bezahlt; he has paid) | his bills are paid regularly on the first of every month (werden bezahlt, he pays). The preterit "his bills were paid" may, of course, have the two corresponding meanings. Cf. the following instances: he was dressed in the latest fashion | the children were dressed every morning by their mother | at that time they were not yet married, but they were married yesterday. I take a final example from a paper by Curme, only modifying it slightly: When I came at five, the door was shut (war geschlossen), but I do not know when it was shut (geschlossen wurde). I think the best way to make the distinction clear is to point out how the opposite statement would run: When I came at five, the door was open (thus the adj.), but I do not know when it was opened.

There is evidently a source of ambiguity here, but it must be recognized that some correctives have been developed in the course of the last few centuries. In the first place the combinations *has been, had been* with a participle, which were rare in Elizabethan English, have become increasingly frequent. Shakespeare very often has *is*, where a modern writer would undoubtedly use *has been*, e.g. Sonn. 76 Spending againe what *is* already spent. . . . So is my loue still telling what *is* told | John IV. 2. 165 Arthur, whom they say *is* kill'd to-night on your suggestion. Thus also in the Authorized Version, e.g. Matt. 5. 10 Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness sake, in the Revised Version: Blessed are they that *have been* persecuted. In the second place the verbs *become* and, especially in colloquial speech, *get*, are more and more used where *be* would be ambiguous, e.g. taking it into his head rather late in life that he must *get married* (Dickens) | "I am engaged to Mr. W."—"You are not engaged to anyone.

1 There is no exact English way of rendering Goethe's "*Was heute nicht geschieht, ist morgen nicht getan*."  
2 In the beginning of St. Luke the A.V. has the following instances, thy prayer is heard | am sent | is borne this day | which was told them | it was revealed, where The Twentieth C. Version has: has been heard | have been sent | has been born | what had been said | it had been revealed.
When you do become engaged to anyone, I or your father will inform you of the fact" (Wilde). Finally the comparatively recent combination *is being* is in some cases available to make the meaning unmistakable. Thus we see that present-day English has no less than three new expressions by the side of the old *the book is read*, namely *the book has been read, gets read, is being read*. This specialization has been an evident gain to the language.

**Aorist and Imperfect.**

We saw above that Lat. *scripsi* besides being a perfect ("have written") was a preterit ("wrote"), but that in the latter capacity it had beside it another preterit *scribebam*. We shall now discuss the difference between these two kinds of preterit, using the names found in Greek grammars, aorist and imperfect. In French grammars, as we have also seen, the aorist is variously termed le passé défini or le passé historique; the latter name (past historic) has been adopted by the Committee on Grammatical Terminology, though the historian seems to require not only that kind of preterit, but also the imperfect.

In Greek, Latin, and the Romanic languages the two tenses are formed from the same verbs by means of different endings. In Slavic, where we have essentially the same distinction, it is brought about in a different way, by means of the distinction between the so-called perfective and imperfective verbs (which terms there mean nearly, though not exactly the same thing as in Diez's terminology above, p. 273). As a rule two verbs stand over against one another, most often, though not always, formed from the same root by means of different suffixes. They supplement one another and make it possible to express temporal shades of meaning though the Slavic verb has only two tenses. This may be thus tabulated:

| perfective verb | present time | future time | preterit
|-----------------|--------------|-------------|-----------
| imperfective verb | present time | imperfect | imperfect |

Now, as to the meaning of the aorist and the imperfect. Both denote past time and they cannot be placed at different points of the time-line drawn, p. 257, for they bear the same relation to the present moment and have no relation to the subdivisions denoted by the prefixes before and after. Nor have they any reference in themselves to the duration of the action concerned, and we cannot say that one is momentary or punctual, and the

1 The following sentences from one of Shaw's plays are interesting, because the emphatic form is wanted in the second speech, and "they are killed" would easily be misunderstood: "No man goes to battle to be killed."

"But they do get killed"
other durative. An indication of length of duration may be added to both, e.g. in: ebāsieuse tessera kai pentēkonta etea 'he reigned fifty-four years' | Lucullus multos annos Asiae praefuit | Louis XIV régna soixante-douze ans et mourut en 1715 | De retour de ces campagnes il fut longtemps malade ; il languit pendant des années entières.

The two tenses correspond to the two meanings of E. then, (1) next, after that, as in “then he went to France” (Dan. dærpa), and (2) 'at that time' as in “then he lived in France” (Dan. dengang). The aorist carries the narrative on, it tells us what happened next, while the imperfect lingers over the conditions as they were at that time and expatiates on them with more or less of prolixity. One tense gives movement, the other a pause. One Latin grammarian, whom I have seen quoted I forget where, expresses this tersely: Perfecto procedit, Imperfecto insistit oratio. Krüger similarly says that the aorist grips (zusammenfasst) and concentrates, the imperfect discloses (entfaltet). Sarauw expands this (KZ 38. 151), saying that in the former “abstraction is made from what is inessential, from the circumstances under which the action took place and from interruptions that may have occurred, and what was really a whole series of actions is condensed into one action, the duration of which is not, however, abbreviated.” It is noteworthy that, as Sarauw emphasizes, an aorist was formed from the imperfective as well as from the perfective verbs in Old Slavic. In the same way French uses its aorist (passé historique) with any verb, no matter what its meaning is. We may perhaps be allowed with some exaggeration to say in the biblical phrase that the imperfect is used by him to whom one day is as a thousand years, and the aorist by him to whom a thousand years are as one day. At any rate we see that terms like the G. “aktionsart” are very wide of the mark: the distinction has no reference to the action itself, and we get much nearer the truth of the matter if we say that it is a difference in the speed of the narrative; if the speaker wants in his presentation of the facts to hurry on towards the present moment, he will choose the aorist; if, on the other hand, he lingers and takes a look round, he will use the imperfect. This tense-distinction is really, therefore, a tempo-distinction: the imperfect is lento and the aorist allegro, or perhaps we should say ritardando and accelerando respectively.

This will make us understand also that there is often a distinctive emotional colouring in the imperfect which is wanting in the aorist tense.

In the composite before-past the corresponding distinction exists in Fr. j’avais écrit and j’eus écrit. Here too ai eu has been
substituted in popular language for *eus,* as in “Quand ma femme a eu trouvée une place, elle a donné son enfant à une vieille pour le ramener au pays” (Daudet).

In the same way as the Latin perfect had two functions, the imperfect in Latin, Romanic, Greek, etc., has two functions, for besides the lingering action we have just been discussing it denotes an habitual action in some past period. Here, therefore, the time-notion is bound up with the idea of repetition, which is really a numerical idea (cf. under Number, p. 210) : the plural idea with regard to the verbal action which is expressed in this use of the imperfect is of the same order as that which finds a stronger expression in iterative or frequentative formations.

We are now in a position to give the following comparative scheme of tenses in some well-known language, line 1 denoting the real perfect, line 2 the aorist, line 3 the habitual imperfect, and line 4 the descriptive imperfect. This survey shows clearly how some languages confuse time distinctions which in others are kept strictly apart.

1. *gegraphe* scripsit *a écrit* has written *hat geschrieben*
2. *egrapse* scripsit *écrivit,* wrote *schrieb*
3. *egraphe* scribebat *écrivait* wrote *schrieb*
4. *egraphe* scribebat *écrivait* was writing *schrieb.*

The English Expanded Tenses.

In the survey just given we found two renderings of Lat. *scribebam* in English, *wrote* for the habitual action, and *was writing* for the descriptive imperfect. Corresponding expressions are found in the present, etc., as English possesses a whole set of composite tense-forms: *is writing,* *was writing,* *has been writing,* *will (shall)* be writing, *will (shall) have been writing,* *would (should) be writing,* *would (should) have been writing,* and in the passive *is being written,* *was being written*—Sweet in his tense system even gives *have been being seen,* *I had been being seen,* *I shall be being seen,* *I should be being seen,* *I shall have been being seen,* though it would certainly be possible to read the whole of English literature without being able to collect half a dozen examples of some of these “forms.” Very much has been written by grammarians about these combinations, which have been called by various names, definite tenses, progressive tenses, continuous tenses. I prefer to call them expanded tenses, because this name is sufficiently descriptive of

---

the formation without prejudging anything with regard to its employment.

With regard to the historical development of these forms I have given a preliminary account of my researches in *Tid og Tempus*, pp. 406-420 with criticism of earlier views, and shall here give only a very short summary. My main result is that the modern construction owes very little to the OE. construction *wæs feohtende*, which in ME. plays no important rôle, but that it arose chiefly through aphesis from the construction of the verbal substantive with the preposition *on*: *is on huntinge*, *is a-hunting*, *is hunting* (as *burst out on weeping*, *a weeping*, *weeping*; *set the clock on going*, *a going*, *going*). This explains the fact that these forms become more common just when aphesis (in *back* from *on bæc, aback,* etc., etc.) became particularly frequent, while it also explains the use of the prep. *of* before an object (still heard in *vugar* speech), and the passive signification in the house *was building*, and—last, not least—it helps us to understand the exact meaning of the expanded tenses in Modern English, which is much more precise than was that of the OE. and ME. participial combinations. We must remember that the preposition *on* was often used where now we say *in*: *he is on hunting* means 'he is in (the middle of) the action of hunting,' and thus contains two elements, first 'being,' with which is connected the time-indication, and second 'hunting,' which forms as it were a frame round 'is.' The action described by the word *hunting* has begun before the moment denoted by *is* (*was*), but has not yet ceased; cf. Fr. *il était à se raser, quand est venu son beau-frère.*

The purport of the expanded tenses is not to express duration in itself, but relative duration, compared with the shorter time occupied by some other action. "Methuselah lived to be more than nine hundred years old"—here we have the unexpanded *lived* indicating a very long time. "He was raising his hand to strike her, when he stopped short"—an action of very short duration expressed by means of the expanded tense. We may represent the relatively long duration by means of a line, in which a point shows the shorter time, either the present moment (which need not always be indicated) or some time in the past, which in most cases has to be specially indicated:

\[ \text{he is writing} \]
\begin{align*}
\uparrow & \\
\text{(now)} & \\
\end{align*}

\[ \text{he was writing} \]
\begin{align*}
\uparrow & \\
\text{when I entered} & \\
\end{align*}

Verbs denoting psychological states, feelings, etc., cannot as a rule be used in the expanded tenses; this is easily explained
if we start from the combination is on -ing, for we can hardly say: he is on (engaged in, occupied in) liking fish, etc. Nevertheless it is possible in speaking of a passing state to say “I am feeling cold.”

The expanded forms of verbs denoting movement, like go, come, must be specially mentioned. They are first used in the ordinary way wherever the verbs have some special signification which does not in itself call up the idea of a beginning movement: My watch has stopped, but the clock is going | things are coming my way now | you are going it, I must say. In the second place they may be used where a single action of coming or going is out of the question: the real hardships are now coming fast upon us | She turned to the window. Her breath was coming quickly | cigarettes were then coming into fashion. But in most cases is coming, is going are used of the future, exactly as the corresponding verbs in many languages acquire the meaning of future time in their present tense (Gr. eimi, etc., see p. 261). The auctioneer will say: Going, going, gone. Thus also: I am going to Birmingham next week | Christmas is coming, the geese are getting fat. Thus we get the expression for a near future: he is going to give up business; even: he is going to go.

Most of the uses of the expanded tenses in Modern English will be covered by the rules given here, and what has been said about the longer time as a frame for something else will be found particularly helpful. Yet it cannot be denied that there are applications which cannot easily be explained in this way, thus many combinations with subjuncts like always, ever, constantly, all day long, all the afternoon. But it is worth mentioning that these were especially frequent in ME., before the great influx of cases arising from the aphesis in a-hunting, etc., changed the whole character of the construction.

It is a natural consequence of the use of the expanded tenses to form a time-frame round something else that they often denote a transitory as contrasted with a permanent state which for its expression requires the corresponding unexpanded tense. The expanded form makes us think of the time-limits, within which something happens, while the simple form indicates no time-limit. Compare then “he is staying at the Savoy Hotel” with “he lives in London,” or “What are you doing for a living? I am writing for the papers” with “What do you do for a living? I write for the papers.” Habits must generally be expressed by the unexpanded tenses; see, e.g., the following sentences: A great awe seemed to have fallen upon her, and she was behaving as she behaved in church | Now he dines at seven, but last year he dined at half-past | Thanks, I don’t smoke (cp. I am not smoking).
But if the habitual action is viewed as a frame for something else, the expanded tense is required: I realize my own stupidity when I am playing chess with him. Every morning when he was having his breakfast his wife asked him for money (while complete coextension in time may be expressed by expanded preterit in both sentences: "Every morning when he was having his breakfast his dog was staring at him").

The use of the expanded form to express the transitory in contrast to the permanent state has in quite recent times been extended to the simple verb be, though the distinction between "he is being polite" of the present moment and "he is polite" of a permanent trait of his character is only now beginning to be observed. But it is curious to see how in other languages the same distinction is sometimes expressed by means which have nothing to do with the tense system of the verb. In Danish av sig in some cases serves to mark the quality as a characteristic trait (han er bange av sig 'he is naturally timid'), while han er bange means that he is afraid at the present moment; but the addition has a very limited sphere of application. In Spanish we have the distinction between the two verbs meaning 'to be,' ser for the generic, and estar for the individual time: mi hermano es muy activo 'my brother is very active' | mi hermano está enfermo 'my brother is ill'; I find a good example in Calderon, Alc. de Zal. 3. 275 Tu hija soy, sin honra estoy 'I am your daughter, but am dishonoured.' With other verbs we have the expansion nearly as in English: él está comiendo 'he is dining' | él come a las siete 'he dines at seven.' In Russian the predicative is put in the nominative if generic time is meant: on byl kupec 'he was a merchant' (permanently), but in the instrumental if an individual time is meant: on byl kupcom 'he was (for the time being) a merchant'; this distinction, however, applies to substantives only, adjective predicatives being always put in the nominative. On a similar distinction in modern Irish see H. Pedersen, GKS 2. 76. In Finnish the predicative is put in the nominative if a generic time is meant: isäni on kipeä 'my father is ill' (permanently, is an invalid), but otherwise in the essive: isäni on kipeänä 'my father is ill' (at the moment). (See also the chapter on Case, p. 183.)

Finally we have to consider the passive construction in the obsolete the house is building, and in the still usual "while the tea was brewing | my MS. is now copying." In my previous paper I have stated my reasons for disbelief in the early occurrence of this construction, as well as in the theory that these constructions have their origin in the rotationally passive use of English verbs (his

1 Cf. It. sta mangiando.
prose *reads* like poetry | it lookes ill, it *eates* drily, marry 'tis a wither'd pear (Sh.). This latter use may assist in explaining some examples of *is* -*ing* (preparing, brewing, maturing), but not all, and in particular not the one which is perhaps of most frequent occurrence: the house *is building*, for it is impossible to say the house *builds* in a passive sense. The chief source of the construction is in my view the combination *on* with the verbal substantive in -*ing*, which as other verbal substantives is in itself neither active nor passive (see above, p. 172) and therefore admits the passive interpretation (cp. the house *is in construction*). Combinations with the preposition *a* were not at all rare in former times in the passive signification: as this *was a doyng* (Malory) | there *is some ill a-brewing* towards my rest (Sh.) | while my mittimus *was a making* (Bunyan). This naturally explains the construction in: while grace *is saying* | while meat *was bringing in*. There is decidedly a difference between "my periwigg that *was mending* there" (Pepys) and "he *is now mending* rapidly," for in the latter, but not in the former case, the unexpanded forms *mends*, *mended*, may be used. Compare also "while something *is dressing* for our dinner" (Pepys) and "while George *was dressing* for dinner" (cf. George dresses for dinner).

Just as the ambiguity of some other combinations with the substantive in -*ing* in its original use as neither active nor passive gave rise to the comparatively recent construction with *being* (foxes enjoy hunting, but do not enjoy being hunted), it was quite natural that the older construction *is building* should be restricted to the active sense, and that a new *is being built* should come into existence. It is well known that this clumsy, but unambiguous construction began to appear towards the end of the eighteenth century, and that it met with violent opposition in the nineteenth century before it was finally acknowledged as a legitimate part of the English language.

Terms for the Tenses.

A final word about terminology. With the extensive use of various auxiliaries in modern languages it becomes impossible or at any rate impracticable to have a special term for all possible combinations, the more so as many of them have more than one function (*he would go* in "He would go if he could" is different from the shifted *I will go* in "He said he would go to-morrow"). Why should the combinations *would go* and *would have gone* have special terms rather than *might go* and *might have gone*, or *dared go*, etc.? The only reason is that these forms serve to translate simple tense-forms of certain other languages. There is really no
necessity for such terms as the "Future Perfect in the Past" for *would have written*, which, as we have seen, in its chief employment has nothing whatever to do with future time, and which still retains some trace of the original meaning of volition in its first element. If we give *I shall write, you will write, he will write* as a paradigm of the future tense, we meet with difficulties when we come to consider *he shall write* in "he says that he shall write" as a shifted (indirect) "I shall write." It is really easier to make our pupils understand all these things if we take each auxiliary by itself and see its original and its later weakened meaning, and then on the other hand show how futurity (future time) is expressed by various devices in English, sometimes by a weakened *will* (volition), sometimes by a weakened *shall* or *is to* (obligation), sometimes by other means (*is coming*), and how very often it is implied in the context without any formal indication. Thus we shall say, not that *I shall go* and *he will go* are "a future tense," but that they contain an auxiliary in the present tense and the infinitive. The only instance in which there is perhaps some ground for a special tense-name is *have written* (*had written*), because the ordinary meaning of *have* is here totally lost and because the combination serves exclusively to mark one very special time-relation. But even here it might be questioned whether it would not be better to do without the term "perfect."

**Time-Relations in Nouns (including Infinitives).**

After thus dealing in detail with time-relations as expressed by means of tenses in finite verbs, it remains to examine whether similar grammatical phenomena may not be found outside this domain. It is, of course, possible to imagine a language so constructed that we might see from the form of the word whether the sunset we are speaking about belongs to the past, to the present, or to the future. In such a language the words for 'bride, wife, widow' would be three tense-forms of the same root. We may find a first feeble approximation to this in the prefix *ex-,* which in recent times has come into common use in several European languages: *ex-king, ex-roi,* etc. Otherwise we must have recourse to adjuncts of various kinds: *the late Lord Mayor; a future Prime Minister; an owner, present or prospective, of property; he dreamt of home, or of what was home once; the life to come;* she was already the *expectant* mother of his child, etc. In a novel I find the combination "governors and ex-governors and prospective governors."  

1 Cf. with an adjective: "this august or once-august body."
In some far-off languages tense-distinctions of substantives are better represented. Thus, in the Alaska Eskimo we find that *ningla* 'cold, frost,' has a preterit *ninglithluk* and a future *ningli-kak,* and from *puyok* 'smoke' is formed a preterit *puyuthluk* 'what has been smoke,' and a future *puyoqkak* 'what will become smoke,' an ingenious name for gunpowder (Barnum, Grammatical Fundamentals of the Inuit Language of Alaska, Boston, 1901, p. 17). Similarly in other American languages. Thus the prefix *-neen* in Athapascan (Hupa) denotes past time both in substantives and verbs, e.g. *xontaneen* 'a house in ruins,' *xoutneen* 'his deceased wife' (Boas, Handbook of American Indian Languages, Washington, 1911, pp. 105, 111; cf. also Uhlenbeck, Grammatische onderscheidingen in het Algonkinsch, Amsterdam Ac. 1909).

It would seem natural to have tense-indications in those nouns that are derived from, and closely connected with, verbs. Yet agent-nouns generally are as indifferent to time as other substantives: though *creator* most often means 'he who has created' this is by no means necessary, and *baker, liar, beggar, reader,* etc., tell us nothing of the time when the action takes place.1 In most cases habitual action is implied, but there are exceptions (in English more often than in Danish), e.g. *the speaker, the sitter* = the person who sits for his portrait.

With active participles some languages have developed tense-distinctions, e.g. Gr. *graphōn, grapsōn, grapsas, geographōs,* Lat. *scribens, scripturus.* The Gothic languages have only one active participle, G. *schreibend,* E. *writing,* cf. also in Romanic languages It. *scrivendo,* Fr. *écrivant,* which is generally called the present participle, though it is really no more present than any other tense, the time-notion being dependent on the tense of the main verb; cf. "I saw a man sitting on a stone | I see a man sitting on a stone | you will see a man sitting on a stone." Note also the phrase "for the time being." The composite form *having written,* *ayant écrit* better deserves its name of perfect participle.

With regard to the participle found, for instance, in It. *scritto,* Fr. *écrit,* E. *written,* G. *geschrieben,* etc., some remarks on the time-relation indicated by it have already been given above, p. 272. The usual term, the past participle, or the perfect participle, may be suitable in some cases, e.g. *printed* books, but is inadequate, for instance, in "Judged by this standard, the system is perfect | He can say a few words in broken English | My beloved brethren | he is expected every moment | many books are printed every year in England," etc. Some grammarians, seeing this terminological

---

1 Accordingly, agglutinations of agent nouns with *is,* etc., may develop, according to circumstances, into either future or perfect tenses. Examples from various languages, see L. Hammerich, *Arkiv för nord. filol.* 38. 48 ff
difficulty, use the words active and passive participle for writing and written, and this is correct, so far as the former is concerned (apart from the old-fashioned the house building now = a-building); but the other participle is not always passive in its character. It is distinctively active in "a well-read man | a well-spoken lad | mounted soldiers | he is possessed of landed propriety," and even if the participle was passive in the original construction underlying the composite perfect (I have caught a fish, originally 'I have a fish (as) caught'), this has long ago ceased to be true, as we see in "I have lost it" and especially with intransitive verbs "I have slept, come, fallen, been," where the whole combination is undoubtedly active. Bréal (S 224) goes so far as to say that the participle itself has (par contagion) become active, which he proves by the fact that one writes in telegraphic style: "Reçu de mauvaises nouvelles. Pris la ligne directe." As there is therefore no really descriptive name possible for the two participles as used in actual language, I see no other way out of the terminological difficulty than the not very satisfactory method of numbering the forms, calling the -ing- participle the first and the other the second participle.

Nexus-substantives do not as a rule any more than other substantives admit of any indication of time-relations; his movement may according to circumstances correspond in meaning to he moves, he moved, he will move. Similarly on account of his coming may be equivalent to 'because he comes' or 'came' or 'will come.' I intend seeing the doctor refers to the future, I remember seeing the doctor to the past. But from ab. 1600 the composite form with having has been in use, as in "He thought himself happy in having found a man who knew the world" (Johnson).

The infinitive, as we have mentioned above, p. 139 f., is an old verbal substantive, and it still has something of the old indifference to time-distinctions: I am glad to see her refers to present time, I was glad to see her to past, and I am anxious to see her to future time. But in some languages, for instance Greek, tense-forms have developed in the infinitive; cf. also Lat. scripsisse by the side of scribere. This perfect infinitive has been given up in the Romance languages, in which we have now the composite perfect

1 In some combinations an infinitive with to may be regarded as a kind of substitute for the missing future participle, as in "a chapter in a book soon to appear in London," the passive "a book soon to be published by Macmillan"; cf. also "A National Tricolor Flag; victorious, or to be victorious, in the cause of civil and religious liberty" (Carlyle). In It. "Non c'era nessuna tavoletta, né abbozzata, né da abbozzare" (Giacosa).

2 The infinitive also refers to a (relative) future when a purpose is indicated, as in He said this (in order) to convert the other, and in the related use in In 1818 Shelley left England never to return, where it denotes the after-past time mentioned p. 262.
infinitive Fr. *avoir écrit*, etc.; the corresponding composite form is also found in the Gothic languages, E. (to) *have written*, G. *geschrieben* (zu) *haben*.

The English perfect infinitive corresponds not only to the perfect (*'Tis better to have loved and lost Than never to have loved at all*), but also to an ordinary preterit (*You meant that? I suppose I must have meant that*) and to an ante-future (future perfect: *This day week I hope to have finished my work*). It was formerly used fairly often to indicate an intention which was not carried into effect (*With that Leander stoopt to have imbrac'd her, But from his spreading arms away she cast her.—Marlowe*); this cannot be separated from its use corresponding to the preterit of unreality, a use which is generally overlooked by grammarians, but which presents more features of interest than I can here point out; I must content myself with giving a few of my examples without classification and without any comment: To *have fallen* into the hands of the savages, had been as bad (*Defoe, = it would have been as bad if I had fallen*) | it would have been wiser to *have left us* (*Ruskin*) | it would have been extremely interesting to *have heard* Milton's opinion (*Saintsbury*) | a Jew would have wept to *have seen* our parting (*Sh.*) | she would have made Hercules *have turned* spit (*Sh.*) | she was old enough to *have made* it herself (*Lamb*) | it seems likely to *have been* a desirable match for Jane (*Miss Austin, = that it would have been*) | We were to *have gone and seen* Coleridge to-morrow (*Carlyle*). The form of the infinitive in the phrase *it would have been better for him to have stayed outside* implies (in the same way as *if he had stayed*) that he did not stay outside, which the simple *to stay in* *it would have been better for him to stay outside* does not; the latter infinitive is just as "neutral" with regard to the question of reality or unreality as *staying outside would have been better*; similarly he ought to *have come here* implies that he has not come, as compared with *he ought to come here*.

Hence we find as synonymous expressions *I should like to have seen* and *I should have liked to have seen*¹ by the side of *I should have liked to see*. In some composite verbal expressions the indication of the past might in itself with equal reason be added to either verb: to E. *he could have done it* and Dan. *han kunde ha gjort det* corresponds Fr. *il aurait pu le faire*, G. *er hätte es tun können*.² In Dan. we may also say *han havde kunnet gøre det*, but this is not possible in English, as *can* has no participle; for

¹ In this as well as in some of the above-mentioned instances grammarians consider the perfect inf. as a redundancy or as an error.
² Cp. also Tobler VB 2. 38 ff.: *il a dû venir 'er muss gekommen sein,' il a pu oublier = *il peut avoir oublié*, etc.
the same reason the perfect infinitive has to be used in *he might* (must, should, would, ought to) have done it.

Instead of saying *you needed not say that* (cf. G. "das brauchten Sie nicht zu sagen"), which denies the necessity in the past time, it is now customary to shift the time-indication on to the infinitive: *you needn't have said that*.

The opposite shifting is found in *I shall hope to see you to-morrow*, which really means a present hope of a future visit; as there is no future infinitive in English, the sign of the future is added to *hope* instead.\(^1\)

**Aspect.**

I must here very briefly deal with a subject which has already been touched upon and which has been very warmly discussed in recent decades, namely what has generally in English been called the *aspect* of the verb, and in German *akteursart*, though some writers would use the two terms for two different things. It is generally assumed that our Aryan languages had at first no real forms in their verbs for tense-distinctions, but denoted various aspects, perfective, imperfective, punctual, durative, inceptive, or others, and that out of these distinctions were gradually evolved the tense-systems which we find in the oldest Aryan languages and which are the foundation of the systems existing to-day. Scholars took this idea of aspect from Slavic verbs, where it is fundamental and comparatively clear and clean-cut, but when they began to find something similar to this in other languages, each of them as a rule partially or wholly rejected the systems of his predecessors and set up a terminology of his own, so that nowadays it would be possible, had one the time and inclination, to give a very long list of terms, many of them with two or three or even more definitions, some of which are not at all easy to understand.\(^2\) Nor have these writers always distinguished the four possible expressions for 'aspects,' (1) the ordinary meaning of the verb itself, (2) the occasional meaning of the verb as occasioned by context or situation, (3) a derivative suffix, and (4) a tense-form. In thus criticizing my predecessors, I may seem to some to live in a glass-house, for I am now going to give

---

\(^1\) With these shiftings may be compared *I can't seem to remember* instead of *I seem not to can remember* on account of the missing infinitive of *can*.

\(^2\) The following is a list of what are, if I am not mistaken, the chief works and articles on this subject: Miklosich, Vergl. Gr. d. slav. spr. Vol. IV.—Streitberg PBB 15. 71 ff.—Herbig IF 6. 157 ff. (with good bibliography).—Delbrück, Synt. 2. 1. ff., cf. Streitberg, IF Anz. 11. 56 ff.—H. Pedersen KZ 37. 220 ff.—Sarauw KZ 38. 145 ff.—Lindroth, see above p. 273.—Noreen VS 5. 607 ff. and 645 ff.—Deutschbein Est 54. 79 ff.—Pollack PBB 44. 352 ff.—Wackernagel VS 1. 153.—On the terminological confusion see also H. Pedersen IF Anz. 12. 152.
my own classification, which after all may not be much better than previous attempts. Still I venture to hope that it may be taken as a distinctively progressive step, that I do not give the following system as representing various "aspects" or "aktionsarten" of the verb, but expressly say that the different phenomena which others have brought together under this one class (or these two classes) should not from a purely notional point of view be classed together, but should rather be distributed into totally different pigeonholes. This, then, is how I should divide and describe these things.

(1) The tempo-distinction between the aorist and the imperfect; this affects (independently of the signification of the verb itself) the tense-form in some languages; see above, p. 276.

(2) The distinction between conclusive and non-conclusive verbs. Here the meaning of the verb affects the meaning of the second participle in Romance and Gothonic languages, and thus has influence on the time-meaning of passive combinations; see above, p. 272.

(3) The distinction between durative or permanent and punctual or transitory. We have seen above that this is one of the functions of the English distinction between unexpanded and expanded tenses, and that the same distinction is in other languages expressed by totally different means.

(4) The distinction between finished and unfinished. This latter is one of the functions of the expanded forms in English: he was writing a letter, as compared with he wrote a letter; in Dan. it is often expressed by means of the preposition på: han skrev på et brev; cf. G. an etwas arbeiten.

(5) The distinction between what takes place only once, and repeated or habitual action or happening. As already remarked, this really belongs to the chapter about "number." Habitual action is very frequently not expressed separately ("he doesn't drink"); in some languages we have suffixes to express it, in which case we speak of iterative or frequentative verbs. Many E. verbs in -er and -le belong here: totter, chatter, babble, etc.

(6) The distinction between stability and change. Sometimes we have a pair of corresponding verbs, such as have: get, be: become (and its synonyms: get, turn, grow). Hence the two kinds of passive mentioned p. 274 above (be married, get married). Most verbs derived from adjectives denote a change (becoming): ripen, slow (down), and a change is also implied in the transitive verbs of corresponding formation: flatten, weaken, etc. (causatives).

1 In the predicative Finnish has a separate case-form (the translative) after verbs denoting a change or becoming.

2 Many of these formations are used both transitively and intransitively.
But a state is expressed by the verb *halt* = 'be lame' (from the obsolete adj. *halt*). Many verbs denote both state and change; in *lie down* the latter meaning is denoted by the adverb. There are other ways of expressing similar changes: *fall asleep, go to sleep, get to know, begin to look*, cp. the states: *sleep, know, look*. Some languages have special derivative endings to express change into a state, or beginning (inchoative, inceptive, ingressive verbs). But it is interesting to notice how this signification of beginning has often in course of time been weakened or lost; thus in the Romanic verbs derived from the Latin inchoatives in *-isco*, e.g.

- Fr. *je finis, je punis*, whence E. *finish, punish*.
- Similarly ME. *gan* lost its original force, and *he gan look* came to mean simply 'he did look, he looked.'
- To is used with a predicative at first only when a change is implied (*take her to wife*), but later also without this meaning (*he had her to wife*); similarly in Dan. *til*.

The opposite kind of change, where some state ceases, is sometimes expressed by a separate formation, as in G. *verblühen*, Dan. *avblomstre* 'cease blooming,' but generally by means of such verbs as *cease, stop*.

Note the three expressions for (a) change into a state: (b) being in the state: (c) change from the state, in *fall in love with (begin to love): be in love with (love): fall out of love with (cease to love) | fall asleep: sleep: wake (wake up)*. But *wake* in that sense may also be considered as 'change into a state,' the corresponding stability-verb being *to be awake*, or sometimes *wake* (cp. Danish *vågne: våge = Fr. s'éveiller: veiller*).

(7) The distinction according to the implication or non-implication of a result. The G. compounds with *er-* frequently are resultative, e.g. *ersteigen*, and this is generally given as one of the chief examples of "perfektivierung durch zusammensetzung"; but it is difficult to see why, for instance, *ergreifen* should be more perfective than the simple *greifen*.

I think it would be better to do without the terms perfective and imperfective except in dealing with the Slavic verb, where they have a definite sense and have long been in universal use. In other languages it will be well in each separate instance to examine carefully what is the meaning of the verbal expression concerned, and whether it is due to the verb itself, to its prefix or suffix, to its tense-form, or to the context. Different things are comprised under the term perfective. If, thus, we analyze the interesting collection of Gothic instances with the prefix *ga*- which is given by Streitberg, *Gotisches elementarbuch*, 5th ed. 1920, p. 196, we shall see that "perfectivation" here means, first,

---

1 Thus Ido: *staceskas* 'rises' (*stacas* 'stands'), *sideskas* 'sits down, *jaceskas* 'lies down, *dormeskas* 'goes to sleep,' *redeskas* 'blushes,' etc.
finishing: swalt lay a dying, gaswalt was dead, saqq was setting, gasaqq set (above, No. 4)—second, change: slepan be asleep, gaslepan fall asleep, pahan be silent, gapahan become silent, and others (above, No. 6)—third, obtaining through the action: fraihnan ask, gasfraihnan learn by asking, rinnan run, garinnan durch das laufen erreichen, erringen. This is akin to No. 7 above, though it is not exactly the same thing, for he who ersteigt a mountain does not gain the mountain. On the other hand, it has some connexion with what was above, p. 159, termed object of result, as in dig a hole (cp. dig the garden), but has evidently nothing to do with time- or tense-distinctions.

1 We see the same in OE. winnan fight, gewinnan obtain by fighting; in later English the prefix ge- was lost, and the verb retained only the signification of gewinnan, without the idea of fighting. Most of the examples of Gothic hausjan, gahausan, saihwan, gasaihwan should be ranged with our No. 6 (get to hear, get to see, obtain the sight of), thus wildedun saihwan patei jus saihwip jah ni gasaihwan desired to see what you see, but did not get to see it. But the distinction is not always clear, and in the following line (Luke 10. 24) the text has jah hausjan patei jus gahausip jah ni hausidedun, where Streitberg boldly emends into hauseip jah ni gahausidedun. In 14. 35, too, he alters the MS. reading to bring about a consistency which was possibly far from the mind of Wulfilas.
CHAPTER XXI

DIRECT AND INDIRECT SPEECH


Two Kinds.

When one wishes to report what someone else says or has said (thinks or has thought)—or what one has said or thought oneself on some previous occasion—two ways are open to one.

Either one gives, or purports to give, the exact words of the speaker (or writer): direct speech (oratio recta).

Or else one adapts the words according to the circumstances in which they are now quoted: indirect speech (oratio obliqua).

The direct speech (direct discourse) may be preceded by some sentence like “He said” or “She asked,” etc., but very frequently the reference to the speaker is inserted after some part of the reported speech: “I wonder, she said (or, said she), what will become of us?” Latin has a separate word for ‘say’ which is used only in such insertions, inquam, inquit.

The direct quotation is an outcome of the same psychological state with its vivid imagination of the past that calls forth the “dramatic present tense” (p. 258). Hence we often find that tense employed in the inserted “says he, say(s) I” instead of “said.”

There are two kinds of indirect speech (indirect discourse), which I shall call dependent and represented speech. The former is generally made dependent on an immediately preceding verb, “he said (thought, hoped, etc.)” or “he asked (wondered, wanted to know, had no idea, etc.),” while in the second class this is as a rule understood from the whole connexion.

What is meant by the second kind of indirect speech may perhaps be best shown by an example. After Pendennis has been “plucked” at the University, Thackeray writes (p. 238): “I don’t envy Pen’s feelings as he thought of what he had done. He had slept, and the tortoise had won the race. He had marred at its outset what might have been a brilliant career. He had

1 Termed by Lorck “berichtete rede” (see his pamphlet Die erlebte rede, Heidelberg, 1921).
dipped ungenerously into a generous mother’s purse; basely and recklessly spilt her little cruse. Oh! it was a coward hand that could strike and rob a creature so tender. . . . Poor Arthur Pendennis felt perfectly convinced that all England would remark the absence of his name from the examination lists, and talk about his misfortune. His wounded tutor, his many duns, the under­graduates of his own time and the years below him, whom he had patronised and scorned—how could he bear to look any of them in the face now? ” A few pages farther on we read of his mother: “All that the Rector could say could not bring Helen to feel any indignation or particular unhappiness, except that the boy should be unhappy. What was this degree that they made such an outcry about, and what good would it do Pen? Why did Doctor Portman and his uncle insist upon sending the boy to a place where there was so much temptation to be risked, and so little good to be won? Why didn’t they leave him at home with his mother? As for his debts, of course they must be paid;—his debts!—wasn’t his father’s money all his, and hadn’t he a right to spend it? In this way the widow met the virtuous Doctor,” etc.

It is not easy to find an adequate descriptive name for indirect discourse of this kind. Lorck rightly rejects Tobler’s term (mingling of direct and indirect discourse), Kalepky’s (veiled speech, ver­scheierte rede) and Bally’s (style indirect libre), but his own term “erlebte rede,” which might perhaps be rendered “experi­enced speech,” does not seem much better. I have found no better term than “represented speech.” (In German I should say “vorgestellte rede” and in Danish “forestillet tale.”) 1

Bally thought that this phenomenon was peculiar to French, but Lerch and Lorck give a great many German instances, though thinking that in German it may be due to French influence, especially to that of Zola(!). But it is very frequent in England (where it is found long before Zola’s time, for instance in Jane Austen) and in Denmark, probably also in other countries (I have recently found Spanish examples), and it seems on the whole so natural that it may easily have come into existence independently in different places. It is chiefly used in long connected narratives where the relation of happenings in the exterior world is inter­rupted—very often without any transition like “he said” or “he thought”—by a report of what the person mentioned was saying or thinking at the time, as if these sayings or thought were the immediate continuation of the outward happenings. The writer does not experience or “live” (erleben) these thoughts or

1 Curme GG (1st ed. p. 248, 2nd ed. p. 245, not mentioned by Lorck) calls it “Independent form of direct discourse.”
Represented speech is more vivid on the whole than the first class of indirect speech. As it is nearer to direct speech, it retains some of its elements, especially those of an emotional nature, whether the emotion is expressed in intonation or in separate words like "Oh!", "Alas!", "Thank God!", etc.

The adaptation to changed circumstances which is characteristic of indirect speech is effected by the following means:

- the person is shifted,
- the tense is shifted,
- the mood is shifted,
- the form of a question is changed,
- the form of a command or request is changed.

It is chiefly in the last two kinds of changes that the difference between dependent and represented speech is seen. The shifting of person has already been considered in Ch. XVI; here we shall deal with the others.

**Shifting of Tenses.**

Corresponding to

1. I am ill
2. I saw her the other day
3. I have not yet seen her
4. I shall soon see her, and then everything will be all right
5. I shall have finished by noon

indirect discourse has the shifted tenses in

- (1) he was ill (indirect present)
- (2) he had seen her the other day (indirect preterit)
- (3) he had not seen her yet (indirect perfect)
- (4) he should soon see her, and then everything would be all right (indirect future)
- (5) he should have finished by noon (indirect before-future).

The ante-preterit cannot be further shifted: "I had already seen her before she nodded" becomes "He said that he had already seen her before she nodded." The preterit of unreality is often left unshifted, "He said that he would pay if he could" may thus be a rendering of "I would pay if I could" as well as of "I will pay if I can." As *must* has now only one form, it is unchanged in indirect discourse: "He said that he must leave at once" = "He said: I must leave at once." This is practically the only
SHifting of Tenses 293

way in which must can be used as a preterit in modern colloquial speech.

It will be seen that the indirect preterit and the indirect perfect are formally identical with the ante-preterit (before-past); and the indirect future is formally identical with the conditional; thus also in French j'écrirais fulfils the two functions of conditional (j'écrirais si je savais son adresse) and of indirect simple future (il disait qu'il écrirait le plus tôt possible = the direct: j'écrirai le plus tôt possible).

If we now ask what is the relation between these indirect tenses and the series of tenses established above (p. 257), the answer is that they should not be placed in that series, where they have nothing to do, being orientated with another zero-point ("then") than that of the original series ("now"). A sentence like "(He said that) he should come as soon as he could" tells us nothing about the moment of his coming in its relation to the present time, but only in its relation to the time when he spoke. He may already have come, or he may be coming just now, or at some future time—all this is left undecided, and the only thing we are now told is that when he spoke he mentioned his coming as due to happen at some time which then belonged to the future.

Nor is it necessary to have special terms for the tenses arising from this shifting. The NED (shall 14b) speaks of the "anterior future" or "future in the past" in "he had expected that he should be able to push forward"—this is simply a shifted (or indirect) future, and of the "anterior future perfect," no example is given, but the reference must be to cases like "he said that he should have dined by eight," which is = the direct: "I shall have dined by eight," thus a shifted (or indirect) before-future time (or, if it is to be designated as a tense: a shifted or indirect ante-future tense).

The shifting of tenses in indirect speech is very natural and in many cases even inevitable: He told me that he was ill, but now he is all right—here the use of the preterit was is motivated by the actual facts of the matter, and was is at the same time the direct past and the indirect present. But this is not always the case, and very often the verb is put in the preterit for no other reason than that the main verb is in that tense and that the speaker does not stop the current of his speech to deliberate whether the thing mentioned belongs to this or that period of time, measured from the present moment. Van Ginneken mentions this: "Je ne savais pas qui il était. Est-ce que je veux dire par-là qu'il est quelque autre maintenant ? Nullement. Était se trouve là par inertie, et par savait seul on comprend qu'il faut entendre la chose ainsi : était et est encore" (LP 499). Or rather, we might say,
it is left unsaid whether things are now as they were. "I told you he was ill"—he may still be ill, or he may have recovered. In the following instances it is the nature of the thing signified more than the words that shows that the present time is meant, but the shifting is perfectly natural: What did you say your name was? | I didn’t know you knew Bright | How did you know I was here? The last example is particularly interesting on account of the *contradictio in adjecto* between his presence here and the form *was*: I am here now, but how did you know that?

It requires some mental effort to leave the preterit and use the more logical present tense, even where one has to enounce some universal truth. We cannot, therefore, expect that speakers will always be consistent in their practice with regard to the *consecutio temporum*. We may hesitate in a case like this: "He told us that an unmarried man was (or, is) only half a man," but we should probably prefer the unshifted in: "It was he who taught me that twice two is four."

The use of the unshifted present here implies that the actual speaker is himself convinced of the truth of the assertion, whereas the shifting of the tense also shifts the responsibility for the saying on to the original speaker; hence the difference in "He told us that it *was* sometimes lawful to kill" (but he may have been wrong) and "I did not know then that it *is* sometimes lawful to kill" (but it is). Note the preterit in Falstaff’s “Did I say you were an honest man?” with the continuation: “Setting my knighthood and my soldiership aside, I had lyed in my throat, if I had said so.” Sometimes the tone of the sentence is decisive: “I thought he was married” with one intonation means ‘I now find that I was mistaken in thinking him married,’ and with another ‘Of course he is married, and didn’t I tell you so?’

The present subjunctive is not shifted to a preterit in reports of proposals made at meetings, etc.: He moved that the bill be read a second time. Here the form *be* is felt as indicating futurity and therefore as more adequate than *were*, which would rather imply something unreal or hypothetical; in other verbs there would be no difference in the preterit between the indicative and the subjunctive, and so the form of the proposal is kept unchanged in spite of the conjunction *that*.\(^1\)

\(^1\) In Russian the rule prevails that in indirect discourse the same tense is used that would be used in direct discourse; the only shifting, therefore, is of person. This rule, which must always be felt as rather unnatural by Western Europeans, was (like several other Slavisms) introduced into Esperanto by its creator, Dr. Zamenhof, and from Esperanto it was taken over into Ido, where it is now taught that ‘He said that he loved—that he had heard—that he should come’ has to be rendered by means of the present, the preterit, and the future respectively: *il dicis ke il amas*—*ke il audis*—*ke il venos*. The only thing to be advanced in favour of this rather artificial
In most cases of shifted tenses the main verb refers to some

time in the past; but we may have similar shiftings after a main

verb in the future, though this will be rarer. When we imagine

a person, who is now absent, saying at some future date "I regret

I was not with them then," we naturally say "He will regret

that he is not with us now." But Henry V in Shakespeare (IV.

3. 64) uses the preterit that belongs to the direct speech of the
gentlemen concerned (though he says here, which implies his own

standpoint): And gentlemen in England, now a bed, Shall thinke

themselves accurst they were not here, And hold their manhods

cheape, whiles any speakes, That fought with vs vpon Saint Cris-
pines day. This reminds one of the Latin "epistòary tenses,"
in which the writer of a letter transports himself to the time when
it will be read, and therefore uses the imperfect or perfect where
to us the present tense is the only natural one.

Shifting of Mood.

The shifting of mood from the indicative to some other mood
in indirect speech is not found in modern English and Danish,
but in other related languages. Latin makes an extensive use of
the accusative with infinitive in what in direct discourse would be
a principal clause, as well as in the more independent of subordinate
clauses, and of the subjunctive in other dependent clauses. Other
languages have other rules, and the use of the subjunctive, or
optative, mood in indirect speech shows such marked divergencies
in the various ancient languages of our family that it seems to have
developed independently at different places for different reasons.
T. Frank (in *Journal of Engl. and Germ. Philol.* 7. 64 ff.), while
rejecting earlier "metaphysical" explanations from the nature
of "subjectivity" and "potentiality," gives good reasons for
supposing that the use of the subjunctive in the Gothonic languages
is a gradual extension by analogy from its use in clauses dependent
on such verbs as Goth. wenjan, OE. wenan, G. wählen, which
at first meant "hope, desire" and therefore naturally required
the optative. It was retained when the verbs came to mean
‘imagine, think,’ and then transferred to other verbs meaning
‘think, say,’ etc.

The development of the forms of indirect discourse in German
is particularly instructive, because it is governed by various and
often conflicting tendencies: the tendency to harmonize the tense

rule is that otherwise it would perhaps be necessary to create a special tense-
form for the shifted future, for it would be against the logical spirit of such
a language to use the same form for the shifted future as for the conditional
(venus) as our Western languages do (viendrait, should come, würde kommen).
with that of the main verb (expressed or understood) and on the other hand the tendency to keep the same tense as in the original statement, further the tendency to use the subjunctive mood as an indication of doubt or uncertainty, the tendency to use the subjunctive simply as a mark of subordination even where no doubt is implied, and finally the general tendency to restrict the use of the subjunctive and to use the indicative instead. Now, as the power of these tendencies varies in different periods and in different parts of the country, German writers and German grammarians do not always agree as to which form to use and to recommend. As a matter of fact we find in actual use:

- Er sagt, dass er krank ist.
- Er sagt, er ist krank.
- Er sagt, dass er krank sei.
- Er sagt, er sei krank.
- Er sagt, dass er krank wäre.
- Er sagt, er wäre krank.
- Er sagte, dass er krank war.
- Er sagte, er war krank.
- Er sagte, dass er krank sei.
- Er sagte, dass er krank wäre.
- Er sagte, er wäre krank.

(See, e.g., Delbrück GNS 73 ff., Behaghel, Die zeitfolge der abhängigen rede, 1878, Curme GG 237.) Of course, matters are not quite so chaotic as might be inferred from this list, but I have no space for detailed explanation. I want, however, to call attention to the effect of the desire for unmistakable forms, even at the cost of consistency, which is excellently stated by Curme as follows:

"Altho the new sequence [i.e. the same tense in the indirect as in the direct discourse] may be followed . . . it is more common to employ it only where its subjunctive forms are clearly distinguished from the corresponding indicative forms, and elsewhere to use the old historic sequence. Thus, as the past tense distinguishes the subjunctive more clearly than the present tense, a present tense form . . . is regularly replaced after a past tense by a past tense form . . . wherever the present is not a clear subjunctive: Sokrates erklärte, alles, was er wisse, sei, dass er nichts wisse; v ele wüssten (the present subjunctive would be like the indicative) aber auch dies nicht. Sie sagten, sie hatten (a past tense form instead of the present tense form haben) es nicht getan. Sie sagten, sie würden (a past tense form instead of the present tense form werden) morgen kommen. So strong is the feeling that a clear subjunctive form should be used, that a past tense form is used instead
of a present tense form even after a present tense, if a clear subjunctive form is thus secured: *Sie sagen, sie hätten es nicht gesehen,* etc. *Sagen Sie ihm, ich käme schon.*—In case of unclear forms the past tense forms are preferred even tho they themselves are not clear subjunctive forms: *Die bildhauerei, sagen sie, könne keine stoffe nachmachen; dicke falten machten eine üble wirkung* (Lessing). The very fact of choosing a past tense form here is felt as indicating a desire to express the subjunctive” (GG 240). (This may, in part at any rate, be due to the feeling that the preterit indicates something remote from actual reality, as in “If he was well, he would write,” etc.; cp. p. 265.)

Questions in Indirect Speech.

Here we meet with the chief difference between the two kinds, dependent and represented speech. We shall speak first of dependent questions.

When a question is reported the interrogatory intonation, which is very often the chief indication that a question is meant, is necessarily lost or weakened, but there is some compensation, partly in the introductory (or inserted) formula, in which the verb ask is used instead of say, partly in the use of an interrogative conjunction where there is no interrogative pronoun. The conjunction often originates in a pronoun meaning ‘which of two’: E. *whether,* Icel. *hvört,* Lat. *utrum,* but in other cases the origin is different, and we frequently find the use of a conditional conjunction where there is no interrogative pronoun. The conjunction often indicates *‘which of two’:* E. *if,* Fr. *si,* Dan. *om,* cf. G. *ob.* Very frequently the difference between a direct and an indirect question is marked by a different word-order: ¹ *Who is she?*—He asked who she was | How can I bear to look any of them in the face?—... how he could bear to look... | Hasn’t he a right to spend his money?—... whether he had not. ... In the same way in other languages, e.g. Danish: *Hvem er hun?*—Han spurgte, hvem hun var | *Hvor kan jeg holde det ud?*—... hvor jeg kunde holde det ud | *Har han ikke ret?*—... om han ikke havde ret. French: *Qui est-elle?* (Qui est-ce?)—Il a demandé qui elle était (qui c’était) | Comment peut-on le souffrir?—... comment on pouvait le souffrir | *N’a-t-il pas raison?*—... s’il n’avait pas raison. In Danish there is the further difference that an interrogative pronoun as the subject of the sentence requires the addition of *der* in an indirect question: *Hvem har ret?*—Han spurgte (om) hvem der havde ret? | *Hvad er grunden?*—... hvad der var grunden (but if *grunden* is here treated as the subject, which is also possible

¹ In English without the *do,* which serves to bring about the interrogative word-order: *What does she see?*—I ask what she sees.
the result is the inverse word-order: Han spurgte om hvad grunden var).

Instead of the form peculiar to dependent indirect questions it has become more and more frequent in English to use the form also found in represented discourse, with no introductory if or whether, and with inverted word-order. Thus: I know not yet, was it a dream or no (Shelley) | he said was I coming back, and I said yes; and he said did I know you, and I said yes; and he said if that was the case, would I say to you what I have said, and as soon as I ever saw you, would I ask you to step round the corner (Dickens). In recent writers this is very frequent indeed; it is mixed up with the dependent form in: they asked where she was going, and would she come along with them? (Carlyle). In German the same form is found, though rarely, e.g. "man weiss nicht recht, ist er junggeselle, witwer oder gar geschieden" (G. Hermann).

Besides being used in quotations of direct questions, indirect questions are very often used (as "clause primaries") after verbs like know, doubt, see, etc., as in: I want to know if he has been there | Go and see who it is, and try to find out where he comes from | it is not easy to say why the book is so fascinating.—They may also be subjects, as in "Whether this is true or not is still an open question." Sometimes the main sentence may be omitted, and the (formally) indirect question thus becomes a (notionally) direct question: If I may leave it at that? (I ask if . . . = May I leave it at that?).

In represented discourse the only shiftings in questions are those shiftings of person and tense that are common to all indirect discourse; otherwise questions remain what they would be in direct quotation. Thus the questions "How can I bear to look any of them in the face now?" and "Hasn't he a right to spend it?" in the passage from Pendennis simply became "How could he bear . . ." and "Hadn't he a right . . ." "What does she see?" became "What did she see?"1 In French the imparfait replaces the present, in German the preterit indicative (not the subjunctive) is used, etc.

Exclamations introduced by an interrogative word remain unchanged except for the shifting of tense and person: "What a nuisance it is to change!" becomes "What a nuisance it was to change" both when it is dependent on such a verb as "He said" and when it forms part of a represented speech.

1 The same form of indirect question is used when "he asked" is inserted into the question: "Hadin't he a right, she asked, to spend his money?" Thus also in Danish: "Havde han ikke, spurgte hun, ret til at bruge sine egne penge?" Note also the English formula, "Mrs. Wright presents her compliments to Mrs. Smith, and might she borrow a saucepan, please?"
Indirect Requests.

Such requests (commands, etc.) as in direct speech are expressed in the imperative have to be changed. In dependent speech either the element of request is expressed in the main verb, e.g. when "Come at once" is made into "He ordered (commanded, told, asked, implored) me (her) to come at once" or the main verb does not express the element of request, which must therefore find expression otherwise in the dependent clause: "He said (wrote) that I (she) was to come at once." The latter is the form generally employed in represented speech, though occasionally the imperative may be retained, as in the following passage from Dickens: "Mr. Spenlow argued the matter with me. He said, Look at the world, there was good and evil in that; look at the ecclesiastical law, there was good and evil in that. It was all part of a system. Very good. There you were." Imperatives with let us are differently rendered in the two kinds of indirect discourse: "He proposed that we (they) were to go" and "Let us (them) go."

Final Remarks.

The distinction between direct and indirect speech is not always strictly maintained. A direct quotation may be introduced by the conjunction ('that') usually reserved for indirect quotation; thus not unfrequently in Greek. The Greek "kai legón autōi, hoti ean thelēis, dunasai me katharisai" was imitated by Wulfila: "jah qipands du imma ľatei jabai wileis, magt mik gahrainjan" (Mark 1. 40, thus also ib. 1. 37). I take a modern instance from Tennyson: "she thought that peradventure he will fight for me."¹ In French we have "je crois que non," although non belongs to direct speech.

Human forgetfulness or incapacity to keep up for a long time the changed attitude of mind implied in indirect discourse causes the frequent phenomenon that a reported speech begins indirectly and is then suddenly continued in the direct form. Examples from Greek writers like Xenophon are given in handbooks of Greek syntax. In Icelandic sagas they abound, e.g. Vols. 1: segir at Breði hafi riðit frá honum á skógin, ok var hann senn ór auguðli mér, ok veit ek ekki til hans 'he says that B. rode from him into the wood, and I soon lost sight of him, and I know nothing about him' | ib. 6 mælti at hann skyldi gera til brauð þeira, en ek man sökja eldivið 'he said that he [the other] was to prepare

¹ Cf. also from Dickens: she sat sobbing and murmuring behind it, that, if I was uneasy, why had I ever married? (I is a shifted you: the question is in 'represented indirect discourse')
their bread, but I will fetch fuel.' ib. 9 hann spyrr, hverir þar væri, eða hví eru-þér svá reiðuligir? 'he asks who were there, and why are you so angry.' A different kind of mixture of the two discourses is seen in Goldsmith Vic. 2. 166: But tell me how hast thou been relieved, or who the ruffians were who carried thee away?

German and Danish have a curious way of expressing what is notionally an indirect discourse by means of the verb soll, skal: Er soll sehr reich sein (gewesen sein) | han skal være (ha været) meget rig 'he is said (reputed, rumoured) to be (have been) very rich.' As soll, skal is in most of its uses a kind of weaker muss, må, I think this usage may be classed as a kind of weaker counter-part of the muss, må, must of logical necessity or of compelling conclusion, as in "he must be very rich (since he can give so much to the poor)."
CHAPTER XXII

CLASSIFICATION OF UTTERANCES

Que donnee nous fut parole
Por faire nos voloirs entendre,
Por enseignier et por prendre.

ROMAN DE LA ROSE.


How many Classes?

BRUGMANN (Verschiedenheiten der satzgestaltung nach massgabe der seelischen grundfunktionen, Sächs. ges. d. wiss. 1918) has an elaborate classification of sentences or utterances with the following main divisions, most of them with up to 11 subclasses: (1) exclamation, (2) desire, (3) invitation (aufforderung), (4) concession, (5) threat, (6) warding off (abwehr und abweisung), (7) statement about imagined reality, (8) question.¹ In the treatment of these classes historical considerations often cross purely logical divisions, and it is difficult to see the rationale of the whole classification as well as to see where such simple statements as “he is rich” have to be placed. This criticism does not hinder one from acknowledging the high value of many things in this book, one of the last things the revered master of comparative philology ever wrote. The older classification is much clearer: (1) statements, (2) questions, (3) desires, (4) exclamations (see, e.g., Sonnenschein’s Grammar). But even this division is open to criticism; the boundary between (3) and (4) is not clear: why are “God save the King” and “Long may he reign” excluded from Exclamations, and why are these latter confined to those that are “introduced by exclamatory pronouns, adjectives or adverbs” such as what and how?¹

A further objection to the classification given by Sonnenschein is that it is expressly meant as a classification of “sentences” only, i.e. such utterances as contain a finite verb. But obviously utterances like “What fun!”, “How odd!”, “Glorious!” or “Hurrah!” are “exclamations” just as much as those

¹ It is interesting to compare this classification with the equally elaborate, but totally different classification in Noreen VS 5. 91 ff., which I must refrain here from resuming or criticizing.
mentioned; “Waiter, another bottle!” cannot be separated from “desires” containing an imperative; and among statements we must reckon also the “nominal” sentences considered above (p. 121). It might perhaps also be said that the term “desire” is not the best term to include “commands, requests, entreaties, and wishes,” and at the same time exclude “I want a cigar” and “Will you give me a light, please?” etc. Notionally these are really desires to be classed with the imperative “Give me,” though formally they are “statements” and “questions.” The classification is thus seen to be faulty because it is neither frankly notional nor frankly syntactic, but alternates between the two points of view: both are important, but they should be kept strictly apart in this as in other domains of grammatical theory.

If, then, we attempt a purely notional classification of utterances, without regard to their grammatical form, it seems natural to divide them into two main classes, according as the speaker does not or does want to exert an influence on the will of the hearer directly through his utterance. In the former class we must include not only ordinary statements and exclamations, but also such wishes as “God save the King,” etc. With regard to this class it is, of course, immaterial whether there is a hearer or not; such an utterance as “What a nuisance!” is the same whether it is spoken in soliloquy or to someone else.

In the second class the aim of the utterance is to influence the will of the hearer; that is, to make him do something. Here we have two subclasses, requests and questions. Requests comprise many utterances of different forms, imperatives, verbless expressions (“Another bottle!” | “Two third Brighton” | “A horse, a horse!” | “One minute?” | “Hats off”), formal questions (“Will you pack at once!”) and formal “statements” (“You will pack at once”) if the situation and the tone shows them to be equivalent to commands, etc. Requests may range from brutal commands through many intermediate steps (demands, injunctions, implorations, invitations) to the most modest and humble prayer (entreaty, supplication).

**Questions.**

A question also is a kind of request, viz. a request to tell the original speaker something, to give him a piece of information that he wants. Questions again may range from virtual commands to polite prayers: the answer may be as it were exacted or humbly solicited. The kinship between ordinary requests and questions is seen in the frequency with which a question is tagged on to an imperative: “Hand me that box, will you?” The
question "Well?" means the same thing as the imperative "Go on!" or "Speak!"

There are two kinds of questions; "Did he say that?" is an example of the one kind, and "What did he say?" and "Who said that?" are examples of the other. Many names have been proposed for these two kinds: yes-or-no question or categorical question v. pronominal question, sentence question v. word question, totality question v. detail question or partial question, entscheidungsfrage v. ergänzungsfrage or tatsachenfrage, bestätigungsfrage v. bestimmungsfrage. Noreen (VS 5.118 ff.) discusses and criticizes these proposed terms and ends by proposing (in Swedish) "rogation" v. "kvestion." This distinction would be impossible in English (and French), where the word "question" has to be used as the common term; it has the further grave drawback that it is impossible to remember which is which. An unambiguous terminology may be easily found if we remember that in the former kind it is always a nexus the truth of which is called in question: the speaker wants to have his doubt resolved whether it is correct to connect this particular subject with this particular predicate. We may therefore call questions of this kind nexus-questions. In the other kind of questions we have an unknown "quantity" exactly as in an algebraic equation; we may therefore use the well-known symbol $x$ for the unknown and the term $x$-question for a question aiming at finding out what $x$ stands for.

Sometimes there may be two unknown quantities in the same equation, as in the colloquial: "Who shall sit where?" (But "I don't know which is which" and "Who's who?" are different: they really mean: 'which (who) is one, and which (who) is the other?')

The answer to a nexus-question is either yes or no; to an $x$-question it may according to circumstances be anything except yes or no. With regard to tone it is the general rule that nexus-questions have a rising and $x$-questions a falling tone towards the end of the sentence. But there are certain questions which in these two respects are like $x$-questions, and yet resemble nexus-questions in their form. If we extend the question "Is it white?" by adding "or black?" and alter "Do you drink sherry?" into "Do you drink sherry or port?" we get disjunctive or alternative questions, in which the rising tone is concentrated on the first part as in the simple question, and the added "or white," "or port" has a falling tone. These questions are the equivalents of pronominal questions ($x$-questions) of this type: "What colour is it?" "Which do you drink, sherry or port?" But it is interesting to notice that what are seemingly the same questions may have a different meaning with a different intonation, if sherry or
port is taken as one comprehensive term for strong wines, the answer to this question (Do you drink [such strong wines as] sherry or port?) is then naturally yes or no (cf. LPh 15. 54). Questions with neither—nor (Have you neither seen nor heard it?) are nexus-questions because neither—nor is a negative both—and, not a negative either—or.

Mention may here be made of the phenomenon which I have termed "questions raised to the second power" (LPh 15. 52). One person asks "Is that true?" but instead of answering this, the other returns "Is that true?"—meaning "How can you ask?" Here most languages use the same form as in indirect questions: "Om det er sandt? | Ob das wahr ist? | Si c'est vrai?" though the sentences differ from ordinary indirect questions by having a much more marked rising of the interrogatory tone. I find the same form in Caxton (Reynard 21, imitation from French?) "Loue ye wel myes [mice]? Yf I loue hem wel, said the catt, I loue myes better than ony thing." But otherwise the English form of the question (inversion without conjunction) is here the same as in direct questions; I have collected a great many examples from the time of the earliest comedies to that of the latest novels. As the retorted question generally implies that it was superfluous to ask, it amounts to the same thing as an affirmation: "Do I remember it?" = Certainly I remember it, and the curious consequence is that it often does not matter whether there is a negative or not in the question, as "Don't I remember it?" is also equivalent to an affirmation.

Questions introduced by an interrogative word (x-questions) may be similarly retorted, and here, too, most languages use the form of indirect questions: Was hast du getan?—Was ich getan habe? | Hvad har du gjort?—Hvad jeg har gjort? In French we see a relative clause taking the place of the interrogative clause: Ce que j'ai fait? Chaucer used an inserted that as in other clauses: But wherefore that I speke al this? (Parl. 17). But from the time of Shakespeare it has been usual in English simply to repeat the question unchanged (except for the tone): "Where is it?—Where is it? taken from vs, it is" (Shakespeare).—The change in the character of the question by being "raised to the second power" is shown also in the kind of answer required: "What have you done?"—"What have I done?"—"Yes, that is what I wanted to know." Questions of this kind are thus always nexus-questions.

1 Est-ce que vous avez déjà tué beaucoup de lions, monsieur de Tar­tarin?—Si j’en ai beaucoup tué, monsieur? (Daudet).
2 There is a different kind of retorted question in which we may have two interrogative words. A says: Why are you doing this? and B asks: Why am I doing what? This is an x-question referring to a part of the original question.
QUESTIONs

The formal means by which questions are expressed, are
(1) tone; (2) separate interrogative words, whether pronouns or
particles, e.g. Lat. num, enclitic -ne (originally the negative word),
Dan. mon (originally an auxiliary verb), Fr. ti (Lang. 358)—in
spoken French we may count [eska] as an interrogative particle;
(3) word-order.

But it should be noted that what from a formal point of view
is a question very often is used for something which notionally
is not a question, i.e. a request to solve some doubt in the mind
of the speaker. Besides the so-called rhetorical questions, which
retain part of the notional value of questions, we must here mention
expressions of surprise, e.g. “What! are you here?” which
certainly is not said in order to be informed whether the other
person is here. Further “Isn’t he stupid!” | G. “Ist das
unglaublich!” In exclamations of this kind the tone is modi­
fied, and in so far they cannot be said to have the complete
form of questions. This is even more true of conditional
clauses having the same word-order as questions and developed
out of original questions, e.g. “Had he been here, I should
have given him a piece of my mind.”

Sentence.

The definitions of ‘sentence’ are too numerous and too diver­
gent for it to be worth while here to reprint or criticize them all.1
In so far as they are not merely bogus definitions, in which technical
words are used to conceal the want of clear thought, these defini­
tions have taken as their starting point either formal or logical
or psychological considerations, while some of them have tried
to reconcile two or three of these points of view. But though
there is thus no consensus of theory, grammarians will generally
be more apt to agree in practice, and when some concrete group
of words is presented to them will be in little doubt whether or
not it should be recognized as a real sentence.

According to traditional logic every sentence forms a trinity
of Subject, Copula and Predicate. Logicians analyze all sentences
(propositions) with which they have to deal into these three com­
ponents and thus obtain one fixed scheme that facilitates their
operations. But even with regard to their purely intellectual
propositions the scheme is artificial and fictitious, and it does
not at all fit the great majority of those everyday sentences of a

1 See Noreen VS 5. 51. 576, Sonnenschein § 1, Sweet NEG § 447, Brug­
mann KG 623, Versch. 15, Paul P § 85, Gr. 3. 10, Wundt S 2. 234, Wellander,
Bedeutungslehre 5, Sundén, Elliptical Words 4, E. Otto, Grundlage der
sprachwissenschaft 145, Kretschmer, Einleit. in die altertumswiss. I. 515,
Sheffield GTh 47, Wegener IF 39. 1, etc., etc.
more or less emotional colouring which form the chief subject-
matter of the researches of the grammarians.

Instead of the old ' threeness ' it is now more customary to 
postulate a ' twoness ': every sentence is said to be composed 
of two parts, Subject and Predicate. In "the sun shines" the 
sun is subject and shines predicate. Each of these two parts may 
be composite: in "The youngest brother of the boy whom we 
have just seen once told me a funny story about his sister in 
Ireland" all the words up to seen constitute the subject, and the 
rest the predicate. Opinions vary as to how this ' twoness ' is 
brought about psychologically, whether by the bringing together 
of two ideas existing already separately in the mind of the speaker, 
or by the breaking up of one idea (gesamtvorstellung) into two 
special ideas for the purpose of communication. This question need 
not, however, occupy us here. On the other hand, it is important 
to keep in mind that the two parts of the sentence, subject and 
predicate, are the same as the two parts of a nexus, primary and 
adnex, but that, as we have seen, it is not every nexus that con-
stitutes a sentence: only an independent nexus forms a sentence.

It is, however, being more and more recognized by linguists 
that besides such two-member sentences as just mentioned we 
have one-member sentences. These may consist of one single 
word, e.g. "Come!" or "Splendid!" or "What?"—or of two 
words, or more than two words, which then must not stand to one 
another in the relation of subject and predicate, e.g. "Come 
along!" | "A capital idea!" | "Poor little Ann!" | "What 
fun!" Here we must first guard against a misconception found 
in no less a grammarian than Sweet, who says (NEG § 452) that 
"from a grammatical point of view these condensed sentences 
are hardly sentences at all, but rather something intermediate 
between word and sentence." This presupposes that word and 
sentence are steps in one ascending hierarchy instead of belonging 
to two different spheres; a one-word sentence is at once a word 
and a sentence, just as a one-room house is from one point of view 
a room and from another a house, but not something between 
the two.

An old-fashioned grammarian will feel a certain repugnance to 
this theory of one-member sentences, and will be inclined to explain 
them by his panacea, ellipsis. In "Come!" he will say that the 
subject "you" is understood, and in "Splendid!" and "A 
capital idea!" not only the subject ("this"), but also the verb 
"is" is understood. In many exclamations we may thus look 
upon what is said as the adnex, the subject (primary) being either 
the whole situation or something implied by the situation (cp. 
Ch. X). Most grammarians would probably analyze such Latin
one-word sentences as "Canto" or "Pluit" as containing implicitly a subject, however difficult it may be to say exactly what is the subject of the latter verb. But grammarians should always be wary in admitting ellipses except where they are absolutely necessary and where there can be no doubt as to what is understood—as, for instance, in "he is rich, but his brother is not [rich]," "it generally costs six shillings, but I paid only five [shillings]." But what is understood in "Watercresses!" or "Special edition!"? "I offer you . . ." or "Will you buy . . .?" or "This is . . ."?

If the word "John!" forms a whole utterance, it may according to circumstances and the tone in which it is said be interpreted in various ways: "How I love you, John," "How could you do that?", "I am glad to see you," "Was it John? I thought it was Tom," etc. How can these various "John!"s be reduced to the scheme subject-predicate, and how can ellipses assist us in analyzing them? Yet it would not do to deny their being sentences. Nor can we stop here. "Yes" and "No," and interjections like "Alas!" or "Oh!" or the tongue-clicks inadequately spelt "Tut" and "Tck" are to all intents and purposes sentences just as much as the most delicately balanced sentences ever uttered by Demosthenes or penned by Samuel Johnson.

If we admit this—and I confess that I do not see at what point of the chain between the Johnsonian construction and the click we should draw the line, then the definition of a sentence is comparatively an easy matter.

A sentence is a (relatively) complete and independent human utterance—the completeness and independence being shown by its standing alone or its capability of standing alone, i.e. of being uttered by itself.¹

In this definition the word 'utterance" has been expressly chosen as the most comprehensive term I could find. Generally by an utterance is meant a piece of communication to someone else, but this is not necessary (soliloquy!); however, in order to be recognized as a sentence an utterance must be such as might be a piece of communication were there someone to listen to it.²

Let us see what is implied in the word "independent" in our definition. "She is ill" is a sentence, but if the same words enter into the combinations "He thinks (that) she is ill" and "He is

¹ On a previous occasion I defined a sentence as what can stand alone without being an answer or a retort, thus excluding "Yesterday" as a reply to the question "When did it happen?" and "If" in the retort mentioned p. 95. I am now somewhat doubtful about this restriction.

² Some definitions of "sentence" are so narrow that it is difficult to see how they are to comprise questions. But mine is not, for though a question is in so far incomplete as it requires a completion in the form of an answer, it is a relatively complete and independent utterance.
sad when (if, because) she is ill," they are no longer independent utterances, but parts of sentences, either, as in the first example, the object of thinks, or, as in the others, subjuncts (strictly speaking, parts of subjuncts, as the conjunctions are also required). These parts of sentences, which in English are generally termed (dependent) clauses, are in German called "nebensätze" and in Danish "bisætninger," as if they were in themselves sentences of a particular kind, which according to our definition they are not. In the same way, while "What to do?" is a complete sentence when standing alone, it ceases to be one and becomes a mere clause in "He did not know what to do." 1

It is also a simple corollary of the definition that when "If only something would happen!" stands alone and means "I wish something would happen," and when "If this isn't the limit!" means "This is the limit," these are (complete) sentences, no matter how easy it is to see that they have developed from clauses requiring some continuation to be complete.

It will be noticed that sentence as here defined is a purely notional category: no particular grammatical form is required for a word or a group of words to be called a sentence. I do not even imitate those scholars who introduce the term "normal sentence" (normalsatz) for sentences containing a subject and a finite verb. Such sentences may be normal in quiet, easy-flowing unemotional prose, but as soon as speech is affected by vivid emotion an extensive use is made of sentences which fall outside this normal scheme and yet have every right to be considered natural and regular sentences.

It would probably be better to divide sentences into the following classes:

1. Inarticulate sentences: "Thanks!" (Thanks very much | Many thanks) | "What?" | "Off!"
2. Semi-articulate sentences: "Thank you!" (Thank you very much) | "What to do?" | "Off with his head!" 2
3. Articulate sentences: "I thank you." | "What am I to do?" | "You must strike off his head!"

Articulate sentences contain both components of a nexus, and as the "nominal sentences" considered above, p. 122, are in the minority, this means that the great majority of articulate sentences contain a finite verb.

1 There is no necessity for a special term ("complex sentence") for a sentence containing one or more dependent clauses. Cf. the end of Ch. VII.
2 This is an interesting type ("Away with you!" | "On with your vizards!" | "To the rack with him!") containing a subjunct implying motion and a primary introduced by the preposition with, whose rôle resembles that of the same preposition in "a cage with the bird flown" and "pale with the pallor of death."
In the practice of any speech-community there will always be strong forces making for order and regularity, for uniformity, for fixed patterns. Through wholesale imitation of the word-combinations in most frequent use certain types will tend to become practically universal. Hence some words which at first may have been rare and have been thought more or less superfluous become more and more frequent and at last may come to be thought necessary because they make the whole sentence conform to the most usual patterns. As most sentences have a subject (Petrus venit), subjects come to be introduced where at first there were none: je viens, il vient, il pleut as against venio, venit, pluit, and in the same way E. I come, he comes, it rains. As most sentences have something placed before the verb, the empty there came to be used in there are many, etc. As most sentences contain a verb, a verb was inserted in places where it was not at first necessary to have one, hence the use of the 'copula' is and of does in "So John does!" As some verbs generally take a predicative, an empty so (G. es, Dan. det) is used, e.g. in "In France the population is stationary, and in England it is rapidly becoming so," cp. also "To make men happy, and to keep them so" (Pope). As most adjuncts are followed by a primary, one is used to prop up the adjunct in "a grey horse instead of the white one" | "birds love their young ones," etc. In all these cases we have practically the same tendency to round off sentences so as to make them conform to a prevalent type.

Although this uniformizing tendency has not been carried through with perfect consistency, it has nevertheless been made the basis of the grammarian's assumption that every sentence, or every normal sentence, must contain a subject and a finite verb; but as soon as we see that it is merely a tendency, and not a law of language, it becomes urgent to give a definition of 'sentence' which does not require the presence of those two constituents.

In all speech activity there are three things to be distinguished, expression, suppression, and impression. Expression is what the speaker gives, suppression is what he does not give, though he might have given it, and impression is what the hearer receives. It is important to notice that an impression is often produced not only by what is said expressly, but also by what is suppressed. Suggestion is impression through suppression. Only bores want to express everything, but even bores find it impossible to express everything. Not only is the writer's art rightly said to consist largely in knowing what to leave in the inkstand, but in the most everyday remarks we suppress a great many things which it would be pedantic to say expressly. "Two third Brighton return"
stands for something like: “Would you please sell me two third-class tickets from London to Brighton and back again, and I will pay you the usual fare for such tickets.” Compound nouns state two terms, but say nothing of the way in which the relation between them is to be understood: home life, life at home, home letters, letters from home, home journey, journey (to) home; compare further life boat, life insurance, life member; sunrise, sunworship, sunflower, sunburnt, Sunday, sun-bright, etc.

As in the structure of compounds, so also in the structure of sentences much is left to the sympathetic imagination of the hearer, and what from the point of view of the trained thinker, or the pedantic schoolmaster, is only part of an utterance, is frequently the only thing said, and the only thing required to make the meaning clear to the hearer. This is especially true of certain types of sentences in which suppressions of the same kind have occurred so often that at last no one thinks of what is left out, the remainder becoming a regular idiomatic expression which the grammarian must recognize as a complete sentence. There are two types of suppression which require particular attention (cf. Lang. 273).

(1) The beginning of a sentence falls out by what we might learnedly term prosiopesis: the speaker begins to articulate, or thinks he begins to articulate, but produces no audible sound (either for want of expiration, or because he does not put his vocal chords in the right position) till one or two syllables after the beginning of what he intended to say. Examples are such forms of salutation as Morning instead of Good morning, G. (Guten) tag, etc. Further: colloquial See ? for Do you see ? | (Do you) remember that chap ? | (Will) that do ? | (I'm a)fraid not | (When you) come to think of it | (I shall) see you again this afternoon | (God) bless you ! Similar examples occur in all languages.

(2) The end is left out: aposiopesis is the learned name for what I have elsewhere (Language 251) more colloquially called stop-short or pull-up sentences. After saying “If only something would happen” the speaker stops without making clear to himself how he would go on, were he to complete the sentence, whether “I should be happy,” or “it would be better,” or “things would be tolerable,” or whatever he might think of. But even without any continuation the if-clause is taken at more than its face-value and becomes, to speaker and hearer alike, a complete expression of a wish. Other expressions of wishes are G. “Wer doch eine zigarre hätte!” | Dan. “Hvem der havde en sigar!” | Span. “Quién le diera!” Further examples of pull-up sentences: Well, I never! | The things he would say! | The callousness of it! | To think that he has become a minister! | Dire qu'il est devenu ministre! | Tænke sig at han er blevet minister! | Figurarsi
ch'egli è divenuto ministro! In all such cases the fact that something is left out should not prevent us from recognizing the utterance as sufficiently complete to be called a sentence.

In other cases, however, the suppression is so violent that this condition is not fulfilled. I should not recognize as sentences signboards ("J. C. Mason, Bookseller"), book-titles ("Men and Women"), head-lines in newspapers ("New Conferences in Paris" or "Killed his father-in-law"), indication of speaker in plays ("Hamlet"), entries in diaries ("Tuesday. Rain and fog. Chess with uncle Tom, walk with the girls") and similar short expressions. It is, however, important to observe that all these phenomena occur in writing only and thus fall outside language proper: spoken language may indulge in many suppressions, but the result is always distinguished from that exemplified in this paragraph.

With regard to suppression a few final remarks may not be out of place here. It has been said (C. Alphonso Smith, Studies in Engl. Syntax, 1906, p. 3) that "verbs denote activity and change: they are hustling and fussy," and that therefore the omission of verbs gives the impression of calm. This is exemplified by Tennyson's In Memoriam, XI (Calm and deep peace on this high wold, etc.). But as a matter of fact the impression there is produced in the first place by the constant repetition of the word calm and its synonyms, and secondly by the fact that the verb omitted is one of rest, "is." If verbs of motion are omitted, their suppression may inversely strengthen the impression of unrest, as in the following example: "Then rapidly to the door, down the steps, out into the street, and without looking to right or left into the automobile, and in three minutes to Wall Street with utter disregard of police regulations and speed limits," or in Longfellow's description of Paul Revere's ride: "A hurry of hoofs in a village street, A shape in the moonlight, a bulk in the dark, And beneath, from the pebbles, in passing, a spark Struck out by a steed flying fearless and fleet." As in these cases a feeling of terseness and of vigour is also produced by the omission of verbs in a great many proverbial locutions, apophthegms, party devices, and similar sayings. G. "Ende gut, alles gut" is more pithy than E. "All is well that ends well," Fr. "Tout est bien qui finit bien," Dan. "Når enden er god, er alting godt." Cp. also: "Like master, like man" | "Every man to his taste" | "No cure, no pay" | "Once a clergyman, always a clergyman" | "Least said, soonest mended," "One man, one vote," etc. By

1 In the initial clauses of "When in France, he was taken prisoner" and "If in doubt, answer no!" we may say that from one point of view we have abbreviation (omission of "he was" and "you are"), but, from another, expansion of "In France he was..." "In doubt answer no!" Similar considerations apply to "I want to know the reason why."
leaving out what may seem superfluous one creates the impression of hurry or stress of business which does not allow time enough to round off one's sentences in the usual way: it is also of importance that proverbs, etc., should be easy to remember and therefore not too long. In these cases, however, it is not the fact that a *verb* is omitted which produces the effect, for we have other abbreviated proverbs, etc., in which a similar effect is produced though they contain verbs: "Live and learn" | "Rule a wife and have a wife" | "Spare the rod and spoil the child" | "Love me, love my dog."¹ In both classes of sayings the usual sentence-construction with subject and finite verb is abandoned in favour of something which may be compared to a Japanese drawing, in which the contours are not completely filled in; the very boldness of such a drawing assists in bringing about an artistic effect by leaving more to the imagination of the beholder. And our grammatical phenomenon thus turns out to be one little part of the ever-standing war between classicism and impressionism.

¹ What is the form of the verb in these sayings? They closely resemble the imperatives mentioned below (p. 314) which are not meant as requests, but might be transcribed as conditional clauses: the difference is that there the imperatives are followed by complete sentences which are so to speak the apodoses, but here by verbs in the same form, which it is more difficult to apprehend as imperatives.
CHAPTER XXIII

MOODS


Classification.

Many grammars enumerate the following moods in English, etc.: indicative, subjunctive, imperative, infinitive, and participle. It is, however, evident, that infinitives and participles cannot be co-ordinated with the others; enough has also been said of them in various other parts of this work, and we shall therefore in this chapter deal with the first three moods only. These are sometimes called fact-mood, thought-mood, and will-mood respectively. But they do not “express different relations between subject and predicate,” as Sweet says (NEG § 293). It is much more correct to say that they express certain attitudes of the mind of the speaker towards the contents of the sentence, though in some cases the choice of a mood is determined not by the attitude of the actual speaker, but by the character of the clause itself and its relation to the main nexus on which it is dependent. Further it is very important to remember that we speak of “mood” only if this attitude of mind is shown in the form of the verb: mood thus is a syntactic, not a notional category.

Imperative.

This is true even of the Imperative, though that mood comes nearer than either the indicative or the subjunctive to being notional. It is a will-mood in so far as its chief use is to express the will of the speaker, though only—and this is very important—in so far as it is meant to influence the behaviour of the hearer, for otherwise the speaker expresses his will in other ways. Imperatives thus are requests, and, as we have seen, these range from the strictest command to the humblest prayer. But we saw also that

1 As Brugmann, Oertel, and Noreen do.
2 Thus in Fr. “ma femme veut que je lui obéis” or “ma femme ne croit pas qu’il vienne” the subjunctive evidently says nothing about the speaker’s frame of mind.
requests are very often expressed by other means than the imperative (**"Another bottle!"** | **"Wollen wir gehen"** | **"You will pack at once and leave this house,"** etc.), and we may here remind the reader of the use in requests of infinitives (**"Einsteigen!"** | **"Nicht hinauslehnen!"** | **"Non piangere!"**) and of participles (**"Vorgesehen!"** | **"Still gestanden!"** | **"Wohl auf, kameraden, auf's pferd, In's feld, in die freiheit gezogen!"**)—in other words, imperative and request are not convertible or coextensive terms.

Nor can it be said that imperatives are exclusively used to express requests. An imperative very often means permission, which is not a request, because it does not say that the speaker wants the hearer to behave in a certain way. But a permissive **"Take that (if you like)!"** may also be expressed in other ways: **"I allow you to take that"** | **"You may take that"** | **"I have no objection to your taking that"** | **"I don't mind if you take that."**—On prohibition = negative command or permission see Ch. XXIV.

A further use of the imperative is seen in Hamlet's **"Vse euerie man after his desart, and who should scape whipping"**—the first part is no more a real request to use every man after his desert than the second is a real question; together the two sentences mean: if we used . . ., no one would escape punishment. Other examples: **Spoil foc's'le hands, make devils** (Stevenson) | **Give you women but rope enough, you'll do your own business** (Richardson; the use of you as an indirect object shows that no request to the person addressed is meant).

As the imperative has no particular ending in English, one might perhaps feel inclined to think that these sentences contained infinitives (though how used?). Parallel uses in other languages show us, however, clearly that they contain imperatives, e.g. **G. Sage das, und du wirst (so wirst du) verbösnt | Dan. Tag hatten op eller lad den ligge, i begge tilfælde får du prygl | Fr. Obligez cent fois, refusez une, on ne se souviendra que du refus | Lat. Scaevae vivacem crede nepoti Matrem : nil faciet scleris pia dextera (Hor.) | Gr. Dos moi pou stō, kai tēn ēn kinēsō.**

As imperatives in this function serve to express condition, we can understand their occurrence in connexion with a preterit, e.g. **"Give him time, and he was generally equal to the demands of suburban customers; hurry or interrupt him, and he showed**

1 Even the Eskimo makes frequent use of a future in the sense of an imperative: **torgorumārpərase** ihr werdet es aufheben — hebt es auf! (Klein-schmidt, Gramm. d. grönl. spr. 69). I mention this because E. Lerch has recently drawn far-reaching conclusions as to French mentality from the occurrence in French of expressions like **tu le feras = fais-le**: **"den herisch-süchtigen, tyrannischen charakter des heischefuturums.** The spirit of the Greenlander is perhaps less domineering than that of any other nation.
himself anything but the man for a crisis” (Gissing), and the use of a perfect imperative in “Soyez bon, pitoyable, intelligent, ayez souffert mille morts: vous ne sentirez pas la douleur de votre ami qui a mal aux dents” (Rolland). Note also the imperative in the middle of a dependent clause, e.g. “Darwin tells us how little curly worms, only give them time enough, will cover with earth even the larger kind of stones (Birrell) | an Alpine Avalanche; which once stir it, will spread (Carlyle) | I thought that, take them all round, I had never seen their equals (Butler). ¹

This use of what might be called the imaginary imperative ² helps us to explain the fact that some imperatives have become prepositions or conjunctions, e.g. When you feel that, bar accidents, the worst is over (Quiller-Couch) | I am not in the habit of beating women at any time, let alone at a lunch-party (Hope) | Suppose he were to come, what then? Dan. Sæt han kom, hvad så?

Indicative and Subjunctive.

If we pass on to the Indicative and the Subjunctive, the first remark that obtrudes itself is that the treatment of this subject has been needlessly complicated by those writers who speak of combinations with auxiliary verbs, e.g. may he come | he may come | if he should come | he would come, as if they were subjunctives of the verb come, or subjunctive equivalents. Scholars would hardly have used these expressions if they had had only the English language to deal with, for it is merely the fact that such combinations in some cases serve to translate simple subjunctives in German or Latin that suggests the use of such terms, exactly as people will call to the boy a dative case. It is equally wrong to speak of bless in God bless you as an optative, while the same form in if he bless you is called a subjunctive; we should use the term ‘optative’ only where the language concerned has a separate form, as is the case in Greek—but there, of course, the optative is not exclusively an “optative” in the sense just alluded to, i.e. a mood of wish, but has other meanings as well. A precise terminology is a conditio sine qua non if one wants to understand grammatical facts.³

The view here presented is in direct opposition to that taken by Professor Sonnenschein. Though my objections to his treatment of the theory of moods are essentially the same as those I had

¹ On a peculiar use of the imperative in narrative style see Brugmann, Versch. 79.
² It may be said to be addressed not to the ‘second person’ (hearer), but to the ‘generic person’ as defined in Ch. XVI.
³ Some comparative linguists use ‘optative’ instead of ‘subjunctive’ in speaking of Gothonic languages, because the form corresponds etymologically to the Greek optative.
against his theory of cases, it may not be superfluous to review what
he says of moods, and to show the contradictions and difficulties
inherent in his conception of them. The term 'mood' must not,
he says, be taken to involve a difference of inflexion. Such a
definition would make havoc of the moods of any language; for
example, the Latin regam and rexerit and the German liebte may be
either indicative or subjunctive; and the Latin forms in -ere may
be either imperative or indicative or infinitive.—My reply is, of
course, that we recognize the Latin moods because the majority
of forms are distinctive: rego, regis, rexero, rexeras, and innumerable
other forms can only be one mood each, and if we substitute the
forms of another verb or another person of the same verb it is quite
easy to decide what is the mood of any ambiguous form in a given
context. If instead of G. liebte in one sentence we should say
hatte, it is the indicative; if we should say hätte, it is the subjunctive,
etc.1

Moods then, according to Professor Sonnenschein, denote
categories of meaning, not of form. The indicative mood speaks
of a matter of fact (S. § 211). But if I say “Twice four is seven”
I use the indicative to express the opposite of a fact. This objection
might be called captious, for the meaning evidently is that the
indicative is used to represent something as a fact; yet even in
that form the statement cannot be always maintained, cf. the
frequent use of the indicative in conditional clauses: “if he is ill,”
and after wish: “I wish he wasn’t ill.”

Next, we are told that “the meaning of the subjunctive is
quite different from that of the indicative” (§ 214). Nevertheless
we read in § 315 that in “Take care that you are not caught” the
indicative is “used with the meaning of the subjunctive.” Similar
contradictions are found in other places: in § 219 the author
admits that it would be possible to use comest and falls instead of
the subjunctives in “stint not to ride, Until thou come to fair
Tweedside” and “Who stands, if freedom fall?”, but he says
that “these present indicatives would be used with a special
meaning; they would, in fact, be equivalent to subjunctives.”
Similarly in § 234: “the past indicative is sometimes used after
‘as if,’ but it always has the meaning of a past subjunctive.”
But as the distinction of moods is by definition one of meaning,
the simple inference is that this indicative is a subjunctive! In-
versely, in § 303 (note) S. speaks of a subjunctive without any clear

1 Professor Sonnenschein goes on to say: “The English subjunctive,
properly understood, is an admirable clue to the uses of the mood in other
languages.” The same educational fallacy as above (see p. 180)! The
pupil who has mastered Sonnenschein’s intricate rules for conditional sen-
tences in English “need only be told” that Latin and German employ the
same moods—to be led astray, at any rate in some cases!
difference of meaning from an indicative in *when I ask her if she love me.* According to § 219 Obs. a present indicative is quite impossible in noun-clauses which express that something is to be done. We take his own sentence "Give the order that every soldier is to kill his prisoners," and we naturally ask, is this "is (to kill)" an indicative or a subjunctive? How are thinking pupils to find their way in this wilderness? 1

If we start from the assumption that meaning is decisive in these matters, it is also difficult to see the logic of Sonnenschein's § 215: "The reason why the subjunctive is not so common now as it used to be is that we have got into the habit of expressing the subjunctive meaning in other ways, especially by using the verbs 'shall' and 'may' with the infinitive instead of the subjunctive" and § 219 "It is a mistake to say that the subjunctive mood has practically disappeared from modern English. . . . But it is true to say that the equivalent expressions mentioned in § 215 are still commoner," for here "subjunctive" must necessarily be used of the form if the paragraphs are to make sense.

Although Professor Sonnenschein says that the meaning of the subjunctive is distinct from that of the indicative, we are nowhere told what exactly that meaning is (though the meaning of some specified employments of the subjunctive is explained). Nor would it be possible to find one formula that should cover all the various uses of the subjunctive in any one Aryan language, let alone one comprehensive formula for all Aryan languages. The nearest approach is contained in the term thought-mood, 2 or perhaps better, "non-committal mood" (Sheffield GTh 123) as opposed to a "downright" statement: something is mentioned with a certain hesitation or doubt or uncertainty as to its reality, but even this vague definition is not always to the point, for sometimes the subjunctive is used for what is downright imaginary or unreal ("Wäre ich doch reich!") and sometimes for what is downright real ("Je suis heureux que tu sois venu"). 3 The truth seems to be that the subjunctive was at first vaguely used in a variety of cases which it is impossible logically or notionally to delimitate as against the use of the indicative, and that each language took

---

1 Note also the treatment of *should be* in "I am glad that he should be here." In § 299 it is called a subjunctive-equivalent, but in § 475 it is said that it is "almost equivalent to a tense of the indicative mood."

2 Noreen (VS 5. 131) says that the 'conjunctive' expresses fictitious idea (though not permission) and wishes apart from hope; as a separate mood he gives the 'optative' (för permissiva och sperativa meningar). His expressions are far from clear.

3 Note Sweet's expression (First Steps in Anglo-Saxon, § 96): The subjunctive is sometimes used illogically in statements of facts. His example is taken from Beowulf 696 Gespræc þa se gylp-words sum, Beowulf Geata, ær he on bed stige.
its own course in sometimes restricting and sometimes extending its sphere of employment, especially in dependent clauses. The vagueness of the meaning of the subjunctive facilitates the transition of a present subjunctive to a future indicative as in the Latin forms in -am, and the extension of the second person singular in the strong verbs from the subjunctive to the indicative, e.g. OE. wäre. In many cases the levelling of the two moods may have been brought about by formal coalescence, but even apart from that there is in many languages a strong tendency to get rid of the subjunctive. In Danish and in Russian there are only a few isolated survivals; in English the subjunctive has since Old English times been on retreat, though from the middle of the nineteenth century there has been a literary revival of some of its uses. In Romanic the subjunctive is less used than in Latin, as seen most clearly in French in conditional sentences ("s’il était riche il payerait," the last form having sprung from the Latin indicative pacare habebat). This extensive movement away from the subjunctive could hardly have taken place, had one mood been felt as decidedly the mood of fact and the other as the mood of thought, and we get nearer to the actual facts if we regard the indicative as the mood chosen when there is no special reason to the contrary, and the subjunctive as a mood required or allowable in certain cases varying from language to language. Only thus can we do justice to the frequency of hesitation, e.g. in E. if he comes, or come, G. damit er kommen kann, or könne, and to the variation of mood without any change of meaning in Fr. s’il vient et qu’il dise. I take at random some everyday sentences from the three best-known languages to illustrate the divergence in their use of moods:

if he be ill—if he is ill; s’il est malade; wenn er krank ist.
if he were ill; wenn er krank wäre—if he was ill; s’il était malade.

sie glaubt, er wäre krank—sie glaubt, dass er krank ist; she believes he is ill; elle croit qu’il est malade.
sie glaubt nicht, er wäre krank; elle ne croit pas qu’il soit malade—she does not believe that he is ill.
damit waren wir fertig—I hope we are through now; espérons que c’est fini.

le premier qui soit arrêté—the first who has arrived; der erste, der angekommen ist.

1 Russian by or b can hardly be called a verbal form any longer: it is added to što ‘that’ or jesli ‘if’ or to the verb, e.g. jesli b ja znal or znal by ja ‘if I knew,’ ‘if I had known.’
je cherche un homme qui puisse me le dire—I am looking for a man who can tell me that; ich suche einen mann, der mir das sagen kann (or: könnte).
quoiqu'il soit réellement riche—though he is really rich; obgleich er wirklich reich ist.

If there are thus many divergences, there are also certain general tendencies common to languages of our family. The indicative is generally used in relative clauses and clauses introduced by local and temporal conjunctions (where, when, while), unless (in some languages) an intention is implied or the clauses express the thought of some other person than the speaker or writer. With regard to condition, the subjunctive is most often required if impossibility is implied (in "clauses of rejected or, better, of rejecting condition," or "contrary-to-fact-condition"), though even there English tends to get rid of the subjunctive; greater hesitation is found when the possibility is admitted, but the speaker "wants to guard himself from endorsing the truth or realization of the statement" (NED); and finally the indicative is required when the two ideas are not really meant as conditioning and conditioned, but as equally true: "if he was rich, he was open-handed too," i.e. he was both, though these two things do not always go together; the meaning of the conditional form may be said to be: if you admit that he was rich, you must admit also that he was open-handed; cp. "she is fifty if she is a day." Similar considerations hold good with regard to concession (though he were, was, be, is).

Notional Moods.

Would it be possible to place all "moods" in a logically consistent system? This was attempted by grammarians more than a hundred years ago on the basis of first Wolff's and then Kant's philosophy. The former in his Ontology had the three categories, possibility, necessity and contingency, and the latter under the head of "modality" the three of possibility, existence, and necessity; Gottfried Hermann then gave the further subdivisions: objective possibility (conjunctive), subjective possibility (optative), objective necessity (Greek verbal adjectives in -teos) and subjective necessity (imperative). It is hardly worth while following the subsequent development of these theories (see the able paper "A Century of Metaphysical Syntax," by W. G. Hale, in the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences, 1904, Vol. III).

1 There is really no condition implied in "If he was successful it was because the whole situation helped him"; cp. on the other hand "If he were successful in that matter he would go on in the same way."
Recently Deutschbein has presented us with a somewhat similar system (SNS 113 ff., cf. also Sprachpsychologische Studien, Cöthen, 1918). His main division is:

I. Kogitativus,
II. Optativus,
III. Voluntativus,
IV. Expectativus,

each with four subdivisions, which are indicated pseudo-mathematically by the formulas 1, 0, < 1 and > 1. These figures are said to represent the proportion between the thought or wish on the one hand and reality or possibility of realization on the other. Thus in the sentence “Lebte mein vater doch” the proportion between wish (W) and “Realisierungsmöglichkeit” (R) is said to be = 0, though a mathematician would probably rather say that it was = ∞, as it is R which is = 0. Apart from this curious inadvertence, the meaning is evidently to give necessity as > 1, reality = 1, possibility < 1, and unreality or impossibility = 0. There is something to be said for his view if thus formulated, though my own tripartition necessity, possibility, impossibility seems to me logically preferable, as reality and unreality really belong to another sphere than necessity and possibility.

Even Deutschbein’s scheme is not exhaustive, and he does not distinguish strictly enough between syntactic and notional categories. As a tentative scheme of the purely notional ideas expressed more or less vaguely by the verbal moods and auxiliaries of various languages we might perhaps give the following list, to which I cannot, however, attach any great importance. The categories frequently overlap, and some of the terms are not quite unobjectionable. The placing of the Conditional and Concessional also is subject to doubt, and a “Subordinative” should perhaps be added at the end of the list.

1. Containing an element of will:

Jussive: go (command).
Compulsive: he has to go.
Obligative: he ought to go | we should go.
Advisory: you should go.
Precative: go, please.
Hortative: let us go.
Permissive: you may go if you like.
Promissive: I will go | it shall be done.
Optative (realizable): may he be still alive!
Desiderative (unrealizable): would he were still alive!
Intentional: in order that he may go.
2. Containing no element of will:

Apodictive: twice two must be (is necessarily) four.
Necessitative: he must be rich (or he could not spend so much).
Assertive: he is rich.
Presumptive: he is probably rich; he would (will) know.
Dubitative: he may be (is perhaps) rich.
Potential: he can speak.
Conditional: if he is rich.
Hypothetical: if he were rich.
Concessional: though he is rich.

Each of these can be expressed linguistically by a variety of means besides those mentioned.

There are many "moods" if once one leaves the safe ground of verbal forms actually found in a language.¹

¹ The artificial languages, Esperanto and Ido, very wisely restrict their moods to the number of two besides the indicative, namely what may be called a desiderative, in Esp. ending in -u, in Ido in -ez, e.g. venez come, il venez let him come, por ke il venez in order that he may come, and a conditional ending in -us: se il venus, me pagus if he came, I should pay. Otherwise auxiliaries or adverbs are used: mustas must, povas can, forsan perhaps.
CHAPTER XXIV

NEGATION


Contradictory and Contrary.

LOGICIANS distinguish between contradictory terms, such as white and not-white, rich and not-rich, and contrary terms, such as white and black, rich and poor. Two contradictory terms together comprise everything in existence, as any middle term is excluded, while two contrary terms admit one or more middle terms. For contradictory terms language generally employs either derivatives like unhappy, impossible, disorder or composite expressions containing the adverb not. On the other hand, separate roots are very often used to express the most necessary contrary terms. Hence such pairs as young—old, good—bad, big—small, etc. Intermediate stages may be expressed negatively, e.g. neither young nor old, but in some cases we have special expressions for the intermediate stage, e.g. indifferent in the comparatively recent sense of 'what is between good and bad.' Sometimes we have even a whole long string of words with shades of meaning partially overlapping, e.g. hot (sweltering), warm, tepid, lukewarm, mild, fresh, cool, chilly, cold, frosty, icy; though each adjective at the head of this list is a contrast to each of those at the tail, it is impossible to draw a sharp line between two halves of the list.

If now we take two simple sentences like "John is rich" and "John is not rich," these are to my mind contrary terms, not contradictory, because they admit the intermediate "perhaps John is rich" or "he may be rich, he is possibly rich," and as a kind of subdivision of this middle term we must mention "John is probably rich" or "No doubt John is rich" (for no doubt as actually used in ordinary speech implies some little doubt). We therefore may set up a tripartition:

A. Positive.
B. Questionable.
C. Negative.
A and C are absolute and imply certainty, B implies uncertainty, and in that respect B is the negative counterpart of the two positive sentences A "it is certain that he is rich" and C "it is certain that he is not rich."

It may shock the logician that the two sentences "John is rich" and "John is not rich" are here treated as contrary and not as contradictory, but I hope he will be relieved when I say that evidently "rich" and "not rich" are contradictory and admit no middle term: the tripartition given above refers only to the attitude of the speaker to the inclusion of John in one of the two classes "rich" and "not rich." Our tripartition assists us in understanding some linguistic facts with regard to questions, for a question is an assertion of the class B + a request addressed to the hearer to resolve the doubt. It is therefore immaterial whether the question is couched positively or negatively: "Is John rich?" or "Is John not rich?" are perfectly synonymous, because the real question is double-sided: "Is John rich, or is he not?" (Alternative question, p. 303, above.) In the same way, in offering a glass of beer one may say either "Will you have a glass of beer?" or "Won't you have a glass of beer?" Positive and negative here mean the same thing, just as in "Perhaps he is rich" and "Perhaps he is not rich."

What is here said of questions is true of unemotional questions only; a marked tone of surprise will make the two sentences into distinct contrasts: for then "Will you (really) have a glass of beer?" comes to mean 'I am surprised at your wanting a glass of beer?'; and "Won't you have a glass of beer?" the reverse. While in English "Won't you pass me the salt?" would be rude as implying unwillingness in the person addressed, in Danish "Vil De række mig saltet?" is generally a command, and "Vil De ikke række mig saltet?" a polite request ('Would you mind passing the salt?'). A Dutch lady once told me how surprised she was at first in a Copenhagen boarding-house at these negative questions, which she took as requests not to pass the salt. Very often the particular interrogative form is chosen to suggest a particular answer, thus especially in tag-questions ("He is rich, isn't he?" | "He isn't rich, is he?"). Consequently questions often come to mean assertions of the inverse: "Am I my brother's keeper?" = 'I am not' | "Isn't that nice?" = 'It is very nice.'

As exclamations have in many cases developed out of questions, we now also understand how it is that very often it does not matter whether not is added or not: "How often have I (not) watched him!"
Some Tripartitions.

Next we have to consider some terms of paramount importance to the logician as well as to the linguist, namely the two absolute extremes all and nothing with the intermediate something. Let us call the two extremes A and C, and the intermediate B. They are most naturally represented in a descending scale:

A. everything, all, everybody (all girls, all the money)
B. something, some, somebody (some girls, a girl, some money)
C. nothing, none, nobody (no girl(s), no money).

Thus also the adverbs:

A. always, everywhere
B. sometimes, somewhere
C. never, nowhere.

It should be noted that some (something, etc.) is here taken in the ordinary meaning it has in natural speech, and not in the meaning logicians sometimes give it, in which it is the positive counterpart of no (nothing), and thus includes the possibility of all. The intermediate stage B of course admits many subdivisions, of which we may mention some of special linguistic interest:

B 1: many (girls) much (money) very sorry
B 2: a few (girls) a little (money) a little sorry
B 3: few (girls) little (money) little sorry.

B 1 approaches A (all); B 3 approaches C (none) and may even in many cases be considered negative rather than positive; this is especially true of the adverb little, e.g. in “They little think what mischief is in hand” (Byron). The use of the indefinite article to distinguish B 2 and B 3 is linguistically interesting; it is not confined to English, cp. Fr. un peu, It. and Sp. un poco, G. ein wenig. The difference is well brought out in Shakespeare’s sentence: “When he is best, he is a little worse than a man, and when he is worst, he is little better than a beast.” B 3 is felt as a contrast to B 1, but B 2 rather to C; cp. “Few of the passengers survived ” and “A few of the passengers survived.”

1 See Keynes, FL 100: “It has, however, been customary with logicians in interpreting the traditional scheme [A = universal affirmative, I = particular affirmative, E = universal negative, O = particular negative] to adopt the other meaning, so that Some S is P is not inconsistent with All S is P.” On p. 200 Keynes is bound to admit that many logicians “have not recognized the pitfalls surrounding the use of the word some. Many passages might be quoted in which they distinctly adopt the meaning—some, but not all.” But, in the name of common sense, one is tempted to ask: why do logicians dig such pitfalls for their fellow-logicians to tumble into by using ordinary words in abnormal meanings? Keynes’s arguments on p. 203 are far from convincing.
The tripartition between:
A. Necessity,
B. Possibility,
C. Impossibility,
is really nothing but a special case of the tripartition mentioned above, for necessity means that all possibilities are comprised, just as impossibility means the exclusion of all possibilities. The verbal expressions for these three categories are:

A. must (or, need)
B. can (or, may)
C. cannot.

If to these three categories we add an element of volition with regard to another being, the result is:

A. Command,
B. Permission,
C. Prohibition.

Verbal expressions for these are:

A. You must
B. You may
C. You must not (may not, see below).

The imperative ("Take that!") may mean either A or B, see above under Requests.

The Meaning of Negation.

If we now want to inquire into the meaning of negation, the first point of importance is to emphasize the difference between a linguistic negative and a mathematical negative: — 4 means, not everything different from + 4, but a point as much below 0 as 4 is above 0. A linguistic negative, on the contrary, changes a term into the contradictory term, at any rate theoretically, for on closer inspection we shall find that in practice this rule requires some very important qualifications; to understand these the division made above into A, B, and C-categories will prove useful and should constantly be borne in mind. Let us first look at quantities in the B-category (above, p. 324): neither all nor nothing.

Here the general rule in all (or most) languages is that not means 'less than,' or in other words 'between the term qualified and nothing.' Thus not good means 'inferior,' but does not comprise 'excellent'; not lukewarm indicates a lower temperature than lukewarm, something between lukewarm and icy, not something between lukewarm and hot. This is especially obvious if we
consider the ordinary meaning of negatived numerals: He does 
not read three books in a year | the hill is not two hundred feet high 
| his income is not £200 a year | he does not see her once in a 
week | the bottle is not half full—all these expressions mean 
less than three, etc. Therefore not one comes to be the natural ex-
pression in many languages for ‘none,’ e.g. OE. nan = ne-an, whence 
modern none, no, further ON. eingi, G. k-ein, Fr. pas un bruit, etc. 

But the same expressions may also exceptionally mean ‘more 
than,’ only the word following not then has to be strongly stressed 
(with the peculiar intonation indicative of contradiction), and then 
the whole combination has generally to be followed by a more 
exact indication: not lukewarm, but really hot | his income is not 
two hundred a year, but at least three hundred | not once, but two 
or three times, etc. Note that not once or twice always means 
several times, as in Tennyson’s "Not once or twice in our fair 
islnd-story, The path of duty was the way to glory.” 

Not above 30 means either 30 or less than 30. No more than 
generally means ‘as little as,’ and no less than ‘as much as,’ e.g. 
“the rank and file of doctors are no more scientific than their 
tailors; or their tailors are no less scientific than they” (Shaw); note 
the distinction between no and not in these combinations: no more 
than three ‘three only’; not more than three ‘three at most’; he 
paid no less than twenty pounds implies astonishment at the great-
ness of the amount, which was exactly £20; he paid not less than 
twenty pounds implies uncertainty with regard to the exact amount, 
which at the very least was £20 (MEG II, 16. 84). In Latin both 
non magis quam and non minus quam are favourite expressions for 
equality, though, of course, used in different connexions: Caesar 
non minus operibus pacis florebat quam rebus in bello gestis | Pericles 
non magis operibus pacis florebat quam rebus in bello gestis (Cauer). 

If we turn to the negatives of the terms given above as B 1, 
2 and 3, we see that negativing 1 turns it into three: not much = little; 
not many = few. But a negative 2 becomes nearly synonymous 
with 1 (or stands between 1 and 2): not a little = much, not a few 
= many. B 3 is not used idiomatically with not. 

Next we turn to the A and C-categories, the two extremes. 
Here we have the general rule that if the negative word is placed 
first, it discards the absolute element, and the result is the inter-
mediate term: Not A = B; not C also = B. If, on the other 
hand, the absolute term is mentioned first the absolute element 
prevails, and the result is the contrary notion: A . . . not = C; 
C . . . not = A. 

Examples of a negative A = B: 
They are not all of them fools | he is not always so sad | non 
omnis moriar.
Exceptionally the same effect (B) is obtained even though the negative comes after the A-word in such sentences as "All that glisters is not gold" (Shakespeare), and "Tout ce qui reluit n'est pas or," which correspond to the Danish and German forms of the proverb: "Ikke alt hvad der glimrer er guld" and "Nicht alles was glänzt, ist gold"; cp. also from the Bible: All things are lawfull vnto mee, but all things are not expedient | all is not lost (Milton, Shelley) | But all men are not born to reign (Byron) | For each man kills the thing he loves, Yet each man does not die (Wilde); similar examples abound also in the literatures of other countries; they are easy to explain psychologically as the result of the two tendencies, to place the subject first, and to attract the negation to the verb. Tobler (VB 1. 197) tries to justify them logically as saying "von dem subjekte 'alles glänzende' darf 'gold sein' nicht prädiziert werden." This is true, but does not touch the fact that the word-order makes us expect the meaning 'nothing of what glitters is gold' (was glänzt, ist niemals gold; C) rather than the intended meaning 'only some part of what glitters is gold' (was glänzt ist nicht immer gold; B).¹

Examples of C with a negative before it = B:

Lat. non-nulli 'some,' non-nunquam 'sometimes' | he was not the eldest son of his father for nothing | it is not good for a man to have no gods (= it is good to have some gods).

Examples of A with a negative after it = C: Tous ces gens-là ne sont pas humains (i.e. none of them is, Rolland) | the one [uncle] I was always going to write to. And always didn't (Dickens). This is rare except when the negative is in the form of a prefix or is implied, e.g. they were all of them unkind; everybody was unkind (= nobody was kind) | he was always unkind | they all failed (= nobody succeeded).

The difference between the two possible results of negation with a word of the A-class is idiomatically expressed by different adverbs:

Result B: he is not altogether happy | pas tout-à-fait | ikke helt | nicht ganz.

Result C: he is not at all happy (he is not happy at all) | pas du tout | slet ikke | gar nicht.

¹ In the examples given in this section all has its generic meaning (every-body, anybody); but all may also be used in the 'distributive' sense (the sum of... see p 203 note). A negative may be placed with the verb, e.g. "All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand" (Sh.), but is often for the sake of emphasis (= not even) put before all, e.g. "Not all the water in the rough rude sea Can wash the balme from an anoyented king" (Sh.).
Cp. from a recent newspaper: Germany's offer is entirely unacceptable to the French and not wholly acceptable to the English Government.

Examples of words of the class C with a negative after them, result A:

Nobody was unkind (= everybody was kind) | he was never unkind | nobody failed. This is comparatively rare with not, and sentences like "not a clerk in that house did not tremble before her" (Thackeray = all the clerks trembled) are generally avoided as not sufficiently clear: the hearer gets easily confused; but if the two negatives are placed in separate sentences, the combination is unobjectionable: there was no one present that did not weep | there is nothing I could not do for her; cp. Johnson's epitaph on Goldsmith: Qui nullum fere scribendi genus Non tetigit, Nullum quod tetigit non ornavit.

We next proceed to the three categories mentioned p. 325: A necessity, B possibility, C impossibility. If we add a negative, we see the following results: not necessary (A) = possible (B); not impossible (C) = possible (B); it is impossible not to see = necessary; no one can deny = everyone must admit | nobody need be present = everybody may be absent | he cannot succeed = he must fail | non potest non amare | il ne pouvait pas ne pas voir qu'on se moquait de lui.

With regard to the further tripartition A command, B permission, C prohibition, we have seen that the imperative may mean either A or B. Therefore a negative imperative, e.g. Don't take that! may mean either a negative command (= a prohibition), or a polite request (or advice) not to take it; and on account of this ambiguity there is in many languages a disinclination to use a negative imperative. In Latin it is only found poetically, being otherwise replaced by a paraphrase with noli (Noli me tangere) or a subjunctive (Ne nos inducas in tentationem); in Spanish the latter has become the rule (No vengas 'don't come'). In Dan. Tag det ikke is generally a piece of advice, and La vær å ta det (Lad være at tage det) has become the usual form for a prohibition. In other languages we find separate verb-forms ('jussive') or else separate negatives (e.g. Gr. mē) used in prohibitions.

Both may not and must not may be used in prohibitions. In the former not logically belongs to may (the negation of a permission, cf. G. du darfst nicht), but as the same combination is often used in a different sense, e.g. in "He may not be rich, but he is a gentleman" (where not goes with be: it is possible that he is not), and as may is also felt to be too weak for a prohibition, the tendency
is more and more to use the more brutal *must not*, except in questions implying a positive answer (*mayn't I = 'I suppose I may') and in close connexion with a positive *may*, e.g. in answers ("May I take that? No, you may not"). In you *must not take* that the negative logically belongs to the infinitive: it is a positive command (*must*) not to take that;¹ but the prevailing tendency to attract the negative to the auxiliary verb leads to the usual form *you mustn't*. In this way we get different auxiliaries in positive and negative sentences, e.g. You may call me Dolly if you like; but you mustn't call me child (Shaw) | You mustn't marry more than one person at a time, may you? (Dickens). Now, however, *must* is beginning to be used in tag questions, e.g. "I must not go any farther, must I?" (G. Eliot), though it is not possible otherwise to substitute *Must I?* for *May I?*

**Special and Nexal Negation.**

We have seen already that the meaning of a sentence sometimes depends on the place of a negative element. In a more general way we may say that the negative notion may belong logically either to one single idea (special negation) or to the combination of the two parts of a nexus (nexal negation). In the former case we have either a negative prefix (as in never, unhappy, disorder), or the adverb *not* put before the word (*not happy*); in some cases a single word without any negative prefix may be regarded as containing a negative idea, e.g. *lack* (= have not), *fail* (= not succeed; but we may also say that *succeed* is the negative counterpart of *fail*).

When a nexus is negatived, the negative adverb is generally attracted to the verb, in many languages in the form of a weak *ne* or similar particle placed before the verb, and sometimes amalgamated with it (cp. earlier E. *nis, nil*); in MnE we have the *do-combinations* (*does not come, doesn't come*, etc.) except with the well-known group of verbs (*is not, isn't, cannot*, etc.).

In the sentence "Many of us didn't want the war" the nexus is negatived, but in "Not many of us wanted the war" *not* belongs exclusively to *many*, which it turns into 'few.'

In many cases it seems to be of no importance whether we negative one notion only or the combination of that notion with another; *she is not happy* may be analyzed either as a description of what she is, viz. *not-happy* (= unhappy), or as a negativing of her being happy (she is-not, isn't, happy). If we add *very*, however, we see the difference between "she is very unhappy" and "she is not very happy."

¹ Thus properly *you must not take*, but *you may-not take*. 
The general tendency is to use a nexal negative, even in some cases where a special negative would be more apposite. By the side of the logically impeccable “I came not to send peace, but a sword” (Matt. 10. 34) we frequently find sentences like “I don’t complain of your words, but of the tone in which they were uttered” (= I complain, though not . . ., but of . . .) | “We aren’t here to talk nonsense, but to act” (where “we aren’t here” in itself is a contradiction in terms). A particular case is found with because: the sentence “I didn’t go because I was afraid” is ambiguous and may mean either ‘I went, but the reason was not fear,’ or ‘I did not go, and the reason for not going was fear,’ though in the spoken language the tone may show which is meant; cp. further “I didn’t call because I wanted to see her” (but for some other reason), and “I didn’t call because I wanted to avoid her.”

With infinitival and similar constructions it is often very important to know which of two verbal notions is negatived; various devices are used in different languages to make the meaning clear. A few examples may suffice: She did not wish to reflect; she strongly wished not to reflect (Bennett) | Tommy deserved not to be hated | Tommy did not deserve to be loved | Dan. prøv ikke på at se derhen | prøv på ikke at se derhen | il ne tâche pas de regarder | il tâche de ne pas regarder | il ne peut pas entendre | il peut ne pas entendre | (Will he come?) I am afraid not | I am not afraid.

The tendency already mentioned to attract the negation to the verb is not the only one found in actual language: we often find the opposite tendency to attract the negative notion to any word that can easily be made negative. In literary English “we met nobody” is thought more elegant than the colloquial “we didn’t meet anybody”; cp. also “this will be no easy matter” and “this won’t be an easy matter.” In many cases we find words like nothing used where a nexal negation would be more logical, e.g. she loves you so well that she has the heart to thwart you in nothing (Gilbert) | you need be under no uneasiness. Attraction of this kind is seen also in the idiomatic use of “he was no ordinary boy” in preference to “he was a not ordinary boy” and in sentences like “you and I will go to the smoking-room, and talk about nothing at all subtle” (= about something that is not subtle, Benson), which most people would probably censure as wrong.

Wherever it might seem possible to attract the negative element to either of two words, it is nearly always put with the first. We may say “no one ever saw him angry” or “never did any one see him angry,” but not “any one never saw him angry” or “ever did no one see him angry.” Cp. also Lat. “nec quisquam” (not “et
nemo”), “neque ullus,” etc. *Without any danger* is preferred to *with no danger.*

When the negative is attracted to the subject, the sentence is often continued in such a way that the positive counterpart of the first subject must be understood. In ordinary life this will cause no misunderstanding, and it is only the critical, or hyper-critical, grammarian that discovers anything wrong in it, e.g. Not one should escape, but perish by my sword (= but all perish, Marlowe) | none of them are hurtful, but loving and holy (Bunyan). Cp. also: Don’t let any of us go to bed to-night, but see the morning come (Benson) | I quite forget the details, only that I had a good deal of talk with him (Carlyle).³

**Double or Cumulative Negation.**

It seems to be an established view among theorists, logicians as well as linguists, that two negatives ought to cancel one another, because two negatives logically make an affirmative in the same way as in mathematics — (— 4) = + 4. Languages, as well as individual writers, are consequently censured if they use a double negative as a strengthened negative. If this view were true, a consistent logician would have to find fault with Chaucer’s: “He nevère yet no vileynye ne seyde In al his lyf unto no maner wight,” because here four negatives (thus an even number) are made to serve as a strengthened negative expression, but not with the OE. example “nan man nyste nan ping” (no man not-knew nothing), because there are here three negatives, of which two should cancel each other, leaving one over. But as a matter of fact no one seems to calculate cumulative negation in this way, and this is perfectly right from the point of view of linguistic logic.

Language is not mathematics, and, as already remarked, a linguistic negative cannot be compared with the sign — (minus) in mathematics; hence any reference to the mathematical rule about two minus’s is inconclusive. But neither are the attempts made by some linguists to justify the use of double negation perfectly satisfactory. Van Ginneken rightly criticizes the view of Romanic scholars, who speak of a half-negation in the case of French ne—an explanation which at any rate does not explain many of the phenomena in other languages. His own explanation is that negation in natural languages is not logical negation, but the expression of a feeling of resistance; according to him the logical or mathematical conception of negation, according to which two

³ Cp. also “It is always astonishing to me how few people know *anything* (or very little) about Faraday”: *or very little* is made possible only because the sentence means ‘that most people know nothing,’ etc.
negatives are mutually destructive, has only gained ground in a few centres of civilization and has never struck root in the popular mind. I have my doubts as to the greater primitivity of the idea of 'resistance' than that of negation understood exactly as we understand it in such a simple sentence as "he does not sleep." Other writers speak of a difference between qualitative and quantitative negation and imagine that this distinction finds a support in Kant's table of categories, though as a matter of fact Kant ranges all negation under the heading of "quality." Anyhow the distinction does not assist us at all to comprehend double negation.1

Language has a logic of its own, and in this case its logic has something to recommend it. Whenever two negatives really refer to the same idea or word (as special negatives) the result is invariably positive; this is true of all languages, and applies to such collocations as e.g. not uncommon, not infrequent, not without some fear. The two negatives, however, do not exactly cancel one another in such a way that the result is identical with the simple common, frequent, with some doubt; the longer expression is always weaker: "this is not unknown to me" or "I am not ignorant of this" means 'I am to some extent aware of it,' etc. The psychological reason for this is that the détour through the two mutually destructive negatives weakens the mental energy of the listener and implies on the part of the speaker a certain hesitation which is absent from the blunt, outspoken common or known. In the same way I don't deny that he was angry is weaker than I assert, etc. Cp. also Fr. il n'était pas sans être frappé.

On the other hand, if two (or more than two) negatives are attached to different words, they have not the same effect upon one another, and the total result, therefore, may very well be negative. We see this in a great variety of languages, where cumulative negation in this way is of everyday occurrence. Examples from Old and Middle English have already been given; they abound in these periods, but are somewhat rarer in Elizabethan English; in dialectal and vulgar English of our own day they are frequent, and many examples may be culled from representations of popular language in novels and plays, e.g. "Nobody never went and hinted no such thing, said Peggotty" | "I can't do nothing without my staff" (Hardy).

In other languages we find the same phenomenon more or less regularly. Thus in Middle High German: nu en-kan ich niemanne gesagen. In French: on ne le voit nulle part. In Spanish: aquí no vienen nunca soldados 'here not come never soldiers.' In

1 These theories have been criticized by Delbrück, Negative Sätze, 36 ff., and in my own Negation, 69 ff. Negation is always quantitative rather than qualitative.
DOUBLE OR CUMULATIVE NEGATION

Slavic languages, Serbian: i nikto mu ne mogaše odgovoriti riječi ‘and nobody him not could answer word’ (Delbrück). Russian: Filipok ničego ne skazal ‘F. nothing not said.’ Greek: aneu toutou oudeis eis ouden oudenos an humon oudepote genoito axios (Plato, in Madvig).

So also outside our family of languages, e.g. Magyar: semmit sem halottam, or: nèm halottam sèmmit ‘nothing not I have heard (Szinnyei). Congo (Bantu): kavangidi kwandi wawubiko, kamonanga kwandi nganziko, kaba yelanga kwa-u ko ‘not did he evil not, not feeling he no pain, not they sick not.’

How to account for this phenomenon, which is spread over so many different languages? There is one very important observation to be made, without which I do not think that we shall be able to understand the matter, namely that repeated negation becomes an habitual phenomenon in those languages only in which the ordinary negative element is comparatively small in phonetic bulk: ne or n- in Old English, in French, in Slavic, en or n- in Middle High (and Middle Low) German, ou in Greek, s- or n- in Magyar. These are easily attracted to various words (we have already seen instances of such attraction in previous sections), and the insignificance of these initial sounds or weakly stressed syllables makes it desirable to multiply them in a sentence so as to prevent their being overlooked. Under the influence of strong feeling the speaker wants to make absolutely sure that the negative sense will be fully apprehended; he therefore attaches it not only to the verb, but also to any other part of the sentence that can be easily made negative: he will, as it were, spread a layer of negative colouring over the whole of the sentence instead of confining it to one single place. If this repetition is rarer in modern English and German than it was formerly, one of the reasons probably is that the fuller negatives not and nicht have taken the place of the smaller ne and en,1 though the logic of the schools and the influence of Latin have also contributed towards the same result. It may also be said that it requires greater mental energy to content oneself with one negative, which has to be remembered during the whole length of the utterance both by the speaker and the hearer, than to repeat the negative idea whenever an occasion offers itself, and thus impart a negative colouring to the whole of the sentence.

If we are now to pass judgment on this widespread cumulative negation from a logical point of view, I should not call it illogical,

1 In classical Latin, too, non is more bulky than the original ne. I am inclined to explain the comparative rarity in Elizabethan English of this kind of cumulative negation (as opposed to the resumptive negation with neither, etc., examples of which abound) from the use at that time of the full not, which had not yet dwindled down to -n’t attached to the verb as in more recent periods.
seeing that the negative elements are not attached to the same word. I should rather say that though logically one negative suffices, two or three are simply a redundancy, which may be superfluous from a stylistic point of view, just as any repetition in a positive sentence (every and any, always and on all occasions), but is otherwise unobjectionable. No one objects from a logical point of view to combinations like these: "I shall never consent, not under any circumstances, not on any condition, neither at home nor abroad"; it is true that here pauses, which in writing are marked by commas, separate the negatives, as if they belonged to so many different sentences, while in "he never said nothing" and all the other cases quoted from various languages the negatives belong to one and the same sentence. But it is perfectly impossible to draw a line between what constitutes one, and what constitutes two sentences: does a sentence like "I cannot goe no further" (Shakespeare) become more logical by the mere addition of a comma: "I cannot goe, no further"?

As a separate variety of double negation must be treated what might be called resumptive negation (Delbrück’s ergänzungsnegation). This is especially frequent when not is followed by a disjunctive combination with neither . . . nor or a restrictive addition with not even: "he cannot sleep, neither at night nor in the daytime" or "he cannot sleep, not even after taking an opiate"; cp. also the addition in "loue no man in good earnest, nor no further in sport neyther" (Sh.). Similarly in other languages, Lat. non . . . neque . . . neque, non . . . ne . . . quidem, Gr. ou . . . oude . . . oude, etc. In such cases, with ‘neither—nor’ and ‘not even,’ all languages seem freely to admit double negatives, though even here precisians object to them.

Closely connected with resumptive negation is paratactic negation: a negative is placed in a clause dependent on a verb of negative import, e.g. ‘deny, forbid, hinder, doubt,’ as if the clause had been an independent sentence, or as if the corresponding positive verb had been used in the main sentence. Examples: First he deni’d you had in him no right (Sh.) | What hinders in your own instance that you do not return to those habits (Lamb). It is well known how in some languages this develops to a fixed rule, e.g. in Latin with ne, quin, quominus, in French with ne (which now, like ne in other positions, tends to disappear). Here, too, we have redundancy and over-emphasis rather than irrationality or want of logic.

1 A special case of resumptive negation is seen when not is softened down by an added hardly, which in itself would have been sufficient to express the idea: "He wasn’t changed at all hardly" (Kipling).
History of Negatives.

The general history of negative expressions in some of the best-known languages presents a curious fluctuation. The negative adverb is often weakly stressed, because some other word in the sentence has to receive a strong stress of contrast. But when the negative has become a mere proclitic syllable or even a single sound, it is felt to be too weak, and has to be strengthened by some additional word, and this in its turn may come to be felt as the negative proper, which then may be subject to the same development as the original word. We have thus a constant interplay of weakening and strengthening, which with the further tendency to place the negative in the beginning of the sentence where it is likely to be dropped (though prosiopesis) leads to curious results, which can here be sketched only in the briefest outlines by examples taken from a few languages.

First, Latin and its continuation French. The starting point, here as elsewhere, is ne, which I take to be (together with the variant me) a primitive interjection of disgust consisting mainly in the facial gesture of contracting the muscles of the nose. The first stage, then, is:

(1) ne dico. This persists chiefly with a few verbs (nescio, negqueo, nolo) and with some pronouns and adverbs; otherwise ne is felt to be too weak and is strengthened by the addition of oenum 'one thing'; the result is non (ne-oenum):

(2) non dico. In course of time non loses its stress and becomes OFr. nen, later ne—thus practically the same sound as the Proto-Aryan adverb:

(3) jeo ne di. This has survived in literary French till our own days in a few combinations, je ne suis, je ne peux, and colloquially in n'importe; but generally it has been found necessary to strengthen it:

(4) je ne dis pas. Next, in colloquial French, the weak ne disappears:

(5) je dis pas.

In Scandinavian, too, the original ne was first strengthened by additions and finally ousted by these, ON. eigi, ekki, Dan. ej, ikke, which at first had no negative meaning.

In German we had first ni alone before the verb, then ni, ne (or weakened n-, en-) before and nicht after the verb, and finally nicht alone.

In English the stages are:

(1) ic ne secgn.

(2) I ne seye not.
886 NEGATION

(3) I say not.
(4) I do not say.
(5) I don't say. In some frequent combinations, notably I don't know, we witness the first beginning of a new weakening, for in the pronunciation [ai d(n) nou] practically nothing is left of the original negative.

The strengthening of negatives is effected either by means of some word meaning a small thing (not a bit, not a jot, not a scrap, etc., Fr. ne . . . mie, goutte, point, pas), or by means of an adverb meaning 'ever' (OE. na from ne + a = Gothic ni aiws, G. nie; E. never also sometimes loses its temporal meaning and means nothing but 'not'). Finally the strengthening addition may be a word meaning 'nothing' as Lat. non, E. not (a weaker form of nought) or G. nicht; in ME. I ne seyne 'not' there is a double negation.

The dropping or leaving out of a weak negative adverb changes a positive into a negative word. The most characteristic examples of this are found in French, where pas, personne, jamais and other words are now negative—invariably so when there is no verb: pas de doute | Qui le sait? Personne | Jamais de la vie, and in vulgar and familiar speech also in sentences containing a verb, where literary language requires ne: Viens-tu pas? | je le vois jamais. With regard to plus, ambiguity has in some cases been obviated by the popular pronunciation, [j an a ply] meaning 'there is no more of it' and [j an a plys] 'there is more of it.' An isolated Plus de bruit is a negative, but Plus de bruit que de mal a positive expression, though the pronunciation is here the same. There is a curious consequence of this negative use of plus, namely that moins may occasionally appear as a kind of comparative of plus: Plus d'écoles, plus d'asiles, plus de bienfaisance, encore moins de théologie (Mérimée).

In other languages the transition from positive to negative is found sporadically, as in Sp. nada 'nothing' from Lat. (res) nata, nadie 'nobody,' and in the ON. words in -gi; in English we find but from ne . . . but, cp. dialectal nobbut, and the curious more for 'no more' in the South-Western part of England, e.g. "Not much of a scholar. More am I" (Phillpotts).

Implied Negation.

As in other provinces of grammar, we have here cases of disagreement between the notional meaning and the grammatical expression. A notional negation is often implied though the sentence contains no negative proper.
A question is often equivalent to a negative assertion: *Am I my brother's keeper?* (See p. 323.)

Combinations like *Me tell a lie! = 'I cannot tell a lie'* have been mentioned, p. 130.

Conditional expressions may serve the same purpose, e.g. "I am a rogue if I drunke to-day" (= I did not drink, Sh.) | I'm dashed if I know; also with the conditional clause standing alone: If there isn't Captain Donnithorne a-coming into the yard! (G. Eliot; here, of course, the direct and the indirect negations cancel each other, the result being positive: he is coming).

Further may be mentioned: (you) *see if I don't | catch me going there!* | Mr. Copperfield was teaching me.—*Much he knew of it himself* | When the devil was ill, the devil a monk would be; | When the devil got well, *the devil a monk was he.* Similar idiomatic and ironical expressions seem to be frequent in all languages.

A notional negative is also implied in the use of the preterit (subjunctive) in clauses of rejected condition (p. 265).

*Note.—The whole subject of this chapter has been treated with much fuller illustration from many languages and with discussion of some points here omitted (negative conjunctions, prefixes, the contraction of *not* into *-nt*, etc.) in "Negation in English and Other Languages," Det kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Historisk-Filologiske Meddelelser I, 5 (Copenhagen, 1917).*
CHAPTER XXV

CONCLUSION

Conflicts. Terminology. The Soul of Grammar

Conflicts.

It is a natural consequence of the complexity on the one hand of the phenomena of life which have to be expressed, and on the other hand of the linguistic means available to express them, that conflicts of various kind are bound to occur, in which the speaker has to make a choice and then, possibly after some hesitation, uses one form where someone else in the same situation might have used another form. In some cases we witness a tug-of-war, as it were, between two tendencies which may go on for a very long period, during which grammarians indulge in disputes as to which form or expression is "correct"; in other cases one of the conflicting tendencies prevails, and the question is settled practically by the speaking community, sometimes under protest from the Lindley Murrays or Academies of the time, who very often prefer logical consistency to ease and naturalness. Examples of grammatical conflicts will be found here and there in this volume: the most typical ones are perhaps those mentioned in Ch. XVII of rivalry between the notional idea of sex and grammatical gender (leading, for instance, to Greek neanias, G. ein fräulein . . . sie, Sp. el justicia). In Ch. XIV we saw the competition between singular and plural in the verb connected with a collective. Some other conflicts of a similar character may be mentioned here.

In the Gothonic languages there is no distinction of gender in the plural; but the want of an express indication of the "natural neuter" in speaking of more than one thing leads to the employment of what is properly a singular neuter ending in G. beides, verschiedenes (cp. also alles); Curme GG 149 mentions alles dreies, and Spitzer somewhere writes alles drei ("Sie sind weder germanen noch gallier noch auch romanen, sondern alles drei der abstammung nach"). Here, then, gender has been stronger than number.

Similarly the feeling for the neuter is often stronger than the feeling for the proper case. In the dative there was originally no difference between masculine and neuter; but in English from an
early period we find for it, to this, after what, and finally these nominative-accusatives were the only forms of the neuter pronouns that were used. In German we see the same tendency, though it has not prevailed as completely as in English: Goethe has zu was; was wohnte er bei is common, and zu (mit, von) etwas is the only form used; thus also mit nichts, etc. (a survival of the old form is found in zu nichte machen, mit nichten); wegen was is used colloquially instead of the ambiguous wegen wessen (Curme GG 198). But the tendency has not been strong enough to allow mit das, von welches, though mit dem, von welchem in a neuter sense is not frequent (cp. damit, wovon), and the dative is required in an adjective following the unflected pronoun: "der gedanke von etwas unverzeihlichem."

G. wem, like E. whom, is common to masculine and feminine, but where a distinctive form for the female sex is desirable, a rare and unrecognized form wer may be used: "Von Helios gezeugt? Von wer geboren?" (Goethe) | "Da du so eine art bruder von ihr bist.—Von ihr? Von wer?" (Wilbrandt, Curme GG 191). This, however, is only possible after a preposition, as wer as the first word of the sentence would be taken as the nominative; Raabe therefore finds another way out: "Festgeregnet! Wem und welcher steigt nicht bei diesem worte eine gespenstische einnerung in der seele auf?" (= what man and woman).

On the other hand, case has proved stronger than gender in the gradual extension of the genitival ending -s to feminines in English and Danish, the chief reason being, of course, that the old form did not mark off the genitive distinctly enough from the other cases. In German the same tendency is sometimes found with proper names; Frenssen thus writes: "Lisbeths heller kopf."

A conflict between the ordinary rule which requires an oblique case after a preposition, and the feeling of a subject-relation which requires the nominative, sometimes leads to the latter idea gaining the upper hand, e.g. E. "Me thinkes no body should be sad but I" (Sh.) | "not a man depart, Save I alone" (id.) | "Did any one indeed exist, except I?" (Mrs. Shelley) | G. "Wo ist ein gott ohne der herr" (Luther) | "niemand kommt mir entgegen ausser ein unverschämt" (Lessing) | Dan. "ingen uden jeg kan vide det," etc. (cf. ChE, p. 57 ff.).

In a similar way we have in Sp. hasta yo lo sé ' up to I, i.e. even I know it' (cp. Fr. jusqu'au roi le sait). It is really the same principle that is at the bottom of the G. nominative in was für ein mensch and the corresponding Russian što za čelovjek; finally also in G. ein alter schelm von lohnbedienter.

The wish to indicate the second person singular is seen to have been stronger than the desire to distinguish between the indicative
and the subjunctive by the fact that combinations like *if thou dost* and *if thou didst* became frequent at a much earlier period than the corresponding uses of the indicative instead of the subjunctive in the third person.

In Ch. XXI we have already seen the conflicts in indirect speech between the tendency to keep the tense of direct speech and the tendency to shift it into accordance with the main verb ("He told us that an unmarried man was (or, is) only half a man" | "he moved that the bill be read a second time"). In the sentence "he proposed that the meeting adjourn" we may say that mood has been stronger than tense, and the same is true in French, where "il désirait qu'elle lui écrive" is now the only form used in ordinary language instead of the earlier *écritvisse*. Inversely tense is stronger than mood in colloquial French in a case like "croyez-vous qu'il fera beau demain," where old-fashioned grammarians would prefer the present subjunctive *fasse*; Rousseau writes: "Je ne dis pas que les bons seront récompensés; mais je dis qu'ils seront heureux"; although after a negative main verb the ordinary rule is that the verb is put into the subjunctive in the dependent clause.

In the matter of word-order there are a great many similar conflicts, many of which fall under the head of style rather than of grammar. Let me mention only one point of grammatical interest: on the one hand prepositions are placed before their objects, on the other hand interrogative and relative pronouns have to be put in the beginning of the sentence. Hence conflicts, which are often settled according to the more or less intimate connexion between the preposition and its object or between the preposition and some other word in the sentence: "What are you talking of? | What town is he living in? or, In what town is he living? | In what respect was he suspicious? | Some things which I can't do without | Some things without which I can't make pancakes." I find an instructive example in Stevenson: "What do they care for but money? For what would they risk their rascal carcasses but money?" By the side of "this movement of which I have seen the beginning" (here it would be less natural to say "which I have seen the beginning of") we have the literary "the beginning of which I have seen." In French it is impossible to relegate the preposition to the end of the sentence, hence it is necessary to say "l'homme à qui j'ai donné le prix" and "l'homme au fils duquel j'ai donné le prix." As a genitive in English cannot be separated from the word it belongs to, the object, which in ordinary sentences comes after the verb, has to be placed before the subject after *whose* in "the man whose son I met"; in French,

---

1 Hesitation where to place the preposition sometimes leads to redundancy, e.g. "Of what kinde should this cocke come of?" (Sh.).
on the other hand, there is no such inducement, and the object comes at its usual place, though separated from *dont*, in "l'homme dont j'ai rencontré le fils."

**Terminology.**

Any branch of science that is not stationary, but progressive, must from time to time renew or revise its terminology. New terms must be found not only for newly discovered things like *radium*, *ion*, but also for new ideas resulting from new ways of considering old facts. Traditional terms often cramp the minds of investigators and may form a hindrance to fertile developments. It is true that a fixed terminology, in which the meaning of every single term is plain to every reader, is a great boon, but if the terminology is fixed only in so far as the same terms are used, while their meanings vary according to circumstances or the usage of individual writers, it becomes necessary to settle what would be the best meaning to attach to these terms, or else to introduce new terms which are not liable to misunderstanding.

In grammar terminological difficulties are aggravated by the facts that many terms go back to pre-scientific ages and that many again are used outside of grammar, often in meanings which have little or no resemblance to the technical meanings attached to them by grammarians, and finally by the fact that the same set of terms is used for languages of different structure. It is, of course, an advantage to the learner that he has not to acquire a new set of terms for each new language he takes up, but this is only of value if the grammatical facts covered by the same terms are really analogous, and not so dissimilar that the use of one and the same name may create confusion in the student's mind.

The scorn of the oldest grammarians for a good terminology is shown by their term *verbum substantivum* for the verb which is the least substantial and farthest removed from any substantive, further by the use of *positive* as the first degree of comparison, thus not as usual opposed to negative, but to comparative, and by the use of *impersonal* of some functions of the third "person." It is a great disadvantage that many grammatical terms have other non-technical meanings, which sometimes make it difficult to avoid such clashings as "this case [speaking of the nominative, for instance] is found in other cases as well" or "en d'autres cas on trouve aussi le nominatif," "a singular use of the singular." When a grammarian sees the words "a verbal proposition" in a treatise on logic, he is at first inclined to think that it has something to do with a verb and may be opposed to a nominal sentence (*nominal*,...
by the way, is also ambiguous), until he discovers that it means a mere definition of a word. Active, passive, voice, object, subject—I have had occasion in various chapters to point out how the everyday use of these words may mislead the unwary; the fact that subject may mean 'subject-matter' has given rise to whole discussions about logical, psychological, and grammatical subject which might have been avoided if grammarians had chosen a less ambiguous term. Neuter, besides its ordinary uses outside the province of grammar, has two distinct meanings in grammar, of which one is unavoidable (neuter gender), but the other can easily be dispensed with: neuter verb—explained as "neither active nor passive; intransitive" in spite of the fact that an intransitive verb is active in the only sense in which the word 'active' should be used by a consistent linguist. Besides this, the NED gives as an additional meaning "neuter passive, having the character both of a neuter and a passive verb"—confusion worse confounded!

A bad or mistaken name may lead to wrong rules which may have a detrimental influence on the free use of language, especially in writing. Thus the term preposition, or rather the unfortunate knowledge of the Latin etymology of this word, is responsible for that absurd aversion to putting a preposition at the end of a sentence which many schoolmasters and newspaper editors profess in utter ignorance of the principles and history of their own language. These people do not consider the two possibilities which the most superficial knowledge of general linguistics would have brought to their notice, that the name may have been a misnomer from the very first, or else that the value of the word may have changed as has been the case with so many other words the etymology of which is not, or is no longer, understood by the ordinary users of the language. A ladybird is not a bird, nor a butterfly a fly, and no one is the worse for it; blackberries are not black till they are ripe; a barn may be used for other things than barley (OE. bere-aern 'barley-house') and a bishop has other occupations than to 'look at' or 'overlook' (Gr. epi-skopos). Why not, then, admit postpositional prepositions, just as one admits adverbs which do not stand by the side of a verb? (As a matter of fact, very is always recognized as an adverb though it never qualifies a verb.)

Terminological difficulties are sometimes aggravated by the fact that languages change in course of time, and that therefore terms which may be adequate for one period are no longer so for a subsequent period. It is true that the case following the preposition to in OE. to donne was a dative, but that does not justify us in calling do in the modern to do a 'dative infinitive,' as the NED

1 Cp. also Lat. tenus, Gr heneka.
does (though under the word *dative* it does not mention this use). It is even worse when the terms *dative* and *genitive* are applied to modern prepositional groups like *to God* and *of God*; see Ch. XIII.

It would evidently be utterly impracticable to throw the whole traditional nomenclature overboard and create a totally new one, for instance by an arbitrary system analogous to that of the old Indian grammarians, who coined words like *lau* present tense, *lit* perfect, *lut* first future, *lrt* second future, *let* subjunctive, *lot* imperative, *lan* imperfect, *lin* potential, etc. (Benfey, *Gesch. d. sprachw.* 92: I omit the diacritics). We must take most of the old terms as they are, and make the best use of them that we can, supplementing them where it is necessary, and limiting the meanings of all terms, old and new, as precisely and unambiguously as possible. But this is no easy task, and I have the greatest sympathy with Sweet, who wrote to me at the time when he brought out his *New English Grammar*: “I have had most difficulty with the terminology.”

In the preceding chapters (and earlier in my MEG) I have ventured to introduce a certain number of new terms, but I make bold to think that they are neither very numerous nor very difficult. In both respects my procedure compares favourably both with the wholesale coining of new grammatical terms and perversion of old ones in Noreen’s great work, and with the nomenclature of certain recent psychologists. It should also be counted to my credit that I am able to toss to the wind many of the terms used in former grammatical works; thus I have no “use for” such terms as synalepha, crasis, synæresis, synizesis, ekthlipsis, synekphonesis, to mention only terms from one department of phonetic theory; in the matter of “aspect” (Ch. XX) I am also more moderate than most recent writers.

Among my innovations I should like to call special attention to the terms connected with the theory of the “three ranks,” where I think that the few new terms allow one to explain a great many things more precisely and at the same time more tersely than has been possible hitherto. Let me give one example that has recently come under my notice. In Tract XV of the Society for Pure English, Mr. H. W. Fowler speaks of the position of adverbs, saying: “The word *adverb* is here to be taken as including adverbial phrases (e.g. *for a time*) and adverbial clauses (e.g. *if possible*), adjectives used predicatively (e.g. *alone*), and adverbial conjunctions (e.g. *then*), as well as simple adverbs such as *soon* and *undoubtedly*.” These five lines might have been spared if the writer had made use of my simple word *subjunct*. 
The Soul of Grammar.

My task is at an end. A good deal of this volume has necessarily been taken up with controversial matter, but it is my hope that the criticism contained in it will be found to be constructive rather than destructive. And let me add for the benefit of those reviewers who are fond of pointing out this or that little article in some recent periodical or this or that doctor's thesis which has been overlooked, that I have very often silently criticized views which appear to me to be wrong, without giving in each particular case chapter and verse for what I take exception to. My theme is so comprehensive that the book would have swelled to unwarrantable dimensions had I treated at full length all the varying opinions of other scholars on the questions I deal with. Those who are interested in the great problems at issue rather than in grammatical detail will perhaps think that I have quoted too much, not too little, from the ever-increasing flood of books and articles on these questions.

My endeavour has been, without neglecting investigation into the details of the languages known to me, to give due prominence to the great principles underlying the grammars of all languages, and thus to make my contribution to a grammatical science based at the same time on sound psychology, on sane logic, and on solid facts of linguistic history.

Psychology should assist us in understanding what is going on in the mind of speakers, and more particularly how they are led to deviate from previously existing rules in consequence of conflicting tendencies, each of them dependent on some facts in the structure of the language concerned.

Logic as hitherto often applied to grammar has been a narrow strictly formal kind of logic, generally called in to condemn certain developments in living speech. Instead of that, we should cultivate a broader-minded logic which would recognize, for instance, that from the logical point of view the indirect object may be made the subject of a passive sentence just as much as the direct object, the question as to the permissibility of such sentences as "he was offered a crown" being thus shifted from the jurisdiction of logic to that of actual usage. Fr. "je m'en souviens" was only illogical so long as the original meaning of souvenir was still felt—but at that time people still said "il m'en souvient," and the new construction is the outward symptom of the fact that the meaning of the verb has changed (cp. the change from me dreams to I dream): when souvenir has come to mean 'have in one's memory' instead of 'come to one's memory,' the new construction is the only one logically possible. The paragraphs devoted in
Ch. XXIV to double negation also show us the applications of mistaken logical notions to grammar, and our conclusion is not that logic cannot be applied to grammatical questions, but that we should beware of calling in a superficial logic to condemn what on a more penetrating consideration may appear perfectly justifiable. On the other hand, of course, logic is of the greatest value for the building up of our grammatical system and for the formulation of our grammatical rules or laws.

The study of linguistic history is of the utmost importance to the grammarian: it broadens his mind and tends to eliminate that tendency to reprobation which is the besetting sin of the non-historic grammarian, for the history of languages shows that changes have constantly taken place in the past, and that what was bad grammar in one period may become good grammar in the next. But linguistic history has hitherto perhaps been too much occupied with trying to find out the ultimate origin of each phenomenon, while disregarding many things nearer our own days which are still waiting for careful investigation.

Grammatical phenomena can and should be considered from various (often supplementary) points of view. Take the concord between a substantive and its adjective (in gender, number and case) and between a subject and its verb (in number and person). The traditional grammarian of the old type states the rules and looks upon deviations as blunders, which he thinks himself justified in branding as illogical. The linguistic psychologist finds out the reasons why the rules are broken in this or that case: it may be that if the verb comes long after its subject, there is no more mental energy left to remember what was the number of the subject, or that if the verb precedes the subject, the speaker has not yet made up his mind as to what the subject is to be, etc. The historian examines his texts over various centuries and finds a growing tendency to neglect the forms distinctive of number, etc. And then the linguistic philosopher may step in and say that the demand for grammatical concord in these cases is simply a consequence of the imperfection of language, for the ideas of number, gender (sex), case and person belong logically only to primary words and not to secondary ones like adjective (adjunct) and verb. So far, then, from a language suffering any loss when it gradually discards those endings in adjectives and verbs which indicated this agreement with the primary, the tendency must, on the contrary, be considered a progressive one, and full stability can be found in that language alone which has abandoned all these clumsy remnants of a bygone past. (But don't let me be tempted to say more of this than I have already said in the fourth book of Language.)
My concern in this volume has been with what might be called the higher theory of grammar. But it is clear that if my views are accepted, even if they are accepted only partially, they must have practical consequences. First they must influence those grammars that are written for advanced students (the second volume of my own *Modern English Grammar* already bears witness to this influence, as does August Western's *Norsk Riksmaalgrammatik*); and through such grammars the new views may also in course of time penetrate to elementary grammars and influence the whole teaching of grammar from the very earliest stage. But how that should be brought about, and how many of the new views and terms may advantageously be adopted in primary schools—those are questions on which I should not like to pronounce before I have seen how this book is received by those scholars to whom it is addressed. Let me only express the hope that elementary teaching of grammar in future may be a more living thing than it has been up to now, with less half-understood or unintelligible precept, fewer "don't's," fewer definitions, and infinitely more observation of actual living facts. This is the only way in which grammar can be made a useful and interesting part of the school curriculum.

In elementary schools the only grammar that can be taught is that of the pupils' own mother-tongue. But in higher schools and in the universities foreign languages are taken up, and they may be made to throw light on each other and on the mother-tongue. This involves comparative grammar, one part of which is the historical grammar of one's own language. The great vivifying influence of comparative and historical grammar is universally recognized, but I may be allowed to point out here before I close that the way in which the facts of grammar are viewed in this volume may open out a new method in comparative grammar, or a new kind of comparative grammar. As this subject is always taught now, it starts from the sounds and forms, compares them in various related languages or in various periods of the same language in order to establish those correspondencies which are known under the name of phonetic laws, and to supplement them by developments through analogy, etc. In the scheme given above in Ch. III, this means starting from A (form), and proceeding to B (function) and C (notion or inner meaning). Even Comparative Syntax goes in the same direction, and is tied down by forms, as it is chiefly occupied in examining what has been the use made by different languages of the forms and form categories which Comparative Morphology has ascertained. But we can obtain new and fruitful points of view, and in fact arrive at a new kind of Comparative Syntax by following the method of this volume, i.e. starting from C (notion or inner meaning) and examining how each of the
fundamental ideas common to all mankind is expressed in various languages, thus proceeding through B (function) to A (form). This comparison need not be restricted to languages belonging to the same family and representing various developments of one original common tongue, but may take into consideration languages of the most diverse type and ancestry. The specimens of this treatment which I have given here may serve as a preliminary sketch of a notional comparative grammar, which it is my hope that others with a wider outlook than mine and a greater knowledge of languages may take up and develop further, so as to assist us in gaining a deeper insight into the innermost nature of human language and of human thought than has been possible in this volume.
In the chapter on Nexus (p. 117) I have mentioned a phenomenon which may be described as an accusative + a finite verb dependent on a verb inserted after the accusative. All books on correct English look upon the use of whom in sentences like “We feed children whom we think are hungry” as a gross or heinous error, the reasoning being evidently this: the relative is the subject of are hungry. A subject should stand in the nominative. 

We think is an insertion that cannot change anything in the relation between the pronoun and are. Who, not whom, is the nominative. The sentence should be: “We feed children who we think are hungry.” It is admitted that the use of whom is common, but the books mentioned give only a couple of examples from reputable writers besides some from less known writers and recent newspapers. My first contention is that this gives a false impression of the extent to which whom is used in these combinations, for as a matter of fact it is much more frequent in good writers than most people suspect. I reprint the examples I have collected from my own reading, which is not very extensive, and in which I have not paid more attention to this than to hundreds of other syntactic phenomena.

(Chaucer?) Ros 3021 To spye and take whom that he fond Unto that roser putte an hond | Chaucer B 666 yet wol we us avyse Whom that we wole that (some MSS. omit that) shal ben our justise | Caxton R 86 his owle hound whom I neuer see doth good | Shakesp. John IV. 2. 165 Arthur, whom they say is kill’d to night | Alls II. 1. 202 thy vassall, whom I know Is free for me to aske | Cymb. I. 4. 137 What lady . . . ? Yours, whom in constance you thinke stands so safe | Meas. II. 1. 72 thy wife ? I Sir : whom I thanke heauen is an honest woman | Cor. IV. 2. 2 the nobility . . . whom we see haued sided in his behalfe | Temp. III. 3. 92 Ferdinand (whom they suppose is droun’d) | Tim. IV. 3. 120 a bastard, whom the oracle Hath doubtfully pronounced thy throat shall cut (= who according to the or. shall cut) | A.V. I. Sam. 25. 11 Shall I . . . give it vnto men, whom I know not whence they be ? | John Speed (1626, quoted Lowes, Conv. and Revolt 163) Pliny places the perosites here whom hee saith bee so narrow-mouthed that they live only by the smel of rost meat | Walton Compl. A. 30 S. James and S. John, whom we know were fishers | Goldsm. Vic. 1766 2. 41 Thornhill, whom the host assured me was hated | ib. 47 Mr. Thornhill, whom now I find was even worse than he represented him (both passages ‘corrected’ in recent reprint) | Franklin Aut. 148 I advise you to apply to all those whom you know will give something; next, to those whom you are uncertain whether they will give any thing or not . . . and, lastly, do not neglect those whom you are sure will give nothing | Shelley Lett. 463 to anyone, whom he knew had direct communication with me | Keats 5. 72 I have met with women whom I really think would like to be married to a poem | Kingsley Y 35 I suppose that the God whom you say made me . . . | Darwin 1. 60 to assist those whom he thought deserved assistance | Muloch Halif, 2. 11 one whom the world knew was so wronged and so unhappy | Kipling DW 36 the Woman whom we know is hewn twelve-armed | Wells Sleeper 118 the Sleeper—whom no one but the superstitious, common people had ever dreamt would wake again | id Marr. 1. 246 college friends, whom he gathered from Marjorie’s talk were destined to play a large part | Churchill Coniston 237 Janet . . . whom she had been told was the heiress of the state | Benson Arundel 150 I met a man whom I thought was a lunatic |
Ingpen Shelley in Engl. 624 his kindness to his grandson, whom he hoped and believed would be grateful | Oppenheim People's M. 149 people ask me to dinner, people whom I feel ought to hate me | id. Laxw. 111 In ten minutes, the man whom you must believe, since the breaking up of your band, has been your secret enemy for all these months, will be here | ib. 276 I am going to watch the man whom your little friend Miss Thorndyke believes is concerned in her father's disappearance | Burt Brand. Ir. 89 with the lover whom Prosper had told her was dead | Rev. of Rev. Oct. '05. 381 the police had the right to lock anyone up whom they suspected contemplated committing political crime | Times 2. 9. '20 the leader, whom I learned afterwards was D. L. Moody | Newep. '22 Writers whom we must all admit are honest in their intentions have treated unpleasant subjects | Report of Royal Comm. on Honours, Dec. 1922 the person whom the Prime Minister considers was the original suggestor of the name | Times Lit. Suppl. 1. 3. '23 a German Princess, whom she hopes will help her to gain her independence.

Compare also the following cases of predicative: OE. Matt. 16. 13 Hwæne scegeð men þæt sy mannes sunu ? | A.V. Whom do men say that I the son of man am ? (Wyclif has here: Whom seien men to be mannus sone ? but Luke 9. 18 and 20: Whom seien the puple that Y am ? . . . But who seien þe that Y am ?) | Walpole Fort. 83 asking him whom he thought that he was | Farnol Am. Gent. 476 And whom do you think it is ? | Oppenheim People's M. 122 Never mind whom you thought it might have been. —In the biblical quotations we have here possibly influence from the Latin accusative with infinitive.

The frequency of whom in such sentences is all the more noteworthy because the tendency in English has gone for centuries in the opposite direction, towards using who instead of whom as an object. There must therefore be a very strong feeling that the relative in "children whom we think are hungry" does not stand in the same position as in "children who are hungry," where no one would think of substituting the form whom. The relative must accordingly be felt as somehow dependent on we think, from which it is not separated by any pause whatever: a pause would be unnatural, and, as a matter of fact, it is quite impossible to use the form whom, if we add as and make a pause before the inserted clause: "children, who, as we think, are hungry," where we have a real insertion without any influence on the sentence which is broken up by the intercalated passage. In "children, whom we think are hungry," on the other hand, we have a peculiar compound relative clause, in which I should not say that whom in itself is the object of think, but rather, as in other cases considered in Ch. IX, that the object of think is the whole nexus, whose primary is whom (which is put in the accusative, because the nexus is dependent) and whose adnex is the finite combination are hungry. The form whom is used because in "who we think" the speech-instinct would be bewildered by the contiguity of two nominatives, as it were two subjects in the same clause.

There is a second test by which we can show that the speech instinct does not take the relative as a real subject, namely the possibility of omitting the relative pronoun, which, as a general rule, can only be omitted in English when it is not to be the subject. Zangwill writes (Grey Wig 326): "Is it so with everything they say is wrong?"—he would not have omitted the relative except for the insertion of they say, for "Is it so with everything is wrong?" is not English. I give a few other examples: Keats 4. 188 I did not like to write before him a letter he knew was to reach your hands | Thurston Antag. 227 count the people who come, and compare them with the number you hoped would come | London Adv. 32 They chose the lingering death they were sure awaited them rather than the immediate death they were sure would pounce upon them if they went up against the master | ib. 50 puzzled over something untoward he was sure had happened | Lloyd

1 Who is the form used before a pause, marked in the folio by the parenthesis, in Shakesp. Ces. III. 2. 129 I should do Brutus wrong, and Cassius wrong: Who (you all know) are honourable men.
George Speech May 1921  In Central Europe there were blood feuds they all thought had been dead and buried for centuries | Times Lit. Suppl. 22. 3. '23 a piratical anthology in which he included certain poems he knew were not Shakespeare's | Lawrence Ladyb. 193 she's just the type I always knew would attract him.

The correctness of this analysis is confirmed by a comparison with similar constructions in Danish and French (see my paper "De to hovedarter av grammattiske forbindelser," Copenh. Acad. of Sciences, 1921, p. 20 ff.). In Danish the relative *der* can be used only as a subject, but *som* both as subject and object: now *der* is never used instead of *som* in "den mand som jeg tror har taget pungen." In the same way *hvem der*, the combination required in the subject, cannot be used instead of *hvem* in "jeg veed ikke hvem man tror har taget pungen." The relative is frequently omitted as object, not as subject, but may be omitted in "den mand jeg tror har taget pungen." The word-order in "den mand som jeg ikke tror har taget pungen" with *ikke* preposed also shows that we have not an ordinary parenthetical insertion. In French we have the somewhat obsolete construction "Mais quelle est cette femme que je vois qui arrive?"—the first relative is put in the oblique form because the speaker dares not say *qui* on account of the immediately following subject, but after *je vois* the relative pronoun is taken up again and this time can be put in the nominative. It is easily seen that on account of the different word-order there is not the same inducement to shift the case of the Latin relative in "Cicero qui quantum scripsit nemo nescit," while in "Cicero, quem nemo nescit multa scripsisse" the sentence is continued in a different form.

In other words, two of the premises in the orthodox reasoning mentioned above cannot hold water before a closer inspection: a subject need not always be in the nominative, and the insertion of the words *we think* can and does change the relation between the relative pronoun and its verb.
INDEX

a, see article; a few, a little, 202 324

d, Sp., 129, 162, 238
d, Fr., 187
ablative, 126, 180, 182, 250
absoluto ablative, acc., dat., gen., nom., 126 ff., 182; superlative, 247
abstract, 63, 133 ff., 198; plural, 200, 211
accent, see stress, tone
accidence, see morphology
accusative after there is, 155 f.; object, 162; in English, 174 ff.; after prepositions, 175; meaning, 179; in neuter, 239
accusative-with-infinitive, 117 f.; with finite, 349 ff.
action-noun, 136, 169 ff., 284
active, 165 ff.; case, 166; adjectives, 168; substantives, 169; participle, 283
adjective, difference from substantive, 72 ff.; as primary, adjunct, subjunct, 99; shifted adverbs, 101; with object, 163; active and passive, 168; concord, 207, 345
adjunct, 97 ff.; restrictive and non-restrictive, 108 ff.; different from nexus, 114 ff.
adnex, 97
adnominal (genitive), 180; cf. adjunct
adverb, 87 ff.; primary, adjunct, subjunct, 100 f.; number, 211; person, 214; pronominal adverbs, 84; with adjuncts, 100 n.; name, 342
adverbial use of cases, 178; cf. subjuncts
after, 89, 248; in Irish perfect, 270 n.
after-future, 283
after-past, 262
afterthought, 25 f., 121, 271, 334
agens, 150
agent-nouns, 141 n., 169; tense, 283
aktionsart, 276, 286 ff.
call, 202, 203 n., 237, 324 f.; nega-
tived, 326
allative, 182
alles (ser alles), 203
alternative questions, 303

amalgamation, 24, 93 f., 102
anakoluthia, 28, 289
and repeated, 27; idiomatic use, 130 n.; meaning, 191 n.
animals, if, he, she, 235
animate, 227, 234 ff.
ante, antequam, 249
ante-future, 263, 271
ante-preterit, 262, 271, 293
aorist, 275 ff.; gnomical, 259
aphesis, 278
aposiopesis, 130, 142, 310
approximation, plural of, 191
article, definite, 85, 109; with
indefinite, 152; indefinite, 85, 113, 152; generic, 203
articulate sentences, 308
as, 90; with predicative, 131; case, 184
aspect, 286 ff.
assumption, 115
attraction, 191; of negatives, 327, 329, 330, 333
attribute, 114, 135; see adjective, adjunct
autres, 193
be, 131; as copula, 150 ff.; value, 153 f.; is being, 280, 281
before, 89, 248
before-future, 263, 271
before-past, 256, 262, 271, 276
both, 206
by with converted subject, 164, 171
can, 325; no infinitive, 286 n.
cardinals, 211
case, 173 ff.; number of cases, 173 ff.; grammatical and local, 185; object, 161 ff.; activus, energeticus, transitivus, 166; distinction between animate and inanimate, 238 ff.; conflicts, 339
categories, how many, 50 f.
causatives, 287
certain, 113
change and stability, 287
Christian names, 68
clause, 103, 308; primary, subjunct.
content, 103 ff.
coalescence, 24, 93 f., 102
coextension of subject and predicate, 153
cognate object, 137
collective, coming, future, 261, 279
come, coming, future, 261, 279
command, 302, 313, 325; negativet, 328
common name, 64 ff.; number, 197 ff., 208; person, 215; sex, 231
comparative, 244 ff.; weakened, 248; double, 248; formal, 249; used of two, 250
comparative grammar, 30 ff., 346
comparison, 245 ff.; latent, 248; of substantives, 80
complement, 88
composite things, sing. and plural, 189
compound words, formular and free, 22 f.; loose in English, 62 n., 94, 98, 102; number in first part, 208; suppression in, 310
conceptional neuter, 241
concession, 319
conclusive verbs, 273
concord, 72 ff., 207 ff.; difficulties, 209, 215, 345
concrete, 63, 133
condensed relatives, 104 n.
conditional, 321; conjunction in dependent question, 297; sentences, 265 ff., 319; in form of questions, 305; imperative, 314; negative idea, 337
conditionnel, 267, 293, 318
conflicts between expressions, 338 ff.
confusion with negatives, 328, 331
conjunction, 87, 89 ff., 297; from imperative, 315
conjunctive pronoun, 85
connective, 85, 90
connotation, 65 ff.
consecutio temporum, 292 ff.
continuative relative, 113
continuous tenses, 277
contradictory, 322 ff.
contrary, 322 ff.
contrary-to-fact condition, 265, 319
converted subject, 164 (162 n.)
coordination, 90, 97
copula, 131 f., 150 f., 305
could have, 285
countables, 188 ff.
country, it, she, 235
cumulative negations, 391
cursive, 273
dative, 162; in English, 174 ff.; subject in passive, 163, 174; with infinitive, 118; absolute, 128; in pronouns, 239; 'dative infinitive,' 342
de, 181
definite article, 85, 109; tenses, 277
definitions of parts of speech, 58 ff.; of infinitive, 143; of subject and predicate, 145 ff.; of object, 157 ff.
definitive genitive, 98
denotation, 65
dependent clauses, 105; speech, 290; questions, 297
deprecation-nexus, 129
devil, negation, 337
dictionary and grammar, 31 ff.
different than, 250
diminutives, 239
direct speech, 290
disjunctive questions, 303
distance with comparatives, 250 ff.
distinctive forms, 296, 338 f.
distributive numerals, 189, 197; all, 203, 327 n.
do, 26
double negation, 331
dramatic present, 258
dream, 160
dual, 205 ff.
duration, 276, 278
during, 128
dynamics, 30
each, 202; each other, 93, 161
economy of speech, 208, 264
eative, 247
elements of sounds, 36; of words, 41 f.
ellipsis, 95, 98, 103 f., 122, 126 n., 127, 141 ff., 306 f.; cf. suppression
empty words, 33
epistolary tenses, 295
epithet, see adjunct
equality, 246
ersterer, 250
es, 25; genitive and accusative, 181
Esperanto, 61, 208 n., 294 n., 321 n.
esive, 183, 280
estar, 280
every, 202, 324 ff.; negativet, 326 ff.
ex-, 282
exclamation, 301, 305; in indirect speech, 298; negative, 323
exclusive plural, 192
existential sentences, 155
expanded tenses, 277 ff.
expression, 147
expression, 309
fact-mood, 313
family names, 67
female, feminine, 55 f., 228, 230 ff.
few, a few, 202, 324
INDEX

figura etymologica, 137
finished and unfinished, 287
finite verb, 87
for, with subject and infinitive, 118 f.; with predicative, 131 f.
form and meaning, 33 f., 40 ff., 56 f.
formula, 18 ff.
fourth person, 220 f.
fraction, 191, 211
free expressions, 18 ff.
frequentative, 210, 277, 287
function, 46, 56 f.
Für, with nominative, 132, 339
future, 45 f., 50, 256, 260; tense, 256; gnomic, 259; supposition, 265; perfect, 263; indirect, 293; for imperative, 314
futurum in praesentī, in praesterto, 255, exactum, 263
gender, 55 f., 226 ff.; changes, 228; sex, 228, 230; common sex, 231; stronger than number and case, 338 f.
general facts, 32; grammar, 47
generic person, 215 ff., 142, 143, 161 (167), 204; number, 203; time, 259, 279 ff.
genitive, 45; adjunct, 98; definitive, 98; restrictive, 110; origin, 166; subjective and objective, 169 ff.; meaning, 180; use in Russian, 207, 238; in English, 237
genus verbi, 164
gerund, 140, 141
geschwister, 189, 195
gnomic preterit (aorist), 259; future, 259 f.
go (going) fut., 261, 279
grammar and dictionary, 31 ff.; division, 37 ff.
habit, 279; (pres.), 259; (past), 277
have to form perfect, 270; have got, 270
he, ambiguous, 220; and (or) she, 233; used of animals, 235
hearer and speaker, 17, 46, 57
heaven, he, 235
heische-futurum, 314
here, 214, 238
historic present, 257 f.
historical linguistics, 30 f., 124 n., 345
history of English grammars, 176 f.
hope with present, 265; shall hope, 286
human and extra-human, 234
human (being), 231
hypothetical, 321; cf. unreality
I, plural, 192, 213; substitutes, 217
Ido, 41, 61, 136, 208 n., 224 n., 232, 294 n., 321 n.
if, mood, 27; dependent questions, 297; wish, 310; cf. conditional
imperative, person, 214; tense, 261 f.; meaning, 313 ff.; condition, 314; preposition or conjunction, 315, 316; negative, 328
imperfect, 275 ff.
imperfective, 273, 275, 286, 288
impersonal, 212, 241; becomes personal, 160
implied negation, 336 f.
impossibility, 325; negatived, 328; expressed by preterit, 265
impression, 309
inanimate, 227, 234
inarticulate sentences, 308
inceptive, 288
inchoative, 288
inclusive plural, 192; time, 271 ff.
indefinite article, 85, 113, 152 f., 154
person, 204; pronoun, 84; those, 155
indicative, 315 ff.
indirect speech, two kinds, 290 ff.; person, 219 f.; tense, 292; mood, 295 ff.; questions, 297 ff.; requests, 299; conflicts, 340
inequality, 246; social, 193, 218
infinite, 87, 313; primary, adjunct, subjunct, 100; nexus, 117 ff.; deprecation, 130; development, 139 f.; without primary, 143; active and passive, 172; neuter, 243; substitute for participle, 284 n.; tense, 284 f.
-ing, verbal substantive, 140 f., 172
intransitive, 88, 158
interjection, 90
interrogative word-order, 26, 297 f.; pronoun, 198, 233, 305; conjunction, 297, 305; cf. question into with predicative, 131
intonation, see tone
intransitive, 88, 158
irregular, 30
isolability, 93 ff., 95
is to, 261
it, 25 f., 241; of things, 234; of children and animals, 235; its, 235
iterative, 210, 277, 287
junction, 97, 114 ff.
jussive, 320, 328; cf. command
King Lear, a passage, 28 f.
**INDEX**

- latent (notional) comparison, 248
- later, latter, 23
- Latin grammar taken as model, 47, 176 f.
- less, 246, 249
- let us, 214; in indirect speech, 299
- lifeless and living, 234 ff.
- like, construction, 160
- little, a little, 324
- living grammar, 17 ff.; cf. lifeless
- localistic case-theory, 179, 186
- logical categories, 47 ff., 52 ff.; subject and predicate, 147 ff.
- male, 55
- man, 204, 231
- many, 85, 202, 324; negatived, 326
- masculine, 55; cf. gender
- mass-words, 198 ff., 240
- may, 325; may not, 328 f.
- meaning and form, 33 ff.; of cases, 178, 183; of moods, 316; of some, 324; of negation, 325 ff.
- mehrere, 248
- metanalysis, 94 n., 128
- middle term, 322 f.; voice, 168, 225
- minus, 249; different from linguistic negation, 325, 331
- mood, 313 ff.; notional, 319 ff.; in indirect speech, 295 f., 298; stronger than tense, 340
- more, 246; more than one, 191; more and more, 252; negative, 326, 336
- morphology, 37 ff.; in new sense, 40 ff.
- moustache, 189
- movement, for future, 261; expanded forms, 279
- much, 85, 324; negatived, 326, 337
- must, 270, 292 f., 325; must not, 328 f.
- names, common and proper, 64 ff.
- national character and grammar, 187, 314 n.; cf. 206
- Nature, she, 235
- near future, 255, 201; past, 257
- necessity, 325; negatived, 328
- need, 325; need have, 286
- negation, 322 ff.; meaning, 325 ff.; comparatives, 247; in questions, 304, 323; nexal and special, 329 f.; double 331 ff.; strengthening and weakening, 335 f.; implied, 336 f.
- neither—nor, 304, 334
- neuter, 55; a subdivision of masculine, 227; disappears, 229; for both sexes, 207, 234; depreciatory, 239; mass-words, 240; conceptional or unspecified, 241; predicative, 153, 242; represents
- nexus, 243; stronger than number or case, 237, 338 f.
- neuter verb, 342
- nexal negation, 329
- nexus, 97, 114 ff.; kinds, 117 ff.; object, 122 f.; subjunct, 126 ff.; of depreciation, 129 ff.
- nexus-question, 303
- nexus-substantive, 136 ff.; without primary, 143; active and passive, 169 ff.; plural, 200, 211; tense, 284
- nice and warm, 97
- no, none, nothing, 324; negatived, 327; no more, not more (less), 326
- noli, 328
- nominal, 72; sentences, 120 f.; style, 139
- nominative, origin, 166; and oblique, 182; with infinitive, 119; after preposition, 132, 339; predicative, 159, 183 f.
- non-conclusive, 273
- non-committal mood, 317
- non-restrictive adjuncts, 111 f.
- non-temporal tenses, 265
- normal plural, 190
- not altogether, not at all, 327
- notional categories, 55 ff.; passive, 165; case, 185; person, 217 ff.; comparison, 248; mood, 319 ff.; division of utterances, 302; question, 302 ff.; negation, 336 f.
- notwithstanding, 128
- noun, 72; of action, 136; cf. substantive
- novelty, 145, 147 f.
- now, meaning, 258
- number, 158 ff.; of verbal idea, 210; of adverbs, 211; cf. dual, singular, plural
- numeral, 85; negatived, 326; cardinal, 211
- object, of verbs and prepositions, 88; definition, 157 ff.; instrumental, 159; result, 159 f.; relation to subject, 160 f.; two objects, 161 f., 122 f.; indirect, 162; after adjective and adverb, 163; genitive, 181; nexus-object, 122 f.; cognate, 137; of infinitive and verbal substantives, 140, 169 ff.
- oblique case, 173, 182 ff.; inanimates, 239
- of, 33; subjective and objective, 171; the city of Rome, 98; hundreds of soldiers, 113
- omission, see ellipsis, suppression
- omnial, 203
- on, Fr., 204, 215 f.
INDEX 357

one, 80, 85, 204, 216, 237; not one, 326
one-member nexus, 141; sentence, 306
optative, 315, 320
ordinals, 211
ornamental adjuncts, 111 ff.
pale words, 33
paradigms, 37, 44
paratactic negation, 334
parenthetical adjuncts, 111 ff.
parsing, wrong methods, 103 ff., 141, 306, etc.
 participles, 87, 141 n.; rank, 100; tense, 272, 283 f.; not a mood, 313; Latin with acc. and gen., 163
particles, 87 ff.
partitive, 110 n.; article, 114, 181; case, 180 f.
parts of speech, 58 ff.
passive, 164 ff.; use, 167; adjectives, 168; substantives, 169 ff.; tenses, 272 ff.; participles, 272 ff., 283 f.; Latin, 161 n.; Scandinavian and Russian, 225
 passé défini, 270 f., 275 ff.
past, 256, 257 f., 262; perfect, 262; historic, 270
patterns, grammatical, 24 ff.
pendant, 128
perfect, 269 ff.; imperative, 262; infinitive, 284 f.
perfective, 273, 275
perfectopresentia, 270
permanent, 279 f.
permansive, 269
permission, 325; negatived, 328
for future, 261
post, postquam, 249
post (urbem conditam), 124
postpositive preposition, 163, 340
post-preterit, 262
predicate, 145 ff., 306; psychological and logical, 147 ff.; grammatical, 150; different from predicative, 150 n.
predicative, 88, 131, 150 n.; less special than subject, 150 ff.; with indefinite article, 152; resembles object, 159; case, 183 f.; neuter, 242; after particles (prepositions), 131
predicative-substantive, 136
prefix, 42 f.
preposition, 32 f.; definition, 87 f.; with nominative, 98, 132; place, 163, 340, 342
prepositional cases, 162, 186 ff.
present, 256, 258 ff.; historic or dramatic, 257 f.; for future, 260; shifted in indirect speech, 292, 294
preterit, 56, 256, 257 f.; gnomic, 259
preterit-present, 270
primary, 96 ff.; substantives, 98; adjectives, 99; pronouns, 99; infinitives, 100; adverbs, 100; groups, 102; clauses, 103
principal, 97 n.; clause or proposition, 105
pro with adjective, 132
pro-adjective, pro-adverb, 83
productive suffixes, 21
progressive tenses, 277
prohibition, 325, 328
pro-infinitive, 83
pronominal adverbs, 84; with adjectives, 100 n.
pronoun, 82 ff.; primary, adjunct, subjunct, 99 f.
proper names, 64 ff.; plural, 69; with adjunct, 108; adjectives, 77
prosiopesis, 142, 310
pro-verb, 83
pseudo-partitive, 111
psychological subject and predicate, 147 f.
pull-up sentences, 142, 310
qualifiers, 96 ff., 108 ff.
qualitative negation, 322
quality, 74 f.
quantifiers, 85, 113; in nexus, 125 f.; with mass-words, 198
quantitative negation, 332
quaternary, 96
possessive, restrictive, 110 f., 153; reflexive, 222 f.; peculiar use in Danish, 99
possibility, 325; negatived, 328
for future, 261
post, postquam, 249
post (urbem conditam), 124
postpositive preposition, 163, 340
post-preterit, 262
predicate, 145 ff., 306; psychological and logical, 147 ff.; grammatical, 150; different from predicative, 150 n.
predicative, 88, 131, 150 n.; less special than subject, 150 ff.; with indefinite article, 152; resembles object, 159; case, 183 f.; neuter, 242; after particles (prepositions), 131
predicative-substantive, 136
prefix, 42 f.
preposition, 32 f.; definition, 87 f.; with nominative, 98, 132; place, 163, 340, 342
prepositional cases, 162, 186 ff.
present, 256, 258 ff.; historic or dramatic, 257 f.; for future, 260; shifted in indirect speech, 292, 294
preterit, 56, 256, 257 f.; gnomic, 259
preterit-present, 270
primary, 96 ff.; substantives, 98; adjectives, 99; pronouns, 99; infinitives, 100; adverbs, 100; groups, 102; clauses, 103
principal, 97 n.; clause or proposition, 105
pro with adjective, 132
pro-adjective, pro-adverb, 83
productive suffixes, 21
progressive tenses, 277
prohibition, 325, 328
pro-infinitive, 83
pronominal adverbs, 84; with adjectives, 100 n.
pronoun, 82 ff.; primary, adjunct, subjunct, 99 f.
proper names, 64 ff.; plural, 69; with adjunct, 108; adjectives, 77
prosiopesis, 142, 310
pro-verb, 83
pseudo-partitive, 111
psychological subject and predicate, 147 f.
pull-up sentences, 142, 310
qualifiers, 96 ff., 108 ff.
qualitative negation, 322
quality, 74 f.
quantifiers, 85, 113; in nexus, 125 f.; with mass-words, 198
quantitative negation, 332
quaternary, 96

plus, 249, 336
plusieurs, 248
positive (comparison), 244; (opposed to negative), 322, 324
INDEX

que, 122
question, 302 ff.; two kinds, 303;
raised to second power, 304;
rhetorical, 304; word-order, 26;
in indirect speech, 297 ff.; negation,
questionable, 322
quinary, 96
quotation-word, 96 n.
rank, 96 ff.; shifted with nexus-
words, 137
reality nouns, 133
reciprocal, 161, 224
redundancy, 25, 197, 264, 285, 334,
340
reflective, 143, 149 n., 221 ff.; verbs,
224; become passive, 225
regularity, 21
rejected condition, 265 ff., 318 f., 337
relative pronouns, 85; clauses,
103 ff.; restrictive and non-
restrictive, 112 f.; continuative,
113
repetition, 210, 277
represented speech, 290 ff.; ques-
tions, 298
requests, 302 f., 312
restrictive adjuncts, 108 ff.; incom-
plete, 110 ff.
result, object, 159 f.; verb, 273,
288 f.
resumptive negation, 334
-s genitive or plural, 193 n.
same, 110
secondary, 96 ff.; number, 207;
comparison, 252
self, 219, 222
semi-articulate sentence, 308
sentence, 305 ff.; built up gradually,
26 f.
sex, 55 f., 226 ff., 230 ff.; common,
231
shall, 50, 214, 219, 261
she, of animals, countries, inanimates,
235
shifted person, 219; tense, 292;
mood, 295; rank, 137 f.
si, 161
singular, 188; with numerals, 208;
in verbs, 209
sollen, 261, 300
some, meaning, 324
speaker, see hearer
special facts, 32; negation, 329
specialization, 75 ff., 108 ff., 150 ff.,
158 f.
species, a whole, 203; cf. generic
spoken and written language, 17 f.,
198 n., 307
stability, 287

statics, 30 f.
stop-short sentences, 142, 310
stress, variations, 23; logical pre-
dicate, 148; removes ambiguity,
221; cf. 231
subject, 145 ff., 306; psychological
and logical, 147; grammatical,
150 ff.; relative to object, 160
subjective genitive, 120, 137, 169 ff.
subjectless sentences, 25, 149, 161,
306
subjunct, 97, 99, 100, 102, 105;
resembles object, 159; term, 343
subjunctive, 315 ff.; uncertainty,
48; becomes future, 261; in
wish and condition, 266; in
indirect speech, 295 ff.; present
unshifted, 294; conflicts, 340
subjunctive-equivalents, 315 ff.
subnex, 97
subordination, 96 ff.; subordinate
clauses, 105
substance, 74 f.
substantive, 72 ff.; primary, ad-
junct, subjunct, 98 f.; same form
as verb, 52, 61 f.
sub-subjunct, 97
successive, 273
suffix, 43: -ter, 250
suggestion, 309
superjunct, supernex, 97 n.
superlative, 49, 244 ff.; given up,
245; absolute, 247
suppression, 309 ff.
surprise, 305
syncretism, 179
syntax, 45 ff.; comparative, 346 f.
tag-questions, 302, 323, 329
teaching grammar, 62
tempo of narrative, 276
tense, 254 ff., 55; non-temporal,
265; passive, 272; names, 281 f.;
indirect speech, 292 ff.; stronger
than mood, 340
terminative, 273
terminology, 341 ff., 55 f., 72, 85,
87 ff., 96 f., 105 f., 147 ff., 255 f.,
281 f., 286 (cf. also 35, 40, 45,
51 f., 62, 83, 86, 104 n., 108 f.,
111, 122, 126, 129, 131, 133 ff.,
186, 212, 224, 244, 283 f., 301,
303, 315)
tertiary 96 ff.; comparison, 252
than, 245 ff.; case, 90 n., 184
that, pronoun and conjunction, 86;
indirect speech, 299
the, see article; with comparatives,
251
there, 18, 154 ff., 209, 214
they, common sex, 233
thing, 74 f., 133 ff., 234
INDEX

thing-word (countable), 188, 198 ff., 240
those, definite and indefinite, 155
thou, concord, 27, 339 ff.; supplanted by you, 193
thought-mood, 313
thought-name, 133
time, 254 ff., 58; in nouns, 282 ff.; cf. tense
to, for dative, 33, 162; with predicative, 131, 288; with infinitive, 100, 140; instead of infinitive, 82, 142
tone, 27, 112, 294, 297, 303, 305, 323, 326
too, 248; too many cooks, 126
transitive, 88, 158; cf. object
tripartitions, logical, 322, 324 ff.
turn, active and passive, 165
two-member sentence, 306
type, 19 ff., 24 ff.
uncertainty, 265, 322
uncountables, 188, 198 ff., 240
understood, see ellipsis, suppression
unification of words, 93 ff.
units, words, 92 ff.; higher units, 194; sentence, 307
universal grammar, 46 ff.
unreality, preterit, 265; infinitive, 285
utterances, classification, 301 ff.; relatively complete, 307
verb, 86; rank, 100; concord, 207 ff.; plural idea, 210; comparison, 253; rôle in sentence, 311; same form as substantive, 52, 62
verbal proposition, 134 n.; substantive, 120, 136 ff.; becomes infinitive, 140
verbid, 87
verbless sentence, 120 ff., 311
verbum substantivum, 341
very, 97, 342
vocative, 184
voice, active and passive, 164 ff.
volition, for future, 260
vos, vous, to one person, 193
während, 128
was, were, 266 ff.
we, meaning, 192; for I, 193; disappearing, 216; paternal, 217
werden, 260, 261
will, 50, 214, 260 ff.
will-mood, 313
what, 234 ff., 243; = that which, 104
whether, 297
who = he who, 104; common sex, 233; whom, 349 ff.
wish, preterit, 265; aposiopesis, 310
with, nexus-object, 123 ff.; nexus-substantive, 138; off with his head, 308 n.; peculiar use, 192, 209 n., 210 n.
without, nexus-object, 124
word, 92 ff., 102
word-classes, see parts of speech
word-element, 41 ff.
word-formation, 38, 42 ff.
word-group, primary, adjunct, subjunct, 101 ff.
word-order, 26, 44, 147, 174, 251 ff., 297 ff., 304 ff., 326 ff., 329; conflicts, 340
written, see spoken
x-questions, 303
ye, you, 192, 193; substitutes for you, 217 ff.
yonder, 214
zeitwort, 59, 254
J ESPERSEN, Otto, 1860-1943
The philosophy of grammar.