WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

Resources

West and Central Africa cover an area two-thirds larger than the United States, with about half its population. West Africa lies along the Guinea Coast and extends north into the Sudan region below the Sahara; it includes Liberia, Portuguese Guinea, French West Africa (with Dakar and its dependencies, and the seven colonies of Senegal, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger Colony, French Sudan, and Mauritania), the Trust Territory of French Togoland, and the four colonies of British West Africa (Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia). Central Africa, as defined here, includes the Trust Territory of French Cameroons, the four colonies of French Equatorial Africa (Gabon, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, and Chad), Spanish Guinea (including Rio Muni and the island of Fernando Po), the Belgian Congo, the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, and Angola (including Cabinda). The British Trust Territories of Togo and Cameroons are treated as parts of the Gold Coast and Nigeria for administrative purposes and will be so considered here.¹

The whole area is deficient in developed sources of power. No petroleum deposits have been developed and coal is mined only in Nigeria and the Belgian Congo. Electrification has proceeded farthest in the Belgian Congo. Of the cities which have electricity, most rely on fuel-operated generators, but a number of the mining companies have their own hydroelectric power. Three great river systems, the Congo, the Niger, and the Senegal, and smaller rivers

¹ The section on West and Central Africa was mimeographed by the author and forwarded to the governments concerned for comment. Limitations of space make it impossible to include all those received, but the more important corrections and criticisms have been incorporated into the text and footnotes. This should not be taken to mean that the governments have endorsed the interpretations and opinions expressed here.
such as the Volta and Gambia provide vast but virtually untapped sources of hydroelectric power. Any real industrialization must depend on the development of these resources. Meanwhile, petroleum products and coal are imported.

Minerals are the most valuable natural resources. In 1941 the Belgian Congo, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Angola were the world's four largest diamond producers, and West and Central Africa accounted for 94 percent of world production. The third largest gem diamond on record was discovered in Sierra Leone in 1945, but most of the diamonds are industrial. Gold, which is very important to the local economies, is exported from most of the territories.

The Belgian Congo, which produces two-thirds of the world supply of cobalt, is also the fifth largest producer of copper. Nigeria and the Belgian Congo expanded tin production during the war, both exceeding Siam, the third largest pre-war producer. The Gold Coast is the fourth largest producer of manganese and its large bauxite deposits were also developed during the war. In 1941 Sierra Leone exported over a million tons of iron ore from what are said to be some of the richest deposits in the British Empire.

The Belgian Congo was the world's largest pre-war producer of uranium ore, and Nigeria provided 98 percent of the world supply of columbite. The Congo's exports of tantalite, another rare mineral of strategic importance, were small compared to Brazil's, but the Congo ranked second in world production. Senegal was the third largest producer of ilmenite. Mineral exports of minor importance include silver, platinum, palladium, and the ores of chromium, zinc, lead, cadmium and tungsten.

West and Central Africa produce two-thirds of the world's cocoa. The Gold Coast, the largest producer, and Nigeria, which ranks third, together account for about half of world production. The area is also a major producer of vegetable oils and oil seeds, which are processed into soap, shampoos, margarine, salad oils, candles, glycerine, and other products, in Europe and America. More than 1,500,000 tons of palm kernels, palm oil, and peanuts (known in West Africa as arachides or ground nuts) were exported in 1938, with lesser amounts of peanut oil, peanut cake, sesame seed (called sem-sem or benniseed), shea nuts, shea butter, cottonseed, cotton-
WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA
seed oil and copra. Palm kernels are obtained by cracking the hard
black shell of the nut of the oil palm; palm oil, which differs from
palm kernel oil, is expressed locally from the pericarp covering the
shell.

Coffee, bananas, maize, and some cassava, tapioca, rice, other
grains and meals, peppers, ginger, and dried and cured fish are also
exported. Butter is exported from French Equatorial Africa, honey
from French Guinea, sugar from the Belgian Congo, and lime juice
from the Gold Coast. Other exports include cotton, sisal, urea,
piaassava, kapok and other vegetable fibers, hides and skins, rubber,
mahogany and other woods, castor beans, essential oils, beeswax,
gum copal and other gums and glues.

In the area of the heavy rain forest the African diet is based on
yams, cassava, maize and plantains, supplemented by palm oil,
wild greens, fruit, fish, and some wild and domesticated meat. In
the western Guinea Coast area, about Liberia, rice replaces yams,
cassava, and maize as the staple diet. In the open Sudan region be­
low the Sahara diet is based on millet and sorghum ("guinea corn"),
supplemented by greens, peanut oil, shea butter, milk and some
meat. The imports of flour, salt, sugar, canned meat, dried fish,
and canned milk, as well as the variety of items used by European
residents, are primarily luxuries. Considering the exports, the area
as a whole produces a surplus of foodstuffs; yet the diet is often
deficient in proteins. Because of the tsetse fly, cattle flourish only
in the Sudan area north of the forest belt, aside from a dwarf
breed found in certain areas along the edge of the Guinea Coast.
In the forest belt the principal domestic animals are goats, sheep
and chickens, plus some pigs, ducks and turkeys. Wild game does
not exist on the same scale as in East Africa, and in some densely
populated areas there is little beside rats, mice, and snails. In many
groups vegetable oils are more important than meat or fish as sources
of protein. Vitamins are obtained from green vegetables and fruits,
vegetable oils, and in the forest belt from palmwine, the fermented
sap of the oil palm and other palm trees. Large quantities of starchy
foods constitute the bulk of the African diet. In parts of the area,
governments are investigating and trying to improve African nutri­
tion through such measures as the immunization of cattle against
tsetse flies, mixed farming with plows and fertilizers, the introduc­
tion of new crops, and the development of fisheries.
The fertility of African soil has often been overrated. A large part of the area is desert or subdesert, and Mauritania supports only about one person per square mile. Even in the tropical forest belt, heavy rainfall and moderately fertile soil mean heavy labor in clearing and weeding the land. Some areas where a dense population prevents adequate fallowing, such as central southern Nigeria, are faced with severe erosion problems. Large-scale mechanized agriculture cannot be adapted to the forested area unless the land is cleared, nor to the flatter subdesert area until irrigation projects, such as that begun by the French in the Niger valley near Timbuktu before the war, have actually been completed. Aside from the export crops, increased production of foodstuffs can be absorbed by the local population.

Between the desert regions of northern French West Africa and the tropical rain forests running along the Guinea Coast and up the Congo basin, there are marked differences in climate. In the former area temperatures are high during the day and low at night, while rainfall and humidity are extremely low. In some parts of Niger Colony and French Sudan the annual rainfall drops below 10 inches a year, while the average recorded at Debundscha, below the Cameroon Mountain in the bend of the coast (near Buea) is 358 inches, making it one of the wettest spots in the world. Throughout most of the tropical rain forest the rainfall is between 50 and 150 inches a year, while temperatures generally range between 65° and 95°.

Along the Guinea Coast the forest areas have two main seasons. The rainy season (June–September) has heavy rainfall, high humidity and median temperatures, with the moisture laden winds blowing north from the Atlantic. The dry season (November–February) has little rain, low humidity, and wider variations in temperature, with a dry wind ("Harmattan") blowing south from the Sahara. In some parts there is a second short dry season in August. The farther north from the Guinea Coast one goes, the more the effects of the Harmattan and the subdesert climate are felt. South of the equator the seasons are reversed. Climate varies with altitude as well as latitude, and Jos in Nigeria and Dschang in French Cameroons, both of which are about 4,000 feet above sea level, have been established as European resorts for local vacations because they are cooler and more healthful.
### Area and Population of West and Central Africa

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<th>Colony</th>
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<th>Area</th>
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West and Central Africa have roughly half of the total population of Africa. Nigeria's population is the largest in Africa and the third largest in the entire British Empire, following only India and Great Britain herself. While the largest number of people are under British control, 60 percent of the area, equal in size to the United States, is French. West Africa has almost twice the population of Central Africa, although its area is slightly smaller. Even greater variations in the density of population occur within these regions. Belgian Africa has three and a half times as many people as French Equatorial Africa, though its area is slightly smaller. The Portuguese colonies, with the same population as French Equatorial Africa, are only half as large. British West Africa, with the same area as the Portuguese colonies, has over seven times as many people, and more than twice the population of Belgian Africa. French West Africa has twice the area of French Equatorial Africa, and four times as many inhabitants.

Population statistics from this part of the world must be accepted with caution, even when they are not admittedly estimates. Commenting on the 1901 census in Gambia's Official Handbook, Archer states, "To this total must be added at least 40 per cent, for the Protectorate, as the people are very shy and object strongly to their numbers being taken." Since that time census-taking techniques have been refined, but even in the larger colonies government staffs are still far from adequate for accurate enumerations, and it is economically advantageous for Africans not to give the true number of taxable adults.

Even with the crude statistics available, three broad trends are apparent. There is a tendency toward greater urbanization; the population is increasing; and there have been migrations to territories offering higher wages and higher standards of living. Migrations across political boundaries, such as those from French colonies and Liberia to British West Africa, do not appear to be as large as some have claimed. A considerable part of the apparent decrease in population during the last decade is not, therefore, due to greater urbanization. Even with the crude statistics available, three broad trends are apparent. There is a tendency toward greater urbanization; the population is increasing; and there have been migrations to territories offering higher wages and higher standards of living. Migrations across political boundaries, such as those from French colonies and Liberia to British West Africa, do not appear to be as large as some have claimed. A considerable part of the apparent decrease in population during the last decade is not, therefore, due to greater urbanization.

in population in the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, attributed to the Concession System and the introduction of diseases by Europeans, may be accounted for by excessive estimates in the early days.

Birth rates, death rates, and life expectancies are no more reliable. Vital statistics are seldom available outside a few urban areas where medical facilities are the best, and they are not representative of the area as a whole. In the Gold Coast the registration of births and deaths is required in 37 urban districts, representing only 11 percent of the total estimated population. In other colonies the figure is even lower.

Malaria, black water fever, yellow fever, relapsing fever, dysentery, diarrhoea, tuberculosis, typhoid, typhus, cholera, small pox, gonorrhoea, syphilis, yaws, leprosy, sleeping sickness, bilharzia, elephantiasis, guinea worm and other filariasis, and various other fevers, intestinal parasites and skin diseases have combined to give West Africa its unenviable reputation for an unhealthy climate. Out of 140 men on the first British ships to visit Nigeria (1554), only 40 survived to return to England. The high European mortality rate, which earned for West Africa the title of the "White Man's Grave," was largely due to malaria. It was not reduced until after Baikie's trip up the Niger and Benue rivers in 1854, when quinine was used for the first time in Nigeria and not a single member of the crew was lost.

Health hazards for whites have been greatly reduced, and further advances may be expected from the wartime discoveries in tropical medicine, particularly in the field of antimalarials. They have not, however, been eliminated. It is still customary for British officials to spend eighteen weeks of leave in England for health reasons, after every eighteen months of service on the Coast. In that they are not part of "White Man's Africa," the diverse climatic, economic, cultural and political regions of West and Central Africa can justifiably be considered as a unit apart from the rest of the continent. Real colonization has been discouraged by disease and only about 162,000 Europeans (0.2 per cent of the population) are found in the entire area. There are about 44,100 (1.2 percent) in Angola, 35,800 (0.3 percent) in the Belgian Congo, 47,400 (0.3 percent) in French West Africa, and 35,000 (0.08 percent) in the remaining
territories. The latest Nigerian census (1931) showed 4,952 "Europeans," including Americans, and 490 "Asiatics," most of them from Lebanon and Syria. It has been cynically suggested that the real reason for the difference in land policies in British West and East Africa has been the mosquito.

In the far larger problem of extending the benefits of medical science to some seventy million Africans, only the beginnings have been made. Smallpox is fairly well controlled through vaccination, and in parts of the French Cameroons the average death rate from sleeping sickness in terms of the total population has been reduced from 29 percent in 1919 to 0.5 percent in 1944. Government medical programs in the British, French, and particularly the Belgian colonies represent marked advances, but on their present scale even the combined efforts of government and missions are inadequate to solve the problem. Purified water systems are found only in the largest cities, while sewage disposal and other sanitation facilities are minimal. Even in Ibadan, Lagos, Accra, and Freetown—the four most important cities in British West Africa—the night soil must be removed by hand, except for a few homes which have private septic tanks. In 1938, Nigeria had only 3,966 hospital beds for twenty-three million Africans.

Economics

Wealth and income in Africa present a wide spread, with Europeans at the top and Africans at the bottom. Within these two classes there is considerable variation and occasional overlapping. Some African lawyers and doctors in British West Africa earn more than the majority of government officials. Before the war, the Emir of Kano, the highest-paid Nigerian chief, received $42,500 ( £6,000 salary and £2,500 establishment allowance) annually, while British administrative officers began at £400 and the Governor of Nigeria was paid £8,250 plus allowances. Such figures, however, obscure the wide gap separating the wages of Africans and Europeans. It is only in exceptional cases that an African earns as much as the lowest-paid European employee. The 1946 report of the official Enquiry into the Cost of Living in Nigeria states "it is doubtful if the normal family income in Nigeria even now exceeds £15" or $60 a year.
Below the African chiefs, traders, and professional men comes the mass of African population, including the wage laborers, the producers of export crops, and the subsistence farmers.

In 1936 French West Africans could avoid "prestation labor" by paying 7f (1.14 francs) a day. From 1936 through 1938 the average daily wage of Gold Coast miners was 35f (1s. 5d.) a day and in 1938 farm laborers in the Nigerian cocoa belt earned between 12f and 34f (6d. and 1s. 4½d.). Incomes were undoubtedly lower, and probably wages as well, in the areas which supplied the cocoa and mining laborers. Minimum daily wages in Lagos, where wages are high, were fixed at 18f (9d.) in 1934 and raised to 25f (1s.) in 1937, and 51f (2s. 7d) in 1947. During the war wages increased through most of West and Central Africa, but not enough to offset the rising prices of local products and imports, and in Nigeria not without a major strike against the government. In 1945 Firestone employees in Liberia received a minimum of 18f a day, plus subsidized food prices. In 1947 the minimum daily wage in Leopoldville was fixed at 32f (14 francs). In 1941 the minimum wage in French Equatorial Africa was 2.8f (1.25 francs) a day, while laborers in mines and forests generally received 7–9f (3–4 francs).

Even the producers of the valuable cocoa crop seldom prosper. In the Gold Coast village of Akokoaso, the average annual cash income was £107.12 (21 8s. 6d.) per family, of which half was required for debt charges. Of the 201 families surveyed in 1932–35, 125 families were in debt, and 60 percent had earned incomes of less than £50. Another study estimates that 30 percent of Gold Coast farmers had pawned their lands in return for long-term loans, while 75 percent pledged their crops in advance.

Below the wage laborers and producers of cocoa and other export commodities are the subsistence farmers, who provide their own food, clothing, and housing. These often earn money through the sale of local foodstuffs or handicraft or through part-time employment, but in many cases their cash income is negligible. In the community of Ozuitem in southern Nigeria, annual cash incomes of 16 individuals in 1938–39 ranged from £16.83 to £92.53 (3 8s. 9d. to 19 1s. 9d.) for men, and from £5.73 to £28.54 (1 3s. 5d. to 5 16s. 6d.) for women. In Akokoaso, where one family had an annual income of £200, 19 families were listed as having no income whatsoever. In the village of Umor in southern Nigeria the average
annual cash income in 1941, based on a survey of 81 cases, is estimated at $5 (25s.) per household, of which 19s. is accounted for by palm kernels and palm oil.

"Non-Europeans" are found at both ends of the economic scale. Some of the wealthiest individuals are Syrians and Lebanese, whose fortunes have grown out of small trading operations, started with little capital and gradually expanded by shrewd trading and an interest in small sales, frugality and a willingness to begin on a low standard of living, and an ability to adapt themselves to African patterns of trading.

Of the export industries in African hands, the most important are cocoa, palm kernels, palm oil, peanuts, and other vegetable oils and oil seeds. Here Africans are the entrepreneurs as well as the laborers. The production of European-owned plantations is relatively small and Europeans serve mainly as middlemen, purchasing the crops and exporting them. The Gold Coast cocoa industry was developed by Africans, when Tetteh Quarshie smuggled the first seeds from Fernando Po in 1879. For the initiative and enterprise which made the Gold Coast a larger producer than the entire Western Hemisphere of a crop native to Mexico, Africans have never received due credit. Between 1905 and 1936 exports were increased from less than 5,000 tons to their peak of 311,151 long tons. African farmers received little assistance from government until cocoa had already become a principal export crop and the foundation of the Gold Coast's economy. The future of West African cocoa, however, may now depend on whether science can discover effective controls for the diseases which threaten the bearing trees.

Mining and to a lesser degree logging are essentially European industries. One of the three largest mahogany producers on the Gold Coast and numerous smaller producers are Africans but elsewhere, like the African mining companies, they are of negligible importance. The production of rubber, sisal, coffee, and commercial bananas is dominated by European-owned plantations.

African-owned industry has had little capital and has had to operate with little equipment. Mechanization, where it is found, is generally confined to the large European companies. The degree of mechanization presents startling contrasts. Some gold mines on the Gold Coast are highly mechanized, while elsewhere Africans
may be seen panning gold in calabashes. Against the modern equipment of Lever Brothers’ plantation in the Belgian Congo are the primitive extraction techniques which account for the bulk of palm oil and palm kernel production. Some American logging equipment, including Caterpillar tractors, Hyster cruiser arches and Athey wagons, is operating in West Africa, but gangs of laborers still haul logs by hand to the roadside. In contrast to the installations of Firestone in Liberia and of rubber companies in French Equatorial Africa and Cameroons are the simple hand rollers and home-made drying sheds in which so much wild rubber was processed during the war. Similar contrasts are presented even between the European tin-mining companies of northern Nigeria. Within sight of the steam shovels, drag lines, and hydraulic equipment of some companies, others employ thousands of African laborers equipped only with picks and head pans. Electromagnetic separators are used in Nigeria to treat tin ore and columbite, and some manganese is sintered before export from the Gold Coast, but smelters are found only in the Congo.

In local industries also the Belgian Congo leads, followed by French West Africa and Angola, with British West Africa, French Equatorial Africa and French Cameroons ranking above Portuguese Guinea, Spanish Guinea and Liberia. Industrialization on any appreciable scale, however, has scarcely begun. European trading companies have been accused of stifling the development of local manufactures in order to preserve their export and import trade. Regardless of the cause, West and Central Africa are exporters of basic raw materials and with few exceptions they are dependent on imports for manufactured goods.

A textile factory in the Congo manufactured nearly 21,000,000 meters of piece goods for local consumption in 1946, but cloth is still one of the major import items of the area as a whole. Factory-made soap is produced in Belgian Congo, Angola, Nigeria, and French West Africa. Angola and Nigeria manufacture cigarettes and Leopoldville and Accra have breweries. Soda water, soft drinks, and dairy and bakery goods are produced in a number of centers; ice cream and macaroni in a few towns. Brick and tile factories are found in Belgian, French, and Portuguese territories, and cement is produced in the Congo. There are saw mills in many parts of
the forest area, but the bulk of wood exported is in log form. Printing presses and machine shops are found in a number of places, and in Leopoldville river boats for the Congo are built. The Congo has tanneries and a factory which produced 403,392 pairs of shoes in 1946. It also produces sulfuric acid, acetylene, and compressed oxygen and has distilleries and refineries. Sugar, flour, cured fish, furniture, and souvenirs are also manufactured in some places on a scale beyond that of crafts. With few exceptions this includes the manufacturers for local consumption, aside from the work of tailors, carpenters, tinsmiths, blacksmiths, mechanics, and the pottery, basketry, weaving, leather work, brass casting, ivory carving, and woodcarving. This is the area which produces the arts and crafts for which Africa is famous.

Foreign trade is the life blood of the European populations and the colonial governments, most of whose revenues are derived from customs. The economy as a whole, however, still has its real foundations in the production of subsistence goods for local consumption. The bulk of the food and housing, and a considerable portion of the tools, household utensils, and even clothing are produced by Africans, using techniques which have changed little since the time of the first Portuguese explorers.

Complex African economies, characterized by guild specialization, intra- and intertribal trade, large markets, middlemen, and the use of cowrie shells, metal, and other forms of true money are found throughout most of the area. Most families engage in the basic economic activity of farming, while some produce more than they need for sale in the market. Special wholesale markets are found where agricultural products are purchased for resale in the regular markets, which are attended by thousands of individuals. Trade in farm produce is generally in the hands of women, but Hausa and Yoruba men can be found trading in most of the large cities between the Senegal and the Congo. African traders, whose skill has earned the respect of many Europeans, operate for profits or commissions or both. Hunters, fishermen, traders, and specialists in the many arts and crafts are organized into guilds which are entered through an apprentice system. Several forms of taxation, interest, and "pawning" (a form of loan whereby the creditor receives the production of an individual or a piece of land instead of
interest) are known. In Dahomey direct taxes based on individual wealth were levied in the days of the native kingdom after an annual census of population, livestock, and granaries.

The remarkable growth of exports and imports has involved increasing numbers of Africans in the complexities of the world market—as consumers, as producers of export commodities, as government employees, and as wage laborers for European and African employers. Prices of local produce in African markets are now affected by booms and depressions and by population changes such as the influx of European troops and civilians during the war. Internal trade has expanded with the development of transportation and with the peace which followed the end of the slave wars. The growth of the class of wage laborers and the increasing amounts of African lands devoted to export commodities have created a greater demand for local foodstuffs in the markets. Economic recessions and retrenchments or isolation through war can cause inconvenience, dissatisfaction, and serious decreases in standards of living, but where Africans have not lost their rights to the land the basic essentials can still be provided by subsistence farming. When opportunities for wage labor disappear, or when world prices for export commodities fall to a point which virtually prohibits production, they can still support themselves on their own farms.

Before the arrival of Europeans all land was the property of African individuals, tribes, or kinship groups. Unoccupied or "vacant" lands, and the oil palms and other planted trees on them, were also owned. In some tribes land could not be permanently alienated according to native law. In the early days of colonial expansion little regard was shown for African property concepts.

Under the Concession System, developed in the Belgian Congo under King Leopold II, all land outside towns and villages except that actually under cultivation was claimed as the property of the concessionnaires, and the use of products of the forest by Africans was defined as theft. When the Belgian government assumed control of the Congo in 1908, freeholds totaled more than 96,525 square miles, not including immense uncalculated areas where only monopolies of forest products had been granted. Early thirty-year grants of monopolistic rights over forest products covered two-thirds of French Equatorial Africa, while those still in effect in
1899 amounted to 335,907 square miles. In 1899 two companies held concessions covering 45,174 square miles in the German Cameroons, where the Concession System also spread for a period. Morel, one of the critics of these injustices and of the brutalities which accompanied the Concession System, concluded that the fundamental issue, which would decide whether “African peoples develop along the lines of freedom, or along lines of serfdom,” was the preservation of African land tenure. It is not difficult to see that where their lands have been alienated Africans may be faced with the necessity of accepting wage labor or starving. The economic freedom of choice between working for wages, producing for export, and simple subsistence farming is lost, bargaining power is reduced. Large-scale alienations of land, through outright purchase or through long-term leases, can be as effective a means of recruiting low-paid native labor as excessive taxation or production quotas.

Reviewing conditions in French Equatorial Africa in the 1920s, Buell concluded that, “When private companies monopolize millions of hectares of land from which all competition is excluded, and when the government obliges the natives living in these areas to pay taxes, it is inevitable that the natives will be forced to work for these companies, and that they will be underpaid, whether for their labor or for their produce.” Under these circumstances, permitting or even guaranteeing Africans the legal right to farm, hunt, and gather within alienated lands does not provide adequate protection of their economic status. The amount of land actually alienated to non-Africans, therefore, is a better test of native land policy than the legal conditions under which leases and sales are permitted.

In spite of government attempts to liquidate the Concession System, European-held lands still seem to be largest in the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, followed by the Cameroons Trust Territories, British West Africa, Liberia, Portuguese Guinea and French West Africa. The native reserve-system of South Africa is lacking except in Angola. According to the 1933 report of Angola’s Survey Department, lands held by Africans amounted to only 597 square miles on tribal reserves and 23 square miles owned by individuals, out of a total of 481,351. Possibly most of the remaining land is state property in legal theory, as in French West Africa. Con-
cessions in Portuguese Guinea totaled 524 square miles in 1947. No information is available for European-held concessions in Angola, or for alienations in Spanish Guinea.

By 1936 the total freehold concessions in the Belgian Congo had been reduced to about 20,370 square miles, excluding Katanga, Kivu, and all leases. The Katanga Company has one-third representation and receives one-third of the revenues from an area of some 173,745 square miles administered by the Comité Spécial du Katanga, in which the Belgian Government holds two-thirds interest. The government also holds controlling interest in the 30,888 square mile concession for colonization administered by the Comité National du Kivu. Huileries du Congo Belge, the Lever Brothers' subsidiary, was to receive freehold rights of up to 1,353 square miles in 1945.3

The original temporary concessions in French Equatorial Africa were reduced to 214,286 square miles in 1912, by granting freehold rights to 9,844 square miles. Further reductions took place up to 1929 when the remaining original concessions expired, but no recent figures are available. In the Cameroons the Germans had reduced their original concessions to 5,792 square miles by 1913, but additional concessions were granted. More recent figures are not available, but 219 of the 362 individual concessions held under the Germans were sold at auction by the French after they took over their share of the former mandate. Under French administration 350 square miles had been granted in concessions by 1935, of which 84 square miles were held in "definitive" rather than "provisional" right.

Liberia granted the Firestone Company the right to lease up to 1,565 square miles for 99 years for rubber production and including mining and logging rights. Firestone pays the government 6¢ an acre for land actually developed. Only 313 square miles have actu-

3 The Belgian Congo government states in letter No. 20520/2.455/INF. of Dec. 29, 1947, that at the present time traditional African concepts of land tenure are respected. The sale or African lands is permitted subject to certain regulations, and only "vacant" lands may be appropriated or alienated by the state. "Vacant" lands are understood to mean only those which are not used for habitations, sedentary or shifting agriculture, or the gathering of wild foods and forest products. No lands are declared "vacant" until after an investigation; to allow for expansion each village is customarily given an area three times the size of the area it inhabits and cultivates. The letter further comments that Morel's criticisms of the Concession System have been refuted.
ally been leased and 125 placed under cultivation, but the planta-
tion represents the largest rubber operation in the world. In encour-
gaging the Firestone negotiations, the United States Government in
effect sanctioned the plantation system and supported the outside
capitalist as against the independent African farmer. In 1945 Liberia
entered an agreement with Landsell K. Christie of New York for
the development of the Bomi deposits of 5–8,000,000 tons of high
grade iron ore. In 1947 the formation of the Liberia Company to
develop Liberia’s other mineral resources, cocoa, vegetable oils and
other agricultural products was announced. The company is to be
owned and operated by Stettinius Associates, and the Liberian
Government will receive 25 percent of the initial $1,000,000 issue
of stock. It is proposed to base cocoa and coffee production on small
African farms rather than large, foreign-owned plantations. Con-
siderable amounts of African lands have been acquired by Americo-
Liberians. Land may be purchased by them at fifty cents an acre or
acquired in a variety of other ways. Total alienations of this kind
are not known, but government officials own large quantities of
land.

Both British and French West Africa refused to adopt the Con-
cession System. Although according to law all “vacant” lands in
French West Africa are owned by the state, only 582 square miles
were reported as alienated at the beginning of 1935. These aliena-
tions, of which 222 square miles were on a “definitive” basis, are
mainly for banana, rice, and coffee plantations in the Ivory Coast
and French Guinea.

Alienations to Europeans in British West Africa can only take
the form of leases, except in those areas which are technically classed
as “colonies” rather than “protectorates.” In Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
and the Gambia, the “colonies” have a total area of only 1,706 square
miles (1931 population 435,812). Minor freehold rights were ac-
quired by Europeans in the protectorates before the governing legis-
lation was passed. This legislation, incidentally, was protested by
both British and Africans as interference in traditional African land
rights. Freeholds outside the Colony in Nigeria are limited to lands
vested in the Niger Company when their Royal Charter was re-
voked, and are described as small in area. Total alienations by leases
and freehold in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia are not known,
but they probably exceed those in French West Africa, which has no large-scale mining industry.

In the Gold Coast, where both the Colony and Ashanti with a total of 48,316 square miles (1931 population, 2,149,440) are classed as "colonies," leases totaled 11,861 square miles in 1947, mostly for mining or timber. There were no freehold concessions. In British Togoland and Cameroons, alienations to non-Africans are now restricted to leases, but there are about 540 square miles of private estates in the Cameroons originally granted by the Germans. Alienations have been small in both French and British Togo.

The British West African governments have successfully opposed the introduction of the plantation system. In the 1920s Lever Brothers tried to obtain freehold rights for palm-oil plantations in southern Nigeria. In spite of the personal intervention of Lord Leverhulme, Governor Sir Hugh Clifford was able to maintain the government policy. Later the United Africa Company leased less than 20 square miles for rubber and palm oil, the total area in European plantations in Nigeria today, and in the end the Nigerian palm oil trade suffered through the competition of Lever Brothers' plantations developed in the Belgian Congo and other areas. This instance deserves special mention because it is sometimes maintained that British colonial policy always follows the line of British business and capital.

Although the British have been successful in maintaining Africans in the role of producers and entrepreneurs rather than wage laborers on foreign-owned plantations, the economic plight of the cocoa farmer shows that they have not found a touchstone which protects the African's economic status. Costly litigation, exorbitant rates of interest, and discounts on crops pledged in advance ate into an income kept low by competition with other low-wage areas, numerous brokers and commissioned middlemen, speculation, and a marketing situation in which 98 percent of the Gold Coast crop was purchased by 13 European trading companies, with one company taking about half.

The major commercial interests in West Africa are the United Africa Company and other subsidiaries of Lever Brothers, who produce Lux, Lifebuoy, Rinso, Swan, Spry and Pepsodent, and who dominate the world market in vegetable oils and oil seeds. As a recent
series of articles 4 has shown, the U.A.C., Africa's largest enterprise and the world's largest trading company, accounts for more business than any of the other companies of the diverse and far-flung economic activities of Lever Brothers and Unilever, "the largest corporation outside the U.S. and one of the half-dozen largest in the world." The U.A.C., referred to by Africans as "The Octopus," and its affiliates have the major share of West African trade in cocoa, fats and oils, imported goods, and other commodities except minerals. An agreement by 12 of the 13 Gold Coast companies to pay uniform prices for cocoa led to the cocoa "hold-up" or "strike" of 1937–38. For over five months African producers in the Gold Coast, and some in Nigeria, boycotted European imports and refused to sell over 200,000 tons of cocoa, until the buying agreement was suspended through the intervention of a special investigating Commission.

Government attempts to develop cocoa marketing cooperatives in British West Africa since 1931 have not met with much success. Less than 3 percent of the Gold Coast cocoa crop and less than 4 percent of the Nigerian crop were marketed by cooperatives in 1936–37. With the objective of stabilizing prices and eliminating some of the unnecessary speculation and middlemen, Nigeria and the Gold Coast each established a Marketing Board in 1947 to purchase cocoa through trading companies operating at fixed commissions to sell cocoa through a Company which it established in London. Profits in good years are to be used to subsidize prices in bad years and to finance research on cocoa diseases.

British policy in West Africa has differed from that of the Belgians, French, Portuguese, and the British in other parts of Africa on the question of European plantations, but there is no apparent difference with respect to mining. Mining concessions, which also require African wage laborers, account for most of the land alienations in British West Africa. Furthermore, when the Royal Niger Company's charter was revoked in 1899, the government assumed its debt of £250,000 and made a cash settlement out of Nigerian revenues of £565,000. It also agreed to pay the company 50 percent of all government royalties on minerals within specified areas of northeastern Nigeria. These payments, amounting to £159,579 in

the fiscal year 1943–44, are made to one of the U.A.C. subsidiaries and are due annually until January 1, 1999.

In her book, *Plan for Africa*, Rita Hinden has given a remarkable analysis of what happens to the mineral wealth of the Gold Coast. Between 1929–30 and 1936–37 the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation paid its investors dividends amounting to 938 percent, an average of 117 percent a year for the eight-year period. In these eight years, investors received dividends totaling 938 percent. Of the average of all mineral exports from 1936 through 1938 (£5,377,000), only £2,000,000 was spent in the Gold Coast. In the year 1937–38, the gold and diamond mines showed a net profit of £2,561,556 and actually distributed £1,957,167 to stockholders. Profits are of course by no means as spectacular in other West African industries, but a considerable share is enjoyed by overseas stockholders. The amounts received by European employees and government officials in Africa are not high by American standards, while the share of the African laborers and producers is minimal.

Where mineral resources are irrecoverably lost to the Africans with every ton of ore that is exported, the distinction between freehold rights and long-term leases becomes academic. There is a real question as to what minerals will be left when the present leases have expired. Meanwhile African landowners receive small payments according to their leases with the mining companies. One of the richest gold mines in the world, operated by the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, which had a net profit of £1,042,064 in 1937–38, is leased for £400 a year. The British West African governments have maintained that they have no authority to interfere in these leases, which they regard as private contracts between Africans and the mining companies. Perhaps the most revealing portion of *Plan for Africa* is the quotation from the records of the Gold Coast Legislative Council of a debate in 1939 on the question of increasing payments of mining companies to African land owners. Unfortunately, only two brief portions can be quoted here.

One is the Governor’s comment on a previous reference to the profits of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation:

*We must remember that when we read in the papers that a mine has made so much profit, this profit has to be divided among numerous shareholders who in many cases only receive three or four per cent. on their capital. In*
fact, as a general rule, they would probably have done far better if they
had invested their money in a first-class Government security.

The other is by a European unofficial member:
If the people of this country are so convinced about the huge profits made
by the mines and want to have a share in this prosperity, there is nothing
to stop them doing so. They, like others, have a perfect right and full
liberty to invest money in the mines and thus take a share in the industry
. . . and if any shares are wanted, I have a few myself which I would
be quite willing to sell.

Social Organization

The fundamental kinship unit in African society is the clan,5 which is found in most tribes in this area. Members of the same clan
or sub-clan generally share distinctive food taboos and are pro­
hibited from intermarrying. Traditions about clan origins are ex­
tremely sacred, and are rarely revealed to outsiders. Clans are not
usually localized, but cut across large sections of the tribe. Lineages,
portions of a clan living together in a given locality, are the most
important social and economic unit. They may own land as a group
and assist each other financially in time of need. The loyalties which
bind an individual to his clan members, and particularly to the mem­
ers of his lineage, are the strongest bonds in African society.

Polygyny obtains throughout the area, with the possible excep­
tion of the Pygmies of the Congo forests. Outside the Islamic groups,
the number of wives is limited only by an individual’s wealth and
the number of available women. In some groups, where economic
surpluses and populations are small, polygynous families are ex­
ceptional. Marriages are generally effected by the transfer of prop­
erty from the family of the groom to the family of the bride, but
it by no means follows that wives are purchased as property of
the husband. Wives may sue for divorce, own their own property
and in some tribes even sue the husband for property which he has
broken or destroyed. The Dahomeans recognize thirteen different
forms of marriage depending on how, when, and by whom the bride
wealth is paid. Polygyny and the payment of bride wealth have

5 The clan includes all individuals who trace descent unilaterally, whether it be
patrilineally or matrilineally, from a common ancestor.
survived the attacks of missionaries. In some colonies, such as Nigeria, two forms of marriage are legally recognized: "native marriage" which is subject only to tribal tradition and may be polygynous, and "Christian marriage" which is performed by the Church and, at least according to law, is monogamous. Ironically, missionaries have been partially responsible for weakening the family. Attacks on "native marriage," bride wealth, and polygyny have led to an increase in adultery and premarital relations.

Rank and status are very important, with the upper classes enjoying social and economic privileges as well as respect and deference. Chieftainship is generally hereditary within the clan, but all male members of the royal clan may be potential rulers. Aside from clan membership, ascribed status is based on age and sex. While women enjoy a high legal status and may influence the decisions of their sons, brothers, or husbands, the important political offices are filled by men. Within the clan, status depends primarily on age, and within polygynous families on seniority. Since the end of the slave wars, wealth and property have become increasingly important as the basis of achieved status in place of military record.

The colonial system has superimposed a new set of social classes on the already highly stratified societies, with the ranking administrative representatives at the top. In British West Africa the social distinctions within the European group are most clearly to be seen in the large government centers such as Accra and Lagos, but are generally disregarded where there are few Europeans. Following the members of the political or administrative service, in approximate order, are those in the legal and medical branches, police, education, forestry, agriculture, customs, posts and telegraph, veterinary, public works and railway. Within these branches position and income are important. The head of the Forestry Department may be a frequent dinner guest with a high-ranking political officer, but a member of the Railway Department seldom dines with a political officer of his own status. Position and income determine rank within the parallel and overlapping series which includes banking, shipping, trading, and mining employees and which starts at a somewhat lower level. The rank of missionaries generally falls below both these groups. Within these various occupations, social status depends also on nationality, with English and Scotch followed by British from
the Dominions, Americans, French, and Greeks. Below these are the Syrians, Lebanese, Indians, and other "non-Europeans," who in turn rank above all but the most important chiefs and wealthy Africans. Although these distinctions are a British innovation, they have been grasped by the class-conscious Africans, as they are observed in different towns, and can be followed when the occasion calls for it.6

A new group, generally referred to as the "detribalized" Africans, has also emerged under contact. This includes a well-to-do, highly acculturated upper-class of business and professional men, often educated in European universities. Clerks, office messengers, and domestic servants who have had some primary education constitute the middle class. Below them are unskilled and semiskilled laborers who may have had no formal education, but who also have left their homes for jobs in the larger cities. The "detribalized" Africans have often given up their tribal religious and social practices, either of necessity because of isolation from their kinsmen, or of choice because of their aspiration to European ways. They have usually learned a European language or the dominant African language of the city in which they work. Aside from the upper class, it is doubtful how many of this group are "detribalized" in the sense that they will not return to their former way of life when their economic circumstances permit.

"Detribalized" Africans are only a small part of the population, which is composed of a large number of ethnic groups of varying size, each with its own language and culture. In the Belgian Congo close to 150 distinct groupings have been listed. In Central Africa the more important groups include the Kongo and Yombe near the mouth of the Congo river, the Mbundu and Chokwe of Angola, the Luba of southeastern Belgian Congo, the Kuba, Songe and Rega of central Congo, the Ruanda and Rundi of the Belgian Trust Territory, the Azande and Mangbetu of northeastern Belgian Congo, the Mongo and Ngala of northwestern Congo, the neighboring Mandja and Baja of central French Equatorial Africa, and the Wute and Pangwe or Fan of the French Cameroons.

Among the more important West African groups are the Hausa

6 The Government of the Gold Coast comments that this paragraph "is regarded as bearing no relation to post-war conditions in the Gold Coast."
(6,000,000) of northern Nigeria and Niger Colony, the Fulani or Fulbe or Puehl (4,000,000) scattered through French and British West Africa, the Ibo (4,000,000) of southern Nigeria, the Yoruba (3,500,000) of southwestern Nigeria and eastern Dahomey, the Akan (3,000,000) including the Ashanti and Fanti of southern Gold Coast and the Baule and other Agni groups of southeastern Ivory Coast, the Mandingo (3,000,000) including the Kpelle, Vei, Mende, Susu, Koranko, Khasoneke, Malinke, Sarakole and Banmana of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and western French West Africa, the Mossi (1,500,000) of northeastern Ivory Coast, the Ewe (1,000,000) of Togoland and Gold Coast, the Kanuri (900,000) of northern Nigeria, and other smaller but important groups such as the Dahomeans, Edo, Ekoii, Ga, Ibibio, Ijaw, Jukun, Kissi, Kru, Nupe, Senufo, Songhai, Temne, Tiv, Tuareg, Tukulor, and Wolof.

West and Central Africa are characterized by the great African kingdoms and empires which existed long before the arrival of European explorers. Along the Guinea Coast were Benin (Edo), Ife (Yoruba), Oyo (Yoruba), Dahomey, and Ashanti (Akan). North of these in the Sudan were Bornu (Kanuri), Mossi, and the vast Fulani empire stretching from the mouth of the Senegal to Lake Chad. The Fulani empire was preceded by the Hausa empires and in still earlier times by Ghana (Sarakole), Songhai, Melle (Malinke), and others known today from Mohammedan records. Comparable kingdoms, such as Kongo, Loango, Luba, and Kuba were also found in Central Africa.

The political history has been one of the rise and fall of dynasties, and of borders and allegiances changed by civil wars and battles between rival states. States of varying size have expanded, contracted and then spread again. They have included in some cases peoples of different languages and cultures, and in others only parts of ethnic groups. In contrast to the Fulani empire, which ruled Hausa, Nupe, Yoruba, and other subjects in Nigeria and numerous groups in French West Africa, are the Ibo, sharing a common language and culture in spite of local differences, but divided into some 500 autonomous political units.

Below the king or “paramount chief” were a large number of court officials and assistants with both political and ritual functions. Some of these usually constituted the king’s advisors and in many
cases they were made responsible for outlying provinces. In Ashanti and Benin the Queen Mother enjoyed special status. The cities and districts within the kingdom were ruled by chiefs who exercised considerable autonomy in administering their areas. They were in turn assisted by their own councils, ward chiefs, precinct chiefs, and lineage heads, and by chiefs of the smaller towns within their administrative areas. Civil and criminal cases were tried before formally constituted courts of law presided over by the chiefs.

The person of the king was in a sense sacred and surrounded by many taboos. Both subjects and subordinate chiefs showed deference in his presence. From the time of the first Portuguese until the establishment of colonial rule, traders and representatives of European governments treated African kings as heads of foreign powers. As late as 1875 the British Consul, representing the Foreign Office rather than the Colonial Office, wrote in advance to King Ja Ja requesting permission to enter the “creeks” of the Niger Delta at Bonny, where Ja Ja ruled over a small area about Opobo. The chiefs along the Guinea Coast collected export duties (“comey”) and harbor fees from the trading ships, and even after King Ja Ja had been exiled to St. Vincent in 1888 he was paid “comey” by the British Government. The trade monopolies exercised by some kings over imported goods, as well as local produce, were the reason for many of the early “punitive expeditions” in southern Nigeria, including that which resulted in Ja Ja’s deportation.

Political Administration

The development of the British policy of “indirect rule” is inextricably associated with Nigeria. Although Lord Lugard is regarded as its founder, the beginnings of indirect rule date back to the period of the Royal Niger Company, when Sir George Goldie wrote “If the welfare of the native races is to be considered, if dangerous revolts are to be obviated, the general policy of ruling on African principles through African rulers must be followed for the present.” The difference between direct and indirect rule is partly one of intent, since all colonial powers have at times, as a matter of expediency, found it necessary to condone African customs and to delegate some of their responsibilities to African chiefs.
In “indirect rule” the utilization of African administrative organizations and the authority of traditional chiefs is a matter of deliberate policy. These are sanctioned by the central Nigerian government as “Native Administrations” and “Native Courts” and their realms of competence are defined by legal statute. The powers of the Native Courts are limited by the maximum sentences they may impose, which vary from three months imprisonment to the death penalty, the latter subject to confirmation by the Governor. Over 90 percent of all criminal and civil cases in Nigeria are tried in Native Courts according to tribal law. Within the realm of powers delegated to Native Administrations, the District Officer has in theory only the status of advisor, though in practice it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between advice and instructions and though District Officers may review cases and even, in some areas, serve as a court of first appeal.

Increasing amounts of the direct taxes on Africans are turned over to the Native Administrations to spend on local roads, hospitals, schools, water works, electric plants, and the salaries of chiefs and Native Administration employees. Kano Emirate receives 70 percent of direct taxes levied within its area and had a revenue of over £206,720 in 1936–37, while in southern Nigeria 23 native treasuries received 50 percent of the taxes and had estimated revenues of less than £1,000. In 1946–47 the expenditures of the 225 native treasuries amounted to £3,315,219, equal to almost 30 percent of the expenditures of the central Nigerian government.

Indirect rule in Nigeria was developed through experience with the large and well-organized Hausa states of the north. It was later extended to the Yoruba kingdoms and other large states in the Western Provinces. In the Eastern Provinces its application has been delayed by the large number of small political units. It has also been extended to other British colonies in Africa and has had an increasing influence on Belgian and French colonial policy. Indirect rule has meant that Africans could continue to be governed by their traditional chiefs according to their own laws and customs. It has also meant the rule of large African populations with a minimum of European officials, and a reduction of administrative expenses to a point where Britain did not have to contribute to the colonial budgets.
In the formulation of indirect rule both Goldie and Lugard were influenced by British experience with the independent feudatory states of India. Today Nigeria is beginning to face some of the same consequences as India. The educated Africans are beginning to demand representation in Native Administrations and the democratic election of chiefs. Some chiefs, such as the King of Benin, have been attacked personally in the newspapers for failing to represent their people, for having sold out to the British, or for failing to support the nationalist movement. Many government officials in Nigeria are aware of the inherent inconsistency between the policy of indirect rule and Britain’s proclaimed objective of preparing Nigeria for democratic self-government. Education is accepted as a fundamental method of obtaining this objective, but indirect rule provides no place among the traditional rulers for Africans who have been educated. Democratic representation is also accepted as essential, but in theory indirect rule does not allow for a change in the rules of succession or a modification of the powers of the chiefs. In fact, the authority of hereditary chiefs has usually been strengthened by government support. In practice, various compromises, not yet crystallized into formal policy, have been worked out. An increasing number of chiefs have attended school, and chiefs’ councils have been given more authority and enlarged to include educated representatives.

On the other hand the status of chiefs has been basically altered by delegating to the Governor the power to remove them from office, rather than relying on the traditional procedures for deposing undesirable and unpopular rulers, and less directly by the Governor’s authority to approve or reject candidates selected for vacant chieftainships. These powers have tended to reduce the chief to the status of a civil servant and to shift his loyalty from his people to the administration, which can in effect hire and fire him. As a result, there is actually less difference between the indirect rule of the British and the direct rule of the French than appears on the surface.

Under direct rule in the French colonies, African chiefs function as agents of the French government; authority in local affairs is vested in the Commandant du Cercle. Chiefs were frequently ap-
pointed for their knowledge of French, their loyalty, or other considerations of usefulness, regardless of the traditional ruling groups and patterns of succession. Although there is a clear distinction between "la justice française" and "la justice indigène," the "native" tribunals are not the traditional African courts and do not represent the chief and his council, and African customary law has been adapted to French legal concepts.

In 1921 the Governor-General of French West Africa declared "we have committed the fault of breaking up completely the native social structure in place of improving it for the purpose of serving our administration," and expressed the hope that use would be made of whatever might have remained. Three years later the reconstruction of African political organization was advocated by the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, and under Félix Eboué this became official policy in 1942.

I intend to see to it [he wrote in a circular to administrators] that the practise of placing in power upstarts, menials or native "tirailleurs" whose services must be rewarded, is discontinued once and for all (there are a thousand other ways to reward them). Moreover, it is my desire that the legitimate chiefs be sought out, wherever our ignorance has allowed them to go into hiding, and that they be reinstated in all their external dignity. . . . [The perfect administrator will discover and educate the traditional chiefs;] he will then have in them reliable assistants who will relieve him of most of the actual work, and his role will merely be to suggest, to advise, and to control.

At a conference in Brazzaville in 1944, Eboué's principles were accepted by the Governors and Governor-Generals of the French territories.

Where British administrative theory aimed at cultural self-determination, that of the French originally aimed at the assimilation of Africans to the status of French citizens. All Africans born within the four "communes" of Saint Louis, Dakar, Goree, and Rufisque were automatically made citizens under the 1848 constitution of Senegal. Outside these areas, in the "protectorate" of French West Africa, citizenship could be acquired by satisfying certain requirements as to age, criminal record, education, monogamy, a "civilized" way of life, military service, service under a
French employer, and devotion to French interests. African "citizens" were granted franchise and had a different legal status than African "subjects." They were likewise held for only 18 instead of 36 months of military service.

These attractions apparently did not outweigh the disadvantages of French inheritance and marriage laws, and were not sufficient to cause any significant number of voluntary nationalizations. Out of a total of 97,246 African citizens in French West Africa in 1944, only 4,741 resided outside of Dakar and Senegal. Many of the citizens in the communes are uneducated and have not adopted French culture, since they acquired their status automatically and are governed by a special code of laws which permits polygyny and other African laws and customs. This special status has been very attractive, particularly because of the terms of military service. As a result various methods of acquiring it were devised, including having mothers visit Dakar for their confinements so that their children might be born within the commune.

In recent times the emphasis has shifted from "assimilation" to "association," a policy aiming at the creation of a native elite in an intermediate position between the unacculturated Africans and the fully assimilated African citizens. The functions of the elite are conceived as assisting in administration and as diffusing French culture to other Africans after filtering out elements unsuited to African conditions. The 1944 Brazzaville conference reaffirmed this position when it called for expanded secondary and professional education, which is "essential for the development of native élites who ought to be called upon to hold an ever greater number of positions in business, industry and the administration."

Portugal and Spain have both been influenced by French colonial policy. Direct rule is practiced but neither assimilation nor association have proceeded as far as in French West Africa. In the Belgian Congo direct rule was practiced in the early days but in 1906 and 1910 the foundations for indirect rule were laid. In 1933 the chiefs' functions as traditional authority and as emissary of the Belgian Government were clearly distinguished. In the latter capacity he can act only on superior orders, except to protect public health, order, and security. In the former he is subject only to advice and to a possible veto by the administration. At the same
time provision was made for native treasuries with incomes derived from additions, not exceeding 20 percent, to the poll tax collected by the central government.

In Liberia, although it is an independent state, Africans have a status which differs little from that of colonials. They are administered through Americo-Liberian District Commissioners according to a policy of indirect rule which is marred by reports of individual extortion. The Americo-Liberians represent about 1 percent of the population. Liberia is not a reliable basis for judging the future of other African territories, since it does not represent an example of African self-government. Politically it resembles the Union of South Africa in that a large African majority is ruled by an immigrant minority which controls an autonomous government. The fact that the majority and minority in Liberia are racially related has not prevented revolts by the Africans in 1832, 1852, 1856, 1875, 1893, 1910, 1911, 1916 and 1932, in several of which the government received “moral support” from American naval vessels.

Aside from the Native Administrations, municipal bodies have been established in the larger French and British cities like Dakar, St. Louis, Freetown, Accra, and Lagos, with authority to collect property taxes and administer various city affairs such as sanitation, markets, electricity, and water works. All these bodies have African majorities, but it is only in the four communes of Senegal that all members are elected. Property and other qualifications restrict the number of eligible voters in British territories. In the Belgian Congo no Africans are represented in the municipal council of Leopoldville.

The British colonies have been ruled under the system of Crown Colony government. The Governor is assisted by a Legislative Council and an advisory Executive Council. As a colony progresses on the path toward dominion status, its inhabitants are given increasing representation in these councils, their powers are increased, and suffrage is extended. The Executive Councils in British West Africa consisted entirely of government officials until 1942 when African members were appointed by the Governor in Nigeria, Gold Coast, and, later, Sierra Leone. In Gambia the legislative council consists of six government officials, one appointed European, two appointed Africans, and one elected African.
In 1946 the Gold Coast received a new constitution through which for the first time the government officials are a minority in the Legislative Council. The council consists of six senior government officials, nine Africans elected by the Joint Provincial Council of the Colony, four Africans elected by the Confederacy Council of Ashanti, five Africans elected by qualified voters in Accra, Sekondi-Takoradi, Cape Coast, and Kumasi, and six members, who may be either African or European, appointed by the Governor. The Governor presides and retains veto power, as he does in all other British West African colonies, but he does not vote. The authority of the Legislative Council was also extended to include Ashanti. The Northern Territories of the Gold Coast are now the only part of British West Africa still subject to legislation enacted by decree of the Governor and the Executive Council.

In 1947 Nigeria also received a new constitution, giving Africans a majority in the Legislative Council for the first time. The new council consists of 16 senior British government officials and 28 "unofficial" members. Eighteen of the "unofficial" members are Africans selected by newly created Regional councils; two are African chiefs appointed by the Governor from the council for the Western Provinces; one is an African appointed by the Governor to represent the "Colony"; three are appointed by the Governor to represent interests not adequately represented, including European business; and four are Africans elected by ballot, three from Lagos and one from Calabar.

Eastern, Western and Northern Houses of Assembly have been created, and a separate House of Chiefs with 23 members for the Northern Provinces. Three chiefs are appointed by the Governor to the Western House of Assembly, but no chiefs are represented in the Eastern Provinces. The other African members in the three Houses of Assembly are selected by the Native Administrations from among their own members (other than chiefs), with minorities appointed by the Governor to represent areas without Native Administrations, African commercial interests and other groups not otherwise represented. In each of the four Regional councils Africans hold a majority over government officials and the latter have no vote in the selection of representatives to the Legislative Council. Besides serving as an electoral college, the Regional councils have
certain powers over financial and other affairs within their areas.

Under this “Richards Constitution” government officials have relinquished their majority in the Legislative Council; the representation of the protectorate with 96 percent of the population has been increased from 15 to 48 percent; and the authority of the Legislative Council has been extended to all of Nigeria. The unique feature of the constitution is its attempt to bridge the gap which in the past has separated Native Administrations from the central government. The new constitution, however, has been denounced by the nationalists as inadequate for the present state of advancement of Nigeria.

A new constitution for Sierra Leone was proposed in 1947, providing a Legislative Council of seven government officials, nine Africans elected by the Protectorate Assembly, one African chosen by the elected members of the Protectorate Assembly from among its appointed members, one African appointed by the Governor, two Europeans appointed by the Governor to represent business interests, and three Africans elected by ballot in the Colony. This would also provide an unofficial African majority.

French Senegal, with its four communes and large number of African French citizens, represents a unique situation. A Colonial Council of 62 members includes 26 who are elected by the French citizens, 18 elected by African chiefs, and 18 elected by French “subjects” who are ex-soldiers. Before the recent addition of the third group, when three-fourths of the Colonial Council were generally Africans, the Africans were divided on issues, with the chiefs upholding government policy when it was attacked by the citizens. Increases in taxation of African subjects and prestation labor were supported by the chiefs, who drew government salaries and whose tax rebates were increased by such measures.

Although the powers of the Council are specifically defined and restricted, it was able to force the government to withdraw increases on registration taxes within the communes in 1922–23 in spite of a government majority made possible by the support of the chiefs. The Council has authority to give advice, to “deliberate” on five specified subjects including taxation, to legislate on thirteen specified subjects of lesser importance, and to approve the budget of the Senegal. Its deliberations must be approved by the Governor-General in Council of Government, who may request it to “deliberate” again if
he does not approve its decisions. Its legislation may be vetoed by the Governor-General within two months; otherwise it automatically comes into effect. Its greatest power comes through approval of the budget, though even here "obligatory" expenses including expenses of the administrative departments, services of debts, contributions to the governments of France and French West Africa, and secret funds are excluded. The Council can withhold about half the expenditures of government and block the imposition of new taxes. As a result its African and other unofficial members enjoy more authority than those of any other consultative assembly in Africa.

Councils of Administration serve as advisory bodies to the governors of other French West African colonies, to the governors of French Cameroons and Togo, and to the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa. A comparable Council of Government advises the Governor-General of French West Africa. All these councils, except in Niger Colony, Mauritania, Togo and Cameroons had elected African representatives and unofficial majorities, but little authority. The 1944 Brazzaville conference recommended that these councils be abolished and replaced by Regional Councils based on African political structures and by representative Assemblies, composed of Europeans and Africans elected by universal suffrage wherever practicable. The new councils and Assemblies were to be consultative except for "deliberative powers" concerning budgets and new public works.

French colonial structure has also been markedly altered at the top as a result of new trends in French thinking. Formerly all legislation for the Empire was enacted in France and only adapted to the local situation by the colonial governments. The Empire is now conceived as a "French Union" in which each territory will enjoy representation in the central Constituent Assembly and considerable local autonomy. "The evolution of the colonies must never tend to a separation from the mother country, but . . . must be aimed at strengthening the bonds which tie all colonial territories together with Metropolitan France, with a view to forming one single national entity, one and indivisible." After the 1945 elections the Constituent Assembly included ten representatives of French West Africa, six from French Equatorial Africa, 48 from other territories
of "France Overseas" not including Indo-China, and 522 for France. Previously Senegal alone had been represented by one member of the Chamber of Deputies. M. Blaise Diagne, who in 1914 became the first African Senegal Deputy, served in this post for many years.

In the Belgian Congo the Governor-General has only emergency legislative powers. His edicts cease to be valid after six months if not confirmed by legislation from Belgium. One African was made a member of the Governor-General's advisory Council of Government in 1947. The Governor of Angola has an advisory council of five government officials and five unofficial members of Portuguese nationality, chosen by recognized economic organizations. In Portuguese Guinea the advisory council includes elected representatives of commerce and the municipalities. The Portuguese councils must be consulted on all legislative measures, but may not make proposals increasing expenditures or reducing revenues.

Liberia has a President, Cabinet, Senate, House of Representatives and a Constitution patterned after that of the United States. Africans have the legal right to participate in politics, but property and literacy qualifications have kept political control in the hands of the Americo-Liberians. The Africans received political representation for the first time in 1945 when provision was made for the election of one member of the House by each of the three provinces of the interior. The vast majority of Africans are still ineligible to vote for Senators or the President.

Religion

Native religions in West and Central Africa are marked by a complexity which parallels that of the political and economic organization. Along the Guinea Coast a large number of deities are recognized, each with its own mythology, priests, worshipers, and rituals. Cycles of elaborate rituals, usually centering around an annual "festival" which may last a week or more, are performed. Parts of the festivals are secret and may be witnessed only by the head priest and his principal assistants; at other times public ceremonies may be held which attract thousands of participants and observers.

Although West African religion is polytheistic, most individuals
worship only one god. Every individual recognizes the existence of numerous deities and may propitiate them at the advice of a diviner, but he has a special relationship to the one he "serves." This may be the one worshiped by his father or mother before him; it may be selected for him on the advice of a diviner; or it may be chosen in other ways. Propitiation of other members of a pantheon, such as the wives, brothers and sisters, and associates of a major deity, may also be required. A few individuals worship more than one god, and even before contact with missionaries, a few did not "serve" any. In many tribes a formal initiation is an essential part of joining a cult group. This may be even more elaborate than the annual ceremonies, involving the seclusion of groups of initiates for many months while they are instructed in myths, songs, dances, and other aspects of ritual and theology.

Worship of a deity may be assumed because of a desire for some blessing which the god can bestow or to avoid evil consequences if the god is neglected. All deities have the power to grant children, the most common request and the main goal in the lives of most Africans. They can relieve sickness and insure good luck, good harvests, and wealth. They are also able to intervene in human lives by punishing those who do not fulfill their obligations. African religion, however, is not dominated by fear. The gods are conceptualized as capricious, but not difficult to please; they are amenable to persuasion and praise, but are powerful enough to be very dangerous if they become angry.

Some deities are known only within a circumscribed area, while others are worshiped over wide areas by thousands of followers. Gods of lightning, of iron, of the earth and the waters are found under different names in many tribes. Myths tell that the gods lived on earth in the remote past and that from them many human families have descended. As a consequence the student often finds it difficult to draw the distinction between deities and ancestors, but it is usually clear in the minds of Africans. Ancestor worship and the deities are dominant factors in the integration of the social structure, the former in particular providing the sanctions of the clan system.

Humans are believed to have not merely one, but four or five separate souls. Rites de passage are important here as in other parts of the world, particularly those surrounding death, when the individual
joins the ancestors. Elaborate puberty ceremonies are more characteristic of Central than of West Africa, but throughout the area recognition is given to the transition from childhood to the status of adult. Marriage is primarily a civil affair emphasizing the contractual features that are binding on the respective families, but divination and the propitiation of family ancestors and deities are necessary to insure its success. Food taboos and rituals are also associated with pregnancy, childbirth, and naming. Any abnormal circumstance at parturition is interpreted as an omen. Throughout the area, twin births are grouped in a special category, but whereas some groups believe them endowed with special powers that bring good fortune, others consider them as dangerous and evil. The treatment of twins and of their parents varies according to the beliefs that prevail.

Magic is another very important aspect of religion. Charms and medicines are classified into categories based on their purpose and the method in which they are applied, and they seem almost countless in number. Over 3,000 dealing only with physical well-being have been published in Yoruba. Others are employed to win cases in court, to bring success in business or love affairs, to protect travelers or the inhabitants of a house, to make thieves noiseless, invisible or impossible to capture, to transport someone immediately to another town, to bring wealth or general good luck, or to prevent unspecified disasters. Their efficacy is derived from the power given to each particular charm by a deity or deified ancestor. They are dispensed by specialists who are paid for their services and who guard their secrets so carefully that in some cases their knowledge dies with them. Belief in witches, ghosts and other spirits, and in dreams and omens also exists.

A position of special importance is occupied by the diviner, who in a sense integrates the various forms of worship. Diviners may be consulted by any individual, regardless of cult affiliation, to determine which deity requires a sacrifice, what the sacrifice should be, or what charm should be compounded to avert disaster. Several methods of divination are practiced within a single tribe. Some permit the diviner to adapt his predictions to his knowledge of his client's personal situation; others are based on thousands of fixed verses committed to memory through years of study.

A large part of the population, particularly in West Africa,
adopted Islam before European contact. As a result, African rules of inheritance, polygyny, and political structure, as well as religion, have been modified, while Islam has been modified in turn. Charms made of verses copied from the Koran are used by non-Islamic groups. In contact with both Moslems and Christians, Africans have shown a readiness to try new rituals and charms, but a reluctance to abandon their own. The persistence of African religious beliefs even in the New World shows the tenacity of African religion and its great importance in African life.

Catholic missionary activity began with the arrival of the first Portuguese. In the fifteenth century the King of Benin agreed to bring his people into the Church in return for a Portuguese wife, but the effects were not lasting except for the adoption of the cross as a symbol and crucifixion as a form of human sacrifice. In other areas also, nominal “converts” soon resumed their traditional forms of worship when the Portuguese withdrew. Protestant missionary activity, which has also met with resistance, is little more than 100 years old. The first Protestant missionaries in Nigeria, a mulatto from Sierra Leone with two Fanti assistants, arrived in 1842. Except in the British colonies and Liberia, the predominant Christian religion is Catholicism.

Neither Catholics nor Protestants have made any appreciable headway in Islamic areas. Elsewhere the figures in Christian tradition have been fitted in with African gods, and in spite of missionary attacks on African “superstitions,” most church members still participate in rituals for the gods or ancestors, make sacrifices, and consult diviners and medicine men. At a Yoruba ceremony which was attended by several hundred people, about ten individuals were pointed out who were not church members. In spite of the steady growth of the number of nominal Christians, they are far less numerous than either the Moslems or the so-called “pagans” who worship the traditional African gods.

Where traditional African sanctions of behavior have been destroyed or weakened under missionary influence, usually nothing has taken their place. There are among the educated young people some who now look upon all African beliefs as superstitions, but who have not substituted for the African codes of morality and ethics those of Christianity. They have become individualistic and materialistic,
apparently recognizing no controls of behavior except legal punishment. Crime and adultery have increased in the areas of greatest European contact; clan responsibilities and loyalties have been weakened; and the authority of the elders has been undermined.

While these developments present important problems for the future, they should not be exaggerated, since the traditional sanctions are still effective for most Africans. They cannot be attributed exclusively to missionary criticisms of African customs, though they are not as pronounced in tribes which have adopted Islam. They are as apparent among Nigerians educated in government schools as those in mission schools. Teaching a simple fact, for example that malaria is caused by the bite of a mosquito, may raise doubts not only about native explanations and remedies for one disease, but also about the validity of the entire system of traditional beliefs.

Missionaries were the pioneers in the field of African education. The first government school in Nigeria was not established until 1909, and except in the French colonies, government has relied upon missions to administer nearly all the schools. Missions can claim most of the credit for British West Africa's reputation for good education. There seems, however, to be a growing resistance toward missionary activity in British colonies.

Educated Nigerians, many of whom were themselves trained in mission schools, have reacted to missionaries in various ways. Some take a strong negative position as regards missionary attempts to change their forms of marriage, dress, and amusement. They regard the opinion, freely expressed by many of those connected with missions, that African religions are superstitions which should be destroyed, as unjustified and ethnocentric. They find it difficult to reconcile this point of view with the teaching they receive that all gods are one, and with the use of names of African gods to refer to the Christian deity in Bible translations, hymns, and sermons by the missionaries themselves. Nor can they reconcile the belief in a single Christian God with the rivalries between the various Christian sects. Finally, missionaries are suspected of being effective if unintentional agents of imperialism. Some of these views are shared by the uneducated Africans, but most literate Africans believe that the good admittedly done by some missionaries is not sufficient to justify the presence of foreign missions in Africa.
Education

Except for the Islamic tribes of the Sudan where African language was written in an Arabic script, the peoples of this part of Africa were without writing little more than 100 years ago. In the Islamic tribes reading and writing were, and still are, taught in classes headed by mallams, but the instruction is usually confined to texts from the Koran. Arabic script has also been used to record local history, and Timbuktu's early fame as a center of learning spread even to Europe. As in the groups without writing, however, the greater part of the individual's learning was acquired verbally or by example. This is largely true even today when schools have been established and many of the languages have been reduced to writing.

African patterns of child care and child training, children's games imitating the activities of adults, evening sessions of riddles and story telling, the use of proverbs to emphasize the reason for criticism or praise or to make a point stick in a child's mind, and the first fumbling attempts of children to assist their parents in cooking, farming, trading, weaving, and many other occupations are all important parts of the process by which adult knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes are acquired. Much of this learning is informal and incidental to other activities. In the apprenticeship system, the West African cult initiations and Central African puberty initiations, the situation is directed specifically toward instruction and training.

It is inaccurate to speak of Africans as uneducated simply because they have not had formalized schooling of a European type. However this usage is difficult to avoid in the English language and where it has been adopted here to avoid clumsy paraphrases, it should be understood that "uneducated" Africans may possess tremendous stores of knowledge, and frequently far more real wisdom and human understanding than the young "educated" African who has spent four or five years in school. "Education," as one of the main issues and major problems in Africa today, does not concern the traditional African patterns of learning, which still operate effectively with the possible exception of the young men who leave home at an early age to enter school or work for Europeans and may grow up ignorant of large portions of their cultural heritage.
The schools are still largely in the hands of missionaries. In 1945, 99 percent of the students in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi and over 90 percent in British West Africa, excluding the Koranic schools, were in mission schools. In Liberia the proportion was 61 percent in 1944, in French Equatorial Africa 52 percent in 1945 and in French Togo 50 percent in 1937. Only 19 percent of the students in accredited schools in French Cameroons in 1944 were under missionaries, but this figure does not include 75 percent of the school population who were in non-accredited schools. Both Belgium and Britain have followed the policy of subsidizing mission schools which conform to certain academic standards, giving rise to the distinction between "assisted" and "unassisted" unofficial schools. Mission schools are also subsidized in French colonies, but here official schools and government educational programs have been more important. In British West Africa both government and missions charge school fees which may be as low as 5¢ or as high as $25 a year; still there are far more applicants than can be admitted. The fees for university studies at Achimota college ($250 to $360 a year including board and lodging) are beyond the means of all except wealthy families, and over half the students rely on the assistance of scholarships. French schools are free, but admissions are limited.

Spanish Guinea has provided education for the greatest proportion of the population. The Belgians have also made education available to large numbers of Africans, but with very small government expenditures per African student and relatively low academic standards. In British and French territories the standards have generally been higher and more has been spent per student, but fewer Africans are enrolled in school; recently both British and French have made plans for a broader educational program which more closely resembles the Belgian pattern. The percentage of Africans in school is no higher in Liberia than in British and French colonies, while academic standards are lower. The Portuguese colonies have spent the most per school child, but their educational system is intended primarily for Europeans and accommodates only a small percentage of the African population.

In 1934 Angola spent $43.90 for each child enrolled in school, but the total number of students was only 6,254 and only 14 of the 472
students in secondary school were African. Gambia spent $28.40 per student in 1946, Portuguese Guinea $26.60 in 1946, French Equatorial Africa $18.50 in 1945, followed by Sierra Leone (1946), Gold Coast (1945-46), French West Africa (1946), French Togoland (1935), Spanish Guinea (1945), Nigeria (1943-44), and Liberia (1944) with between $5 and $15. Government expenditures per school child were $3.46 in the Belgian Congo (1946), including 3,273 European students; for African children in unofficial schools, 99 percent of the total enrollment, they were $1.70 in the same year. They were $1.05 in French Cameroons (1938) and 57¢ in Ruanda-Urundi (1944).

Government expenditures on education, per capita, were 87.2¢ in the Gold Coast in 1945-46 (as against 33.8¢ two years earlier), 59.3¢ in Spanish Guinea (1945), 39.6¢ in Gambia (1946), 29.3¢ in Belgian Congo (1946), 27.2¢ in Portuguese Guinea (1946), 19.6¢ in Sierra Leone (1946), and 14.1¢ in French Equatorial Africa (1945), using population estimates above. In all other territories they were less than 10¢ a year, while they were only 4.0¢ in Liberia (1944) and 3.7¢ in Ruanda-Urundi (1944). Between 3.5 and 6.5 percent of the budget is devoted to education except in the Gold Coast (8.0 percent in 1945-46) and French West Africa (1.7 percent in 1946).

Of the total population 8.7 percent was enrolled in school in Spanish Guinea (1945), 8.5 percent in Belgian Congo (1946), 6.4 percent in Ruanda-Urundi (1944), 5.0 percent in French Cameroons (1944) including 3.8 percent in non-accredited schools, 4.7 percent in Gold Coast (1945-46), 2.9 percent in Nigeria (1946), followed by Sierra Leone (1946), Gambia (1946), French Togoland (1935), Portuguese Guinea (1946), French Equatorial Africa (1945), Liberia (1944), and French West Africa (1944-45), with between 0.5 and 1.5 percent. In Angola only 0.17 percent of the population, including European students, were enrolled in 1934.

These figures are not strictly comparable because of the marked expansion of education in recent years and because the cost of school buildings is not listed as an educational expense in British West African colonies, and other educational costs are concealed. Although they do not include the expenditures of missions, Native Administrations, and other non-government organizations, they
represent total enrollments in so far as these are available. The combined facilities of mission, government, and all other schools accommodate less than 2,500,000 Africans, or about 3 percent of the population.

Even in British West Africa, teachers' salaries are too low to attract the best-qualified Africans. Of the 27,860 teachers employed in Nigeria in 1946, 24,000 were untrained. In southern Nigeria 61.9 percent and in Sierra Leone 51.2 percent of the 1935 enrollments were in classes below Standard I, the first primary grade. Only 1.1 percent and 5.4 percent respectively were in grades above Standard VI. The total number of enrollments in secondary schools in all British West Africa in 1942 was 11,670. In 1947, 705 British West Africans were studying in British universities, 244 on scholarships, and a few others in American universities. About 250 were taking university courses in British West Africa. Achimota (Prince of Wales College) near Accra is the outstanding college in all West and Central Africa. It represents an original investment of £600,000 and receives an annual government appropriation of £64,000, but less than 100 students have been enrolled at the university level. Although these numbers are very small, British West Africa has produced more lawyers, doctors, journalists and clergymen than any other part of the area.

The subjects taught in primary school vary somewhat from one area to another, but generally they include reading, writing, arithmetic, history, and geography, hygiene and nature study, domestic science and arts and crafts, gardening, and, in mission schools, religious instruction. Manual training, agriculture, nursing and elementary medical training, engineering, teacher training, and other practical subjects are taught in special post-primary schools or in some cases by the technical departments of government.

The curricula in the secondary schools and colleges of British West Africa have not always been adapted to the local geographical and cultural background. Greek and Latin, English history, and British flora and fauna were studied, and until recently it was necessary to import biological specimens from England. British education officers recognized the desirability of fitting education to the special needs of the local situation, but all efforts in this direction

were opposed by Africans until the British universities modified their matriculation examinations to provide for the increasing number of students, in all parts of the Empire, who were taking them. These examinations are necessary for continued study abroad and important because of the better opportunities for jobs and the increased prestige enjoyed by those who possess certificates from British universities. European employers as well as Africans give inferior ratings to certificates from local schools.

Objection to adapting courses to the African situation persisted, however, even after the change in the matriculation examinations, because of the fear that this may be used as a device to maintain Africans in a subordinate position. With reference to the Union of South Africa the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Native Education, 1935–36, states frankly: “The education of the white child prepares him for life in a dominant society, and the education of the black child for a subordinate society.” Though it is understandable that Africans should wish to be satisfied that no dangers lurk behind courses of instruction especially designed for them, it is difficult to see how learning Latin or studying plants and animals which they will never see after they leave the classroom is of any real benefit to most African students. There is a difference between teaching subjects which are useful in an African environment and withholding essential knowledge or teaching obedience, loyalty and submission to European employers and officials. Nevertheless, as long as educational programs are drawn up by alien rulers, however honorable their intentions, any deviations from European patterns will be suspect.

The implementation of a modern educational policy in Africa, Morris Siegel has said, would “tear down the very foundations of the colonial system or else precipitate grave disorders in the territories.” Where there is no intention of granting Africans eventual independence or of permitting them to rise to equal status with Europeans, there are good reasons for restricting educational facilities, even when colonial budgets might permit improvement and expansion. The amount and the kind of education provided depends on both the wealth of the colonies and their natural resources and foreign trade, and on the objectives of those providing the educa-

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8 The Journal of Negro Education, XV, No. 3 (1946), 562.
tion. Religious objectives may be as important as colonial policy. In mission schools religion is emphasized, occasionally to such a degree that they provide little more of general education than many Koranic schools.9

The Belgian system of education has been characterized by J. S. Harris as one in which

The government, in conjunction with the mission schools, has now achieved an educational program which feeds clerks and skilled labor to its administration and private enterprises. With the exception of the specialized training for agricultural and medical assistants, there is no higher education comparable even to our high schools. . . . Only if it is intended that the Congo peoples remain permanently under European tutelage, can a disjointed system of education which denies them any effective training beyond the rudimentary and limited vocational levels be justified.10

In the Congo and French colonies many British West Africans are still employed as clerks.

The importance of practical studies is emphasized by the Belgians and the French. The two essential aspects of education in French Equatorial Africa have been outlined by Jean de la Roche as

First, it would be a terrible mistake, fraught with disastrous consequences, to equip African youth with intellectual training only. . . . Second, though nothing now prevents an African youth from choosing an intellectual career, the majority of students are needed to carry out practical work of vital and immediate importance.11

9 The British Colonial Office comments, "The conclusions of this paragraph do not agree with British Colonial policy and the facts given are not supported by current events," and refers to developments discussed below under Present Outlook.


11 *Ibid.*, p. 402. The Belgian Ministère des Colonies comments: "Such considerations as those of Harris and de la Roche are incorrect since, in maintaining a diversified professional education under a state of continuous improvement such as the development of the country requires (medical and agricultural assistants, clerks, technicians, etc.), the Belgian Congo is now attempting to create a non-specialized secondary education of the European type (collèges) directly preparatory to studies of a university character (collèges universitaires). All utilitarian ends are disregarded in this education, which looks essentially toward the formation of a native lay elite (doctors, veterinarians, agronomists, engineers, etc.) to supplement the religious elite (Catholic fathers and Protestant pastors) which already exists. The Belgian Colonial Government, being constantly aware of the dangers for the Blacks themselves in a program that would result in the unconsidered formation of an intellectual group which would have no way of making an honorable living, considers that it is essential to act cautiously in this matter, and limit the number of colleges
The French policies of assimilation and association have been reflected in education. The French language is not just a subject of study; it is the medium of instruction. It is required so that Africans will "think like Frenchmen" and is an important instrument for the dissemination of French culture. This has not been altered under the new French policy. The 1944 Brazzaville conference agreed that "Instruction must be in the French language. Use in teaching of local dialects is absolutely forbidden, in private as well as in public schools."

The British objective has not been to replace African by European culture, but to permit a new culture to develop which combines the most desirable features of both traditions. In line with this policy of cultural self-determination, of which indirect rule is an aspect, students are first taught to read and write in their own language (the "vernacular"). Later they learn English, and at upper primary and secondary levels English is used as the medium of instruction. The Portuguese and Spanish follow the French pattern, while in Liberia, government schools teach in English, and mission schools use African languages initially. In the Congo the problem is complicated by the large number of African languages and by the fact that both French and Flemish are official languages, but African languages are used at lower levels and French is used as the language of instruction in higher primary education.

The choice between these two alternatives is partly a matter of policy and partly based on practical considerations, such as the availability of teachers and textbooks, the number of individuals speaking the same language, the number of African languages and the extent to which they have been reduced to writing. Teaching in African languages shows a greater respect for African institutions and for the African's right to determine his own future, and it is also the most effective method of giving elementary education. It may, however, perpetuate a situation where Africans cannot communicate with each other because of linguistic differences and be a sharp barrier to further education. Only a very limited number of books have been translated into African languages and at pres-
ent European languages are the only practical media of advanced education.

The French have taught in their own language and have attempted to spread French culture as rapidly as possible, but they have, unlike the British, maintained two separate educational systems. In Native Schools the curriculum, course outlines, and textbooks are intended to provide training for life in Africa, and neither French history nor Latin are taught. Separate schools for Europeans and a few Africans follow a curriculum which is identical with that of schools in France.

Racial Relations

Discussions of the attitudes and relationships between European rulers and their African subjects can seldom be accepted as objective because they are so frequently used as ammunition for attacks on or the defense of colonial policy. Since these relationships are not easy to describe and are in themselves indelicate subjects, documented analyses are less common than flat statements which cannot be evaluated. In spite of obvious dangers of error, the issues involved are important enough to warrant an attempt to answer the questions: How do Africans feel and behave toward their European rulers, and how are they treated in turn? These points will be taken up in reverse order.

The range of variation, depending on the nationalities, the tribes, and the individuals and situations concerned, is not wide. Nowhere is there as complete racial segregation as in the Union of South Africa or the southeastern United States, on the one hand, or social equality on the other. Discrimination does not consistently follow racial lines, but in all the territories, Africans clearly occupy a subordinate position. This is true even in Liberia, where the concepts of color bar and racial discrimination are not pertinent. Some of the acculturated Africans have been accepted in Liberian society and have intermarried with the Americo-Liberians, but there is a wide social, political and economic gap between the Americo-Liberians and the Africans of the interior.

It is also true in the Portuguese colonies, despite the social acceptance of mistresses and mulattoes. It appears that, while there is
less discrimination in terms of color, there is also less consideration for African cultural traditions and economic freedom, and more physical brutality reminiscent of the Concession System than in any other part of Africa. In Portuguese colonies, as in French, Spanish, British, and Belgian, Africans may be kept standing in line while a European is waited on ahead of turn, or while an official chats with a casual European visitor who has just dropped by. The African's chances for social, political, and economic advancement are not improved because mulattoes have the same legal status as Europeans, one which is different from his own. The number of mulattoes in the Portuguese colonies, 28,000 to 44,000 whites in Angola and 2,200 to 1,400 whites in Portuguese Guinea, is no indication of social equality, which does not exist between a man's African mistress and his legal European wife. The Spanish pattern in general resembles that of the Portuguese.

The French colonies, particularly in French West Africa, are regarded as having little racial discrimination. Africans may attend the French schools and sit side by side with French children. Buell 12 The Government of Portuguese Guinea comments: "The picture of the European whose black mulatto mistress and sons are denied social equality is obviously erroneous. There is no racial discrimination in Portuguese Guinea, as the number of mulattoes shows. Anyone who is qualified may rise to any position, regardless of color.

"One of the brightest names in the history of Portuguese Guinea is Honório Barreto, an African from Guinea, who was its governor in the first half of the 19th Century. We do not believe that at that time any other colonial power sent Africans to Europe to study or let them become governors of the colony from which they came. Other Africans from Guinea serve today as Chief of Customs, Inspector of Commerce, and as Administradores, a position equivalent to the French 'Commandant de Cercle'. Colored people hold very important positions in Portugal and Cabo Verde, which lies off the West Coast of Africa. In Cabo Verde Portugal has accomplished the task of total assimilation in a way that has not been equalled in any other part of Africa. Most of the mulattoes in Portuguese Guinea come from Cabo Verde, many of whose inhabitants emigrate because of overpopulation.

"In Portuguese Guinea neither mulattoes nor Africans have less rights than Europeans. All 'natives' (indígenas) may become 'citizens' (cidadãos) and enjoy absolutely equal rights with European 'citizens', if they desire and if they have developed sufficiently to live under Portuguese laws. 'Natives' are protected by special legislation which respects tribal law and tribal organization. Authority is respected and there are no nationalist movements because there is neither economic exploitation nor racial discrimination. Perhaps the reason for this mutual respect is the fact that Portugal has spent five of her eight centuries of history as a colonial power in Africa. While in many parts of Africa the natives call the Portuguese 'whites' (branco) and other Europeans by their respective nationalities, in Guinea any African who has adopted European ways of life is called 'white'. This shows that to Africans, to be white is not a matter of color, but of civilization."
describes French women selling fish to Africans in the markets and waiting on Africans and Europeans alike in the stores and restaurants in Dakar. Geoffrey Gorer, on the other hand reports, “The colour bar is extraordinarily strong in Dakar. Negroes are practically never seen in the cafés, restaurants and hotels.” In 1944 there were 4,108 mulattoes to 47,425 Europeans in French West Africa. Sons of African women, born in or out of wedlock, have been sent to France for an education by their French fathers, but Eboué’s statement of policy devotes considerable attention to those in French Equatorial Africa whose fathers have not recognized or provided for them.

It is sometimes believed that there is no discrimination against Africans in French colonies because Negroes have risen to high positions. Many of these have been West Indians and the outstanding example, Félix Eboué, former Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, was born in French Guiana. Racial ties have not prevented such individuals from identifying themselves with the French rather than the Africans, as can be seen from Eboué’s words, “We shall not ensure their happiness by applying to them the principles of the French Revolution, which is our Revolution.” As Siegel points out, the policy outlined by Eboué calls for teaching the Africans “their political, economic, and social place, which in every case is one of inferiority and subordination to their French masters.”

The position of African “subjects” who constitute 99 percent of the population cannot be judged by that of New World Negroes or African “citizens.” The latter also enjoy a superior position and a few like M. Diagne, the former Senegal Deputy, have risen very high. Nevertheless the unequal salaries of Africans and Europeans was one issue on which at least as early as 1928 chiefs and citizens in the Colonial Council of Senegal united against the government. Buell states, “While the French have accepted the ‘equality’ doctrine, they have shown no intention of turning over the country to the blacks, nor even of associating the blacks upon a basis of equality with the Europeans in the administration of the country. There are fewer natives in the administration in French than in British colonies.” The 1944 Brazzaville conference calls for an increased Africanization of the administrative service, and defines the future relationship between Africans and Europeans as follows:
Our entire colonial policy will be based upon the respect and the progress of the native society, and we shall have to accept fully and absolutely the demands and consequences implied by this principle. The natives may not be treated as devoid of human dignity, they can be subjected neither to eviction nor to exploitation. However, the colonies are destined, by their very nature, to be inhabited jointly by both Europeans and natives. Although our policy must be subordinated to the full development of the local races, we must also give European activity the place to which it is entitled.

The prerequisite for the progress of the African continent is the development of the native populations. The activity of the Europeans and other non-Africans in the colonial territories of Africa must conform to this condition.

On the other hand, this progress of the African continent, as it is being contemplated, cannot be achieved in the near future without the collaboration of non-African persons and enterprises to a much greater extent and in greater proportion than at the present time. Consequently, all necessary talent, ability and services will be duly enlisted and utilized. . . .

All the various trades must gradually be taken over by the natives. The Governors-General and the Governors of the territories shall establish, within a brief period, an inventory of the enterprises which will be opened progressively to the natives.

Comparison between British and French relations with Africans are often misleading. There have been no special schools for the few British children; at the last census there were only forty European and American children under fifteen in all Nigeria. British women do not customarily work in stores or restaurants in West Africa, and a part of the difference is due to British reserve, which may express itself in lack of warmth in social and personal relations even among themselves. Africans, furthermore, are seldom seen in French cafés in Abidjan and Douala. Although there is more fraternizing and less racial discrimination in French than British colonies, the differences are less marked than they appear on the surface.

Regardless of policies in other parts of British Africa, as far as West Africa is concerned statements that Africans cannot travel first class, or that British never eat, dance, or sleep with Africans are untrue. Railways, buses, theaters, restaurants, hotels, and other public places are open to Africans and Europeans alike. The refusal of
the Greek manager to accommodate an African in the Bristol Hotel in Lagos in 1947 brought protests in the African press, questions in the House of Commons, and official condemnation from the Governor of Nigeria. Except during the war, when automobiles were scarce, however, the British seldom found it necessary to travel with Africans on the buses in Lagos and Accra. For economic reasons Africans rarely patronize European hotels or restaurants, and seldom pay for the higher-priced seats occupied by Europeans at the motion picture theaters. Africans likewise travel third class much more often than second or first. The explanation for this may be found in the differential between first class and third class railway fares which, for example, in Nigeria are 4d. as against ¼d. a mile, respectively.

There is little more racial discrimination in British West Africa than in the northern United States, but its existence cannot be denied. There are separate latrines, hospitals, and cemeteries for Europeans and separate residential areas in the larger cities. The official Nigerian policy, as announced by the Governor in 1947, is to end discrimination in European hospitals and residential reservations. There are separate hospital beds for Europeans in French West Africa and separate European hospitals in the Belgian Congo. Separate residential areas, usually justified on the grounds of health, are also found in French and Belgian colonies and presumably in the Portuguese and Spanish colonies as well.

Cafés, restaurants, and bars are important in the social life of the French and Belgian colonies, but British entertaining is done at home or at the club, the traditional center of social life in the British colonies. The “European” club is a private institution, open only to members and their guests. The exclusion of Africans is not comparable to the refusal of American restaurants to serve Negroes, but discrimination is evident in the absence of African members and African guests. In Lagos and Accra, clubs with mixed membership have been established to promote better understanding between Europeans and Africans.

Public dances which were popular with the British troops during the war are also attended by Africans and Europeans in Glover Memorial Hall in Lagos and King George V Hall in Accra. These functions are not frequently attended by the British at the top
of the social scale, but the entire European community, from the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti down, traditionally attends an annual mixed dance in Kumasi. Africans are also invited to some of the garden parties and other large functions given by British officials and they may be included in small dinner parties on lower social levels.

In the larger centers where clubs and the presence of European women make an active social life possible, there is generally less contact than in towns where a few Europeans are isolated. Social contacts also more frequently involve individuals at the lower end of the European and at the top of the African social scales than they do those at the opposite ends. The differences between individuals within the British community are even more pronounced than those between the British as a group and the French. At the higher levels of British society social contacts with Africans are often motivated by political considerations, rather than a desire for closer social relations or personal friendship. British and African social activities are effectively separated, but by economic factors and individual preference and personal invitation, and not by barring Africans from public places.

Although the number of mulattoes in British West Africa is very small, African mistresses are common. Some British have even expressed the belief that all single men, as well as some married men whose wives are with them on the coast, keep mistresses or visit African prostitutes. The main difference between the British and the French or Portuguese in this respect is that the British do not carry on such relationships openly. The few individuals who make no attempt to conceal them become the subject of gossip and are ostracized by most of the British community, while a man whose mistress may pass as the wife of his cook is still accepted socially as long as this arrangement is not a matter of common gossip. British men consider it bad taste for these relationships to be called to the attention of British women, who in turn pretend to ignore them. Their French neighbors regard such niceties with a certain amusement. In some cases children and mistresses are provided for by inheritance, but since these unions have no legal status even when they are permanent, such arrangements are on an individual basis. As might be expected from the pattern of secrecy imposed on
British-African matings, legal marriages between British men and African women are unusual, but they do occur.

Another distinction between the British and French colonizing methods is that while the former have without intent created a larger and better educated “élite” than the latter have been able to do through deliberate policy, they have not treated them as an élite. British policy has been directed toward the welfare of the mass of illiterate Africans, and has looked upon the educated Africans with suspicion. As a result they have alienated the most articulate group, while the French have maintained its loyalty. Since the only African opinions which reach America and Europe are those of this minority group, judgments of colonial policies have frequently been distorted.

When the African trade unions criticized the Nigerian Government for paying higher allowances to some 93 Nigerians who held “superior posts” in 1945, the government replied that it was a “cardinal point of Government policy to appoint Africans to superior posts and to apply to such posts conditions of service similar to those attached to European posts. Had the Government not extended the payment of local allowances to such posts, . . . Government would have laid itself open, with some justification, to a charge of discrimination.” But most Africans in government service still received much less than Europeans. The Nigeria Civil Servant, as quoted in The Eastern Nigerian Guardian, shows 1,631 European employees in 1944 earning £1,077,390 as against 14,866 Africans earning £988,640.

Aside from the educated élite which will be discussed later, the attitudes of the mass of the African population do not appear to be significantly affected by the varying treatment they receive from Europeans. There is no real evidence that the social aloofness of the British in West Africa results in less loyalty or devotion, on the one hand, or that it brings greater respect, as some British officials believe, on the other. From the large number of laborers from Portuguese colonies who remain in the Union of South Africa, where racial discrimination is undisguised, it can be seen that social equality may not be regarded by Africans as the most important consideration.

The mass of Africans look up to Europeans as superiors, fear
them for the military strength of their governments, and respect them for the technological accomplishments of Western civilization. There have been few native revolts, and violence against Europeans is rare except in the port towns in connection with robbery. There are few parts of the African bush where it is not safe for a European to walk at night alone and unarmed, and there was no violence even when feelings ran high during the Gold Coast cocoa strike.

Where colonial rule is not oppressive, the lives of millions of Africans in small villages are almost unaffected by the acts of government. They pay taxes, buy and use European goods, and may produce goods for export; some member of the family may even work for Europeans in the mines or on the coast. But they may see a European only once a week or perhaps once a year, and they have little knowledge of what policies are being formulated in the capital. To them the price of peanuts or palm kernels and the cost of kerosene or cloth have more importance than questions which lie within the government’s power to decide. They may be aware of the differences between their own country and its neighbors—in taxation, military recruitment, wages and prices, land and labor policies, racial discrimination, and educational opportunities—but they would find grievances against whatever foreign power ruled them. Few Africans have the loyalty and devotion to their rulers that is sometimes attributed to them.

A Yoruba man in one of the important towns in the cocoa belt of Nigeria once explained that his people were thankful to the British for three things. First, they had suppressed the slave trade and ended slave raiding, so that it was safe to travel about the country and go to the farm at night without fear of being captured. Second, they had built a reservoir and installed water works in the town, so that people were no longer killed in fights for water during the dry season. Third, they had imported tin for roofs, so that it was no longer necessary to thatch the houses every year.

Personal acquaintance has taught some Africans that all Europeans have their foibles and are not above making mistakes. Personal idiosyncrasies often become crystallized in nicknames which spread rapidly and may be remembered after the proper name has
been forgotten. Since they are usually uncomplimentary, they are seldom known to their owners. Africans may also swear at passing Europeans in English or French after they are out of earshot or when it is certain that they will not stop, or they may insult them in an African language which the European does not understand. Still more subtle and still safer is the practice of addressing Europeans with conventional African greetings or with complimentary terms, such as “My master,” while modifying the intonation so as to change the greeting to a taunt or sneer. Traditional songs of defiance and derision are composed about some Europeans, who may remain unaware of the meaning behind a melody which is being hummed. Verbal reprisals of this sort are frequently directed against Europeans in general and may be employed when the European is a complete stranger and too ignorant of African ways to take offense. In the areas where there has been the greatest contact, they are more commonly and more openly used.

Personal contact with Europeans has also taught Africans that in many ways Europeans are more naïve and easier to deceive than members of their own group. Regardless of social rank or official position, Europeans are to a large extent at the mercy of their African servants and assistants. That there is so little actual dishonesty under the circumstances is surprising. The European who regards Africans as simple and childlike puts himself at a further disadvantage. This belief is sometimes deliberately cultivated by African employees, who find in it an easy excuse for the evasion of responsibility.

The Yoruba of Nigeria, who disapprove of all marriages outside their own group, make no exception for sexual relations with Europeans. In one interesting case a Yoruba who had married a British woman while attending an English university was disowned by his father when he returned to Africa. The Yoruba, who employ all the forms of verbal reprisal mentioned, have the reputation in British circles of being impudent. Yoruba clerks sometimes refuse to carry out orders of their European employers and in other ways behave in a manner which the British regard as insolent. A second form of behavior is to be found among the Hausa of northern Nigeria, who are outwardly ingratiating and obsequious, although
they are said to maintain their personal pride and self-respect. Most British prefer the Hausa to the Yoruba, Ibo, and other southern Nigerians.

The Ibo come closest to a pattern of true racial equality in their dealings with Europeans. Even in their traditional role of "house boys" they treat their European masters much as a European servant would, receiving instructions politely and without insolence, but not hesitating to raise reasonable objections. On the other hand they may ignore the commands of a European to whom they have no obligations. Regardless of tribal differences, the British like and feel more at ease with the older Africans who have had the least contact with Europeans, and they are least adept in dealing with the younger acculturated group. A member of the Nigerian Secretariat has been quoted as asking, "Why is it that we do so well with primitive people, but once they become educated, we seem to fail?"

**Acculturation**

Acculturation has been taking place in West Africa for centuries. Islam is believed to have reached the Sudan area of northern French and British West Africa more than 1,000 years ago. The earlier civilizations of Byzantium, Rome, and Egypt may also have influenced West Africa, and may themselves have been influenced by African cultures in return. Disregarding these contacts across the Sahara, the possible circumnavigation of Africa by the Phoenicians in the seventh century B.C., the Carthaginian contacts in the sixth century B.C., and the unsubstantiated French claims to have reached the Gold Coast in the fourteenth century A.D., West Africa has been in contact with Europe for 500 years.

In 1441 Portuguese explorers marketed African gold and slaves in Lisbon; by 1472 they had reached southern Nigeria. After Columbus discovered America, the early interest in gold, ivory, pepper, and precious woods faded in the face of the slave trade, which reached its peak in the early nineteenth century. The slave trade left its unmistakable mark on both Africa and the New World, where the influence of the Yoruba, the Dahomeans, the Ashanti, and some Congo tribes is still evident, particularly in Brazil, Cuba, and Dutch Guiana. In the latter nineteenth century, trade in palm
oil and other products gradually replaced the traffic in human beings, and the present political boundaries were established. In 1870 90–95 percent of West and Central Africa was still independent of European control, but by the end of the century all except Liberia had been acquired by foreign powers.

From the first arrival of Portuguese explorers, Africans have been eager to obtain goods of European manufacture. Trade, in which Africans were already experienced, developed rapidly. Exports, including slaves, grew steadily to pay for the increasing imports for African use, which today range from cheap perfumes and beads to automobiles, refrigerators, and tractors. The desire for cloth, kerosene, lamps, hardware, bicycles, and other European merchandise is still the real incentive which causes Africans voluntarily to abandon subsistence farming for production of export commodities or to enter employment as wage laborers. When imports were cut off from French West Africa during the war, there was unrest and production dropped. In British West Africa cloth, soap, and cigarettes were easier to obtain than in England, because the British cut their own rations so that the production of strategic African materials might not suffer.

Two American crops, cocoa and peanuts, have become major export commodities. Two others, maize and cassava, have become of fundamental importance in the subsistence economy. In addition, Hevea rubber, tobacco, American varieties of cotton, pineapples, avocados, papaya and other plants of American origin have become a part of the African economic picture. Even in the field of material culture, Africans have been selective in their acceptance of European culture. Although textiles constitute one of the most important imports, West Africans refuse to buy if cloth is shoddy or colors fade or run, and they are discriminating in their choice of color and design. The Gold Coast Handbook advises traders that “an acquaintance with local tastes is desirable before shipping. Tastes for patterns and colours vary in different districts, and goods which obtain a ready sale in some districts are useless in others.”

European contact has also affected African religion, social organization and political institutions, as has been indicated, but in these fields European culture has had less appeal to Africans. Even outside the areas of Islamic influence, true conversions to Protes-
tantism and Catholicism have not occurred on a large scale. Missionary attempts to modify marriage have resulted either in apathy or antagonism. Western medicine has been accepted for the treatment of smallpox and a few other diseases, but as one educated African explained, it still has much to learn about tropical diseases. For these, for childbirth, for good luck, for success in business, court trials and the other important aspects of life in which Western medicine does not pretend competence, Africans still use the charms and medicines of their forefathers and make sacrifices recommended by their diviners. Pidgin languages, including Afro-English and Afro-French dialects, have become important as lingua franca along the coast. These are basically European in vocabulary and African in grammar and idiom.

The British policy of cultural self-determination has permitted Africans to continue to live by their own laws and customs, where these were not "repugnant to morality or justice," to be governed by their traditional chiefs and administrative organizations, and to use and learn to read and write their own languages in school. The British attitude, rather than being one of respect for African traditions as it has often been described, is more accurately one of tolerance of African customs and a respect for the African's right to choose his own way of life. Their hope is that the best and most useful features of African and European culture will be incorporated into a new pattern suited to the environment and to the people under present-day conditions, and they have felt that this can best be accomplished through slow and gradual change.

Cultural self-determination, however, like indirect rule or the use of African languages in school or the adaptation of education to African needs, can be used to keep Africans from achieving equality and independence, although none of these are sinister per se. Speedy acculturation and rapid education are opposed both by those who are sincerely apprehensive of the undesirable consequences of too rapid change, and by those who wish no change at all in the African's present position. Policies based on a respect for the African's right to develop his own institutions, suited to his own needs, may be identical with those whose basis is a belief that Africans are racially inferior and incapable of assimilating European culture.
At the other extreme, the French policy of assimilation, which grew out of the French Revolution’s goals of *égalité* and *fraternité*, was a direct denial of the African’s liberty of self-expression. It was a form of “cultural imperialism” which tried to impose French culture upon Africans without any reference to their desires. Delafosse, the French anthropologist, wrote in 1921 that the French tyrannically suppressed native institutions in the name of racial equality, acting as inhumanely as those who preached racial superiority. “We believe,” he eloquently protested, that human societies, even though established outside of our microcosm, and upon a basis of which we are ignorant, and which we are often incapable of understanding, should not be suppressed from the earth by the mere will of another society, whatever it may be, and that we have no right either to reduce them to slavery or to impose upon them laws and customs which they reject, which have not been fitted to them, and the forced adoption of which may lead them to death.  

For both assimilation and association the retention of African customs was a measure of failure. But the policy of association, in actual practice, permitted most Africans to live their lives almost undisturbed; in theory their customs were expected to change more slowly. Eboué’s policy, based on French experience in Morocco, resembles cultural self-determination. Nevertheless the emphasis in French policy remains chiefly on political institutions, and their hope is still for the rapid spread of Christianity and French culture, and the “modernization” of African customs. The 1944 Brazzaville conference did not mention “respect” for African religion and showed little for bride wealth and African marriage. “As regards more particularly large-scale polygamy, it is indispensable that this scourge of Continental Africa be resisted by the Administrators with all the means at their disposal.”

Belgian policy, although following the British in some respects, has a character all its own. Africans are regarded as one of the Congo’s most valuable economic resources.  

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14 The Government of the Belgian Congo comments: “This statement, made by superficial observers, and the conclusions drawn from it are absolutely incorrect. It does not correspond at all with Belgian colonial policy or its philosophy, which considers the native above everything, not as an economic value but as a human value. It is in the idea of respect for the human individual that one must find the basis of Belgian policy in the Congo. If this policy of considering the native first
manpower, operating at full efficiency, is needed to exploit the mineral wealth and other natural resources. Accordingly the Belgians have provided the best medical facilities and made certain that African wage laborers receive good food, good housing, and enough education to fit them for European employment. In several of the major economic enterprises government and business are partners in the exploitation of the natural resources. Cultural self-determination, as it is practiced in the Congo, seems to have been adopted as a practical means of avoiding native discontent with little emphasis on eventual African self-government.

Regardless of these variations in policy, there is no area where African customs have either remained unchanged or completely disappeared. In some areas the early eagerness to adopt European ways is already passing. In some cities the Yoruba, who have constituted the white-collar workers of Nigeria for almost a century, passed through this phase some time ago. The white suits, white shoes, and white sun helmets in which the young educated men of Ife posed for a photograph about 1920 had been put away by 1937, together with their morning suits and dinner jackets, and some of the same men had returned to African wrap-around cloths. Most Nigerian office workers wear shirts and shorts or trousers at work, putting on their African clothes when they return home. In 1947 the nationalists proposed that they wear African clothes to work, as the Hausa generally do. A similar movement in the thirties renounced all European merchandise which could not be produced locally by Nigerians; it did not gain wide or lasting sup-

as an economic asset is that of certain large companies, it is not that of the government.

"In other words, the policy of the Government of the Belgian Congo is very largely progressive, and aims at improving the situation of the natives both as wage laborers and as farmers. Social legislation is well developed. The wage laborer is protected in the case of industrial accidents and occupational diseases; a family allowance is given him; and salaries and working conditions are supervised by Government. Since labor unions have been organized, there have been practically no more strikes. Native associations have been recognized and are functioning satisfactorily. For the farmers the government is creating a financially well-endowed Welfare Fund to develop agriculture, hygiene and education among rural populations by improving individual and group health, native techniques and the utilization of labor, the marketing of products, the purchase of goods necessary to the community, and to raise the moral and intellectual level of the masses. These projects are in addition to the already considerable accomplishments of the government services. Natives participate directly in many administrative bodies, notably in the Conseils de Province and the Conseil de Gouvernement."
port, but its slogan, "Back to the Land," is still to be seen in Lagos.

As forms of protest, nativistic religious movements have been of minor importance compared with political parties, labor unions, and newspapers. In 1914 a Nigerian who called himself the Second Elijah led a nativistic revival in the Niger Delta which gained thousands of followers. He denounced witchcraft, immorality, and European gin, and later the Europeans who produced the gin as well. He proclaimed that Europeans were not really children of God; had they been so they would not have had to build a bridge across the Niger, for the waters would have parted for them as they did for the children of Israel. Elijah was finally arrested for sedition, but out of his movement grew the Delta Church. Other leaders of this type have arisen in Nigeria, including one whose amplifiers and loudspeakers were confiscated during the war, but their influence has been localized.

A similar movement was led by the prophet Simon Kibangu, a carpenter in the Congo who had become a Baptist. In 1921 he was directed in a dream to work miracles, raising the dead and commanding the lame and the blind to be healed in the name of Christ. As his fame spread, European medicines were thrown away and African charms and shrines were destroyed. Drumming and dancing were tabooed, and polygynous chiefs accepted monogamy when they were baptized. His followers said they were tired of giving contributions to Europeans and set up their own schools and churches, creating a demand for hymn books and Bibles which for some time could not be satisfied. Wage laborers left their work to be cured by the prophet. Native farms were deserted to such an extent that the government feared it might have to close the main railways, because its African employees could not obtain food. When Wednesday was declared the day of rest, European commerce was further disorganized.

Minor prophets, said to have been influenced by "radicals" from British West Africa, gave Kibangu's movement an anti-European appearance. Among the prophecies ascribed to them were that all white men would be killed by fire from heaven on October 21, 1921, and that the Congo Africans would be delivered from white oppression by American Negroes or, alternatively, by the second coming of Christ. Arrested in June, Kibangu escaped through
another “miracle.” Martial law was imposed on the Africans, and the European community lived in fear until Kibangu and his followers were rearrested in September. A military court imposed the death penalty on Kibangu, but this was commuted to life imprisonment. Nine other prophets received life sentences, others shorter terms, and about a hundred followers were exiled to other parts of the Congo.

In the Ivory Coast in 1914 William Wade Harris, a Liberian, proclaimed one Savior, one God, and the Bible as His book. He preached the dignity of labor and obedience to authority, denouncing alcohol, robbery, and African religious beliefs. Through his influence African shrines were destroyed and African priests converted or driven away. His followers, according to the French, spread rumors that the whites were about to leave and that taxes would be reduced. They were arrested and Harris was sent back to Liberia. Eleven years later the Wesleyans assumed responsibility for the churches of the “Harris Christians,” who still numbered over 30,000. All of these movements were essentially puritanical and Christian in character, denouncing traditional African beliefs and customs. Their alleged anti-white aspects were secondary and it is difficult to interpret them as reactions against European culture or protests against colonial rule.

Strikes, boycotts, and political action have become increasingly important. Under difficult conditions, Nigerian civil servants carried out a successful strike against the government in wartime, holding up exports of strategic materials and costing the British administration prestige. Eventually they won a 50 percent increase in wages, although the 1945 strike was renounced by the former union leaders and declared illegal by the government. From the point of view of acculturation, an interesting note is that masses of union members took an African oath, on the Earth, not to abandon the strike. Traditional oaths were also taken during the 1937–38 cocoa “hold-up” not to sell cocoa or buy European merchandise.

In contrast to the government’s policy during this strike, has been the appointment of government officials in British West Africa and elsewhere throughout the Empire, whose duty it is to organize and promote the growth of African trade unions. The labor movement in British West Africa antedates these appointments and one
of the tasks of the officials has been that of welding numerous small unions into large and more effective organizations. Union memberships number about 80,000 in Nigeria and 15,000 in the Gold Coast. The number of industrial wage earners is still less than 5 percent of the population, but it is increasing, and the development of a sound labor movement at this time will benefit Africans in the future.

**Nationalistic Movements**

The 1945 strike and others in Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone, and the cocoa “hold-ups” and boycotts in 1937–38 and 1930–31 show the increasing effectiveness of European economic techniques in African hands. Strikes were also reported from the Congo during the war, but leadership in economic and political action clearly rests with the nationalist movement in British West Africa. This fact cannot be explained in terms of greater oppression or exploitation by the British; if anything the reverse is the case. Nor are there grounds for regarding Portuguese or Spanish rule as more enlightened because nationalist movements have failed to develop in their colonies. It appears, rather, to be the result of better education, plus the rejection of the educated “élite.” In part the development of a nationalist movement, in this case at least, is a measure of good—not bad—colonial policy.

Within British West Africa, political leadership passed from Sierra Leone to the Gold Coast in the thirties, and to Nigeria in the forties. Developments in Nigeria today, which are closely followed by the unions and political leaders in Accra and Freetown, set the pattern for the whole of British West Africa, and perhaps in time will determine the course of events in all West and Central Africa. Reorganizations, changing names, and differences in points of view of Nigerian trade unions, political parties, and political leaders, important as these are on the local scene, only conceal a fundamental unity in objectives.

Influencing all these groups is Nnamdi Azikiwe, or “Zik” as he is called, the most important leader in West and Central Africa. Zik, an Ibo who was born in 1904, studied in the United States for ten years, principally at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania. In 1934 he returned to West Africa to serve as editor of the *African*
Morning Post at Accra until he was convicted of sedition, a charge from which he was later cleared in a higher court. Zik then went to Lagos where he established Zik’s Press and began to publish the West African Pilot in 1937. Later he added The Eastern Nigeria Guardian of Port Harcourt, The Southern Nigeria Defender of Warri, The Nigerian Spokesman of Onitsha, and The Daily Comet of Lagos.

Early in the 1945 strike the government suspended publication of the Pilot and Comet, but Zik’s editorials and coverage of the strike were distributed to the Lagos subscribers by the Guardian, published by the Port Harcourt staff but printed on the Pilot’s press. The initial reaction that Zik was finally to receive a lesson which many British felt he deserved gave way to a feeling that his resourcefulness had placed the government in an embarrassing position. British prestige was further decreased among Africans, and Zik’s personal position further enhanced, by his unsubstantiated claims of a government plot against his life during the strike.

These incidents and the assertions in West Africa, America, and England that freedom of the press had ended in Nigeria, obscure the previous British record, whose tolerance can only be appreciated by examining the outspoken criticisms of British rule which have appeared almost daily in the African papers in Nigeria, Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone. Only one example, from the Ashanti Pioneer in Kumasi, may be cited here.

NIGERIA EXPLODES!
The Lagos Section of the Nigerian Governmental and Municipal technical workers are on strike! So read the B.B.C. news on Monday, July 2, 1945.

Yes, the Nigerians are learning to talk in the language that the Occident understands—economically speaking. And the strike is hinged on wages!

To hell with wages in the Colonial World! No one who has been observing, intelligently, the Nigerian renaissance in Trade Unionism and National Consciousness could have predicted otherwise.

And the storm has broken. And it has been sweeping on since June 22, 1945! And it continues. And the strikers are relentless! And the Government procrastinates. And the explosion reverberates!
It will be echoed, far and wide—in the hearts of exploited millions in the Colonial World, in India, in South Africa and elsewhere, where impudent, self-styled Master Races perpetrate Man’s economic Inhumanity to Man!

Only in British territories have such comments been permitted in African newspapers.

Zik’s papers have consistently carried on an outspoken campaign against social and economic discrimination against Africans, attacking the marked differences in salaries and allowances received by Africans and Europeans in government service, even when both hold the same degree from British universities, and charging that there is a ceiling beyond which Africans cannot hope to advance. In reply, the government has pointed to Africans serving as judges in the Supreme Court, as administrative officers, and in other “superior posts” in government. The British have blamed Zik for injecting the race question into West African politics, as a result of his education in the United States; others point out that Zik cannot be held responsible for developments in Freetown, where anti-white sentiments are most openly expressed, prior to his return to Africa.

“Zikism,” as the program of Zik and his followers has been called, has among its main points increased education, Africanization of the civil services, the industrialization of Africa, and self-government. It criticizes the slow rate of progress toward these goals and the deviations from official policy, rather than the professed objectives of the British in Nigeria. Russia, England, America, and the French Revolution are studied by the educated group, but the greatest influence on the nationalist movement is the example of India, after which the proposed return to native dress and the recent boycott of the Legislative Council have been patterned. Recently Zik’s papers have featured crimes of violence, prostitution, and economic inequalities in England in answer to the argument that Nigerians require the civilized guidance of Britain until they are ready for self-rule.

Officially “Zikism” emphasizes the inherent values in African culture and urges their retention in the pattern of the future. Actually many of the educated Africans look down upon the “old-
fashioned” and “superstitious” ways of their fathers, though as a group they regard this condescending attitude as wrong. They are also aware of the difficulties of walking the tightrope between European and African ways of life. The desirable features of European cultures have been clearly defined, but references to African traditions which should be retained are vague. African art, music, and folklore, which have prestige in European eyes, are usually mentioned.

Even in these fields “African art” may not be the traditional African forms, but any art done by Africans. More interest is shown in paintings and in carvings which combine African and European techniques and conceptions than in African masks and figurines. The musical emphasis is on current popular songs, or jazz and other European music, rather than the excellent music of the religious ceremonies, and the same is true of the dance. Aside from proverbs and the traditional histories of various cities, educated writers have largely neglected traditional folklore. Essays and poems are composed, while the vast wealth of African folk tales, for example, remains unrecorded. In passing it is worth mentioning that British policy, which also stands for the encouragement of African art, has stimulated the use of European techniques, has assisted in finding markets for adapted forms and useful objects such as book ends, purses, and cushions, but attempts only to preserve masks and other traditional objects with the exception of Benin bronze casting. The point is not whether these new forms are good or bad, but that the creation of those which made African art famous is largely neglected.

Through his newspapers Zik has spread his political philosophy and won the following of the educated youth of Nigeria. His ideas have also spread by word of mouth among the illiterate Africans, but the true extent of his influence is unknown. Zik and the other political leaders claim to speak for Nigeria as a whole, while the government maintains that they represent few outside the educated minority. Since no impartial attempt has been made to determine the extent of their support, these claims cannot be evaluated. They were not settled by the decisive victory during the 1947 Legislative Council election under the new constitution, because this was limited to Lagos and Calabar and also because of the small number
of qualified voters. Zik and two other candidates of a party affiliated with the "N.C.N.C." (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons) were elected as representatives for Lagos, a city of more than 200,000. Zik received the support of two-thirds of all registered voters, but this was only 3,573 votes out of a possible 5,379. Having run for election to prevent "persons who have little backing" from representing Lagos, the three representatives temporarily boycotted the Legislative Council in protest against the new constitution.

Relationships between government and the nationalists have deteriorated steadily since the 1945 strike. The unions have been warned that in the event of another general strike, less leniency will be shown to workers as regards reinstatement and back pay. A new labor law, described as anti-strike legislation, has been enacted, but several localized strikes have occurred, including miners in the tin fields and a strike of United Africa Company employees in Burutu during which government police fired into a crowd of workers in June, 1947, wounding two or three Africans. Talk of a strike of teachers for higher pay was in the air for almost a year.

The Nigerian Government has been criticized in the British press for having permitted itself to be falsely accused in Zik's papers, and the Governor and the British press have charged the Nigerian press with "irresponsibility." Several members of Zik's staff have been sued for libel, and the editor of the Comet was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment in 1947 for having suggested that police should aim to miss when ordered to fire on Africans. The Nigerian Government has continued a wartime propaganda publication to offset Zik's influence, and it has been reported that the London Daily Mirror plans to establish a paper in Nigeria for the same purpose.

While the government has adopted a sterner position, the nationalists have shown increased determination. In his speech following his election as President of the N.C.N.C., Zik said:

Under my leadership, you should expect plain speaking and the natural consequences. Today I might be with you, but that is no guarantee that I would not be in jail or in exile or in the death-house tomorrow. You must be prepared to suffer heavy blows from the enemy; you must be prepared to make sacrifices in order to guarantee for Nigeria a nobler heritage. In other words, we are entering a new era in the political his-
tory of Nigeria, as from today, under my leadership, and you must be prepared for the worst.

Following their boycott of the Legislative Council in 1947, the N.C.N.C. delegates visited England to present their case to the British people and to the Colonial Office. Failing to receive any satisfaction, Zik announced, “We are the last delegation that will come to Britain from Nigeria and the Cameroons. We will beg no more.” Zik’s influence is reported to have declined after his unsuccessful mission, and the possibility of a split in his following between the Ibo extremists and the Yoruba moderates has been mentioned.

One of the serious problems the nationalists are facing arises out of the mutual suspicion and distrust with which the ethnic groups of Nigeria now tend to regard each other. Of the three which account for over half the population, the Ibo and the Yoruba have been active in the nationalist movement, but the Hausa and many of the smaller groups have remained largely outside. Tribal loyalties and cultural and linguistic ties have been the foundation of the support of political leaders in the past, but may prevent colony-wide solidarity. The nationalists are aware of the importance of unity, but unless it can actually be achieved Nigeria, like India, may be split on cultural and religious lines.

Even more important as a basis for a strong nationalist movement is unity between the small “educated” minority and the “uneducated” Africans, with whom the government contends the N.C.N.C. has lost touch. This will require more than lip service toward the value of African culture. If there is not to be disillusionment with the educated group as leaders, it must mean an end of condescension toward traditional African customs, and a sincere and studied attempt to represent the interests of the majority, and not only the wage laborers and the élite. What happens in other colonies will depend in large part on the success or failure of the nationalist movement in Nigeria.

The most recent outbreak in Accra may possibly provide a common rallying point sufficient to shift the nationalist leadership back again to the Gold Coast. On February 28, 1948, rioting in Accra ended with 22 or more Africans dead and over 200 wounded, after which two sloops were summoned from South Africa, troops
were flown in from Nigeria and others were held in readiness at Gibraltar, and a censorship "more rigid than in wartime" was imposed. The outbreak apparently resulted from two independent causes, according to the report in *The Economist*. A.W.A.M. (Association of West African Merchants) stores had previously been boycotted by Africans in protest against high prices and alleged favoritism to European customers. After negotiations in which a 33 1/3 percent reduction in prices is said to have been promised by A.W.A.M., the boycott was called off. On February 28, Africans crowded the stores to buy goods they had gone without, but they discovered that many items were not available, that few prices had been reduced, and that some prices had been raised. Crowds gathered in the street to voice their protests.

On the same day a procession of African ex-servicemen was marching to the Governor's residence to present a petition. Having served in Burma and on other fronts, they had had little success in finding civilian employment in jobs for which they had been trained during military service. They had obtained previous permission to present their petition and were proceeding, unarmed and in an orderly fashion, when their right to enter the Governor's grounds was questioned by a police guard. In the excitement of the argument that followed, an ex-serviceman was shot and killed. Aghast, his companions raised their voices in bitter protest, and in fright the police dispersed them with tear-gas. Still complaining, the veterans returned to the center of Accra, where their indignation mingled with that of the frustrated shoppers. Wholesale looting and violent rioting followed, which was quelled by the police only after bloodshed. A general strike was ordered by the Trade Union Congress of the Gold Coast, following the arrest of six of the veterans and official charges of Communist incitement of the outbreak.

Present Outlook

Both the British and the French are committed to increased educational programs stressing mass education, and expansion is already apparent. The French plans aiming at universal compulsory education were drawn up in conferences at Dakar and Brazzaville in 1944. They involve a proposed expansion of educational facilities
over forty years in French Equatorial Africa until government expenditures in 1984 are 14 times what they were in 1944, and over thirty years in French Cameroons until government expenditures are 72 times their amount in 1938, and in French West Africa until there are 25 times as many classes and pupils as there were in 1945.

British plans have been outlined in two White Papers prepared by Parliamentary Commissions. One calls for the development of university education in West Africa. The other calls for mass education and the rapid elimination of illiteracy (at present about 95 percent); it envisages the education of both children and adults and is not conceived as replacing present educational programs. University and mass education are related because of the present shortage of trained teachers. A University of Nigeria is to be established at Ibadan, and a Gold Coast University College is to be provided by extending the functions of Achimota.

The success of these constructive programs will depend on the measures taken to overcome the shortage of teachers and to solve the problem of finance. The French conferences recognized the necessity of subsidies from France. In its Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945, Britain has already reversed its long-standing policy that each colony must be self-sufficient. Under its ten year development plan (1946–56), Nigeria’s educational budget will be increased by about 50 percent. This should make real improvement possible, but it is insufficient to achieve the objectives of the White Papers or to solve Nigeria’s educational problem.

The British plan for mass education has a great deal to recommend it, although it may be misinterpreted because the average standard of education would be lowered by teaching greater numbers for shorter periods. Reading and writing, taught in African languages, can be achieved without undermining African cultures, destroying traditional sanctions of behavior, or necessarily resulting in sudden acculturation. Until mass literacy is achieved, Africans will not be able to follow the affairs of their country adequately, express and

15 Of the £55,000,000 contemplated for Nigeria’s development plan, £15,000,000 will come from Nigerian revenues, £17,000,000 from loans, and £23,000,000 from British revenues under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Of this total, £7,673,000 or $30,692,000 a year is allocated to education, plus whatever additional amounts Britain may spend on higher education in Nigeria.
enforce public opinion, or protect themselves from exploitation by local or foreign interests. The African press is capable of reaching almost the entire population in their own languages, if they could read and if circulation were large enough. Mass literacy is essential to political progress. It will make it possible for the true majority to make its will known and for government to present its case to the population, but it may serve to increase the power of Zik and any other political leaders who may follow him. Both the British and French proposals can only mean decreasing the period of political dependency, and in view of their past policies, there seems adequate justification for waiting to see what is actually done instead of accepting the paper plans at face value.

None of the governments, however, should, for long, maintain their educational programs at the present low level, and medical and other social services must also increase. A recent trend in education which will continue to grow is the development of African-financed and African-directed schools in British West Africa. The nationalists are already calling for a Nigerian university, apart from that projected by government.

As the nationalist movement spreads, so will racial consciousness. Indeed, it is apparent that race is already becoming a real point of tension. Africans are pressing, with increasing success, for the Africanization of colonial civil service, and both the British and French are committed to more rapid progress in this direction. It seems too late for the British to win the allegiance of the African élite, as the French have, by turning over to them the role of ruling other Africans.

The United Africa Company is also employing increasing numbers of Africans in managerial positions, and during the war it announced its intentions of shifting from retail to wholesale trade, in which African merchants would have a more important position. Among educated Africans there is a growing recognition of the fact that capital is necessary to the development of African-owned enterprise, and that the share of the African laborer is small compared to that of the investor. African-owned business enterprises are due to increase.

A significant recent development was the inauguration in 1946 of a series of international conferences to discuss problems common
to the territories of West and Central Africa. A French-Anglo-
Belgian conference on public health was attended by observers
from Liberia and Portuguese Guinea, and Anglo-French represent­
atives have discussed veterinary and communication problems. Be­
tween 1947 and 1950 eight French-Anglo-Belgian conferences to
which other powers will be invited have been planned to discuss
agriculture and soil conservation, rural economy, forestry, nutri­
tion, labor, education, health and problems of rinderpest, trypa-
nosomiasis and the tsetse fly. These attempts to solve common
economic and social problems jointly and to coordinate some
aspects of the technical services may pave the way for effective ap­
proaches to problems which do not end at colonial boundaries and
which cannot be solved by any one colony alone. They may also,
conceivably, lead to a gradual disappearance of some of the dif­
fences which now distinguish the administrations of the European
colonial powers.

Continued economic development of Africa is inescapable. There
is much talk about plans for the industrialization of Africa, but how
far these plans will be prosecuted is still to be seen. The United
Africa Company and the Mengel Mahogany Company of the United
States have planned plywood factories for Nigeria and the Gold
Coast. The U.A.C. obtained approval for a factory to process cocoa
butter, such as the American Rockwood Company wished to erect
in Lagos during the war. However, the “groundnut scheme” for
Nigeria proposes that peanut oil be extracted in England although
the peanut-cake by-product is needed in West Africa for cattle feed.
Many government plans for economic development are being held
up by the lack of personnel, by the world shortages of materials, and
by the lack of dollar credits.

How far these African countries will go in the direction of be­
coming exporters of manufactured goods instead of raw materials,
and of becoming self-sufficient even in commodities whose raw ma­
terials are produced locally, only time will tell. We must also wait
to see whether or not even a socialist government in England will
be able to direct the benefits of the mineral wealth of Africa to
Africans instead of European stock holders. In 1946 the British
government stated officially that colonial mining enterprises should
be for the benefit of the community at large, and set forth argu-
ments for vesting all mineral resources in the colonial governments. In Nigeria recent legislation along this line has been strenuously opposed by the nationalists. There are no signs of socialization of mineral resources in the Belgian Congo or other colonies.

The next year or so should see a postwar boom such as that which occurred in West Africa in 1920, if not prevented by war, an international economic collapse, or government controls of dollar exchange. This time, exports and imports may be much larger because of recently developed and recently discovered resources. The integration of Africa into the world economy will continue, with an increasing effect of overseas economic conditions on African life, and a growing recognition in Europe and America of the extent of their dependence on the natural resources of West and Central Africa.

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