H. J. Simons

RACE RELATIONS AND POLICIES IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AFRICA

The Clash of Cultures

Fringed by long stretches of surf-beaten, sand-barred coast or dense forest belts, possessing few safe natural harbors and navigable rivers, and with access into the interior obstructed by the escarpments of high plateaus, Africa, the most tropical of the continents, was until recently also the most isolated and, to the Western world, the least adequately known of the great land masses. In spite of the centuries-old commerce in slaves—Africa's first and for a long time only important export commodity—Western contacts with the continent south of the Sahara were confined to coastal regions until well into the third quarter of the nineteenth century. The only exception was in the extreme south, where white colonization began in 1652. In 1835 there were fewer than 100,000 whites in Africa, and of these 66,000 were found at the Cape. Even today, more than half of Africa's four million whites are concentrated in southern Africa, with a further million settled along the Mediterranean seaboard. Elsewhere Europeans live for the most part in small, isolated settlements, hardly more than outposts of Western civilization. Yet in little more than half a century the indigenous peoples of Africa, variously estimated to number between 150 and 200 millions, have been integrated into the world society. Ruled more or less directly by European powers, they buy and sell on the world markets, participate in world wars, and rapidly acquire the culture traits of the Western civilization that is the decisive factor in determining the speed and direction of their social development.

This process of change occurs throughout the continent, but it is most rapid and comprehensive in the territories of white settlement. Here, where the African is in close and continuous con-
tact with Western civilization, or to be more accurate, with its African variant, the greatest demand is being made upon his power of assimilation and adaptability. In proportion to the range and intensity of the European economy, the traditional subsistence techniques of the tribal peasant and pastoralist are being superseded by modern productive methods and relations. In satisfying his related demands for land and labor, the European destroys the territorial homogeneity of tribal society, makes wage-earning in labor centers an imperative for an increasing number of its members, and weakens the basis of its kinship, political, and religious institutions. The balance that formerly existed between the human society and its environment is disturbed, some of the consequences being soil erosion, widespread and increasing malnutrition, and much preventable disease. While, however, large-scale white settlement makes change unavoidable for the African, it also creates a framework for new social forms, through the provision of educational facilities, health services, religious institutions, a modern legal and administrative system, and a diversified market economy. The emerging society embraces both the indigenous African and the immigrants or their descendants from Europe and Asia, but while the ethnic groups have common institutions and forms of behavior, they retain distinctive cultural features and are graded into a rigid hierarchy of social classes on the basis of racial characters.

The size of the white settlements and their future prospects are therefore of paramount importance to the indigenous population, and form a convenient point of departure for a survey of the multi-racial societies that are in course of development. What factors have determined the present distribution of white people in Africa? There are South African Calvinists who maintain that the presence of Europeans, at least in South Africa, is the result of divine providence, but a simpler explanation can be found. "In the remote past it was the search for precious metals which established contact with Asia and Europe." ¹ Before the end of the fifteenth century the Portuguese had developed a lively trade on the West Coast, where the Dutch, French, and British built forts and established factories during the succeeding two hundred years. Not, however, until explorers and traders penetrated into regions habitable by Europeans

could large and permanent white settlements develop. On account of the great, unrelieved heat and humidity, and because of the wide distribution of tropical diseases, West Africa and the greater part of Central Africa offered no prospect for white settlement. More favorable conditions were encountered in the region south of the Tropic of Capricorn, on the subtropical highlands of Southern Rhodesia and on the East African plateau.

The Physical Background

On the elevated plateau that extends uninterruptedly from the central districts of the Cape Province to the equator, and projects into Abyssinia across the eastern part of equatorial Africa, highland altitudes compensate somewhat for low latitudes, and help to determine a climate more favorable than any other in Africa to the health of Europeans. In South Africa the plateau, which consists of a number of great plains, can be divided into regions distinguished according to surface characters and climate. To the west, including the northwestern area of the Cape Province, the southern and central portions of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and the southeastern districts of South West Africa, lies the vast Kalahari semidesert, with an annual rainfall ranging from five to fifteen inches. East of this region is the High Veld, whose elevation rises gradually from 4,000 to 6,000 feet across the Southern Transvaal and the greater part of the Orange Free State, to culminate in the highlands of Basutoland. The High Veld, with an annual rainfall of between fifteen and thirty inches, a temperate climate, the Witwatersrand goldfields, a large part of the Union’s coal reserves, and important diamond mines, is the most important industrial and agricultural area in the Union. In the south the interior plateau is approached through the Karroo regions, an area with a wide range in altitude and rainfall, the mean annual rainfall increasing from about five inches in the western districts to fifteen inches in the eastern. Much of this region is affected by severe droughts and soil erosion, but it is good sheep country in parts, and the sheep farms, many of them 5,000 acres and more in size, supply a big proportion of the Union’s wool output. The diversified tract of country between the plateau and the oceans includes a narrow coastal fringe lying below 1,500 feet.
In the northwest the coastal belt is continuous with the Namib desert of South West Africa; towards the south and east the rainfall increases steadily. A comparatively narrow strip of about 50,000 square miles, running parallel to the coast and extending as far east as the George-Knysna districts receives most of its rain in winter; further east, as far as Port Elizabeth, in an area of about 16,000 square miles, precipitation is fairly evenly distributed throughout the year. This winter rainfall area in the Western Cape, the first to be colonized by Europeans, and the population center of the Colored people, contains the Union's most important wheat and deciduous fruit-growing districts. In the southeastern region, extending from the foot of the escarpment across the Eastern Cape Province, Natal and Swaziland to the narrow coastal belt, an abundance of grass and a rainfall of between twenty and thirty inches provide favorable conditions for mixed farming, with animal husbandry as the main occupation. The part of this tract that falls within the Cape Province has been mainly “reserved” for the original African inhabitants who, though settled more densely than any other section of the Union's rural population, remain preeminently pastoralists and primitive agriculturists. The eastern coastal belt, though only ten miles wide near East London, broadens to a width of over a hundred miles in Zululand and Mozambique. The Natal coast, the only considerable area of low plain in the Union and its most productive region, has a tropical climate favorable to the cultivation of sugar cane, Natal's most important economic crop, and the reason for the introduction of Indians. Today Natal's Indian population almost equals the European. Resembling the northern Natal coastal region, but with a higher elevation, is the Transvaal Low Veld, lying between the eastern Transvaal frontier, along which runs the Kruger National Park game sanctuary, and the Great Escarpment on the west. Subtropical in climate, having a low and uncertain rainfall, and falling within the malarial zone, the Low Veld, though constituting one of the few regions available in South Africa for new settlers, offers uncertain prospects to the white farmer.2

Few parts of the Union are climatically unsuitable for whites; the limiting factor is low rainfall rather than high temperatures. Further north, within the tropics, conditions are less favorable and, although high altitudes modify temperatures, the future of the white population can hardly be regarded as assured. In Southern Rhodesia the plateau, a continuation of the High Veld, running southwest to northeast through the middle of the country, stands 4,000 to 5,000 feet above sea level, but only 24 percent of the colony lies above 4,000 feet, considered by some authorities as the lower limit of the area suitable for Europeans. About 89 percent of the white inhabitants are settled on the plateau above or near this limit, and within this region fall the main agricultural and mining centers. Maize and tobacco, the principal commercial crops, are produced largely in the wetter east; cattle-raising predominates in the drier southwestern tract. Gold is worked at many places along the railway, which largely follows the highland belt; chrome iron ore, asbestos, and coal are other minerals produced in large quantities. Flanking the High Veld to the east and west, and situated for the most part in comparatively low-lying country, are the native reserves. Comprising about 30 percent of the colony's land area, they are widely scattered in fairly small patches, badly served by communications, and in large parts inferior to the white settled areas in respect of both soil and rainfall. The low-lying valley regions of the Zambezi in the north, and of the Limpopo and Sabi rivers in the south, are tropical and unhealthy for settlers, but the southern Low Veld is generally free from tsetse fly and suitable for ranching. The western districts, which include a large tsetse-fly area running parallel to the Northern Rhodesia border and a semiarid tract adjoining Bechuanaland Protectorate, fall within the Middle Veld region, but are outside the zone of white settlement.3

Central and East Africa

The two Central African Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have pronounced physical affinities with the East African plateau. Historically and ethnologically, however, as well

as in respect of their economic and social life, the inhabitants are more closely related to those of Southern Rhodesia. Amalgamation between the three territories has been strongly advocated in recent years, especially by the Europeans of Northern Rhodesia, who see in the proposal a means of limiting the influence of the British Colonial Office on native policy and of strengthening their own relative position.\(^4\) In spite of an abundance of land available to immigrants in the northeastern districts, Northern Rhodesia has proved less attractive to settlers than the countries further south. The bulk of the white community is contained in the central area within 20 to 30 miles of the railway line, which keeps generally to the higher country. On this railway belt between Livingstone and Broken Hill are settled the majority of white farmers, engaged mainly in cattle-raising and the growing of maize and wheat. Beyond Broken Hill, and extending to the Belgian Congo, is the mining industry, the decisive factor in the territory’s economy. Apart from government officials, the greater number of Europeans are engaged in mining activities, mainly in the copper belt. The northeastern lobe, connected with the rest of the Protectorate by a narrow neck of land running between Portuguese and Belgian territory, contains two small and isolated European settlements, one at Abercorn on the Tanganyika border, the other in the Fort Jameson district near Nyasaland. Two vast land concessions, having a combined area of six and a quarter million acres, and situated in the Tanganyika district and the Eastern Province, are held respectively by the British South Africa Company and the North Charterland Exploration Company, but few farms in the concession areas have been taken up by Europeans, while many of the inhabited parts of the reserves demarcated in these regions are overpopulated.\(^5\) Another and more important group of reserves is situated in the central area along the railway belt. The western part of the Protectorate, including Barotseland, whose status is protected by treaty, is almost entirely occupied by Africans. Unlike the Bantu-speaking peoples of southern Africa, the majority of Africans in the Protectorate do not go in for cattle-raising, an industry limited by the widespread occur-


rence of tsetse fly to the western part of Barotseland, the central railway zone, and the Fort Jameson and Abercorn districts.

Many of the adverse conditions, such as poor communications, high transport charges, and a small local market, that have restricted the growth of the European agricultural community in Northern Rhodesia are even more conspicuous in Nyasaland. In the latter territory, which, with an area only one-seventh that of Northern Rhodesia, has a larger African population, the density of settlement forms another limiting factor. The Protectorate consists of a strip of land, about 520 miles long and from 50 to 100 miles wide, and traversed from north to south by a deep depression, forming part of the Great Rift Valley. The greater part of the trough is occupied by Lake Nyasa, south of which lies the Shire Highland plateau surmounted by the Mlanje Mountains. On these highlands are concentrated the bulk of the white settlers, who produce most of the important export crops, tobacco and tea. A large proportion of the European population consists of officials and missionaries; commerce is mainly in the hands of Indians, of whom there are almost as many as there are Europeans. In both the Central African Protectorates the supply of African labor exceeds the local demand, and a considerable migration of workers takes place to neighboring territories where wage rates are generally higher.

The outstanding feature of the East African plateau is the Great Rift Valley, a system of trough-like valleys extending, mainly from north to south, along a course indicated by a series of lakes between Lakes Rudolf and Nyasa. On the west the plateau is bordered by a branch of the Rift Valley running through Lake Tanganyika to the Albert Nile; in the north there is a vast region, including nearly half the area of Kenya, of arid and sparsely populated scrubland; on the eastern flank the plateau falls in terraces to a hot and moist coastal plain. Occupying a broad depression between the eastern and western rift valleys is Africa’s largest lake, Victoria, whose borderland areas, divided between the three East African territories, contain two-thirds of East Africa’s twelve million inhabitants. The plateau itself, exclusive of the Rift Valley and certain of the lake basins, has an average altitude of about 4,000 feet. Most of the areas of white settlement are situated at elevations above 5,000 feet. The mandated territory of Tanganyika, East Africa’s largest and most
populous territory, has two important regions of high altitude on which Europeans are settled, one in the northeast around Moshi and Arusha on the slopes of Kilimanjaro and Meru, the other in the southwest in the Iringa Province. Owing to the high altitudes at which it can be grown, coffee is, with mixed farming, the principal basis of European settlement in the Northern Province, and both coffee and tea estates have been developed in the southwestern areas. Sisal, the territory’s most successful plantation crop, is grown in the northeastern district of Tanga Province along the railway line, under climatic conditions that are unfavorable to white settlement. While European settlers and Indian middlemen have made an important contribution to its development, Tanganyika is regarded as a “Native African territory . . . in the sense that the economy of the territory is predominantly native African.” 6 The highland areas, which carry a dense African population, have been virtually closed to further alienation, and “experience obtained from the beginning of European colonization in 1893 points clearly to very definite limitations of white settlement and enterprise.” 7 One of the main limitations is the comparatively small area of habitable country and the high density of its African population. Two-thirds of the territory are uninhabited or sparsely inhabited; the one-fifth that is well watered and free of tsetse fly holds five-sixths of the people. 8

Apart from the highlands, the main centers of African settlement in Uganda are in the Lake Province, where coffee is extensively cultivated by peasants, notably in the Bukoba and Mwanza districts. Cotton, another peasant crop of importance, is grown in settlements established in Uzinga district. The Victoria basin, in which these districts lie, is the most fertile part of Uganda, and contains the main concentration of non-African plantations in the Protectorate. Small groups of European planters, engaged in the cultivation of coffee, tea, and rubber, are also found on the Toro highlands surrounding Mount Ruwenzori. Sugar cane and sisal are grown on a number of estates owned by Indians. The Protectorate, however, provides “the

leading example in East Africa of the systematic encouragement of the agricultural capacities of an unusually intelligent native people in a relatively densely populated country." 9 Cotton, the chief export product, is grown almost exclusively by peasants on thousands of small plots scattered throughout the country, and particularly in Buganda Province and in the region east of the Nile. Uganda, with one and three-quarter million acres under cotton and a crop of 418,000 bales, as compared with 129,000 acres and 28,000 bales in 1916,10 vies with the Sudan for second place among the cotton-producing countries of the British Empire. The country's great dependence on this one product has disadvantages, and in some respects, such as a fall in the general level of soil fertility, the increase in the area under cotton has been too rapid. On the other hand, the industry has been largely instrumental in enabling the Protectorate to pay its way out of revenue and so to escape the burden of a large external debt.11

In Kenya, resembling in this respect southern Africa rather than Uganda or Tanganyika, the economy has been developed upon the basis of European enterprise, and the African's direct contribution to exports in the form of hides, wattle bark, and raw cotton is relatively small. Fully half the African population is concentrated in two regions: the three Kavirondo reserves in the borderlands of Lake Victoria, and the three Kikuyu reserves adjoining the main centers of the European coffee industry on the Highlands. These two regions, with a combined area of about 9,200 square miles, constitute only one twenty-fifth part of the Colony's land surface area. In contrast nearly two-thirds of the Colony, including the Uganda Extension, Turkana, and the Northern Frontier District, is inhabited at an average density of less than one to the square mile. The Highlands, the most extensive tract exceeding 5,000 feet above sea level in tropical Africa (excepting the great plateau of Abyssinia) includes an area of about 16,700 square miles known as the European Highlands. The land alienated to Europeans, amounting to some 11,000 square miles, is situated along the Uganda railway and its branches, on the Trans-Nzoia and Usain Gishu plateaus, and in

### Area and Population

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<th>Territory</th>
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<th>European</th>
<th>Asiatic</th>
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*Source: Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa, No. 22, 1941 (Government Printer, Pretoria); The South and East African Year Book and Guide, 1947 (London); An Economic Survey of the Colonial Empire (1937).*

* a Estimate. b Includes Colored. c Includes Arabs. d Arabs, Somalis, and others.
the districts of Laikipia and North Nyeri between Mount Kenya and the Rift Valley. Coffee, grown almost exclusively by Europeans, and mainly within a radius of fifty miles to the north and northwest of Nairobi, is the most important economic crop; maize, tea, sisal, and sugar cane are the other chief crops grown in bulk on European-owned farms.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{The Hazards of Farming}

Throughout southern and eastern Africa, farming remains the biggest single industry, giving employment to the bulk of the population, contributing a large, and in the East African territories a major, portion of the national income, and exercising a far-reaching influence on social and economic policies. As the preceding survey will have shown, two distinct though interrelated fields of agricultural activity exist in these regions. There is the relatively advanced type of farming practiced by the white farmer, usually the owner of what in Europe would constitute a fair-sized estate, employing the technique and equipment made available by modern science and industry, receiving a considerable amount of assistance and protection from the state, and expecting a standard of living comparable to that of the well-to-do farmer in Europe or America. On the other hand is found the more primitive, predominantly subsistence economy of the African peasant, tilling his small fields with the aid of the hoe or, at best, an ox-drawn plough, rearing cattle and small stock for social as much as for economic ends, and often dependent for a large proportion of his family income on wages earned in European employment. Between farmer and peasant exists a many-sided relationship, involving both conflict and cooperation. They compete with each other for land, markets, transport facilities, and government assistance; they look to each other for labor and wages respectively; and both are affected, in different degrees, by price fluctuations, drought, soil deterioration, diseases, pests, and the other factors that make farming in Africa a hard and uncertain occupation. In all the territories under discussion, with the exception of Uganda, Tanganyika, and Nyasaland, the European is the dom-

inant figure in agriculture, but he maintains this position largely by means of an elaborate and costly system of protective tariffs, subsidies, and market control schemes.

There is, indeed, reason for pessimism concerning the future of the white farmer, not only in territories where his hold, only recently established, may be regarded as precarious because of lack of experience and a generally undeveloped economy, but also in South Africa, whose experience of 300 years of permanent white settlement under relatively favorable conditions provides a test that may well be considered to be decisive. His advantages are considerable. He is shielded by law from African competition for land in no less than 85 percent of South Africa's total area; he has available a large supply of labor at comparatively low wage rates; exceptionally low railway rates are charged on most farm products; over a million pounds are spent annually on agricultural research, precautionary measures, administration and the dissemination of information; and in the ten years between 1931–32 and 1940–42 the state spent about £25,000,000 in direct assistance and subsidies to farmers. In addition, prices to consumers have been raised by a considerable amount, estimated at not less than £6,000,000 for the year 1939–40, by various protective and price-raising measures applied to the principal foods, including sugar, wheat, maize, butter and cheese, and leaf tobacco. Apart from export products for which there is no appreciable local demand, and perishable products marketed internally and not subject to import competition, nearly every important agricultural commodity is sold at internal prices above the corresponding world prices. These efforts to place agriculture on a sound footing have undoubtedly contributed towards the significant expansion that the industry has made during the past 20 years. In the period 1924 to 1938, the production of the crops most benefited by price-assistance policies more than doubled, as did also the exports of fresh and dried fruit for which relatively favorable prices were paid in overseas markets. At the same time, the number of

13 Third Interim Report of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, U.G. No. 40 (1941), par. 88. From 1910 to March, 1936, the state had spent over £71,000,000 from loan funds, of which nearly £20,000,000 had to be written off, and over £41,000,000 from revenue for agriculture. (S. H. Frankel, op. cit., p. 119.)

14 Third Interim Report of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, par. 89.
African males employed on European-owned farms increased by approximately one-sixth.

Of the total working population, about two-thirds are engaged in farming activities, or one-third if the 1,750,000 Africans who farm in the reserves and about 750,000 non-Europeans who undertake casual work on farms are left out of account. Yet farming has contributed only one-eighth of the national income since 1934. The outlook becomes even more depressing in the light of comparisons with leading agricultural countries. South Africa, in spite of a policy aimed at self-sufficiency and a large farming community, does not produce nearly enough of most important foodstuffs to provide her own population with an adequate diet. New Zealand, in contrast, can satisfy her food needs with the output of only 6.4 percent of the gainfully occupied population; Australia does the same with 9.7 percent, and the United States with 23.4 percent.\(^15\) With low productivity go a heavy burden of debt and a small average income. Farms are overcapitalized; the estimated total mortgage indebtedness of £100,000,000 amounts to one-third of the total value of European-owned farm land, calculated at an average value of £3 per morgen.\(^16\) The available data show that most farmers are on a low standard of living as compared with Europeans in urban areas.\(^17\)

In attempts to explain agriculture's poor showing, stress has been placed on the unfavorable physical conditions. Two-thirds of the country is so dry as to be suitable only for extensive ranching. "An optimistic estimate of the Union's future arable land would be in the neighborhood of 15 per cent of the surface. Naturally, this must include a great deal of indifferent land at present marginal to cultivation."\(^18\) Less than 6 percent of the surface is actually under the plough. Some authorities are optimistic about the prospects for animal husbandry, but it too has been severely handicapped by poor grazing, erratic and high seasonal rainfall, prolonged droughts, and a high incidence of diseases and pests. Land has been irrigated, but

\(^{15}\) Ibid., par. 9.
\(^{16}\) Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Reconstruction of Agriculture: Report of the Reconstruction Committee of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 1943-44, par. 9.
seldom with economic results, and it is considered unlikely that more than a million morgen, forming less than one percent of the total area of farm land, will ever be brought under irrigation.\textsuperscript{19} To these drawbacks must be added the disadvantage of high transport charges, the absence of inland waterways, and a sparse and scattered population.

The pessimistic note sounded in recent official publications is perhaps due less to a perception of the country’s natural limitations than to an unexpressed disbelief in the possibility of eradicating from the existing economic structure and the organization of the industry those defects that are the principal cause of its malaise. Dictated by political rather than economic considerations, the desire to achieve self-sufficiency and to conciliate the farming section of the electorate has led to the adoption of protective and price-assistance measures without safeguards to insure sound land usage. In consequence, soil erosion is considered by some authorities to be a greater menace in South Africa than in any other country. Farmers look to a paternal government to shield them from the consequences, not only of nature’s harshness, but also of their own ignorance and inefficiency, and to insure an abundant supply of non-European workers, who, illiterate, badly housed, fed, and paid, have neither the incentive nor the opportunity to acquire and apply the skill that agriculture so badly needs.

It is unlikely that efforts to find a remedy will lead to the abandonment of protection and artificial stimuli, or to a return to the free market and unrestricted competition. If state assistance continues, and that it will do so is almost certain, it will have to be accompanied by an increasing amount of state supervision. The Department of Agriculture’s Reconstruction Committee, while asserting that private ownership of land must be retained, recommends a policy that, put into effect, would virtually eliminate private enterprise in agriculture. The Social and Economic Planning Council, skeptical of the efficacy of state-owned enterprises and state controls, believes that farming could be improved by other means, but that even an increase of 100 percent in output and net farm incomes would leave the industry in a relatively unfavorable position, in which one-third of the working population, exclusive of the re-

\textsuperscript{19} Department of Agriculture and Forestry, \textit{Reconstruction of Agriculture}, par. 26.
serves, would produce only one-fifth of the national income. The Council's proposed solution is to facilitate the rural exodus.

Hand in hand with the strengthening of the farming industry must, therefore, go a policy of economic development elsewhere in order to effect a shift from the less to the more remunerative occupations, possibly for the whole increment in the rural European population and for a large proportion of the non-European increment as well.20

_The Settler in the Tropics_

In the Rhodesias and the East African territories, European farming, though still exploiting the advantages of cheap, abundant land, unexhausted soil and low wage costs that characterize pioneer settlements in Africa, also have to contend with the corresponding disadvantages of poor transport facilities, small local markets, and inadequate knowledge of agricultural requirements and possibilities. If in these territories state aid to farmers is on a smaller scale than in South Africa, the reason is not that they need less, but that governments have less to give. The tendency of official policy, especially marked in the period subsequent to the slump of the early thirties, is in the direction taken in South Africa. In Southern Rhodesia marketing boards now control the maize, dairy, pig, and tobacco industries; internal maize prices are stabilized at a figure higher than the export parity; bounties are paid on the export of high-quality beef and dairy products; government financial assistance is given for livestock improvement and irrigation works; and substantial reductions have been made in debts to the government for land sales, fencing, wells, and interest charges.21

Developments in Northern Rhodesia have not justified the early optimistic view taken of agricultural possibilities. In the twenty years following the impetus given to settlement after the 1914-18 war, the number of white farmers remained almost stationary, at a figure ranging between 300 and 400. Attempts to grow an export crop on a large scale as an alternative to maize have failed. In 1936 maize producers were subjected to a control board, formed to di-

vide the local market in a fixed ratio between European and African producers, and to export the surplus, while representative farmers' organizations expressed opposition to the introduction of more producers. Shortly afterwards, however, the nemesis of "scarcity" economics overtook the Protectorate. In a prolonged period of poor harvests, maize production dropped from 437,000 bags in 1937 to 152,000 in 1941, the European share of the output declining from 242,000 to 120,000 bags. At the same time consumption rose by 42 percent, and the deficiency had to be met by imports.22

In Kenya, the storm center of British colonial policy in Africa, the prospects of farmers have been the subject of strongly conflicting viewpoints, and the extent of government aid is in dispute.23 According to one authoritative opinion, expressed at the time of the 1930 slump, white settlement had proved to be a "hothouse plant," nourished by "adventitious aids, or even artificial aids," and while there was a possible future for large-scale plantations, the attempt to develop farming colonization as an economic business on its own was unlikely to succeed.24 The Joint Committee on Closer Union 25 considered that the progress made by the settlers did not compare unfavorably with that of other countries at a similar stage of development, but that "the figures and arguments submitted merit serious consideration before any policy of further intensive white settlement is adopted." The nature of the assistance provided to farmers since the 1931 slump has been summarized by Sir Alan Pim:

Apart from the protective import duties and the special railway rates, more especially the preferential rating of local as compared with imported articles, a good deal of direct assistance has been given to farmers, particularly to cereal farmers. The help given includes rebates, mainly of railway rates and port charges, to the extent of £81,000 in 1929-30, and £47,000 in 1932, together with agricultural advances totalling £101,000, and loans of £116,000 to the cereal industries.26

With the upward swing of the demand for agricultural products during and after the war, faith in the future of European farming

22 Address to Legislative Council by H.E. the Governor, 6th December, 1941.
23 See the discussion in Race and Politics in Kenya by Elspeth Huxley and Margery Perham (London, 1944).
24 Sir Edward Humphrey Legget, in evidence before the Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, vol. ii, Minutes of Evidence, pars. 3499 ff.
has been revived, and renewed attempts are being made to strengthen the white population by encouraging the immigration of settlers into the Rhodesias and Kenya. Future prospects will depend largely on the possibility of reducing the disparity between the prices of agricultural and manufactured commodities, and of avoiding a recurrence of the pre-war depressions. On the basis of the available evidence, the cautious observer will be inclined to share Lord Hailey's doubts "as to whether European agriculture will do more, even in good times, than make possible a very modest living as a return for hard work and the incurring of grave risks of loss of invested capital, and whether in bad times it must not prove a recurrent charge upon the revenues of the governments." 

The African Peasant

In any attempt to assess the economic position of the peasant population, considerable importance must be attached to the legal and administrative measures that prevent Africans and Europeans from competing on the open market for rights in land. Complete territorial segregation does not exist, for the farmer is an employer of non-European labor even when, as is usual in Southern Africa, he and the members of his family are also land workers. Except in Uganda and Tanganyika, where the system does not operate, segregation takes the form of demarcating "white" and "black" areas, and of prohibiting the members of one racial group from buying or leasing land in the area reserved for the other group. Though developed in response to a variety of conditions in the different territories, the reserve policy had a general origin in the struggle between the intruding whites and the indigenous people for land, which was also a struggle for the best land. In Natal, the first colony to adopt a considered and extensive reserve system, the aim was both to protect the colonists against the numerically dominant African population and to insure an adequate supply of labor for the farms. The Transkeian Territories and Zululand, on the other hand, owe their existence as "native" areas to the well-organized Nguni

society that deflected the main stream of colonists into the interior. The tribes of the Transvaal were not able to offer an effective resistance, and here reserves were marked out, mainly under British pressure, to safeguard them against the total loss of their hereditary lands. In Rhodesia and Kenya, again, the administrations made white settlement an objective of policy at an early stage of occupation, and demarcated reserves in order to determine the areas available for colonists. More recently, in all the territories, as the African adapted himself to the new conditions and showed an ability and desire to buy up land formerly occupied by his ancestors, the reserve system acquired an additional function of protecting the European against competition.

The reserves also protect the African inhabitants against European competition, and for this reason many critics of the policy hesitate to challenge the principle of segregation, but concentrate on attempting to increase the share allocated to the African. These are not, however, separate issues. With political and economic power concentrated in the European, race differentiation involves race discrimination. In proportion to population, the African share is much smaller than the area set aside for Europeans. Fertility of land and access to water supplies are more important than area size, but even if it is assumed that the reserves are no worse off in these respects than the European zone, the Africans in the area allocated to them can never hope to be anything more than small peasants, while the Europeans are intended to have the status of well-to-do farmers.

If not related to the carrying capacity of the land, comparisons of population density are misleading. Even crude density figures, however, tell a tale when they reveal contrasts as startling as those that exist between the areas of white settlement and the reserves. No amount of qualification could eliminate the significance of the difference between the 1,978 acres that constitute the average size of a European farm in South Africa and the 60 acres available for residential, arable, and grazing purposes to an average family of five in the reserves, or between the average densities per square mile of 14.09 in all rural areas, including the reserves, and 57.2 in the reserves alone. More generous provision has been made for African

settlement in other territories, yet areas of high population density occur in all. Densities recorded range from an average of 38 per square mile in Swaziland reserves to 119, 156, and 240 in specific areas in Northern Rhodesia; in the Kikuyu reserves in Kenya the average is 480, and in parts of Kavirondo density rises to as much as 1,000.

Most of the reserves are overcrowded; of those that are not, few can absorb immigrants as well as provide for the natural increase. In any event, since occupation rights are limited by the traditional system of land tenure to members of a particular tribe or local group, congestion cannot be relieved by a redistribution of population. "The one reiterated cry of the Natives in the reserves is that the land is overcrowded, and that more land is required," remarked the chairman of the South African Natives Land Commission of 1915. That may be said with equal force of African opinion today, not only in South Africa but in all territories where reserves have been demarcated. The dominant European attitude, on the other hand, is that the peasants suffer, not from scarcity of land, but from indolence and primitive methods of cultivation. This is the viewpoint, typical of that held by numerous official investigators in the different territories, which was adopted by the 1915 Commission: "While, therefore, it is quite true that most of the reserves are overcrowded, this is only so because of the uneconomic manner in which the land is occupied and cultivated, and the overstocking which goes on without let or hindrance, save for losses through drought and disease."
Like some other aspects of African culture, peasant agriculture exemplifies the principle described by Professor Toynbee as "the intractability of institutions." In this instance, however, the "source of disharmony" proceeds from external forces, and not from an internal process of change such as led up to the agrarian revolution in Europe. When land was abundant, the peasant’s methods, including the burning of bush, shifting cultivation, and periodic migrations to new pastures, achieved a satisfactory balance with the natural environment, and at least avoided serious injury to the soil. In the limited areas of the reserves, the traditional safeguards against soil exhaustion can no longer be employed, and the new techniques required are imperfectly understood and infrequently applied. Many of the defects of the medieval agriculture of Europe, and also those noted by Arthur Young in his survey of the common fields at the beginning of the last century, are conspicuous in the reserves. The arable fields are small, scattered and variable in size; enclosures are rare; crops are not rotated and the single-crop maize, or millet or some other cereal predominates; fertilizers or manures are seldom used, and fields are usually cultivated for several seasons until they show signs of exhaustion. The majority of peasants still use the hoe; where the plough has been introduced, it has made cultivation easier but, by encouraging concentration on cereals, its effects have been detrimental to the land and to the people’s nutrition. Some authorities, notably agricultural officers in Northern Rhodesia, now incline to the belief that the traditional methods of farming should not be condemned outright, but there is no serious difference of opinion about the broad lines of criticism.

If one weakness has been stressed above all others, it is that of overstocking. Much has been written about the African’s practice of raising cattle for social rather than for economic ends; the importance of quantity rather than quality for purposes of ritual killings and dowry payments and as a medium of exchange; the significance of cattle as a source of meat and milk; and the social prestige attached to the possession of large herds. Because of the poor quality of the stock, the failure to improve the animals by breeding,
and the absence of fodder reserves, milk yields are low and the value of animal products is extremely small.\textsuperscript{36} No convincing evidence has been advanced to show that the majority of peasant families possess more cattle than they need for nutrition and draught purposes. The practice of pasturing animals on common grazing lands, and on arable after harvest, permits of a wide range in the distribution of stock. In South African reserves a few individuals may be found in a district who own 50 head of cattle or more, but many families own none.\textsuperscript{37} Agricultural officers in Southern Rhodesia estimate that the peasant family needs at least eight head of cattle, but actually owns an average of only 4.6 head. In the Transkeian Territories the average is 5.77 head per family. The common belief among Europeans that Africans are unwilling to sell cattle and hoard stock as a miser hoards money may also be found to stand in need of correction. Sir Philip Mitchell reminds us that "the problem is at least as much a problem of economics and transportation as tribal customs and beliefs."\textsuperscript{38} And, he adds,

\begin{quote}
my experience in both the Tanganyika Territory and Uganda has taught me that the alleged reluctance to sell stock is a great deal less strong than is generally represented, while the appetite for meat is almost unlimited. But without Government help in organising and controlling the sale and distribution of stock, in developing small butchers' shops throughout the villages and appropriate forms of dairying, the problem is beyond the capacity of the African native stock owner and small trader to tackle.
\end{quote}

Overcrowding, overstocking, and unsuitable methods of husbandry have resulted in widespread erosion and diminishing fertility of the soil in South African reserves. Conditions have deteriorated during the past twenty-five years to the point where, with few exceptions, insufficient food is produced for the minimum requirements of the inhabitants, and supplies must be augmented by purchases from local stores. On the assumption that other foods are eaten, and leaving only a small margin for wastage or consump-


\textsuperscript{38} General Aspects of the Agrarian Situation in Kenya, p. 7.
tion by animals, minimum grain needs are estimated to be 2.75 bags per head of population per year. In the Transkeian Territories, one of the best reserves, the peasants produced an annual average of only 1.5 bags of grain between 1939 and 1942, and imported on an average another 288,000 bags a year. Inclusive of imports, the average amount available per head was only 1.6 bags. In the Ciskeian reserves, less than half of the total grain requirements are produced by the inhabitants during a good season. Vegetables are even scarcer than grain; like fruit, they are regarded as a rarity. Even more serious is the deficiency in milk supplies. As for other territories, although information is less complete, the available evidence suggests that the peasants are hardly better off than in South Africa, even where more land is available. Many parts of East Africa, for instance, are no longer self-supporting in food, and depend largely on imports from European farms.

For an appreciation of the problem presented by the reserves, the low standards of production should be expressed in standards of health, housing, education, and social amenities. Statistics of livestock and farm products are more detailed and accurate than those of the human population. In no territory are vital statistics of rural Africans collected, and general descriptions are bound to give a misleading impression of conditions in particular areas. Such regional studies as have been made, however, substantiate the conclusion that the reserves for the most part are depressed areas, rural slums as they have been called, in which people stagnate in poverty, illiteracy, and ill-health. The income of £40 to £50 a year on which an average reserve family of five or six persons has to live in South Africa is probably higher than the incomes of peasants elsewhere. At least 30 to 40 percent of the reserve inhabitants of South Africa have never attended school; in South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia more than half the number of African children of school-going age are each year receiving no education at all. Educational standards are lower in most of the other territories.

The great bulk of the people live in primitive huts, usually built of wattle with clay, windowless, with no outlet for smoke, and infested with vermin and rodents. Huts are frequently overcrowded, partly because of shortage of building materials or labor, partly because of hut tax. Earthen floors are the rule; beds, tables, chairs and other articles of furniture are found in only a small minority of
huts. Sanitary facilities are seldom found; supplies of pure or even polluted water are inadequate for domestic purposes. In the absence of reliable morbidity statistics, the incidence of various diseases cannot be indicated, but the South African material shows that enteric, typhus, plague, leprosy, tuberculosis, malaria, bilharzia, and syphilis are widespread. As reported by the Social and Economic Planning Council:

One of the most striking features about health conditions in the Native Reserves is the prevalence of debilitating conditions which prevent the inhabitants from producing their maximum efficiency. It is also noteworthy that practically all diseases prevalent in the Native Reserves are associated with overcrowding, poor standards of personal hygiene, inadequate sanitation, impure water supplies, malnutrition and general poverty. To this extent, they are all preventable.39

The rate of increase of African population is believed to be high, but the reason is that birth rates are high; available figures for the death rate are rarely less and often more than twice as high as that for Europeans. Medical and nursing services are inadequate. South African statistics show an average of one medical practitioner to 21,500 persons in the reserves.40

Migrant Workers

Even this low standard of subsistence cannot be maintained on the basis of peasant agriculture alone. In South African reserves few households depend solely on agriculture and, as opportunities for gainful employment of other kinds are negligible in the reserves, a large and constant migration of men takes place to mines, farms, and towns. The extent of the migration is an index of the peasant's failure to make a living out of the soil. Expressed as a proportion of the male population between 18 and 54 years of age, the number of men absent from the various South African reserves at the time of the 1936 census ranged from 41.6 to 69.0 percent. In other territories at least a third of the adult male population is away at work; in some districts the proportion is as much as 60 or 70 percent.41

39 Report No. 9, par. 133. 40 See below, pp. 317 f.
For this migration a variety of reasons can be suggested, though not enough is known about the causal factors to allow their relative weight to be assessed. There is evidently a pull towards the employment centers as well as a push from the reserves. Town and mine offer adventure, new experiences, escape from the monotony of the village, opportunities for education and advancement, and other advantages to outweigh the discomforts and risks of the journey into the unknown. On the other hand, it can be shown that manpower is the chief, often the only export from tribal areas, and that only by working for a wage can the peasant pay for imported goods, education, church dues, and taxation, and the other items in the family budget for which cash is needed. According to the calculations of the Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages Commission, for instance, the average Transkeian peasant, working nine out of twelve months on the mines, earned £20 1s. 7d. in wages if employed as a surface worker, as compared with £4 5s. received for the sale of produce from his holding in the reserve, and £13 10s. 2d. representing the monetary value of his own produce consumed by the family. The total income of £37 16s. 9d., it was estimated, fell short of the family's minimum requirements by an amount of £17 os. 7d.

Could not the peasant, however, produce more on his land and grow export crops to supply his cash needs? That possibility is ruled out for the landless families in the reserves, estimated to number 20,000 in the Transkei and 13,000 in the Ciskei, as well as for the large number of families in all territories whose allotments are too small to provide the cultivator with a living. Migration takes place on a large scale also from other regions, where tribal lands have not been restricted; in these parts, at least, the peasant may be thought to have a freedom of choice between industrial employment and production on his own account. Only a series of intensive regional studies could establish whether such an option does exist, or whether, in spite of the relatively abundant land at his disposal, the peasant is forced by such conditions as inadequate transport,

43 Report, p. 19.
poor communications, uncertain markets and prices, to obtain cash by working for a wage. There can be no doubt, however, as to the necessity of a radical change in the system of land tenure and husbandry if the African is to be placed in a position to devote his full time to agricultural pursuits.

One obstacle to such a development is the self-perpetuating character of migrant labor. At one time General Smuts strongly recommended the general adoption of this method of securing labor for European enterprise on the ground that the movement to and from employment centers achieved the dual purpose of spreading civilization among tribesmen and preserving their own cultural values. In reality, by bridging the gap between town and country migration accelerates the process of culture change in the reserves. If the worker on his return home does undergo a refresher course in tribal culture, he is also an agent for the spread of Western concepts and values. The absence of a large proportion of men in the prime of life is incompatible not only with tribal integrity, but also with a harmonious and well-balanced society of any description. The migratory system is not the only, but it is believed to be the main cause of what the South African Social and Economic Planning Council describes as "the breakdown of Native family life. Widespread prostitution and marital instability, adult crime and juvenile delinquency, venereal disease and sexual perversions, are amongst its effects." In addition, the loss of manpower reacts adversely upon agriculture in the reserves; the migrant worker has little incentive to improve his methods of husbandry; and the women, upon whom the burden of cultivation falls, are unable to give the land the needed attention and skill. Instead of agriculture being the mainstay of the reserve population, it becomes a subsidiary occupation whose yield steadily diminishes while the period spent by the men in employment centers tends to increase. The process has gone so far in South Africa that the migrant worker serves an average period of 13.6 months at a time on the Witwatersrand mines, in contrast to the period of three to six months worked in 1903, while 16.8 percent of the men return to the mines after spending "what may be re-

46 Report No. 9, par. 185.
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garded as no more than a holiday visit” of from one to three months in the reserves. On the basis of facts such as these, the Social and Economic Planning Council concludes not only that the migratory system is “morally, socially and economically wrong,” but that “as far as the Reserves in particular are concerned no real progress towards their rehabilitation is possible as long as the migratory system of peasant labour is encouraged.”

This admission, coming from an authoritative body charged with the drawing up of blueprints for South Africa’s future development, marks a significant change in the attitude that has determined policy for the past century. The reserves have been regarded, not as the homes of an independent, self-contained peasantry, but as the reservoirs of labor for the European entrepreneur, from which he could draw workers at need, without incurring the responsibility and cost of housing and feeding the women and children, the unemployed and unemployable, or of providing the education and social services needed by an urban community. What, then, is the explanation of the change of heart? Humanitarian considerations play a part; more important, however, is the realization that the progressive deterioration of the reserves and its effect on health standards threaten to deplete the potential labor force, and that the growing gap between the production and minimum family requirements of the peasantry can be bridged only by raising wage levels or improving methods of husbandry.

Program for Rehabilitation

All past efforts to arrest the impoverishment of the reserves have been too limited to free the peasant from dependence on the labor market. Additional land has been set aside for African occupation, though not enough to put an end to overpopulation. Other measures adopted include anti-soil erosion works, the reduction, under compulsion if necessary, of livestock, the improvement of the quality of stock, the provision of water supplies, the eradication of tsetse

48 Report No. 9, par. 185.
49 Under the South African Land and Trust Act, 1936, the Swaziland Native Land Settlement Proclamation, 1946, the Southern Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act, 1941 (superseding the Land Apportionment Act, 1930), the Kenya Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1942 and Native Lands Trust Ordinance, 1938.
fly and the education of the people in sound methods of agriculture. More radical methods are now being applied or discussed in most territories. Emphasis is placed on the resettlement of reserves, and the prescription of land usage in accordance with plans drawn up by experts and carried out under close supervision. The South African scheme provides for regional planning committees, the establishment of rural villages, the zoning of residential, arable, and grazing areas, the limitation of population and stock, fencing, soil conservation, irrigation and water supplies. In Kenya it is proposed to transfer families from overpopulated areas to regions made habitable by the elimination of fly and the improvement of water supplies.

Drastic as these schemes are in some respects, they do not go far enough in the most vital aspect of the agrarian problem. Nowhere is it proposed to reform the archaic system of land tenure that, enforced by the administrations, limits the peasant to the cultivation of a ten-acre plot or less. Production can be appreciably increased, but not to the point of giving the peasant family a satisfactory standard of living, on holdings of the size now being cultivated in most regions. As the results of the Glen Grey quitrent tenure in the Ciskeian and Transkeian districts have shown, individual ownership and the registration of title carry with them no advantage as long as the peasant is bound by the rule of “one man one plot.” Indeed, individual titles have proved to be a serious obstacle in the way of carrying out desirable reforms. It is not the Western type of ownership that is significant, but the associated right to buy and sell land or to mortgage it. Land scarcity and production for the market will, if not obstructed, promote individualism and the sale of land in violation of tribal custom, and bring about differentiation in the amount of land held and a landless peasantry. No administration has, however, been prepared to give legal sanction to these changes, and regulate them as part of a carefully devised policy. Rather than face up to the problem of providing for the families without land, or of meeting the cost of surveys and registration of titles, the governments have nominally enforced the traditional system of landholding and tolerated such modifications as resulted from the new conditions. As to the unsatisfactory con-

50 A. Philips, Report on Native Tribunals (Nairobi, 1945), Chap. XXV.
sequences of this neglect there can be no doubt, but it is not a simple matter to find an alternative.

One possible form of development is that adopted by Southern Rhodesia in the "native purchase areas," where, eventually, about 24,000 farms averaging 250 acres each will be available for sale or lease to the energetic and ambitious person who wishes to rise above peasant rank. In view of the white farmer's record, however, it is difficult to be enthusiastic about the prospects for the African who attempts to work a medium-sized farm with a negligible amount of capital and inadequate knowledge. There is also the possibility of introducing a cash crop, such as cotton or coffee, which, as has been shown in Uganda and Tanganyika, can be produced on small holdings, but it is by no means certain that the peasants in these territories have a higher standard of living than Africans in South Africa whose wages supplement their income from the land. If the future lies with large-estate farming, highly mechanized and scientifically organized, one alternative to peasant agriculture may be the plantation, such as is now being developed in East Africa for the production of groundnuts. There are a number of objections to the adoption of this course, however, including the danger of overconcentration on a single product, the political influences wielded by highly capitalized private enterprise, and the transformation of the peasant into a wage earner. If policy should be aimed at keeping the African on the land and enabling him to employ modern technique and equipment on an adequate scale, the most hopeful, if not the only, course is to encourage collective or cooperative farming by whole communities.

It cannot be assumed that administrations generally will be able to carry out a policy of allowing the reserve population to achieve a satisfactory standard of living on the land. Opposition to effective rehabilitation must be anticipated from several quarters. European taxpayers are unlikely to accept responsibility for the initial capital expenditure, which, together with a portion of the maintenance charges in the early stages, will have to be met out of public funds. In the Eastern and Central African territories money has been provided from the Colonial Development Fund, but on an insufficient scale to finance a rehabilitation program of the required dimensions. Internal resources are small in most territories; the diversion
of a substantial part to the reserves would involve considerable adjustments in the economy, as well as political repercussions. The peasant would not be able to pay for the improvements, at the outset or later on, unless he were in a position to give all his time to growing foodstuffs and export crops on his own land. It cannot be supposed that employers as a class would assent to a scheme resulting in a big reduction in the labor force. Nor would white farmers readily accept the African as a competitor in a small market. The policy followed in Kenya of prohibiting Africans from growing arabica coffee, and the restriction placed in Southern Rhodesia upon the African’s share of the maize quota, indicate what the reaction would be to such competition. To these difficulties must be added the inevitable opposition of the peasants themselves, who, as experience with stock-limitation and soil-conservation measures shows, combine with conservatism a deeply rooted distrust of European intentions. Suspicion may be dispelled, inertia and the deadening weight of tribalism overcome, if rehabilitation is made part of a wider program of social reconstruction, bringing education, opportunity for self-development, and a greater share in government to the people. All these changes, however, involving as they do a radical revision of the African’s status, would encounter strong resistance from the dominant European minority.

Mines and Industries

In South Africa and the Rhodesias, agriculture’s poor showing has been offset by the exploitation of mineral resources. Mining, not farming, is the mainspring of the economic system in these countries. The industry has been the chief factor responsible for the growth of large European communities, big towns, and secondary industries; and it has determined the direction of railway lines. In 1875, at the beginning of the mining era, South Africa’s white population was 332,000; in 1904 it had risen to 1,117,000, of which number 528,000 are estimated to have consisted of immigrants. Owing to the great output of gold and diamonds, the value of mineral pro-

51 The ban was lifted in 1939, but Africans may grow coffee only in limited areas in Meru and Kisii.
52 C. G. W. Schumann, Die Ekonomiese Posiesie van die Afrikaner (Nasionale Pers, 1940), p. 68.
duction, to which these two minerals contributed 92.4 percent in 1940, is higher per capita than in any country elsewhere in the world. Gold mining alone accounts for almost one-fifth of the national income, two-fifths of the public revenue, and three-quarters of the exports. The industry therefore enables South Africa to pay for motor cars, machinery, electrical equipment, raw materials, clothing and other imported goods, and provides for a large part of state expenditure, including assistance to farmers.

Diamonds and gold, for all their importance in the economy, have not been used to a large extent as raw materials for local industry. With the encouragement of the state, diamond cutting has developed since about 1928; gold is refined on the Witwatersrand; and some mining stores, notably explosives and acids, are manufactured in South Africa. The indirect stimulus given to manufactures is considerable; the gold-mining industry provides an important market for local products, as well as the foreign exchange needed for imported machinery and materials. Producing, however, wholly for export, and anxious to keep working costs as low as possible, the gold-mining groups have not been concerned to promote the development of industry. The mining of base minerals, many of which occur in large quantities, has been discouraged by heavy transport costs and low market prices. The resources needed for a big metallurgical industry exist, but capital has not been available for its development. The local iron and steel industry, for instance, like the railways, was developed with state capital. In all, mineral raw materials do not play an important part in South African industries; the value of diamonds, copper, iron ore, chrome ore and other minerals used locally was probably not more than £1,500,000 in 1934-35 and £3,000,000 in 1938-39.

In certain directions industrial expansion has been extremely rapid in the past thirty years; more so, indeed, than the rate of expansion in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. South Africa is today the most industrialized country in Africa, and possesses the most diversified and best-balanced economy. Manufacturing received a big impetus during the first, as also during the second,
World War, and the protectionist policy initiated by the Nationalist-Labour Government in 1925 provided an additional stimulus. In the period 1917–18 to 1939–40, the gross value of manufactures increased by 260 percent, that of mining by 166 percent, and of agriculture by 32 percent. The number of persons employed in manufacturing industries increased from 123,842 in 1916–17 to 413,492 in 1941–42, and their contribution to the national income rose from 9.6 percent to 19.0 percent. These advances, however, are less impressive when viewed in relation to the low level from which they began. Both in the degree of industrialization and in standards of productivity South Africa has lagged behind the other dominions.

South African industries are for the most part of the "lighter" kind, not highly mechanized, operating on a small scale, and largely dependent on protection afforded by tariffs and dumping duties. Only a small proportion, constituting in 1939 just over 4 percent, of manufactured products are exported, while the local market is restricted by the small population and the low purchasing power of the great majority of non-Europeans. In addition to the disadvantages experienced by all countries in the early stages of industrialization, there are others associated with the concentration of capital and energy on the dominant gold-mining industry, with the rigid caste-like stratification which denies non-Europeans adequate education and confines them to less skilled and badly paid types of work, and with the social pattern that places a premium not on efficiency and productive capacity, but on the possession of a white skin.

In the other territories, absorption into the world economy is a process of less than two generations, and the nature of the mineral resources has not yet been fully explored. Mining has played a dominant role in the development of Southern and Northern Rhodesia, providing about 80 percent and 95 percent respectively of domestic exports. Asbestos is produced on a big scale in Swaziland, the improvement of the diamond market has stimulated production in South West Africa, where output reached the value of £1,114,395 in 1945, and significant quantities of gold are produced in Kenya and Tanganyika. In Uganda and Nyasaland mining is of minor importance. Appreciable quantities of base minerals and metals are be-

\(^{56}\) Ibid., pars. 35, 37, and 55.
lied to exist in most of the territories, and some of them may prove to be as richly endowed in this respect as South Africa. The tendency has been, however, to concentrate on the exploitation of gold and diamond deposits, and the further stage of developing base minerals has been reached only in the Rhodesias. By far the largest expansion outside South Africa has taken place on the Northern Rhodesia copper belt, where minerals to the value of more than £12 million were produced in 1944, copper alone accounting for over £10 million.

Although the war gave an impetus to the growth of manufacturing industries, they are still in their infancy in most of the territories. Only Southern Rhodesia can be said to have entered upon a period of industrialization, though development is bound to be slow in view of the small requirements and purchasing power of the local market. In addition to processed food products, clothing, furniture, cement and tobacco are the principal commodities manufactured, and a small export trade in them is carried on with neighboring territories. As in South Africa these industries receive a considerable measure of protection. Manufacturing development is at a much lower level of development in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and is confined largely to the processing of agricultural products for export. Of the East African territories, Kenya has made the biggest advance in industry, but even here the value of goods manufactured from local products or imported materials has never been considerable.

With the exception of South Africa, and to a small extent Southern Rhodesia, the various territories under discussion are primarily producers of minerals and agricultural products, and importers of manufactures, mainly consumers’ goods. Yet, without industrialization, a balanced economy cannot be achieved, and opportunities for the employment of people in overpopulated areas must continue to be inadequate. The unremunerative character of agriculture and the low wages paid to farm workers do not offer much prospect for a substantial improvement in the African’s standards of living, while the relatively small value of agricultural exports limits the amount of possible imports. Existing resources appear adequate for industrialization; power is available either in the form of coal or water, and mineral deposits are extensive. None of the schemes pro-
posed by the British or colonial governments, however, makes provision for industrial development; the emphasis is placed on the increased output of agricultural products and raw materials used in Britain's manufactures. To take one example, although cotton has been grown on a big scale in Uganda since 1922, and contributes about four-fifths of domestic exports, its cultivation has not stimulated local industry other than ginning, while Uganda's imports of cotton piece goods, blankets and threads constitute one-fifth of total imports.56 The complex of relationships inherent in the colonial system is not conducive to the growth of manufacturing industry in the colonies; industrialization, as South African experience has shown, is a consequence not merely of mining development, but to a greater degree of the achievement by a colony of a real measure of self-government.

The Labor Market

In all the territories under discussion, Africans, either as migrants or permanent workers, supply the bulk of unskilled and semi-skilled labor for farms, mines, factories, domestic service, and other occupations. Their absorption in the Western economy represents a process similar in its cultural significance to the experiences of the English yeoman and agricultural laborer during the great agrarian and industrial changes of the eighteenth century. The African, however, has to take a leap into an alien world, ruled by men of a different race, speaking a different language and observing unfamiliar customs, and subjecting him to the restraints and inhibitions of the color bar. These peculiar features of the economic revolution in Africa have given it a direction and pattern unlike that of the corresponding upheaval in other continents.

The transition to wage earner has followed much the same course in the various territories. After the initial period of conquest or subjugation, workers were available from tribes whose lands had been sold or given to Europeans and for whom reserves had not been set aside. Additional labor was provided by men who spontaneously left the tribal areas to work for cattle or money wages and to buy European merchandise. These sources were rarely adequate, and

pressure was put on men in the reserves: directly, as under the thinly disguised slavery of the "apprenticeship" system practiced in the Transvaal Republic, or through administrative officers, as in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, or in the form of compulsory labor on roads and railways as in East Africa; indirectly, by imposing head and hut tax or by sending recruiting agents into the reserves. Direct pressure is no longer needed in South Africa; even the mine recruiter is an agent for forwarding rather than for procuring labor. In some of the other territories, workers may still be legally impressed for porterage or public works, and during the war, industrial conscription, forcing Africans under the threat of penal sanctions to work for private employers, was introduced in Southern and Northern Rhodesia, Kenya, and Tanganyika. As the discussion of the reserves has shown, however, there are now few areas outside Tanganyika and Uganda where the majority of families are not dependent on wages. In some territories there is not enough work for all who want it, or the wages offered locally are not attractive to potential workers, with the result that men migrate to employment centers in other territories.57

While breaking down the isolation of tribal communities and making wage earning a necessity, employers have also attempted to direct the flow of labor into certain channels and to restrict the mobility of the workers. The controls take the form of pass laws, developed historically in South Africa as a measure of protection for the white pioneer during the period of armed conflict, and subsequently used to prevent Africans working under contract on the mines from changing their employment or returning to the reserves before the expiration of the contract period. The pass laws today form one of the keystones of "segregation": tying the labor tenant to the farm under the Native Service Contract Act of 1932 and the Proclamation 150 of 1934; restraining the growth of the permanent urban African population under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act; giving the mines a virtual monopoly of recruiting and a means of enforcing contracts under the Native Labour Regulation Act; protecting agriculture and mining from the competition of secondary industry and commerce for African labor; and preventing this competition from raising African wages. An even more compre-

hensive type of control operates in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya in the form of compulsory registration of all males over the age of 14 or 16 years respectively, and the issue of certificates containing particulars of employment which must be produced on demand. The enforcement of these regulations involves a "harassing and constant interference with the freedom of movement of Natives [which] gives rise to a burning sense of grievance and injustice," and leads to a large number of convictions, amounting in South Africa to 125,000 a year. It is significant that pass laws, though recommended at times, have not been introduced in territories such as Uganda, Tanganyika, and Nyasaland, where the European employer exercises less influence on official policy.

The statutes restricting the movement of Africans, and the masters and servants laws which operate in most territories, contain penal clauses that make desertion from employment or breaches of discipline a criminal offense. These substitutes for the more usual sanctions available to employers in other countries, such as dismissal from employment or a claim for damages, have their origin in the African's inexperience of the master-servant relationship, his ability, owing to the unspecialized nature of his work, to change his employment with relative ease, his retention of a base in the reserves on which he can fall back if unemployed and where his family can subsist in partial independence of his wages, the reluctance of employers to provide incentives by improving conditions of work, and above all his inferior status. With the growth of a body of permanent workers in the towns and the increasing dependence of the migrant workers on wage earning, prosecutions under the labor laws have steadily diminished in urban and mining centers in South Africa. The penal sanctions retain, however, their significance in relation to the farm workers, who, undergoing a transition from the position of share-cropper and labor tenant to that of a full-time wage earner, and deprived of many of the privileges, such as the right to pasture stock, that made agricultural employ-

58 Under the Southern Rhodesia Native Passes Act and Native Registration Act.  
59 Under the Kenya Native Registration Ordinance, the Resident Labourers Ordinance, and the Employment of Servants Ordinance.  
ment attractive, now tend to migrate from the farms to the towns. The farming community, suffering a chronic shortage of labor and unwilling or unable to compete for it with other classes of employers, has strongly opposed attempts to abolish or relax the pass laws and masters and servants laws.62

Most of the conditions giving rise to legislation of this kind would disappear if the forces set in motion by the European economy were allowed free play. The tendency is for Africans to settle permanently with their families in the towns. The number of Africans living in South African urban areas increased by 287.1 percent from 439,707 males and 147,293 females in 1921 to 1,094,322 males and 590,890 females in 1946. The increase in the number of females in particular is a reflection of the growth of an urbanized African community. If the process of urbanization were allowed to take its course, a stable body of workers would develop which, being wholly dependent on wages, would respond to the incentives and conform to the standards of discipline found in mature industrialized societies. There is the additional advantage, recognized in the Belgian Congo, of an increase in efficiency and productivity on the part of the permanent wage earner. In South Africa the need to achieve stability in the labor market has been emphasized by numerous government commissions,63 but the government has preferred to tighten controls and extend them to new areas such as the Western Cape.

The migrant's possession of a source of income in the reserves has the paradoxical effect of strengthening his bargaining power while at the same time depressing wages below minimum standards of living. That is to say, in so far as wage rates are adjusted to the relation between the supply and demand of labor, he uses his favorable position to obtain a wage income sufficient to bridge the gap between subsistence needs and the income derived from production in the reserves. This level of wages is clearly inadequate for the land-
less migrant and the urbanized worker. In reality, however, em­
ployers show a marked resistance to any tendency for wages to
increase in response to labor scarcity. Farmers call upon the govern­
ment to make labor available, and the mine owners, in addition to
recruiting foreign workers, have virtually eliminated competition
among themselves for African labor by agreeing that no mine shall
pay more than a specified maximum average. As a result, no sub­
stantial increase has taken place in mine wage rates for Africans
since 1914. The employers' resistance to granting wage increases is
all the more effective because of the poor state of trade-union or­
ganization among Africans, the prohibition of strikes by Africans,64
and their exclusion from the industrial legislation providing for the
settlement of disputes and the negotiation of agreements between
employers and employees. A Wage Board has fixed wage rates for
numerous categories of employees in commerce and industry, but
not at subsistence levels where unskilled workers are concerned.

Unskilled wage rates in South Africa are said to be on a level with
those paid in Italy, and skilled wages with those of Canada.65 The
comparison illustrates the peculiarity of the wage structure found
in Southern, Central, and Eastern Africa, where skilled work is re­
served largely for Europeans. In Western Europe, and the British
dominions, the spread between the highest and lowest rates of wages
is in the neighborhood of 30 percent, and seldom exceeds 50 percent;
in South Africa it is several hundred percent; In many South Afri­
can industries the skilled worker earns as much in a day as the un­
skilled man earns in a week. European workers, including semiskilled
and unskilled, in private industry, received an average annual wage
of £279 in 1941–42, as compared with the average of £60 paid
to Africans. This unusual disparity evolved in the early period of
mining and industrial development, when artisans were scarce, and
had to be attracted from abroad, while unskilled labor was abun­
dant and cheap. In course of time, traditional practices became part
of the color-caste organization; differences between skilled and un­
skilled occupations came to be regarded primarily as differences be­
tween European and non-European. Only in the Cape, where

64 Under Masters and Servants Laws, the Native Labour Regulation Act, and a
War Emergency Proclamation which is still in force.
65 Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. 282 (1945), par. 120.
Colored people supplied the bulk of craft labor for many generations, are non-European artisans found in large numbers. The industrial color bar, as the barriers are commonly known, consists of a number of conventional and legal devices to give the European a monopoly of skilled work. Few statutes contain specific discriminations against the employment of non-Europeans, the most notable instances being the Mines and Works Act Amendment Act of 1926, in terms of which regulations have been issued preventing Africans and Indians from qualifying for certain specified occupations, and the Industrial Conciliation Act, which excludes Africans from the machinery established for the settlement of industrial disputes. An Apprenticeship Act, operating in conjunction with the virtual absence of facilities for the industrial training of non-Europeans, has the effect of confining apprenticeship to Europeans with few exceptions. More important than these laws, however, are the monopolistic policies pursued by the craft unions and the preference of employers for European skilled workers, particularly when the same wage rates are fixed for all workers doing the same class of work.

Competition between racial groups occurs not only as a result of the upward movement of non-Europeans, but also through the impoverishment of a section of the European community. That position has existed for several generations in South Africa, where the rural white population has also undergone a process of rapid cultural transformation, resulting in the migration of a large proportion to the towns. The "poor white" shares the political and legal privileges of the superior caste, but for want of ability or opportunity is unable to rise above the economic level of the lower-class non-European. In an attempt to repair this damage to the caste barriers and to reduce the area of interracial contact on an equal plane, the state has adopted a "civilized labor policy" of employing Europeans as unskilled workers at subsidized wage rates. Further industrialization, it is realized, must result in a reduction in the proportion of work held to be skilled, now probably higher in South Africa than in any other industrialized country, and a considerable increase in the number of semiskilled workers of all races. Desirable though this

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development appears on economic grounds, the ultimate political and social consequences of the equalizing effects are not acceptable to the European ruling class. The possibility of introducing horizontal segregation in industry where vertical segregation has broken down is now being explored. The establishment, partly with state funds, of a textile factory at Kingwilliamstown near the reserves, in which only Africans will be employed as operatives, is an illustration of the proposals now being made for a policy of decentralization in industry, involving the transfer to the reserves of some of the industries making cheap standardized wares for native consumption, as well as for a policy of residential separation and racial parting in factories.67

Regarded from a different viewpoint, the industrial color bar is an indication of the extent to which the non-European has been drawn into industry and of the challenge he offers to racial discrimination in this sphere. If discriminatory practices in other types of occupation have received less prominence it is not because they are absent, but because the possibility of competition appears extremely remote. Moreover, while many employers and other influential sections oppose the industrial color bar on economic grounds, the same groups usually assume without question that the exclusion of non-Europeans from professional, managerial, and other white-collar occupations is both inevitable and desirable. There are non-European artisans, principally Colored and Indians, who work for an employer or on their own account but, in a number of occupations traditionally associated with middle-class status, European monopoly is very nearly complete. In the public services and on the state-owned railways, non-Europeans with few exceptions are employed only as laborers, messengers, or in other subordinate posts. Banks, insurance companies, business concerns, and other privately owned concerns under European control similarly exclude non-Europeans from all but the most menial occupations. According to the industrial census of 1941–42, 30,549 Europeans were occupied as working proprietors, managers, accountants, and salaried personnel, as compared with 118 Africans, 177 Colored and 560 Asians. Similarly, in the professions non-Europeans are represented by an insignificant number. The 1936 census returns show that there

67 Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. 282 (1945), par. 135.
were 9,090 Europeans, 14 Africans, 23 Colored and 25 Asiatics following the profession of advocate, attorney, architect, civil engineer, dentist, chemist, or medical practitioner. The non-European is not shut out from these occupations by a legal barrier; he is excluded because there are no educational facilities, or because he cannot avail himself of those that exist; because professional men refuse to article non-Europeans; or because the government employs only Europeans in the important posts of the public service. The rule that no non-European is to be placed in authority over Europeans gives the European a virtual monopoly over all positions of structural importance in the social hierarchy.

In spite of this rigid caste system, the more mature and diversified South African economy opens up wider opportunities for the majority of Africans than exist in territories further north. Money wages of skilled workers are higher, both the standard of living and the wage rates of unskilled workers are lower, than in South Africa. There is consequently a migration of white South Africans to the Rhodesias, and a migration of Rhodesian Africans to South Africa. The South African pattern of race relations is being reproduced in broad outline in the Rhodesias, where a strict color bar prevails on the railways and copper mines. In the other British colonies, however, the number of white artisans is small, and there has been no state intervention to restrict the entry of Africans into skilled occupations. On the contrary, since Indians provide the bulk of skilled labor, and as European hostility towards the Indian is pronounced, the tendency has been to train Africans to oust the Indian artisan. To continue the comparison with southern African conditions, the East African territories may be said to afford greater scope for a limited number of Africans in the railway service, government departments, the building trade and industry. During the war South Africa looked to the European population to provide the additional skilled labor force required; in East Africa it was the African who received training as tradesmen, telegraphists, radio operators, dental mechanics, and clerks. In administration and commerce, on the other hand, the new generation of Kenya-born Europeans is pushing

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downward in competition with Indians for clerical and other subordinate positions. It is possible, then, that a stratification of the European community will lead to the adoption of the South African measures for safeguarding a specifically European standard of living against the African and Asiatic.

_Aids to Welfare_

An analogy, useful for some purposes, can be drawn between the changes now taking place in Africa and the effects of what is commonly known as the industrial revolution in Europe and America. It is not a parallel, however, that should be taken very far. In the Western world, the new economic organization was a culmination of earlier developments, the result of a process of internal growth that reacted upon the whole of the society. There was much dislocation, but also a large amount of correlation between changes in economic, political, legal, family, and other institutions. In Africa, the impetus to change comes from agencies external to the indigenous society; the degree of correlation is small, and the extent of disequilibrium great. The European, concerned primarily with the exploitation of natural resources, concentrated his capital and energy on railways, farms, and mines, and neglected the building of schools, houses, and hospitals for the African. Considerable effort was expended in converting the peasant into a wage earner; very much less attention was given to his physiological and cultural needs. Money could be found for economic ventures, but not for social services. Provision has been made for the African's needs, not concurrently with economic development, but subsequent to it, even though the effects of the time-lag have been harmful both to the African and to economic progress.

If the services required could be arranged on a schedule of priorities, first preference would have to be given to education. The school is an indispensable medium for preparing the African to cope with changes that take place through other means. In providing educational facilities, the authorities have had to start from scratch; to find a literary form for the spoken word, as well as books, teachers, and buildings. The first schools in all the territories were opened by missionaries, as part of their proselytizing work, and they still
play a dominant part in non-European education. The state's contribution has consisted of grants-in-aid and the establishment of a central administration, operating through an inspectorate, to bring about uniformity and the observance of minimum standards. Progress might have been slower if the governments had assumed sole responsibility; they would, for instance, have been more sensitive to European opinion hostile to non-European education. The present arrangement, however, is unsatisfactory, in that it militates against coordination and systematic planning. The case for state provision and control of schools has been greatly strengthened by the large growth in the government's share of expenditure on education.

No more than a superficial examination of school statistics is needed to show that an enormous leeway has to be made up. The position in South Africa, where both European and non-European education has reached a higher level than that attained in other territories, may be taken as a guide. Education is compulsory only for European children, who are required to attend school until reaching the age of 15 or 16, according to provincial regulations, or until passing standard six or eight. Although both primary and secondary education is free for Europeans in all except one of the provinces, only 55 percent of children aged 16 are in school, and not more than 11 out of every 100 pupils matriculate. With regard to university education, however, better provision has been made for the European community than that existing in most other countries. In 1940 the number of university students, including non-Europeans, was 11,220; in 1945 it rose to 14,220; and in 1946, as a result of the influx of ex-servicemen, the peak figure of 20,186 was reached.

A considerable expansion of facilities for the education of non-Europeans has taken place in the past two decades. The number of pupils has trebled and the expenditure quadrupled. In 1925 there were 188,400 African and 64,000 Colored and Asiatic children at school; in 1945 the numbers had increased to 588,000 and 200,000 respectively. State expenditure on African primary and secondary education increased from £605,500 in 1934-35 to £2,540,000 in 1946-47; while in the latter period another £860,000 was spent on meals for African schoolchildren. In spite of this progress, only about 7 percent of the African population attend school, as compared
with 16 percent of the Colored and Asiatic and 20 percent of the European population. Of African children in the age group 7 to 14 years, 30 percent are at school in any one year, compared with 77 percent of Colored and Asiatic and 100 percent of European children.

In all non-European schools a large turnover is experienced, and the majority of pupils leave school with a very elementary education. Accommodation and equipment, generally adequate in state schools, are inadequate and unsuitable in most of the mission schools. There is much discrimination to the disadvantage of non-Europeans in respect of school fees, boarding grants, transport facilities and grants, the provision of books, hostel accommodation, the salaries and training of teachers, and the ratio of pupils to teachers. These qualitative differences are reflected in the comparative costs. State expenditure on European primary and secondary education in 1940-41 amounted to £22 11s. 3d. per pupil, as compared with £7 spent on every Colored and £3 os. 4d. on every African pupil in the Cape Province, where provision for non-Europeans is most generous.

Higher education for Africans, including a course for training medical aids, is provided at the South African Native College at Fort Hare, with a current enrollment of over 300 post-matriculation students, some of whom come from outside South Africa. Non-Europeans are also admitted to courses at the Universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand, and Natal, but are excluded from other university institutions. In addition, of some 3,000 students registered in the University of South Africa more than a fourth are non-Europeans. It is with respect to technical training that non-European education has made least progress. Four schools have been established for training Africans as agricultural demonstrators, non-Europeans are admitted to a small number of courses at the Cape Town and Witwatersrand technical colleges, and several missionary institutions train Africans in carpentry, building, printing, bookbinding, and other trades. But the numbers involved are insignificant. The Social and Economic Council's comment on the inadequacy of facili-

70 Exclusive of Asiatics in Natal, of whose school-age population 45 percent are estimated to be at school.
71 For a comprehensive survey of facilities available for each racial group see Report of the Provincial Financial Resources Committee, U.G. No. 9, 1944.
ties for non-European vocational education is that unless they are improved "the Union is doomed to a losing competitive struggle against the mentally developed labour of the Western countries, against the awakening Eastern races and even against other parts of Africa." 72

In other territories, African education is at a lower level in most respects than in South Africa. The number of pupils enrolled may be proportionately greater, but the type of education provided is usually inferior. The proportion of children of school age attending school at any one time ranges from 18 percent in Kenya to 50 percent in Nyasaland. The great majority of pupils are found at "kraal" or "bush" schools, many of which because of their low standards do not qualify for government grants. 73 A large proportion of pupils receives no more than a kindergarten education, attendance is irregular, the rate of elimination extremely high, and very few pupils reach the secondary standards. Provision for higher education is made at Makerere College in Uganda, which gives courses in medicine, agriculture, veterinary science, and teaching, for matriculated students from East African territories. Technical training in such trades as carpentry, building, and leatherwork is given at missionary institutions in all the territories, and at government schools in most of them.

The discrepancy between the state's expenditure on European and on African education, which was seen to be a marked feature of the South African system, is even more noticeable in some of the other territories. In 1938 the government spent £6 per head of population on non-African education and 1s. 5d. on African education in Southern Rhodesia; in Northern Rhodesia the corresponding figures were £5 and 8d., and in Nyasaland 11s. and 3d. 74 In Kenya, government expenditure per European pupil in 1944 was estimated to be £23.6.61s., per Indian £5.5.30s., and per African 12.2.5s. 75

74 Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, par. 203.
Health and Housing

To the African's handicap of illiteracy is added a considerable burden of ill-health. He does not eat enough to sustain health, and what he eats is often deficient in protein, vitamins, and calcium. In South Africa, malnutrition is widespread also among other sections of the population, and the National Nutrition Council, established in 1940, has stated that "malnutrition is an urgent national problem of enormous extent. . . . If this insidious deterioration process is much prolonged, the cumulative result on the future labour supply of the country and on the quality of its people must be calamitous." 76 Food deficiencies have been found in all the other territories.77 The undernourished African has to grapple with a host of tropical diseases, many of them associated with poor diet, poor housing, impure water, and the absence of effective sanitation. Malaria occurs in most parts, with the exception of highland regions and the more southerly districts of South Africa. Sleeping sickness is found throughout Central Africa and in East Africa. Hookworm, bilharzia, and other worm diseases are serious in most territories; in East Africa over 90 percent of the population are believed to be infected with one or more kinds of worm. Outbreaks of formidable epidemic diseases, such as smallpox, typhus, and typhoid fever, are frequent in most territories. Cases of leprosy occur throughout Africa, though compulsory isolation has reduced its prevalence. The worst scourges are syphilis and tuberculosis, both of which seem to have been unknown in southern Africa before the European era. In South Africa it is estimated that 20,000 persons die annually of tuberculosis, the incidence of which is many times higher among non-Europeans than among European.78 It has been calculated that the incidence of yaws and syphilis in East Africa is 60 percent.79 Although vital statistics of rural Africans are not recorded in any territory, there is abundant descriptive and some statistical evidence of the high incidence of diseases. The frequently quoted saying that "disease knows no color bar" is misleading. In South Africa the non-

77 See E. B. Worthington, Science in Africa (London, 1938), Chap. XVII.
78 The Senate of South Africa, Debates, 22d April, 1947, col. 1297.
European death rate is believed to be about twice that of the European. In 1942 the percentage infant mortality rate among Europeans was 4.75, among Asiatics 8.84, and among Colored people 17.67. The comparable African figure is unknown, but estimates of infant mortality in urban areas have ranged from 20 to 40 percent, and an investigation carried out in the reserves of the Cape Province in 1937 showed that mortality during the first year of life was approximately 25 percent, during the second year 33 percent, and by the time the age of 18 was reached, 50 percent.

African diseases are bred out of the African's poverty. Unless standards of nutrition, housing, sanitation and education are raised far above existing levels, very little headway can be made against disease. Nor can any territory provide curative treatment and preventive services on anything like the scale required as long as national incomes remain at the present figures. Health services are grossly inadequate in relation to African needs; they would be inadequate even for a society with the health standards found in Europe. As recently as 1938, in a relatively advanced territory like Southern Rhodesia, no medical facilities were available for about a quarter of the African population. In Northern Rhodesia, at the same period, more than half the territory was without medical attention. In the three East African territories, government hospitals before the war provided a total of about 5,300 beds for an aggregate African population of not less than 11 millions, an average of about one bed for every 2,000 persons, as compared with one bed available for every 150 Europeans. In South Africa a ratio of one bed for every 200 of population has been accepted as representing adequate provision for general hospitalization. Accommodation for Europeans in provincial and mission hospitals and in nursing homes in 1941 conformed to the desired standard; for non-Europeans, however, the beds provided amounted to an average of one for every 920 persons.80 In respect not only of hospitals, but also of the number of medical practitioners and nurses, clinics and health centers, South Africa is far better equipped than other African territories. Yet the National Health Services Commission of 1944 found that personal

80 Report of the Provincial Financial Resources Committee, par. 378. For Africans the Committee accepted a standard of one bed per 600 units on grounds of expediency.
preventive services were rudimentary and incomplete; personal curative services were totally inadequate for the great mass of the people; health services generally were distributed mainly among the wealthier sections who needed them least, and were but poorly supplied to the underprivileged groups. The Commission proposed a national health scheme, financed by means of a special tax, and based on a network of 400 health centers. Up to the present, the main developments have been the authorization of a hospital tax on Africans alone, the establishment of 16 health centers, seven of them in the reserves, an increase in the number of whole-time district surgeons bringing it up to 40, provision for free hospitalization in some provinces, greater facilities for training non-European medical practitioners and nurses, and the elaboration of a centralized health administration.

For all their inadequacy, health services represent a great advance over the tribal methods of treating diseases. This cannot be said of the housing accommodation provided for the majority of Africans. In this respect, standards have tended to deteriorate under European rule. Attention has already been drawn to the primitive nature of the traditional hut in the reserves. The tribal village, however, in addition to possessing an aesthetic charm, did avoid overcrowding, while the frequent rebuilding of huts reduced the extent of vermin infestation. These qualities have largely been lost in areas where villages are permanently sited because of the scarcity of land and of building material. It is a growing practice, though one contrary to tribal rules, for adults to share the same huts with young persons, and in the permanently established village, the absence of sanitary controls becomes a menace to health.

These conditions are duplicated on most European farms, where the laborer usually builds his hut out of local materials such as grass and sods, wattle and daub. On larger estates of the plantation type, employing migrant workers for the cultivation of sugar, sisal, tea, wattle, maize, and other commercial crops, the tendency is to build barracks which, apart from affording protection against rain and wind, have little claim to merit. Similar compounds, or one-roomed huts, are also found on most mining properties; with some exceptions, such as the Wankie collieries in Southern Rhodesia and certain of the Northern Rhodesia copper mines, it is not the prac-
tice in British territories to provide accommodation for the families of African miners. The mine compound, unattractive though it is and devoid of any of the qualities of a home, does at least conform to a prescribed standard of hygiene. It is within the urban areas and on their boundaries that the slum conditions characteristic of industrialized countries have been reproduced with most harmful effects. Where towns are small and Africans are able to live on their own lands in the vicinity, as is the rule in Uganda and Nyasaland, the number housed within the urban area can be kept at an insignificant figure by limiting the right of residence to domestic servants and other persons employed in the town. In most of the large urban areas in all the territories, however, the problem of housing the African has been found insoluble.

South Africa once again provides an extreme example. In 1919 it was estimated that 10,000 new houses were needed in urban areas for Europeans and a similar number for Africans. The latest figures show a shortage of 60,000 houses for Europeans and another 120,000 for non-Europeans. Restricted by the segregation policy to a limited residential area, prohibited in most towns from buying or leasing land, unable to obtain credit facilities from building societies and other financial organizations, the African, and to a lesser extent the Colored and Indian, are dependent upon the accommodation provided by local authorities or the central government in "locations" and townships. In some of the new locations the standard of housing is satisfactory; in the majority, families regardless of size have to live in two- or three-roomed houses which "are from the first day of their occupation overcrowded and therefore slums as defined in the Second Schedule to the Slums Act, and escape condemnation as such only by reason of the specific withdrawal of Native locations from the purview of the latter Act." For the non-European communities, water supplies, sanitation and other environmental services are usually inadequate. Poor though these standards are, they compare favorably with the conditions under which large proportions of the non-European urban community live in privately owned houses. Forced out of the towns by high rents, scarcity of housing,

81 Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives, par. 94.
and the segregation laws, many have settled in the peri-urban areas in shacks of wood and corrugated iron, clay and wattle, or poles and sacking, with primitive sanitary arrangements and poor cooking facilities. As many as 100,000 Africans live under these conditions around Johannesburg alone.

Similar slums have developed in and about the urban areas of other territories. Accommodation is often of the barrack type, a survival of earlier days; or Africans are allowed to build their own huts on stands rented from the local authority. Both types of housing have proved unsatisfactory. It is now recognized that primitive housing is as undesirable in the towns of Africa as in the cities of Europe, and that the African cannot out of his own resources provide himself with a satisfactory standard of accommodation. Attempts to design a type of house that would be adequate and at the same time within the African's means have not been successful. Either the standard must be lowered, which is what occurs in the slums and in a great deal of the housing provided by employers and public authorities, or rents have to be subsidized out of rates and taxes. The second alternative has been followed to a varying extent in most territories, but not on a sufficiently large scale to eliminate the slums that have been inherited from an earlier period, nor even to keep pace with the growth in the urban population. Although a sub-economic housing scheme was instituted in South Africa as far back as 1930, the rate of construction of subsidized houses averaged only about 2,000 a year up to 1944. Since then greater efforts have been made, including the creation of a new central housing authority with extremely wide powers, and the adoption of a national building program of £40 million. In spite of these provisions, only 7,000 houses for Africans were built in 1946 under schemes financed by the government.

One of South Africa's peculiar difficulties is that Africans, debarred from skilled trades by the color bar, have to live in houses whose costs are largely determined by the living standards of European employers and artisans. In the face of strong opposition from the building trade unions, the government has embarked upon the

83 See Labour Conditions in Northern Rhodesia (1938), Colonial No. 150, and Labour Conditions in East Africa (1946), Colonial No. 193, both by Major G. St. J. Orde Browne.
training of African artisans, who are to be employed at reduced wage rates on building houses for Africans alone, but by the middle of 1947 only 50 had been trained, while 81 more were undergoing training. The experience of other territories where Africans are employed as artisans in the building trades indicates, however, that the great obstacle to adequate housing is not the relatively high wage of the European worker but the poverty of the African.

**Labor and Social Welfare**

The presence of a large body of European wage earners, well organized and politically influential, has the effect of narrowing the non-European’s field of employment to the less skilled types of work. The disability is offset to some extent by his participation in the benefits of an advanced standard of labor welfare legislation which the African unaided cannot hope to secure. In South Africa industrial workers of all races derive advantage from the collective-bargaining and wage-fixing machinery, and from statutory provisions insuring a 46-hour working week, limitations on overtime, increased pay for overtime, annual holidays with pay, confinement allowances, protective clothing, cloak-room facilities, and safety appliances. Compensation is payable to non-Europeans as well as to Europeans, though on a lower scale to Africans, for injuries sustained or diseases contracted during the course of employment. Unemployment insurance, recently established on a national basis, covers employed persons regardless of race. The two fields of employment, agriculture and private domestic service, in which the number of European wage earners is negligible, are significantly excluded from the whole range of labor welfare, while separate and on the whole inferior provision is made for the African miner, who is also excluded from unemployment insurance and from the provisions for paid holidays and increased overtime pay. In the British colonies, with industrial development at a low level and a predominating African labor force in agriculture, mining, domestic and government service, labor legislation has scarcely advanced beyond the primitive stage of regulating and enforcing master and servant con-

84 *House of Assembly Debates, 2d June, 1947, col. 6348.*
85 *Unemployment Insurance Act, 1946.*
tracts, and of implementing international conventions relating to forced labor, recruiting, written contracts, and penal sanctions. A large number of statutes concerning labor conditions was enacted during the war, but the main improvements consisted of relieving the severity of the penal sanctions applied to contracts and of greater protection for juveniles.

In yet another respect—the alleviation of poverty—South Africa is far in advance of the rest of the continent. One of the striking developments of the past decade in South Africa has been the expansion of welfare services, including the creation of a separate government department of Social Welfare, and their extension to non-Europeans. Although the cruder forms of "poor relief," such as the discretionary issue of pauper rations or the subsidization of rents, are still common, the main trend has been towards the introduction of regular payments to beneficiaries falling within prescribed categories. A survey made in 1940 showed that "ethnic discrimination in the social services of the Union is the rule rather than the exception, and does not excite much comment. There are fewer social services available to the non-European than to the European, and many of those that are available are far from adequate. This is true both of private and State services." 

Old-age pensions were payable to Europeans and Colored persons only, invalidity pensions to Europeans only, state-aided butter and milk schemes were not available to Africans, nor to Asiatics in Natal, and institutionalized treatment of most kinds was provided on a far more generous scale for Europeans. An estimate of the annual expenditure in 1941–43 on all forms of social insurance and assistance measures showed that out of a total of £9¾ million, Europeans received more than £8¾ million, the Colored £¾ million, and the Africans only £598,000. It is doubtful whether there has been any significant change in these proportions, but effective recognition has been given to non-European claims. Since 1944, blind-persons, old-age, and invalidity pensions have been extended to members of all the non-European groups, the basic rates per annum being fixed at £42 for Europeans, £21 to £24 for Colored and Asiatics, and £12, £9, and

£6 for Africans in cities, towns, and urban areas respectively. In 1947 the payment of family allowances was instituted, but to the exclusion of Africans. Race discrimination is still observed, with regard to both the scope and the quality of the services provided, and the standard of relief is meager; yet these recent developments are important because they entail an admission that non-European poverty is the concern of the whole community.

Implicit in that admission is a challenge to the basis of South African society. There are limits to the extent to which mass poverty on the African scale can be mitigated by a transfer of income from the privileged section. Professor Batson points out: "Long before relief-transfers in the Union could become big enough to have an appreciable direct effect upon the burden of poverty, their effect upon the contributing groups would transform the present capitalist industrial system from top to bottom." 88 The distribution of wealth is correlated with the distribution of political power, and few European taxpayers would be disposed to accept a lower standard of living in order to raise non-European standards. Considerable opposition has been shown, and is still manifested, to the extension of unemployment benefits, old-age and invalidity pensions, and school feeding schemes, to non-Europeans. There is also the economic difficulty: with an average national income of only £35 per head per annum, South Africa cannot afford social-service expenditure commensurate with Western standards. It has been calculated that, to achieve the necessary minimum of social security by 1955, the national income level would have to be raised by at least 50 percent over the 1938 level.89 It is conceivable that this target can be attained, but only if the structure of society is modified so as to allow the non-European to develop and apply his abilities.

In Transition

Measured in terms of standards of living, the development of new forms of social organization, educational statistics, and the output of literature, the non-European has progressed farther in South

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Africa than in any other territory south of the Sahara. It should not be supposed that there has been complete assimilation into a common culture. Most Africans retain traits that distinguish them from other groups. They still recognize tribal and clan affiliations, marry according to their customary laws, practice the traditional ancestor cult, and retain a strong belief in the efficacy of magic. Governmental organization has been adapted to these peculiar features. A separate Native Affairs Department is concerned exclusively with Africans, a special system of courts, staffed with Europeans, applies native law in civil cases between Africans, and tribal chiefs occupy a minor position in the administration of the reserves. In spite of the cultural heterogeneity, however, the anthropologist is already able to discern a "common South African civilization, shared in by both Black and White, and presenting certain peculiarities based directly upon the fact of their juxtaposition." Cultural differences no longer coincide, as they did in the early period of white settlement, with racial differences. The Colored people, and a large number of Indians, have been fully absorbed into the Western type of community. All South Africans are bound together in a single political and economic structure. Europeans and non-Europeans frequently do the same kind of work and have a similar economic status, receive the same kind of education, belong to the same churches, or trade unions, marry under the same laws, live in the same type of house, speak the same languages and play the same kind of games. They may even, as the war has shown, share a common set of loyalties, and cooperate in defense of an ideal acceptable to individuals of different races.

It is civic status, and not culture, that is correlated with racial origins. Europeans and non-Europeans at similar cultural levels have different rights and obligations. The differentiation is not absolute. All persons, for instance, are liable to pay income tax if they fall within the tax-paying categories. There is, however, differentiation between Europeans and non-Europeans, and between different groups of non-Europeans, in most of the consequences normally attached to citizenship status. Only Europeans are liable to con-

scription during war and to compulsory military training during peace. Only Europeans may be elected to Parliament and, except in the Cape Province, to Provincial Councils and Municipal Councils. Only Europeans possess adult franchise rights. There are no non-European judges, magistrates, or commissioned officers in the police and armed forces. Differentiation involves restrictions upon the right of Africans, and in some provinces of Indians and Colored, to acquire land and to trade. It involves a ban upon the movement of Indians from one province into another, and legal restrictions in the form of pass laws upon the movement of Africans. It involves racial separation, always to the disadvantage of non-Europeans, in residential areas, schools, churches, political and trade union organizations, trains and buses, hotels, cinemas, restaurants, recreation grounds, and public conveniences.

An authoritative body of European opinion, as we have seen, believes that the process of assimilation should be accelerated by encouraging the townward movement from the reserves, facilitating the absorption of non-Europeans in industry, and extending the scope of education, health and social services. The admission that the cultural barriers between white and black have broken down beyond repair, and that the future of all racial groups in South Africa must be worked out within the framework of a single society, is implicit in the comment of General Smuts: "Isolation has gone and segregation has fallen on evil days." Within this society, however, the majority of Europeans are determined to maintain their dominant position by enforcing the pattern of race discrimination. It is this relationship between white and black that General Smuts had in mind when, during the debate on the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill, he claimed that "South Africa has decided once and for all, that our complex society will be dealt with on separate lines. We have done it in the case of the natives, and we are going to do it in the case of the Indians." What is envisaged in this passage is a single society rigidly divided into hierarchical

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92 In July, 1943, registered parliamentary voters consisted of 1,282,605 Europeans, 46,335 Colored and Indians, and, on a separate roll, about 12,000 Africans.
orders, membership of which is determined at birth by racial characters.

Assimilation has not led to a relaxation of color bars. Indeed, a history of race relations in South Africa would show a tendency for discrimination to increase as the cultural gap between white and black diminishes. Africans in the Cape were removed from the common voters' roll in 1936, eighty years after they had been given the franchise on the same terms as Europeans. The 1946 legislation prohibiting Natal Indians from acquiring land or residing outside specified areas was a reaction to their successful adaptation to South African conditions and their ability to hold their own in competition with the European. Illicit sex relations between Africans and Europeans were made illegal in 1926; today there is persistent agitation among a section of the white population for the illegalization of marriages between Europeans and non-Europeans. These trends, however, reflect an awareness of the threat that assimilation presents to the color bar. Already a considerable number of non-Europeans are superior in education and economic standards to the lower-class Europeans. The dilemma was pointed out by Mr. Hofmeyr, Deputy Prime Minister, when he accused the Leader of the Nationalist Opposition, Dr. Malan, of seeking to do simultaneously two things which are ultimately incompatible. He wants to maintain a vertical colour line, on the basis of a policy of separation as he advocates it. He wants also to be just and generous to the extent, for instance, of giving non-Europeans a full university of their own as adequate as any of our European universities. But that university of his is going to set up trends which must inevitably destroy that vertical colour bar he is setting up.

The reality of this conflict has been grasped by a school of "totalitarian" segregationists, who now demand nothing less than the repatriation of all Indians—four-fifths of whom are South Africans by birth—and the expulsion of all Africans to an unknown destination.

To the non-European, race discrimination is part of the order of things, as inevitable as class differences appear to people in other

countries. Aspects of segregation—the pass and tax laws, the inadequacy of land in the reserves, police raids—are sources of constant dissatisfaction, but European domination is too pervasive and intensive, too traditional, for serious challenge. Moreover, the rapid expansion of the economy has provided the ambitious and able non-European with opportunity to improve his personal position in spite of the color bar. The greatest resistance to segregation has come from groups, such as the Natal Indians or the Colored teachers, who are being forced back to a lower level or who feel that further progress cannot be made under existing conditions. The non-European, however, is ceasing to be a passive factor in politics. Political education has been spread through agencies like the African National Congress, the Natal Indian Congress, trade unions, teachers’ leagues, and the press. A section has become politically conscious. The demand for an extension of the franchise is being raised. Significant developments have occurred since the end of the war: the “passive resistance” of Natal Indians to segregation and their rejection of the scheme for a communal franchise with representation by Europeans; the decision of the African members of the Native Representative Council (the body created to advise on African opinion) to suspend its sittings until the Government has proposed a policy acceptable to them; and the current campaign to boycott the election of the seven Europeans who represent Africans in Parliament. These events may be due to a postwar reaction, or they may be a prelude to a popular struggle of non-Europeans against race discrimination.

In the British dependencies, the imperial government has exercised a restraining influence on the growth of a caste system. Southern Rhodesia, with a status corresponding to that of a dominion, though nominally a colony, must be excepted from this generalization. The Crown retains the right to disallow legislation imposing special disabilities on Africans, but the colony’s pattern of race relations follows closely that of South Africa. The official policy of “parallel development” for white and black is in reality one of segregation and discrimination. As in the South, the prospect of non-European progress tends to intensify discrimination, a recent instance being the Prime Minister’s proposal, withdrawn after debate, to exclude Africans from the franchise and to substitute representa-
tion by two Europeans in Parliament. The reason given for the motion was that, although there are fewer than 200 Africans on the roll and no more than 2,000 possess the high qualifications prescribed for the vote, African voters may be in the majority in the next two or three decades.

In the Central and East African territories, the future of the Europeans themselves is uncertain. It is doubtful whether they will ever command a numerical strength that would enable them to enforce a caste system. The well-established Indian communities in these dependencies have in the past offered effective resistance to complete white domination, and the participation by Africans in local government according to indirect-rule principles may be expected to hasten their political development. For some time to come, however, the decisive factor must remain the nature of imperial colonial policy. Up to the present, the British Government, while acceding to a wide range of discrimination, has set its face against the transfer of full political authority to the settlers. In Kenya, for instance, though the doctrine of the "paramountcy of native interests," adopted in 1923 by the British Government as the basis of policy, was subsequently replaced by the concepts of "trusteeship" and the "dual mandate," the demand of the colonists for representative government has been resisted on the ground that it could not be representative of any but the white minority. The declared policy of the imperial authorities is to extend the franchise in different parts of Africa, and to put Africans on legislative councils. Africans, as well as Indians, are members of the legislative councils of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, and a similar step has been proposed for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Even though the European representatives may continue to form a majority for many years to come, the direct participation by the non-European in central government constitutes a sharp break with the South African tradition that has prevailed in the past.

These tendencies, as well as events abroad, are bound to have repercussions in South Africa. The criticisms at the United Nations of South African native and Indian policy made a deep impression on wide sections of the South African population, both European and

97 For an examination of their significance, see M. R. Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony (New York, 1937), Part III.
non-European. Non-Europeans are beginning to show an interest in the advance towards self-government in West African dependencies. South Africa, which formerly took the lead in social and economic progress, may find that more rapid advance is being made by the African in other parts of the continent. The changes that are taking place in the East, the emergence of new independent non-white states, the challenge to universal white domination, and the passing of the old imperialism, may be expected to weaken the structure of South Africa's caste society. In South Africa itself, as we have seen, strong economic and social forces are tending to undermine the bases of race discrimination. It is conceivable, however, that the dominant European minority will devote its energies to a strengthening of caste barriers, even at the cost of retarding its social progress and surrendering its own liberties.

SUGGESTED READINGS

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