The United States is ruling Japan. To the Japanese that is a fantastically preposterous outcome of their long-planned war to dominate. To Americans it still seems unreal. The traditional American aversion to conquest has not been reconciled with the cold fact that Tōkyō takes orders from Washington. The American habit of ignoring Asia facilitates an unconscious evasion of this contradiction. Inadvertency of dominion, however, does not abate the urgency of certain inevitable problems.

No one can rule wisely unless he understands those whom he rules. In this case, pink-tea concepts of international understanding lead to blundering and muddle; the need is for insight. Achievement of insight into Japanese society is the more imperative because of American ideals of responsible democratic government. Wise, blind, or indifferent, American voters ultimately determine the limits and trends of their nation's policy; the consequences of their decisions are inescapable for Americans and Japanese alike. Ordering the Japanese to abjure militarism and adopt democracy may be no more effective than commands shouted at the moon.

Before wise policies can be carried out over a term of years such policies must be understood. No one can command the American public to understand the Japanese. If such understanding is achieved there is a fighting chance that wisdom may prevail. If not, the wisest policy is defenseless against demagogues and popular ignorance. The penalty for bungling is automatic, inherent in the situation.

There have been many Japans. Intriguing glimpses of the earliest Japan, about the time of Christ, are possible through archaeology and history. Chinese documents refer to the curious customs of Wa, island country in the eastern ocean. There dwelt numerous tribes whose cultural practices hint at South Sea contacts as well
as affiliation with the Asiatic mainland. The Wa regarded their chieftains—some of whom were women—as supernaturally potent. The dominant tribes were immigrants who were driving back the aboriginal Ainu toward the northeast.

The next Japan, revealed in the earliest native records, was in process of consolidation under the rule of the tribe of Yamato. Stubborn chieftains who balked at subordination to the Yamato king received short shrift. Customs and folk tales of Asiatic origin were blending inextricably with beliefs and customs from the South Seas. The Yamato chieftain was beginning to assert prerogatives resembling those of the Chinese emperors, but his divine kingship was attested by hereditary sanctity like that of kings in the South Sea Islands. To record his mythical divine genealogy he employed Korean scribes who introduced Chinese writing and thereby inaugurated Japanese history.

The Japan of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries A.D. reflected the glory of China's preeminent T'ang dynasty. To absorb this brilliant civilization at its fountainhead, Japanese students flocked to China. In Nippon the court, capital, patterns of governance, Buddhist religion, art, literature, and architecture acknowledged Chinese models. Particularly in art and architecture the Chinese originals often were equaled, now and then surpassed. Women still retained a time-honored freedom and set the pace in literature, in contrast to the situation in China. The common folk experienced the new civilization only through relentless taxation and corvée; the Imperial court constituted an unreal world of aestheticism and pseudo-Chinese sophistication. Along the adventurous northeastern frontier, far from the brilliant courts of Nara and Kyōto, semi-independent feudal lords pressed back the still vigorous Ainu.

As the glory that was T'ang faded, Chinese influence waned. By the eleventh century another Japan was emerging. Power shifted to aggressive war lords bred on the Ainu frontier, whose bases lay remote from Kyōto and its sacrosanct, politically impotent emperor. Distinctively Japanese rituals of social intercourse and patterns of governance took shape. Subtly, however, Confucian and Buddhist influence abetted the fighting men in achieving the subordination of women. Buddhism, already decadent, underwent rejuvenation as new sects arose with uniquely Japanese characteristics.
The political struggle, ever more ruthless and disorganized, culminated in the devastating Onin war (1467–1477).

A strikingly different Japan was created when three great dictators enforced peace about 1600 A.D. Thenceforward for nearly three centuries political power resided in the House of Tokugawa. The emperor retained his sanctity but the Tokugawas kept the power. Closing Japan to the outer world symbolized a determination to petrify a feudal status quo by sumptuary legislation and rigorous policing. Successive dictators strove to control ideas and to congeal the arts; Confucian doctrine was reinterpreted to justify the Tokugawa regime. Continued peace, however, nurtured new arts and a new money economy. The ban upon change may have invited the internal collapse that neared its climax as Perry's famous expedition arrived to "open" Japan.

"Modern" Japan dates arbitrarily from 1868 when the Emperor was restored as nominal head of the state. Whether the surrender to American arms in 1945 will initiate another metamorphosis cannot be foreseen. Whatever may impend, the brief "modern" period from 1868 to 1945 affords a key to current happenings. This essay accordingly focuses upon the thought-ways, customs, and societal patterns of that brief epoch, and the historical present tense refers to the "modern" period, not to the MacArthur episode.

Despite the plural historical Japans, certain persisting themes impart unity to Nippon's history. Assiduously as the Japanese copied China, they nevertheless boast that they remained Japanese, distinct in personal character, tastes, and feelings. Japanese cultural patterns subtly belie their superficially Chinese aspects. In contrast to China, warriors held ascendancy over literati, priests, peasants, and craftsmen. Confucianism, Buddhism, familism, and even Chinese writing underwent adaptation, not mere adoption. The Japanese learned avidly from foreign sources while aggressively asserting their superiority to all foreign barbarians. In patterns of governance, despite radical outward transformations, a consistent theme persists: like the South Sea peoples they have maintained a sanctified supreme magical ruler shorn of political power. The real controls have operated quietly from behind the scenes. Even shōguns, ostensibly masters of the Emperor, often answered in their turn to hidden manipulators. In religion, durable folkways of ancient belief in in-
tangible supernatural power called *kami* infused a characteristic content into both Buddhist and Confucian forms. Another age-old theme is enforcement of Spartan frugality upon the many to provide luxury for the few. Recurrently such luxury outruns the slender resources of islands whose bounty cannot multiply as do the inhabitants. When this economic strain attains a climax, transition to another Japan impends.

The consequences of Japan’s geographic position with respect to several great cultural areas are basic, though difficult to analyze. Ethnographically Japan is marginal to China, to the Malayo-Polynesian region, and to Siberia with its Central Asiatic affiliations. From all of these regions—by channels often lost to history—customs, ideas, beliefs, and technologies were carried to Japan. Since the middle of the nineteenth century still another alien influence has overshadowed these older contacts: the expanding Euro-American civilization. Attempts to allocate specific Japanese cultural forms among these sources are beyond the scope of the present discussion. The historical record, however, is clear with respect to Chinese and Euro-American influence. The record also shows that the Japanese have not received passively whatever foreigners chose to bring them; rather they have aggressively sought out what they desired from China, Europe, and America.

Deliberate exclusion of all the historical Japans save that of the “modern” period simplifies the present description. A related difficulty, however, persists.

Today, also, there are many Japans. The fundamental, enduring Japan is that of the forty-odd million peasants. Persistent also is that of the Imperial Court, now allegedly waning. The omnipresent bureaucracy is another world of its own. Still another Japan includes the families who dominate commerce, finance, and industry; while that of the military hierarchy has usually dominated the historical records. Then there are intelligentsia, technicians, the “fleeting world” of demimonde and *geisha*, soldiers, sailors, factory hands, advocates of modernization, nostalgic but violent reactionaries who inhabit a feudalistic dreamland—to say nothing of fascists, Rotarians, cinema addicts, communists, Salvation Army, labor bosses, political gangsters, Buddhist monks, and politicians. Perhaps still another Japan—MacArthur’s Japan—may hold sway for a mo-
ment, to disappear like Cinderella’s coach when the time comes.

If the Japanese people act so much alike that their homogeneity is impressive, it must be acknowledged that this homogeneity is highly diversified. How then can Japan be described briefly? It is possible to outline the limits of conduct within which diversities occur. Beyond these limits an individual promptly is stigmatized as un-Japanese. Within them one may be queer, his ideas may be suspect, but he remains a queer Japanese, a radical Japanese, or a maladjusted Japanese. The usual patterns of conduct may be conceived after the analogy of statistical modes—the most frequent among many varying occurrences—in order to describe them broadly. The range of variation so patent to anyone who learns to feel at home in Japan is omitted deliberately.

GEOGRAPHY.—Japan is not a Japanese word. The Chinese name Jiḥ-pen means “Source of the Sun” and derives obviously from the position of the islands off China’s eastern coast. Anglicized it became “Japan.” The Japanese pronounce these Chinese ideographs Nibon or Nippon; by these words they denote both their country and its people.

Japan Proper comprises thousands of small islands and four large ones: Honshū, Kyūshū, Shikoku, and Hokkaidō. From northeast to southwest for fifteen hundred miles they dangle in a long festoon off the Asiatic coast. Hokkaidō, the northernmost, resembles Maine or Newfoundland in climate. Southward, mean temperatures increase until in Kyūshū the climate compares with that of Florida. Bathed by the warm Black Current, the southern tips of Kyūshū, Shikoku, and the Kii peninsula of Honshū enjoy subtropical climate. Across the islands on the shores of the Japan Sea deep snows persist throughout the winter from Toyama north.

In land area, Japan Proper approximates California. Rugged mountains, however, permit cultivation of but 15 percent of the area. This compares favorably with California, where about 7 percent is cultivated and not more than 13 percent is regarded as arable. Wherever feasible, Japanese hillsides are terraced to utilize every inch of tillable land.

The mountains, geologically young, are unusually precipitous. Several peaks exceed 10,000 feet in height; the sacred Mount Fuji
JAPAN PROPER, SHOWING DENSITY OF POPULATION AND SIX LARGEST CITIES

Density of population indicates approximate distribution of level land. Urban areas, shown in black, indicate also the industrial concentrations. Non-urban areas of high density indicate approximate distribution of rice land. Areas of low population density generally are rugged and mountainous.

By courtesy of the Department of Geography, Syracuse University. Drawn by Lillian Johnson, after Trewartha.
reaches over 12,000 feet. In dry weather the short steep rivers dwindle to mere creeks and river navigation is negligible. In the rare level districts, canals carry much heavy freight. Abundant rainfall keeps the mountains green to their very summits. Slight earthquakes occur frequently in most districts and every few years a major earthquake strikes. Many of the severe shocks occur in rural areas; when one wrecks a city as in 1923 in Tōkyō and Yokohama, the disaster transcends description.

The few plains, which include most of the arable land, adjoin the sea. Proximity of the ocean and scarcity of agricultural land foster general dependence on marine products. Fish, crustaceans, mussels, and seaweed afford protein in the popular diet. For more than fifteen centuries Japanese fishermen have exploited the rich coastal waters and have ventured far into the Pacific.

Mineral resources, area for area, compare favorably with the Asiatic mainland. The fairly abundant bituminous coal is costly to mine because the seams are badly folded and broken. Sulphur is plentiful. Copper and gold occur in moderate quantities. Tin, silver, lead, magnesium, mercury, antimony, and petroleum exist in small deposits. Iron ore is plentiful but of a grade thus far unsuited for industrial use. Japan’s mineral resources do not suffice for intensive industrialization although they would be adequate for a smaller population. They might supply the present population under an economy oriented to consumer needs rather than to war and heavy industry.

Apart from the ocean the outstanding natural resource is the forests. On most of the mountainous 80 percent of the land, conservation and reforestation have maintained forest cover. The forests could provide the building materials, fuel, synthetic fibers, and chemicals necessary to a standard of living like that of 1930. Such a wood-based economy differs from an iron-based economy, but permits a scale of living better than current Chinese or Indian standards. Wooden or concrete instead of steel-framed buildings; wooden railway cars and bus bodies; wooden utensils; charcoal fuel; rayon textiles; wood-derived chemicals such as industrial alcohol; wooden ships—this specialized economy can be maintained and extended with proper forest management.
Steep gradients and heavy rainfall encourage hydroelectric development. Inadequate space for storage reservoirs, however, drastically reduces the supply of electricity in the dry months. The heavy industries of the 1930 decade obtained supplementary power from high-cost steam plants. Even so, the per capita consumption of electricity exceeds that of European countries; short distances mean short transmission lines, and almost every peasant’s hut has electric lights.

The islands are famed for scenery. The green-clad, precipitous mountains often descend directly to the islet-studded ocean; the white surf, dashing streams, and almost vertical mist-shrouded peaks of Japanese paintings have their counterpart in reality. From sea level to mountain heights climate and vegetation pass through a wide gamut of change; for this reason most of the attempts to map clear-cut climatic zones are misleading. Nature, however, seems capricious; not only earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, but typhoons, floods, landslides, and other frequent disasters contribute to the psychological tension so often cited as a Japanese characteristic.

BODILY APPEARANCE.—Racially the Japanese derive from a Mongoloid-Malayan mixture. There is considerable diversity in physical characteristics, but practically any type of Japanese can be matched in some part of China. From bodily features alone it is impossible to be certain that an individual is a Japanese and not a Chinese. Improved habits of diet and living during the modern period have been accompanied by an increase in average stature. There are many tall Japanese, but they are outnumbered by the short ones; the average male stature is five feet three inches.

Black hair, straight, abundant, and rather coarse in texture, is practically universal. Beards are scanty and body hair sparse. Noses are generally rather flat and bridgeless. The combination of high cheekbones and slight pads of fat on the cheeks often imparts a well-fed look even when the rest of the body is emaciated. Skulls are broad, rarely long. The “Mongoloid eyelid”—a fold of the upper lid that covers the inner junction of the two lids—occurs more frequently than among Europeans, less often than in many parts of China. Skin color ranges from near-white to brown; the light brown incorrectly called yellow predominates. Japanese are rarely
fat; most of them are small-boned and slender. In bodily contour females differ but slightly from males.

For many centuries intermarriage has occurred without regard for differences in bodily type. Consequently diverse features and proportions occur in combinations that interest a trained observer. For example, a slender wiry “Malayan” type of body will carry a broad head with Mongol features. Some persons, allegedly of noble ancestry, are tall and slender, with narrow aquiline noses and high sloping foreheads. A few round-headed, light-skinned, hairy individuals recall the Ainu aborigines who inhabited the islands prior to the coming of the Japanese.

Population.—In 1940 an official census yielded a total of 73,114,308 persons in Japan Proper.1 There were almost exactly 100 males per 100 females; the war that followed probably reduced this ratio slightly. The population had increased 13.4 percent between 1930 and 1940, but the rate of increase has been declining.

In the feudal period before 1864 the population had hovered between twenty and thirty millions. The total number of Japanese has nearly tripled in less than a century—a fact that underlies many of Japan’s acute social problems.

Conspicuous trends of population change in the modern period include: (1) rapid increase in total numbers; (2) lowered death rates and increasing average length of life; (3) mounting birth rates, changing later to a decline; (4) stability of rural population; (5) tremendous expansion of large cities that absorbed practically all the increase in general population. Apart from reliable census data for 1920, 1930, and 1940, Japanese published statistics often are misleading—a fact notable in discussion of birth and death rates.

The swift increase in total population attained a peak in 1930-1935 with a net five-year increase of 4.8 millions or 7.5 percent. From 1935 to 1940, net increase fell to 3.9 million or 5.6 percent. Comparisons of data of expectation of life with similar data from Occidental countries are vitiated in part by special conditions in Japan. The increase, however, is significant:

Expectation of Life at Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921-1925</td>
<td>42.06 years</td>
<td>43.2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-1936</td>
<td>46.92 years</td>
<td>49.63 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The average Japanese lives about twenty years less than does the average American. The rapid increase in Japan’s population therefore means that many more babies are born than would suffice to attain a similar increase in the Occident. As recently as 1935-1936 the death rate of male infants stood at 114 per 1,000. Death rates at all ages, despite improvements, exceed those of Western nations and are reminiscent of Occidental death rates in the early years of the industrial revolution. Such rates differ widely in various parts of Japan, both rural and urban.

Crude birth rates apparently increased from 28.5 in 1886-1890 to 34.6 in 1921-1925; perhaps the increase merely indicates more complete registration. From 1925 to 1938 the figure fell gradually to 27. The following figures indicate a change in marriage customs, probably later marriages of women:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children Born per 1,000 Younger Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age of Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data from Taeuber and Beal, “The Dynamics of Population in Japan.”

Births to women aged 30 or above also have declined somewhat; women of ages 25-29, however, maintained earlier birth rates unchanged. In the large cities fertility was lower than in the rest of the country.

It is difficult to compare statistics of urban and rural populations in Japan with those of Occidental countries. For example, the U.S. Census classes as rural all places of less than 2,500 population. Japanese peasants, however, live in villages, and isolated farmsteads are unknown. Statistical practice selects 10,000 as the maximum rural population and classes larger places as urban. Officially, however, Japanese deem a population urban only if the place has been incor-
corporated as a shi or city. This latter standard loses meaning because incorporation practices differ widely.

Whatever the basis of classification, it is apparent that the rural population remained almost constant in numbers until the bombing of cities in 1943–1945. In 1920, places of 10,000 or less included 37.9 million people and in 1935, 37.5 million. Taking the unincorporated places as a basis, the rural population continued close to 45 millions in both years. Obviously the larger cities absorbed the total increase in population; peasant Japan was saturated. The bulk of the increase went to a few supercities. In 1920, 12.1 percent of the total population resided in cities of 100,000 or more; by 1940 this percentage had increased to 29.1. The six largest cities grew most rapidly, especially during the war preparations of 1935–1943. Dissipated by wartime bombings, the people gradually returned after fighting ceased.

**Population of Japan’s Six Largest Cities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>Nov. 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tōkyō</td>
<td>6,778,804</td>
<td>2,675,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōsaka</td>
<td>3,252,340</td>
<td>1,102,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagoya</td>
<td>1,328,084</td>
<td>597,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyōto b</td>
<td>1,089,726</td>
<td>866,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokohama</td>
<td>968,091</td>
<td>624,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kōbe</td>
<td>967,234</td>
<td>376,166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aData from *Administrative Subdivisions of Japan*, Dept. of State, Washington, 1946.

b Not bombed. Apparently the people expected bombings.

*Note: Tōkyō and Yokohama included extensive suburban areas that suffered less destruction, otherwise population might have dropped further.*

The urban picture gains force from data of rural populations. City dwellers fled to the security of rural homesteads, and rural areas were overcrowded severely during and just after the war. A small but representative sample of rural gun—roughly equivalent to American counties—appears on the following page.

These drastic wartime shifts of population are typical. Manifestly the results of a regular census in 1950 would be difficult to predict. Whether the urban areas recover completely and rural districts continue overcrowded depends upon the extent to which industry and foreign trade are rehabilitated.
### Population of Sample Rural Gun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT (GUN)</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higashi Iwai, Iwate Prefecture:</strong></td>
<td>1940: 86,451</td>
<td>Nov. 1949: 100,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>131,553</td>
<td>173,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kamo, Shizuoka Prefecture:</strong></td>
<td>84,244</td>
<td>99,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fugeshi, Ishikawa Prefecture:</strong></td>
<td>84,341</td>
<td>102,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saeki, Hiroshima Prefecture:</strong></td>
<td>110,410</td>
<td>149,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kuma, Kumamoto Prefecture:</strong></td>
<td>80,700</td>
<td>92,853</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aData from *Administrative Subdivisions of Japan* (Dept. of State, Washington, 1946).

Despite the mixture of races in early Japan the modern population includes very few immigrants. Until recently, most of the peasants never had seen a foreigner, and until the last two decades no foreigner could own land under any circumstances. In the 1930 decade less than 25,000 Chinese, approximately a million Korean laborers, and nearly 10,000 Europeans and Americans who were concentrated in the larger cities provided the sole foreign elements. Isolation from personal acquaintance with foreigners enabled the militarists to instill fear of other nations and insure support for an aggressive war.

### LAND AND PEOPLE

—Until the modern period Japan maintained relatively few large cities. That cities existed at all was due to the excellent keeping qualities, small bulk, and ready transportability of a single grain—rice. Also important were the analogous qualities of a standardizable, easily handled fuel, namely, charcoal. Rice, a swamp grass that grows in standing water, requires back-breaking hand labor but yields abundantly. A toiling peasant family can raise about double the amount required for their own sustenance. As soon as early societal organization provided for the transportation and

2Urban populations are possible only when the economy achieves a surplus beyond the needs of the farmers, fisherfolk, or herders who wrest livelihood directly from nature. So-called primitive societies remain primitive because they are unable to produce such a surplus. If and when their harvests or food animals are abundant the surplus is consumed in feasting or is wasted for lack of means of preservation. Urban or civilized societies depend upon foods that can be transported and kept. With such foods available, civilization is possible if patterns of societal organization are adequate to the complexities of exchange, storage, and transportation. In this sense the words *civilized and primitive* denote differing societal patterns without invidious comparisons. Cf. the present author, "God Kings and Cosmic Government," in *Christian Leadership in a World Society, Essays in Honor of C. H. Moehlman*, ed. J. W. Nixon and W. S. Hudson (Rochester, N.Y., 1945).
storage of surplus rice and charcoal, it became possible for part of
the population to live in towns. Even today Japan's economy is
based on rice.

Prior to the modern period, agents of the feudal lords collected
the rice harvest from the peasants who were bound inseparably to
the estates. The overlord stored the rice in his castle and doled it
out in annual stipends to his retainers and craftsmen—sometimes
to the peasants as well. To his superiors he paid tribute in rice. In­
comes were reckoned in koku (5.119 U.S. bushels) of rice; a minor
fief was appraised in thousands of koku, and the great feudatories in
millions. The landless samurai warriors afford one of the many con­
trasts with feudal Europe: the European horseman fed himself from
his own land holdings and was in a position to rebel against undue
exactions. Japanese overlords controlled the food of warrior and
peasant alike. To rebel was to starve. When mouths outran the
available food, famine, war, abortion, infanticide, and killing of the
aged restored a balance.

If in feudal times famines were frequent and peasants often rioted
in protest at their miserable lot, how then could modern Japan man­
age with more than double the former population? By careful esti­
mate there were 3,067 persons per square mile of crop land in
1938, in contrast to 2,365 in Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
a mere 238 in the United States. Statistics of Japan's national wealth
seem to support the facile answer that industrialization and importa­
tion of food did the trick. In 1904 Japan's foreign trade amounted
to Yen 14.63 per capita; in 1937, despite greatly augmented popula­
tion, it came to Yen 95.41 per capita. On the whole, however, the
gains from foreign trade did not go to importation of food; they
paid for armament, capital goods, raw materials for industry, and
luxuries for the few. The food supply was increased by better fer­
tilizers, adequate storage and distribution, and some increase in cul­
tivated area. Korea and Formosa, and later Manchuria, supplied
large amounts of food. The Japanese increased Formosan sugar pro­
duction manyfold, for example, while drastically reducing the per
capita consumption of sugar by the Formosan population. The bulk
of the sugar went to Japan and, as domestic trade, did not enter into
foreign trade statistics. By such devices food imports from out­
side the Japanese Empire were held to a minimum.
The fact of more than 3,000 persons per square mile of crop land requires analysis. From Tokyō south, many farms yield two crops annually and the subtropical peninsulas permit three crops. Hence one square mile of Japan's crop land is equivalent roughly to two square miles of Euro-American farmland. Edward Ackerman has estimated the number of square miles of Occidental crop land required to equal Japanese production, assuming one crop yearly. On this basis he computes the density of Japan's population "per square mile of equivalent food producing capacity" as about 1,200 persons—a figure well below the population density in the British Isles.3 The British, however, import much food; the Japanese home islands, prior to World War II, produced 85 percent of the food consumed. Strenuous efforts reduced the amount of imports. Every weed was analyzed and methods of utilizing its food values were worked out. Until the warlords were assured that food imports could be cut below 10 percent, and that this 10 percent could be eliminated by strict frugality, the attack on Pearl Harbor was held in leash.

In the 1930s the average daily food allotment per person was 2,500 calories, in comparison with the American standard for good health of 2,200–3,000 calories. The small-bodied Japanese require less and maintained health on the 2,500 average. Of course the rich got more and the poor less; in northern Honshū famine has been endemic since 1930. Most of the protein came from marine sources; Japan not only consumed much fish but led the world in fish exports.

It has been asserted that if all land were fertilized and cultivated scientifically, if only high-grade seed were used, and if distribution were efficient and rationing equitable, the pre-war daily allotment of 2,500 calories could be restored without importing more than 10 percent of the nation's food. Whether this is feasible in the face of postwar chaos, and whether in the long run the people would endure the regimen, remain to be seen. The Japanese were willing to fight to improve their lot, especially after seeing fabulous wealth portrayed in American films. At the moment this discussion would seem academic to the undernourished masses.

Japanese cuisine affords an outstanding instance of aesthetic em-

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3 Data of population density in relation to crop land from E. A. Ackerman, "Japan: Have or Have-not Nation?" in Japan's Prospect, ed. D. G. Haring (Cambridge, Mass., 1946).
bellishment of a few simple, scanty foodstuffs. Formal etiquette governs the serving and eating of meals. Food is served daintily on individual trays. Exquisite artistry characterizes the lacquered bowls, porcelain cups, and other dishes. Soups and other liquids are drunk from bowls or teacups without handles. Cut in small pieces in the kitchen, solid food is conveyed to the mouth by chopsticks. Boiled rice, many kinds of raw or cooked fish, pickled radishes, a slice of lotus root, half a pickled potato and a few peas, and other side dishes are arranged skillfully to appeal to the eye. Traditionally the culinary skill of the hostess was acknowledged by a hearty belch after each course, and tea, like soup, was ingested with appropriate sound effects. All this is effective in giving the impression of a bounteous feast despite the limited resources at the disposal of the kitchen.

Rice, the foundation of every meal, is cooked in most homes but once a day and is served cold at two of the three meals—an economy dictated by the scarcity of fuel. In good times a normal meal involves from five to seven small bowls of rice per person. Polished rice is preferred to brown rice, despite its lack of vitamins; consequently beri-beri, a disease of malnutrition, connotes prosperity since the poor cannot afford white rice. In wartime other grains or beans were mixed with the rice and sometimes replaced it. Every child is taught at home and in school never to waste even one grain of rice; formerly etiquette required that one rinse his rice bowl with tea and drink the tea at the end of a meal, lest grains of rice be wasted.

Varied and tasty soups are concocted with slender resources. Other dishes include shrimp, octopus, seaweed; noodles and noodle soups; relishes of greens, pickled vegetables; beans, bean pastes, bean curds, and bean confections; eggs, shreds of meat, rice wafers, and fruits. Clear green tea, the universal beverage, is served to guests, to customers in stores, in business offices, in schools between classes, at roadside stands, and is sold at railway stations to passengers on trains. Within the past fifty years milk has gained acceptance; sold in small long-necked bottles, boiled rather than pasteurized, and stoppered with a cork, it is used chiefly to dilute whiskey. Cows are kept in pens in the towns and food is brought to them. *Sake*, the favorite intoxicant, is brewed from rice and is served hot. *Shōchū*, a potent distillate of low-grade *sake*, takes the place of the more expensive brew in some villages. A nutritious, aromatic sauce brewed
from soy beans provides salt, flavor, and vitamins for many cooked foods. In pre-war days bread, cake, caramels, chocolate bars, and other foreign-style edibles were stocked in many stores. Bread (called *pan*) and sponge cake (called *kasutera*—“Castile”) have been used for three centuries; as the names indicate, they reached Japan via early Portuguese adventurers.

Many of these foods are luxuries scarcely known to the peasants, who subsist on brown rice in good times, otherwise on millet, beans, and miscellaneous vegetables. Meat is a luxury for all classes; to Buddhists it is taboo, though that rule now is honored in the breach. Poultry butchers frugally dissect a chicken and sell the meat in tiny slices; the bones are sold separately for soup. A popular seasoning is a rock-hard sun-dried bonito; a little of this is grated into soups or other dishes.

Perhaps the restricted diet and the widespread complaint of “indigestion” help to explain the universal passion for pills: vitamins, patent medicines, breath purifiers, liver pills, alleged aphrodisiacs, muscle builders, female pills, and just pills. The demand seems insatiable. Tobacco is used sparingly. A cigarette is extinguished after a puff or two and placed economically over an ear until time to relight it for another puff. The Japanese pipe, dear to the old folks, has a long bamboo stem and a tiny brass bowl that holds but a pinch—whence its name of *ippuku*, “one puff.” From time immemorial Emperors and officials have preached frugality to the people.

**Houses.**—Although Occidental-style houses have appeared in the cities since the 1920s, most Japanese live in traditional types of dwelling. These are of wood with mortised joints to economize on nails—scarcely any metal is used. There is no cellar; the house is raised two or three feet on posts that rest on foundation stones driven into the earth. Town houses are roofed with tiles laid without nails in mud spread on thin shingles; in the hamlets, roofs are thatched. Roof profiles copy that of Mount Fuji.

Long porches three feet wide, with polished unpainted floors, extend along the sunny exposures. They serve as hallways into which all rooms open. At either end, boxes hold sliding wooden doors to enclose the porch in bad weather and at night. Between each room and the porch are other sliding doors—light wooden-latticed frames over which translucent white paper is stretched to
admit light. These paper-covered frames explain the Occidental myth that Japanese houses are made of paper. Glass replaces this paper in the better homes. Broad thin clapboards cover the outer walls. Solid partitions are of plaster on bamboo lath, but usually the principal rooms are separated by sliding doors covered with decorated opaque paper. In hot weather all doors may be removed to allow the breeze to circulate. Ideal in hot weather, the Japanese house affords slight protection against the cold. The fact that houses so well adapted to the tropics characterize even the cold northern districts has been advanced in support of the theory that the Japanese originally came from the tropics.

Neither the exterior nor the interior of these houses is painted, except as lacquer may be used on interior woodwork in the lacquer-producing areas. Ceilings are of thin wood. At one end of a room, ornamental posts and shelves mark off a slightly elevated “place of honor,” before which guests are invited to sit. Unpainted wood is preferred for beauty of grain in conformance with the canon of severe simplicity embodied in Japanese aesthetic ideals. A single vase with one flower and some twigs, or a scroll painting, in the place of honor may constitute the sole decoration of a room.

Straw mats called tatami, two inches thick, cover the floors. Tatami consist in a tightly woven core of coarse straw faced with finely woven matting. Narrow black cloth strips bind the long edges. Tatami always measure six feet by three feet and provide a convenient unit of area. Thus a house may be advertised as follows: “House with garden, 3,6,6,8,2; Kotobuki chō 194.” This means that the house contains one 3-mat room, two 6-mat rooms, one of 8 mats, and one of two. The remaining words give the address. The immaculate cleanliness of well-kept tatami and their ready disintegration under hard shoes explain the inexorable rule that shoes must be removed before entering a Japanese house.

Furniture is limited strictly in quantity. People kneel on square cushions and require no chairs. Consequently tables are about a foot high. A chest of drawers, one or two low tables, a diminutive dressing cabinet with a mirror—such is the furniture of the average home. Beds are piles of padded quilts spread on the floor. A sleeper inserts himself midway in the pile and places his head on a hard round pillow. By day the folded quilts repose in large closets.
Kitchens traditionally lack windows and often have dirt floors. Rice is cooked over a quick fire of twigs and straw in a large clay firebox. In cities gas and electricity often replace the old arrangements. A well with a sweep or with a pair of buckets on a rope hung from a pulley provides water. In cities with a modern water supply the less prosperous homes share a faucet on a street corner. Except in the largest cities drainage flows in open gutters beside unpaved streets.

Scarcity of fuel explains meager heating facilities. In winter one may toast his chilblains at a tiny charcoal fire half-buried in ashes in a large wooden or earthenware container. In colder districts a concrete firepot three feet square is built in the floor of one room, to be concealed beneath half a tatami in warm weather. When in use it may be covered with a light wooden framework a foot high, over which quilts are spread. A table top may be placed on top of the quilts and people sit around the firebox with their feet in the warm space under the quilts while they use the table top for reading, eating, writing, or a friendly card game. At night the quilts are spread around the firebox like spokes of a wheel and each sleeper may poke his feet into the pleasant warmth of the central tent.

Attached to the house is a privy. A large earthenware jar beneath a hole in the floor provides a storage place for Japan’s principal fertilizer. A long-handled wooden dipper serves to transfer the accumulated contents of the jar to wooden tubs with lids. Cartloads of these “honey buckets” impart a pungent aroma to city and countryside on Sunday mornings when farmers come to town for their fertilizer.

In the towns—except for some districts along the Japan Sea—high wooden or stone walls separate houses and gardens from the streets. Usually the kitchen is nearest the street to facilitate delivery of supplies. Living rooms face southward when possible toward an ornamental garden. Low projecting eaves admit the slanting winter sunshine but shut out summer heat. With space at a premium, houses are packed together, and since their construction is light fires spread explosively. The labyrinthine older streets are six to ten feet wide and have no sidewalks. House numbers often follow no consecutive or rational order; thus 842 may adjoin 76 and 328, since the numbers are scattered at random over a chō or ward. Seeking an
address, one asks people on the street for help, and anyone who
knows the place escorts the stranger with unfailing politeness.

Peasants enjoy few of the comforts available to townsfolk. Mud-
walled and thatched, their one-story huts contain few rooms. Some
of these have only the earth for flooring. Relatively prosperous
landowners enclose their quarters with fences.

Occidental-type houses gained popularity in the cities in the
1920s. The Tōkyō-Yokohama earthquake of 1923 demonstrated
the superiority of steel and concrete buildings and the lesson was
not forgotten. Offices, stores, and public buildings tend to follow
Western architectural ideas.

CLOTHING.—Occidental styles of clothing gain or lose popularity
with changing fashions, especially in the cities. In their homes, how­
ever, most Japanese prefer the traditional garb: the kimono of cot­
ton, silk, or wool. Extra layers of kimono are donned in cold weather.
Men and women wear contrasting styles and colors but both sexes
lap the left front over the right as American men button their coats.
For men the preferred colors are brown, dark blue, grey, or black;
decorative patterns are limited to small figures or inconspicuous
stripes, and the sash is narrow and tied in a small knot. Boys wear
cotton kimono decorated with small white figures on a blue or grey
background, made usually by printing or tie-dyeing the yarn; the
size of the figures is larger for small boys, smaller for older boys.
Except in infancy and after the age of sixty, men never wear red.

Women of good repute wear subdued colors in public but like
under-kimono gay with color. Young girls appear in bright colors
and large decorative designs; the patterns grow smaller and the
colors less vivid as the wearer approaches womanhood. The obi or
sash is broad, colorful, and tied in an elaborate vertical bow at the
rear. Brocades and other expensive materials are preferred in the
obi. Pregnant women wear a special obi and are treated with con­
sideration. Geisha and prostitutes wear bright colors with large de­
signs; only licensed prostitutes tie the obi in front.

On ceremonial occasions a plain outer kimono coat of subdued
color, known as a haori, is worn over the kimono. The decorations
consist in subtle patterns in the weave of the cloth, and of family
crests. Some occasions call for the hakama, a loose divided skirt
worn over the kimono and tied at the waist; this served as standard
garb for many students until the textile shortage of the late thirties drove it into eclipse along with the *kimono*. Women factory workers took to wearing *mompei*, trousers of coarse cotton cloth like the traditional *momohiki* worn by laborers. The two legs of *momohiki* are separate garments, tied about the waist by narrow strips of cloth. Skin-tight, they may be accompanied by rolled puttees. The appropriate upper garment, a blue-jean jacket, has wide sleeves and *kimono*-type collar adorned on lapels and in the back with ideographs that symbolize the trade guild or employer of the wearer. In hot weather the jacket is discarded and white *momohiki* remind an American of a suit of old-fashioned long underwear. As the temperature rises men discard garments until only a loin cloth remains. In the steaming rainy season laborers of both sexes may toil in the fields quite divested of clothing. If necessitated by weather or hard work, nudity involves neither immodesty nor offense, although uncovering of the body for display is disapproved strongly. To the old-time Japanese, the cheesecake leg art of American newsstands would have meant nothing; his interest focused on the nape of a woman’s neck as the critical test of beauty. Ladies planned their costumes to display a pretty neck to advantage.

Traditional Japanese clothing is laundered by the housewife in a wooden tub with wooden scrubbing board. First she pulls all threads from the seams and then washes each strip of cloth separately. Instead of ironing a garment, each piece of cloth is spread smoothly on a board and dried in the sun. The process is completed by sewing the garments together again.

While city-dwellers favor Occidental-style leather shoes, rubber shoes, or rubber boots, peasants and some city folk cling to the traditional sandals of straw, wood, or rubber. Outdoor sandals are wooden clogs, called *geta*, with flat tops and two transverse cleats beneath to raise the foot above the mud. When it rains *geta* with cleats as high as three inches are worn. Thongs passing between the great toe and its neighbor hold them precariously in place; hence the ankle-length socks have a separate space for the big toe. Laborers and peasants wear straw sandals secured by straw rope, or cotton socks with heavy canvas or rubber soles and a separate compartment for the big toe, or more recently, *chika-tabi*, the rubber-soled shoes known in America as “sneakers.”
Despite incongruity with Japanese costume, men universally wear European types of hats. In feudal times men wore long hair and favored elaborate coiffures; now, except for professional wrestlers, close-cropped heads are the rule. Except when clad in European-style dress women never wear hats; together with details of *kimono* and *obi*, the hair-do indicates a lady’s age and marital status.

A **Japanese Neighborhood.**—Renting or buying a house generally is complicated by the fact that land and building usually belong to different owners. One who moves into a neighborhood is expected immediately to call upon each adjoining household. A present such as a cotton towel, box of matches, mosquito incense, tickets good for a bowl of noodle soup at a local restaurant, or some other small gift is offered each neighbor; the servants ascertain via the gossip grapevine the local custom in such gifts. During the brief formal visit one does not enter beyond the *genkan* or paved entrance hall; he introduces himself, presents the gift, apologizes for intruding into the neighborhood, and requests the gracious favor of his new neighbors.

Enterprising tradesmen soon appear to solicit the trade of the new household. Representatives of neighborhood organizations call to inform the newcomer of the extent to which his support is expected. Such include the *seinenkai* or young men’s club, which generally holds forth at a nearby shrine and collects funds for festivals, patriotic celebrations, and parties. Perhaps a *fujinkai* or women’s club solicits the support of the lady of the house. The most active body, the *tonari gumi* or neighborhood association, includes from five to a dozen adjoining households and is a subdivision of the *chōnaikai* or ward association. The *chōnaikai* employs collectors of garbage and sewage, night watchmen, and other district functionaries. Charitable activities formerly were conducted in part through the *chōnaikai*. These groups are effective agencies of government, for their chain of command extends all the way to Tōkyō.

About 1927 the growing movement for social welfare began to utilize the *tonari gumi*. Subsequently the Welfare Ministry named in each *tonari gumi* a sort of local welfare officer who was required to keep in touch with every family, to promote mutual aid, and to report cases in need of public relief. With the onset of war, military leaders turned the *tonari gumi* into a tool of psychological mobiliza-
tion, an agency for detection of "dangerous thoughts," air-raid defense, rationing, and like functions. Official orders are attached to a small board called "mobile bulletin board," entrusted to the head of the *tonari gumi*, and circulated among the members. Each head of a household must affix his seal in acknowledgment of the order.4

Other frequent visitors include Buddhist priests and monks, solicitors for nondescript and often fraudulent charities, book agents, gadget vendors, craft guild members soliciting funds, and even an occasional gangster conducting a disguised house-to-house shake-down.

The policeman calls as soon as the new family moves in. He obtains a meticulous record of every member of the household, whether or not the official family register (*koseki*) is transferred from the former residence. Should a visitor stay overlong or a house guest arrive with baggage, the policeman turns up to probe the visitor's past. He calls regularly for a routine check, and cultivation of his good will pays dividends. From his street-corner police box he keeps tabs on everyone; should a crime occur, he will know who was away from home at the time. When a fire starts, someone runs to the police-box, bows, and requests that the fire brigade be called. A stiff fine awaits the household where the fire started; on such occasions, unless an unpopular family was at fault, neighborhoods may stand together solidly—no one can guess where the fire might have started.

Two or three times annually the policeman informs each household of the day set for compulsory housecleaning. All furniture, including *tatami*, must be removed from the house and cleaned. Before anything may be put back the policeman inspects the house to make sure that all is spotless.

Neighborhood gregariousness focuses in the bathhouse. Distinguished by a tall smokestack, a commercial or municipal bathhouse provides facilities used by all except the prosperous. In the cool of the evening one dons a *yukata* (cotton bathrobe), takes a brass basin, toothbrush, soap, and towel and, with an occasional pause to chat, saunters to the bathhouse. In an anteroom he scrubs himself with

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4 The occupying American army failed to understand and utilize these neighborhood groups. Thus was forfeited an opportunity to explain democracy to every last Japanese. The way was left open for other interests to use these *tonari gumi*, perhaps for subsequent reassertion of Japanese aggressiveness.
rich lather; courtesy requires young people to wash the backs of their elders. In the next room he slips into a tank perhaps fifteen feet square where neighbors soak contentedly and gossip for an hour or so. In cold weather the main purpose of a bath is warmth, for the water is heated to 110° F. Men, women, and children bathe together with no self-consciousness or embarrassment. During the 1920s the shocked protests of foreign missionaries and tourists evoked a government order requiring separation of the sexes in public baths. Puzzled by the strange requirement, many establishments complied by stretching a rope across the tank and posting signs, "Gentlemen" on one side, "Ladies" on the other. While the gossip may wax lively, the gathering in the steaming tank is completely decorous.

Apart from bathhouses, men congregate in a neighborhood teahouse or beer hall where flippant waitresses join in the repartee and earn pin money as unlicensed prostitutes. Rarely does anyone drop in casually at a neighbor's house for a chat. Houses are small and calls are formal.

Children play in the streets and in the roomy grounds of shrines or temples. Nursemaids accompany the smaller children and carry babies on their backs. A chônaikai or tonari gumi may collect funds to pay attendants and provide equipment for play. More recently, playgrounds adjoining public schools have come into vogue.

Festivals at Buddhist temples or Shintô shrines are neighborhood affairs. Children stage playlets and perform folk dances, priests mime the legendary gods, women compete in exhibitions of flower arrangement, and vendors of food, drink, and trinkets set up booths in the shrine yard. The youths of the seinenkai bear the mikoshi or god-car through the streets and get drunk on sake offered to the god. Tradition insists that the god guides his bearers; if so, the gods have long memories for the heavy mikoshi is wont to smash the fence of someone who has not contributed to the shrine.

A general air of excited anticipation develops in the neighborhood as the grand festival of the New Year approaches. Since all debts must be paid before the old year passes, many a burglary is committed to enable some conscientious debtor to meet the deadline. Before every house, at either side of the gate, decorations of pine for longevity, plum for vigor, and bamboo for fertility are erected
save for the licensed prostitute quarters which logically omit the bamboo.

The New Year breakfast, a gift from servants to the family, consists of a soup made of fermented beans, and a doughlike pounded rice called mochi. Since a person's age is reckoned by counting the calendar years in which he has lived, New Year's is a universal birthday and the usual greeting is congratulatory. A baby born on December 31 is two years old the next day—has he not seen two years?

Following breakfast the man of the house dons his best kimono and haori. If he favors European dress, striped trousers, morning coat, and top hat are de rigueur. Thus adorned he sallies forth to visit neighbors, business associates, and relatives. The calls are brief. He enters the genkan, exchanges congratulations with the hostess, and invites favorable treatment in the new year. Each hostess serves him a cup of sake and the ceremonies proceed in an increasing alcoholic haze. The next few days are given over to family recreation, calls by the ladies on their friends, and other festivities.

In rural Japan, neighborhood relations involve participation in various cooperative groups. Some work in rotation on roads and bridges, others provide mutual aid in rice planting or harvest. The purpose of other groups is monetary or other material assistance; called kō, these vary widely in purpose and membership. The general scheme runs as follows: a man in need of cash, say to meet a mortgage, organizes a kō by inviting acquaintances who have the funds. The kō meets monthly, semi-annually, or annually and meetings rotate from house to house. At the first meeting every member except the organizer brings a predetermined sum of money—say twenty yen. If there are twenty members, the first meeting pays the organizer 380 yen. At each of the twenty subsequent meetings, the organizer, like his fellow members, contributes his twenty yen and the winner of the current total is selected by lot from those who have not yet won. The pattern varies endlessly; in some schemes those who win pay a higher amount thereafter while others pay less. Toward the end of the cycle the few remaining potential winners may sell their chances for a good sum. In some kō the members are villages, not individuals; the annual prize finances the people of the winning village in a mass pilgrimage or a sumptuous picnic.

Craft guilds may be active in neighborhood affairs. Carpenters,
gardeners, cooks, potters, stonecutters, makers of sandals, fire brigades, collectors of sewage—even pickpockets and burglars—maintain guilds whose ancient pattern is challenged by modern labor unions. The guild limits apprentices, maintains prices, provides mutual aid, and holds parties. At the New Year for example, the carpenters may don costumes and escort a fearsomely masked synthetic beast from house to house to scare evil spirits—for a fee.

The more prosperous families learn how to deal with the servants' guilds. Custom sanctions the petty graft that diverts about 20 percent of the family purchases to the servants. Tradesmen render one bill to the employer and another to the servant, who gets his rebate even if the master pays his own bills. Servants, however, regard themselves as loyal defenders of their employer; their 20 percent graft may be a moderate price for the vigilance with which they defend the household from the exactions of gardeners, carpenters, sewage and garbage collectors, and tradesmen generally. Servants participate freely in most family activities.

Like any employee, a servant receives pay monthly, neatly enclosed in an envelope to maintain the fiction that money is beneath notice. Dismissal is effected by deducting a few sen from the usual wage. The dismissed person counts his pay, waits discreetly for a few days, then resigns formally on the pretext that his grandmother has died, his father is ill, or his brother needs help in his business. If the employee's face has been protected, his departure synchronizes with the arrival of a new worker supplied by the guild.

All employees expect bonuses, especially at the end of the year. No worker may be released without a dismissal allowance equal to at least a month's wages, perhaps several years' salary in case of long service. A vigilant guild sees to it that a niggardly employer cannot replace the departed worker.

Leases, receipts, contracts, and other legal papers are validated by imprint of the personal seal (ban or hanko) of the householder or businessman. If revenue stamps are required on the document—as on all receipts for more than a trifling sum—they must be affixed and canceled by the ban so that part of the imprint overlaps on the document. A contract may be torn in two, each party retaining half. Matching of the halves verifies the agreement. Use of the seal corresponds exactly to Occidental use of signatures. Contracts, how-
ever, are not regarded as sacred; if either party stands to lose heavily by fulfilling the contract no great disgrace attends refusal to honor it.

Every neighborhood has its shopping street. Small shops are tended by a wife or daughter while the head of the house works elsewhere. Specialization is minute; thus beef, pork, chicken and eggs, beans, fruits, and confections are sold in separate shops. Sake, soy sauce, and pickles occur in the same malodorous shop. Restaurants, also highly specialized, not only serve food on the premises but deliver meals when ordered. A boy on a bicycle delivers such meals, kept hot in lacquered wooden boxes, to home or office. Other neighborhood shops offer hardware, cloth and thread, notions and incense, porcelain, household supplies, geta and sandals, medicines, electrical goods, soft drinks, shaved ice with syrup, and so on. Barber shops, hairdressers, and beauty parlors are near at hand; the beauty parlors usually adjoin a shrine of Benten, goddess of beauty. A tiny branch postoffice provides not only postage and revenue stamps, money orders, parcel post and registry, but also accepts telegrams, handles postal savings and life insurance, and operates a postal transfer system that takes the place of bank checks in most transactions.

When a shop displays price tags, no haggling is tolerated. But some shopkeepers—fish dealers in particular—relish a good argument over prices. Buyer and seller may grasp hands under the protective cover of *kimono* sleeves and bicker silently by a code of hand pressures, leaving the way open for a fresh start with the next customer.

Unless a purchase be trivial a shopkeeper serves tea, and conversation wanders lightly before approaching business. The fiction is that gentlemen never count money. One pays furtively by depositing money in a tray; the shopkeeper computes price and change on an abacus since mental calculation is neither attempted nor accepted. Pretending not to count the change, the customer removes it almost surreptitiously from the tray.

Once or twice a month a *yomise* or night-show is set up somewhere in the *cho* (ward). Under glaring electric bulbs, sidewalk stands display everything from dwarf trees to German cameras. The entire neighborhood turns out; people stroll about eyeing the dis-
plays, flirting, gossiping, haggling over an occasional purchase. *Caveat emptor* is the law of the *yomise*.

From early dawn till long after dark the streets are busy. Motor trucks and taxis have not eliminated ox-carts, two-wheeled hand-carts, bicycle trailers, horses, and human burden-bearers. In villages and the older parts of cities where streets are too narrow and tortuous for taxicabs, the *jinrikisha* survives. Before dawn vendors of *tōfu* (bean curd) blow a soft-toned horn as they trot from house to house. At either end of a shoulder-pole an itinerant fish seller carries tubs that contain live fish swimming in water and cleaned fish packed in ice. Pushing a tiny cart that holds his tools, a mender of *geta* beats a small drum shaped like an hourglass. Drowning the lesser noises, a large steam whistle announces the cleaner of tobacco pipes, whose cart carries a copper boiler to provide high-pressure steam. The colorful wares of a flower seller—who probably is an *eta* or one-time outcaste—hang in baskets from his shoulder-pole. The milkman, the knife grinder, the street sprinkler, delivery boys, and many others pull or push two-wheeled carts. Others carry their stock in trade on their shoulders. At night a plaintive bamboo flute announces the blind masseur; at a street corner the cooking facilities of a two-wheeled cart provide midnight lunches. Throughout the wee hours the clapping together of two sticks reminds householders that all is well as the watchman makes his rounds to scare burglars and look out for fires. Until the advent of American troops holdups were rare and even at night in slum districts a woman never was accosted on the streets.

**ETIQUETTE.**—Designed to create and maintain “face,” etiquette is fundamental and its rules are complex and onerous. All schools teach etiquette, especially to girls. Classical etiquette followed various patterns, but the school founded by Ogasawara Shinano-no-kami (14th century A.D.) prevailed and his descendants still teach the subject.

The introduction of strangers occurs even less frequently than in England. One introduces two persons only if both actively desire it. The bow, equivalent to the Occidental handshake, is a universal greeting, except that men who pass on the street may merely nod and lift their hats. Men do not raise their hats to women. The kiss and the embrace are deemed grossly sexual and are taboo in public.
A standing person bows slowly from the hips at a 90° angle, sliding his hands down his thighs as he bows. When seated on the floor both hands are extended froglike, palms down, and the forehead is touched to the floor. The bow is a formal courtesy, not a token of servility.

A call is a courtesy extended by the guest to the host. One apologizes for failure to call, prolongs his stay to show politeness, and apologizes profusely for leaving. Close friends minimize these formalities. The same principle leads a guest to refrain from eating all of the confections set before him. He always carries paper in which to wrap some of the dainties and stow them in his *kimono* sleeve. In effect this says to the host, "These cakes are so delicious that I wish my household to taste them."

Formal calls are expected when a man occupies a newly built house, on occasions of congratulation such as the birth of a son or at the New Year, and after a conflagration. The occupant of a burned house holds forth amid the embers to serve tea and cakes to callers offering sympathy.

Rigid etiquette governs formal exchanges of gifts. In general the recipient of a gift returns a present of equal value. If the return gift be delayed the value of the return increases by a sort of compound interest. Such postponement of the return carries subtle implications; it may hint that the original gift was inadequate or even that it was excessive. When calling, small gifts to children of the household are appreciated and involve no complex etiquette of exchange. On returning from a journey gifts are presented to business associates and employees, even to neighbors; such giving is friendly, informal and with no savor of competition. The preferred traveler's gift is a local product of some place visited, since every locality fosters a distinctive handicraft.

Men precede women in boarding trams, entering doors, and in receiving service of any kind. A lady offers her seat to a gentleman, and a wife always walks two or three steps behind her husband. Hotel maids and sleeping car porters aid a gentleman to undress and fold his clothing neatly. One tips an innkeeper, not his employees; the amount generally equals one third of the bill. A symbolic present of a towel or matches acknowledges a satisfactory tip.

Both sexes carry and use fans in hot weather. A closed paper um-
brella is carried by the tip, handle down. In sun or rain, one's open umbrella must be folded if one talks with a person who does not carry one; a gentleman shares his companion's discomfort rather than humiliate him by offering what he lacks.

One deprecates his own household and possessions; he refers to his wife as a fool or a poor cook, to the food that he serves as filthy stuff, to his children as ignorant brats. A guest counters by exaggerated praise of the food, the skill of the cook, the beauty and breeding of the children. Japanese, however, rarely invite anyone to a meal in their homes, in accordance with the principle that a visit honors the host. Friends are feasted at a restaurant or tea house and professionals, usually geisha, provide the entertainment.

Even within the family, etiquette restrains expression. Children approach their parents with bows and formal phrases. Husband and wife avoid public display of affection. In the service of etiquette the language has attained esoteric complexity, with separate vocabularies for the sexes, for differing degrees of social status, and for formal occasions; elaborate circumlocutions protect the polite fictions of "face." In this brief sketch, the meticulous etiquette of eating, of tea, of drinking, of women's activities, of formal conduct in relation to house and garden and special occasions, must be omitted.

MORALITY.—By insensible stages etiquette blends into morals. If morality be defined as habitual conformance to mores, the Japanese are highly moral. If in contrast to morality, ethics be defined as the discriminating refusal to use another person as means to an end that he does not acknowledge freely, ethical conduct is rare in Japan. From infancy to death individuals move in an intricate network of duties and obligations. The most important obligation, on, denotes those infinite debts incurred by being alive and which no amount of effort can repay. Foremost is the debt to the divine Emperor by whose grace one exists and whose air one breathes; death in battle is but a token appreciation of the Imperial mercy. On inheres in the parental gifts of life and nurture, and in feudal times the overlord's on was regarded as modern Japanese regard the Emperor's on. Teachers confer "the life of the spirit" and thus create on that cannot be repaid. A person is said to "wear the on" of these benefactors.

Obligations capable of exact repayment are called giri. Favors received and insults that rankle alike involve giri. Giri prompts the
meticulous calculation of equivalence in gift exchanges and dictates the repayment of favors and other reciprocal transactions. *Giri* is felt as a burden; *giri* also implies a sense of honor. Of an ill-bred person it is said, "He does not know *giri.*" The touchy sense of honor of the medieval European knight is analogous to one aspect of *giri.*

Underlying this morality are teachings of Confucius, of Buddhism, and of the native cults of Shintō and Bushidō. The Confucian doctrines of duty, loyalty, and filial piety deal with attempted repayment or acknowledgment of *on* received from ruler or parent. The good ruler sets an example to his subjects, the good father to his household. Duty and filial piety consist in following these examples and in loyal devotion. The Japanese rejected the Chinese distinction between good and bad rulers or parents. Good or bad, rulers and parents impose on their subjects or children all the obligations implied by *on.* Confucius' insistence on propriety is implicit in Japanese *giri,* which requires formal balance and harmony; the social order is preserved by action precisely appropriate to every situation. Note Confucius' negative Golden Rule: "Do nothing to others that you do not wish done to you." Japan's meticulous etiquette serves Confucian propriety, even though formal rules of conduct may nullify ethical considerations. Through etiquette one preserves his own face and protects the face of others. At whatever cost one maintains face for his family.

The customs that center in maintenance of face impress an Occidental observer as extravagant and neurotic. *Yūmei mujitsu*—the polite fiction—is carried unblinkingly far past the point where anyone could be deceived. Loss of face results from denying the reality of fictions or from being found out, not from the actual conduct that fictions camouflage.

Coequal with the polite fiction and the maintenance of face is the Buddhist doctrine of noninterference. The belief in fate determined by events of a previous existence implies that whatever happens to one is part of the rewards and retributions due him for conduct in a former life. Anyone so reckless as to interfere in this order of the universe deserves whatever unpleasantness he may incur. For example, if a maniac attacks an innocent person, bystanders make no move to protect the victim or to apprehend the attacker. The seemingly innocent victim must be reaping the penalty for crime
in a past incarnation; anyone interfering invites trouble. If a boy falls in the canal, let him drown; who knows that in a previous life he did not drown a sweetheart in a jealous rage?

One automatically aids others in protecting their face for he may need their cooperation in maintaining his own face. For example, after twenty-five years of faithful service the dean of a girls' college belatedly sows his wild oats. Parents complain that the dean has seduced their daughters. In interminable secret sessions the trustees examine the evidence and decide to oust the dean. There is no hint of scandal. On the contrary the school stages a celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the dean's appointment to the faculty and invites notables from near and far. At the climax of the speech-making the dean, overcome by emotion, resigns dramatically. In recognition of his splendid record the trustees present him with a house and lot. Some of the outraged parents may have contributed to the fund that purchased the house and lot, but no matter how many persons know the real situation, never a word or a glance betrays their awareness.

A year later the former dean is appointed to the faculty of a college for boys, whose president also serves as trustee of the girls' college. A puzzled American ventures to ask, "Why do you appoint X to your faculty when you know all about the mess at the girls' college?" Smiling, the president replies, "X knows who saved his face. He dare not let me down; he will be the most dependable man on my faculty!" For twenty years the erstwhile dean leads an exemplary life, and the respect paid at his grave is genuine. He wore the president's on with dignity and devotion.5

Martial bravery and ruthless direct action are the tokens of manly excellence. The much-uttered word makoto ("sincerity") denotes direct action, or single-minded pursuit of a goal, no matter how devious the means. Weakness is despised. Unscrupulous exploitation of the weak is expected from a strong brave man. Protection of the weak is limited strictly to one's household, clansmen, or faction. Suicide, not a cowardly retreat from living, incontrovertibly demonstrates sincerity; it establishes one's integrity when motives are questioned, offers honorable death to political opponents, defeated

dignitaries and prisoners of battle, and cuts the Gordian knot of dilemmas in which on and giri conflict with each other or with "human feelings." Successful violence may achieve like ends.

Self-control is a cardinal virtue. Despite highly emotional temperament the Japanese despise any show of emotion, except at funerals, in the theater, or in aesthetic enthusiasms. Sorrow is camouflaged by a smile; one who inflicts his troubles upon others "does not know giri."

Early in the modern period the codes of on and giri, embroidered with stirring tales of the bravado of the samurai of old, were revived and deliberately elaborated into the patriotic cult of Busbidō—"The Way of Knights." The word Busbidō was new, and so were the startling applications of its principles to Japan's international relations. From the moment that the 1924 immigration law passed the United States Congress, the Japanese deemed themselves insulted. National giri and taimen (face) required Pearl Harbor.

Morality and etiquette do not apply to foreigners, who disregard on and "do not know giri." Since Japanese, unlike foreigners, are descended from the gods, no Japanese could be wrong in a difference with a foreigner. Children are indoctrinated with the idea that the god-descended Japanese are incapable of sin. Habitual practice of on and giri leaves them helpless when facing persons whose mores are alien; baffled and infuriated by the incomprehensible ways of foreigners, Japanese seize any opportunity to humiliate hapless aliens who fall into their power. When the alien holds the power, the Japanese is outwardly obsequious and complaisant; he holds his temper and bides his time. Japanese mores and Euro-American mores are incommensurable. The Occident proclaims the value of the individual; Japanese tradition explicitly denies the value of the individual.

FAMILY CUSTOMS.—The Japanese family supplies the model for all social and political behavior. In theory, individuals exist solely for the family and the nation. Each person is responsible to and controlled by his family; in turn the family bears responsibility for its members; the success of one is the boast of all, the disgrace of one loses face for all. Individual earnings belong to the family, and the aged and disabled receive care from the same source. Individuals
rarely execute a last will and testament; the family continues to hold all property regardless of individual deaths.

Descent is traced in the male line. The surname is spoken and written before the given name. Family names were not permitted to commoners until the official ending of feudalism, when the new government ordered all families to assume surnames. The illiterate commoners appealed to local scholars to provide them with names. If the putative scholar really knew the ideographs, his clients acquired original surnames written with beautiful and suitably obscure characters; more often it happened that no one in the village knew more than a few ideographs and every local family took the same name without regard to kinship.

Normally a household includes grandparents, their eldest son, his wife and children, other immature sons, unmarried daughters, and unattached collateral relatives in the male line. Lacking food and space for so many people, urban households average smaller. At maturity younger sons leave the household to enter the army, business, or a profession, or to work in factories. Consequently urban populations include disproportionate numbers of younger sons and unmarried women who still belong legally to rural households. When ill or unemployed these persons return to the old home. The family register or koseki usually is maintained in the police station nearest the ancestral residence. Persons who “have no koseki” are hounded as suspicious characters by the police; it is assumed that only the vilest of men would be repudiated by their families.

When there is no son, or if the sons are incompetent, a man adopts as heir a youth who normally marries a daughter of the house and assumes the family name. Such adopted sons may be younger sons of relatives. Rich men commonly adopt poor, honest youths who through hard work know the value of money. The position of adopted son sometimes carries an aroma of subservience that provokes trouble; many adopted children, however, are indistinguishable socially from natural children.

At a reception a distinguished Japanese educator introduced the writer to his wife, a son, and two daughters. Later the professor introduced his brother with a wife and two children; his sister, her husband and two children; and finally another brother with wife and three children. With keen appreciation of the humor of the situation, the educator confided, “You are interested in kinship customs. All ten children originally were ours. Now you see how our adoption customs enable a professor to live on his salary—if his relatives happen to be childless!”
The father rules the household. A distinction between "external matters" and "internal matters" allots responsibility for the domestic establishment to the wife. Except for the purchase of supplies, all business outside the house is handled by the husband. Whatever the situation, respect and obedience are due to the husband and father. From infancy, females learn that the word, even the whim, of a male is law; even in the modern period girls must memorize the "Great Learning for Women," a classical formulation of this doctrine. At the age of sixty a man retires from the family headship in favor of his eldest son. In unusual situations a younger son, or even the wife, may succeed to the headship of the family. The domestic hierarchy is based on age and sex; specific kinship terms differentiate elder brother, younger brother, elder sister, and younger sister.

Extraordinary events convene the family council, which includes the head of the house, his brothers, father's brothers, and for certain types of inter-family problem, males of the wife's family. Family councils deliberate the marriage of a son or daughter, adoption of a son, release of a son for adoption elsewhere, new ventures and business crises, education of a child, employment of a daughter, erection of a house, land transactions, or a crime or offense involving the family. Supposedly no woman except a grandmother sits in the council; in practice capable women may participate and wield much influence. The composition of the council varies with the occasion; the more serious the problem, the wider the representation of related households. Joint councils of two or more families are not uncommon.

All sorts of meetings—committees, village councils, boards of directors, teachers' meetings—are patterned on the family council. The word sōdan denotes an interminable solemn discussion in which everyone talks, beginning with those low in status and working up to the head of the senior branch of a family or the chairman of a committee. No vote is taken and the weight of a majority is not calculated formally. The head discovers what the others think, learns what he can "get away with" and delivers his decision. Failure of

Families of wealth or distinguished lineage often maintain codes of household law inherited from feudal days. These rules bind every member to conduct uncompromisingly oriented to family interests. The extreme penalty for violations is ousting from the family and removal of the offender's name from the koseki in the police station. No employer hires a person until he is assured that the candidate is backed by his family. Even a family head, if he disgraces the house or wastes its resources, may be deposed by the council; if his sons are too young for responsibility and his wife is capable, she may be named as head.

Family obligations extend beyond the grave. Confucian, Buddhist, and Shintō practices converge in emphasis upon the duty of ancestor worship. Neglected spirits may become "hungry ghosts" that harm everyone. One's highest duty, after loyalty to the Emperor, is to rear sons to continue the family and the ancestral rites—hence the imperative necessity for adoption if no son grows up. National and family ancestors are honored with libations of sake and prayers at a "god-shelf" in every home. To the ancestors, formal announcement is made of the birth or naming of a child, business successes and reverses, school graduations, marriages, entrance of a son into the army, journeys, adoptions, and deaths. At O-bon, midsummer festival of all souls, ancestors are believed to return and share a feast with the family. In addition to the Shintō god-shelf, Buddhist households maintain a family altar.

Marriages traditionally are arranged by the family council, in which the prospective groom or bride does not participate. A married person—perhaps a relative—of the same sex as the candidate is selected as go-between. Aided by the gossip grapevine, go-betweens who represent different families meet and discuss possible matings. The go-between investigates the family of each proposed mate, inquires into social and financial status, education, personal tastes and habits, health, and probable compatibility of each candidate, and further ascertains the record of the family with respect to leprosy, syphilis, tuberculosis, and crime. Supposedly the bride and groom meet for the first time at their wedding, but in late years they manage to get acquainted earlier. Often the go-betweens sign the wed-
ding invitations; always they permanently sponsor the new household. Should a marriage fail because of circumstances overlooked by a careless go-between, the offending negotiator suffers rigorous social ostracism.

The wedding ceremony traditionally occurs at the groom’s home. Some modern weddings, in imitation of Christian custom, are held at a Shintō shrine or Buddhist temple. Shintō shrines are preferred because of the association with fertility magic and life; death is abhorrent to Shintō, while Buddhist temples are associated with death and funerals. The go-betweens have already negotiated the value of the presents contributed by the two families; the bride’s family practically provide a dowry. At her home the bride dresses in white, the color of mourning, to symbolize death to the family of her origin. She enters the groom’s house clad in garments symbolic of birth into the new family; these, however, are exchanged for other garments that indicate acceptance of household duties. The ceremony consists in three exchanges of three cups of sake between groom and bride—called *san-san kudō* or “three-three nine times.”

Families who cannot afford the expense and formality of go-betweens turn to relatives for aid in finding mates for their children. Marriage brokers who guarantee a properly investigated mate for a fee exploit the poor by fostering matches that are sure to break up and thus occasion another fee; the Ministry of Welfare has established public marriage bureaus to combat such abuses.

To legalize a marriage the bride’s father obtains her registration card at the police station and sends it to the groom’s father, who deposits it in his own *koseki* at the appropriate police station. Thenceforth the bride is a legal member of the groom’s household, subject to control by its head. Her parents-in-law may divorce her, even against her husband’s wishes, if she displease them. Among the middle classes, concern for a daughter’s welfare motivates many a trial marriage; the ceremony is performed and the couple live together, but the girl’s father shrewdly postpones the transfer of registration until he is assured of the success of the marriage. The poor often dispense with all formality and a couple simply live together at their pleasure; in rural hamlets a number of studies reveal almost universal coincidence of the date of registry of a marriage with the date of birth of the first child.
An adulterous wife is punished severely while her male partner goes scot free. Except in districts where local reforms have outlawed the traffic in girls, commercialized prostitution has status like that of a public utility. Published indices of economic conditions usually include statistics of the patronage at houses of prostitution. Since a father has full power to contract for the labor of his daughters, many girls lose their freedom for terms of years as factory hands or as involuntary prostitutes. Industrial employment of women, therefore, does not connote their social and economic freedom. Girls often volunteer as prostitutes to pay their fathers' debts, to finance a brother's education, or to defray family medical expenses. Newspapers feature these "noble sacrifices" in pictures and sentimental write-ups. Modern women, however, repudiate the dual standard of morality. They no longer respect the dutiful wife who rises in the wee hours to serve tea to the girl her husband has brought home from a party, and who later serves breakfast to the pair.8

*Geisha* are trained entertainers who dance, sing, play musical instruments and amuse guests with salacious repartee. A *geisha* establishment provides girls at fixed hourly rates for dinners and parties. Novels portray the struggles of an innocent *geisha* to retain her virtue; such an achievement probably would deserve a novel. Despite glamorous apologia for the system no *geisha* may look upon a member of the Imperial family. An army general once allowed a *geisha* to smoke a cigarette from an Imperial gift package and the ensuing scandal ended in the general's suicide. In contrast to the relative freedom and education of *geisha*, *jōrō* or licensed prostitutes are guarded day and night lest they escape. Thousands of these girls have burned to death in locked quarters during the frequent city-wide conflagrations. Every *jōrō* fills out a daily report to the police on her clients—a system that locates many a criminal.

The Japanese idolize infants. Babies ride on someone's back by day and sleep with the mother at night. After a year or so of indulgence they encounter increasingly rigorous training in etiquette and family *mores*. No longer fondled, their relations with parents assume formalized patterns. A child does not rush home from play

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8 For data of registration of marriages and births, see, for example, T. E. Jones, *Mountain Folk of Japan* (New York, 1926). The American Occupation ordered the closing of all licensed prostitution districts. Another order enforced woman suffrage. Apparently these orders won popular support.
or school to mother's welcoming arms. He bows gravely at the threshold and announces "Now I return!" The parent returns the bow with the phrase, "Come back!" He learns the momentous details of family face; many adolescents and even younger children have committed suicide to atone for the disgrace of failure at school or in games. Girls discover that their role in life centers in obedience: in childhood to father, brothers, and mother; in maturity to husband, parents-in-law, and sons; in old age, to a son. A boy must obey his father and elder brothers but may lord it over his mother and sisters. Adolescent emotional conflicts often focus in the dilemma of enforced submission to the family versus the dismal reality of internal quarrels and jealousies that preclude psychological security in the family situation. Repressed conflicts of this sort have been adduced in explanation of the sadistic brutality of soldiers and police.9

The superficially idyllic calm of a Japanese community conceals underlying tension and insecurity. Every family is pitted against every other family in the struggle for face and prestige. No individual dares relax his guard psychologically, and even within families emotional security is relatively scarce. Emotional habits nurtured in such a milieu inevitably transfer to foreigners and foreign nations. Every Japanese expects hostility toward his nation just as he expects other families to search out the vulnerable aspects of his family face, or as his forebears expected other duchies to maintain unrelenting espionage. Always in the presence of foreigners he is self-consciously a Japanese making face for Japan and hypersensitive to slights, insults, and fancied plots.

Family behavior sets norms for all social relations. Subtly and irretrievably institutional forms copied from the Occident are differentiated from their prototypes; a school or business corporation looks Occidental but the pattern of interpersonal dealings is that of the Japanese family. The go-between is indispensable to all negotiations that involve relations with persons not of one's family. Before a new employee meets his employer a go-between threshes out all details and achieves an understanding. When the principals finally meet they observe a polite fiction and smoothly work out

the prior agreement as if neither had heard of it previously. Com-
mmercial contracts, educational appointments, the building of a house,
the choice of a physician—every human contact is prepared in ad-
vance. Often the go-between is more than a negotiator; he acts as
sponsor of one of the parties in dealing with the other. A responsible
sponsor or hoshōnin stands back of every important transaction and
guarantees the integrity of social relations of all sorts.

A man is bound to his hoshōnin by obligations of both on and giri,
depending upon the favors he has received or expects. If a position
be obtained through the good offices of a hoshōnin of standing in
the community the dependability of the employee is assured. Bond
may be required and if so the hoshōnin sees to that; but posting a
bond means less in practice than the fact that the new employee
wears the on of his guarantor. Such patron-protégé relationships
may obtain between families and thus outlast the lifetime of an in-
dividual. The employer in his turn protects the face of his em-
ployees; no one, from school teacher to bureau chief, from peasant
to Zaibatsu, ever publicly reproves or corrects another person. A
schoolchild, corrected by the teacher before the class for slight mis-
takes, may commit suicide to restore lost face, and when that occurs
the teacher's position is not enviable. If a pupil, an employee, or an
associate requires correction or merits rebuke, the go-between or
the hoshōnin is informed of the situation and improvement is in-
stantaneous. Yūmei mujitsu, the polite fiction, has preserved every-
one's face. In such a society the American businessman who prides
himself on "dealing straight from the shoulder" encounters repeated
frustrations. At the very least he runs the risk of getting uniformly
untrustworthy employees and clients whom no one will sponsor,
and he complains bitterly of the dishonesty and unreliability of the
Japanese.

One who achieves face cannot retain it passively. Others feel
out the crevices in his armor of propriety. Cleverly devised situa-
tions test his resourcefulness and ability "to take it." Loss of temper
practically obliterates the angry man's face; ability to meet ex-
treme provocation smiling and unruffled multiplies face tenfold.
There arise, however, exceedingly rare crucial situations in which
one may fly into a violent rage and thereby enhance his face.

In discussing the relation of Emperor and subject, patron and
protégé, employer and employee, or the organization of associations, corporations, and political parties, the Japanese cite the analogy of the family *ad nauseam*. The hierarchical pattern of human relations is the only one they really understand, for they absorb it in the family before they learn to frame a sentence.

**SOCIAL CLASSES.**—Feudal Japan was composed of small duchies, each ruled by a *daimyō* backed by armed retainers called *samurai*. The *shōgun*, a super-*daimyō*, governed at Edo (now Tōkyō); the Emperor was secluded at Kyōto. Commoners and *samurai* owed supreme loyalty to their local *daimyō*; even modern peasants turn for advice to his legally powerless descendant, the *tono sama*. Thus tightly organized on the pattern of the extended family, subjects of the same *daimyō* held suspect any person from another duchy. Such local loyalties persist; a Japanese refers to his native district as his *kuni* (country). Almost the first question after an introduction is “What is your *kuni*?” The tradition of solidarity among subjects of a *daimyō* continues in the *mores*; fellow “countrymen” aid each other, mutually protect face, stop at each other’s homes when traveling, contribute funds to educate boys of their *kuni*, and intermarry. Many an Osaka or Tōkyō factory is manned by employees who all come from one *kuni*.

The English word “clan” has been applied to these compact *kuni* groups although they do not resemble the clans or sibs of primitive tribes; they neither practice exogamy nor believe in common descent. Ostensibly *kuni* were abolished at the opening of the modern period; actually they continue real though intangible. The elusive factions in army, navy, bureaucracy, and financial oligarchies often stem from *kuni* loyalties and rivalries.

Feudal law defined social classes rigidly. Styles of dress, dwellings, food, districts of residence, even toys, were prescribed for each class. Broadly summarized the feudal classes were: (1) nobility, *samurai*, and priests; (2) farmers, honored in theory as food producers but actually oppressed; (3) artisans; (4) merchants, despised as economic parasites; and (5) outcastes.

Four classes were recognized legally in the modern period: *nobility*, *gentry*, *commoners*, and “new commoners”—a euphemism for erstwhile outcastes. None of these constituted a “landed class”; even the gentry were descendants of *samurai* and nobles, not land-
holders as such. The suffrage was extended to males of all classes in 1925. Even at that late date, however, it was necessary to record one's social class when filling out blanks such as school registration forms, police reports, and the like. Particularly in the cities these obsolescent legal class categories no longer fit the real situation. Socially significant groupings based in observable cultural differences yield categories such as: (1) Imperial family and titled nobility; (2) Zaibatsu, families who control finance and big business; (3) civil servants, teachers, professional people; (4) a small middle class of businessmen, industrial executives, supervisors, technicians, retail merchants, white-collar workers; (5) army, navy, and police officers; (6) farmers and peasants; (7) laborers and factory hands; (8) vagrants and descendants of outcasts. These groups vary in cohesiveness and class-consciousness; Japanese, however, act habitually in terms of class and "respect their betters." Money income plays little or no part in winning the respect of others; save as the first two groups constitute a plutocracy, wealth and income do not parallel the foregoing divisions.

Incomes as represented in yen have risen throughout the modern period, especially at the close of the first World War. The attempt to represent Japanese incomes in U.S. dollars involves innumerable difficulties; wage levels may be indicated roughly, however, by counting two yen as equal to one dollar. On this basis, taking 1930 as indicative of the latter decades of the modern period, some approximations may be stated. The net annual income of a peasant family, after charging minimum subsistence to expenses, ranged from a profit of about four dollars to a loss of about $60, with losses predominating. Day labor and spare time piecework helped recoup the losses. A farm laborer could earn a daily wage of slightly less than fifty cents. Apprentice boys received board, space to sleep, and simple clothing, plus from twenty-five to fifty cents a month in cash. A girl factory worker living in a company dormitory, with strict economy could net from twenty-five cents to a dollar a month after paying room and board. Skilled laborers received from fifty cents to two dollars a day; these workers, like office workers and salesmen, might expect a year-end bonus that in prosperous times ran from a month's pay to a full year's pay. Schoolteachers and civil servants generally counted prestige above money, and their
pay ran from $15 per month upward. Upper-level civil service men, engineers, and other experts received salaries of $1,500–$2,500 annually. A foreign ambassador’s salary stood at about $3,000 plus expense allowances for foreign duty. In the port cities in the 1920s, room and board, native style and first-class, could be had for about $15 per month. All of these figures are completely meaningless in the whirl of postwar inflation, black markets, and near-starvation that marks the 1940s.

The stability of class alignments has decreased steadily during the modern period. Numerically perhaps, most people continue in the class of their origin. Industrialization and urban growth, however, enable younger sons to move to cities, forge out their own careers, and shift to new classes. Sons of peasants have been able to advance in the army, and hence peasants generally have regarded the army as their champion against landlords, bureaucracy, and the Zaibatsu. Until the last two decades the higher civil service ranks were open only to graduates of the Imperial Universities; other universities, however, now share that privilege. Because of the expense, this road to advancement was more feasible for sons of the well-to-do, but an extended family could pool their resources to see an unusually bright boy through college. Advancement via commerce and finance involves handicaps; partly because businessmen inherit the stigma that a feudal society attached to merchants, partly because feudal-mindedness allots top positions to members of the Zaibatsu plutocracy. Of course minor civil service officials usually have risen in life—railways, post office, telephone and telegraph services and the like have discovered that prestige is a cheaper and more welcome reward than high salaries.

Between 1927 and 1945, the advocates of totalitarianism agitated for elimination of class differences. Their goal was not democracy, but rather the egalitarianism beloved of dictators who govern on the principle, “If a head rises above the others, cut it off.”

Religions.—Before the introduction of Buddhism from Korea in the sixth century A.D., the amorphous indigenous cult of kami held sway. Generally mistranslated as “god,” kami resembles the South Sea concept of mana, which denotes mysterious impersonal supernatural power resident in places, persons, material objects, or ghosts. In the habits of the common folk the kami cult persisted
and permeated Buddhist practice. To distinguish this cult from Buddhism, it received the name of Shintō (The way of kami).10 Japanese, however, rarely accept one religious sect to the exclusion of others; almost everyone considers himself at once a Buddhist, a Shintōist, and a Confucian. Individuals worship any deity regardless of cult affiliations, as indicated by the oft-repeated sentiment, "You never know; there might be something in it!" The Shintō pantheon nominally includes eight hundred times ten thousand kami—a statement that should be interpreted in the light of the use of the numbers eight, 80, 800, 8,000, 80,000 and "eight hundred times ten thousand" to indicate vague quantities of the appropriate orders. The supreme kami, though not the creator, is Amaterasu 5-mikami, sun goddess and heavenly ancestress of the Yamato dynasty. She originally sent a heavenly host to take over Japan and to rule the world—a myth that accounts for the belief in the divine descent of all Japanese, and for their aggressions on foreign countries. This myth is indoctrinated thoroughly in all schools. Other kami include popular food and fox deities, "clan" kami, local kami, and historical personages whose superior powers indicated possession of kami. At the Grand Shrine of Ise, dedicated to Amaterasu 6-mikami and the Imperial Ancestors, the Emperor or his deputy reports to the heavenly kami all important national events.

The peasant pays his respects to the kami at shrines presided over by sundry local deities, at his family god-shelf, and at national shrines dedicated to the Heavenly kami and the Imperial Ancestors. His reverence extends to sacred mountains, waterfalls, trees, phallic symbols, and scenes of natural beauty. He has gone on pilgrimage to one or more well-known national shrines and has good-luck charms from each of them. His infant sons are dedicated at a shrine of Hachiman, the war kami. Planting and harvest he times by the ancient festival calendar whose events provide his recreation. At school he learned to bow toward Tōkyō in reverence to the Emperor, but the doings of earthly kami in high places are as mysterious to him as are the Heavenly kami. When one of his household dies he summons a Buddhist priest and tries to pay for masses on behalf of the departed. His grandmother fingers a Buddhist rosary

10 Chapter VII of Japan's Prospect (ed. Haring) sketches the history of the kami cult.
and repeats the *Nembutsu*; he omits these rituals and remains inno-
cent of theology. Christianity he knows by rumor as a subversive
alien cult that neglects ancestors. He visits Shintō shrines and Bud-
dhist temples when he feels so inclined; they hold no regular con-
gregational services.

In early times the prestige of Buddhism was enhanced by asso-
ciation with Chinese culture. Its magnificent temples, centers of
learning and the arts, often succumbed to corruption. Nearly all
Japanese Buddhist sects followed the Mahayana tradition which
emphasizes Bodhisattvas (saints) at the expense of the teachings of
Sakyamuni, the Hindu founder of Buddhism. Amida, a Bodhisattva
who is believed to maintain a glorious western paradise for those
who accept his grace, occupies a prominent position in the more
popular sects. The bliss of paradise and the tortures of hell intrigued
the Japanese, but, habitually incapable of a sense of guilt, they at-
tenuated the fear of hell to an aesthetic melancholy. Sakyamuni’s
metaphysics they leave to priests and monks. In the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries a.d., several new sects emerged in a Buddhist
Reformation that strikingly parallels the European Protestant Refor-
mation. Against the magic and superstition of the former hierarchy
the reformers pitted the free grace of Amida; some of them abolished
monasteries and instituted marriage for the clergy. One of these re-
formed Buddhist sects, Shinshū, continues the largest and most vigor-
ous in Japan. Nichiren, an anti-Amida reformer, founded in the
thirteenth century Japan’s sole belligerent Buddhist sect and won a
large following of peasants, fisherfolk, and minor gentry. Nichiren’s
devotion to the Emperor stimulated later movements toward restora-
tion of the Imperial power, and his chauvinistic followers helped to
set the stage for the second World War.

Long dormant under Buddhist ascendancy, Shintō was revived in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by scholars who discovered
ancient documents indicating that Buddhism was a foreign cult and
that Japanese are descendants of the *kami*. They proclaimed Japan’s
mission to extend the blessings of divine rule to all the world. An
upsurge of patriotic devotion to the Emperor swept away the
*Shōgun* and effected the Restoration of 1868. When foreign powers
demanded freedom of religion in Japan, the fiery patriots solved the
dilemma by creating two Shintō cults. The first, State Shintō or
Shrine Shintō, was declared to be nonreligious and purely patriotic, hence obligatory upon all Japanese and State-supported. The second, Sectarian Shintō, was declared to be a voluntary religious system. Thus was laid the basis of that national indoctrination which prepared the people for the successive wars of conquest that came to a climax in 1941. Public officials were required to conduct State Shintō rituals; Shintō mythology was taught in all schools; all children were compelled to worship at Shintō shrines in the schools and to bow in reverence at frequent readings of Imperial Rescripts. In practice, State Shintō was a genuine religious cult which the common people did not differentiate from sectarian Shintō.¹¹

Current magical practices include divination, exorcism, fertility rites, rain-making, and superstitions regarding foxes and badgers; both Buddhist temples and Shintō shrines are involved in magical activities. A few old-time shamans, called yamabushi, still follow their vocation.

Only one tenth of one percent of the population is reported as Christian, although the Bible has been a best-seller during most of the modern period. Christianity is strongest in urban districts.¹²

**WRITING AND BOOKS.**—Although spoken Japanese differs from Chinese quite radically, Chinese ideographs form the basis of the written language. Some 2,200 ideographs are essential to reading a newspaper; six to eight thousand give access to more sophisticated publications. Each ideograph represents an idea and has several pronunciations. A purely Japanese phonetic syllabary enables the common people to write with only fifty characters; however, thus far no phonetic writing system has given satisfaction because the language contains thousands of homophones, and only ideographs differentiate these words. Although few people remember the more complex ideographs after they finish school, they understand most of what appears in the newspapers because the phonetic syllables are printed beside each ideograph.

Paper-making was learned from the Chinese centuries before Europeans knew the secret. Small handicraft establishments turn out hundreds of kinds of papers for as many special uses, and modern

¹¹ In 1945 the American occupation suppressed State Shintō; Sectarian Shintō was not disturbed.

factories produce newsprint and other Occidental types of paper. Printing also reached Japan from China long ago; in fact, the oldest extant printed matter was made in Japan. Multiple color printing of pictures was accomplished successfully more than a century before Europeans learned the trick. Although most modern books are printed and bound in the Occidental manner, the true Japanese book is printed on one side of a long strip of thin paper. This is folded accordion-fashion, stitched at one edge, and the pages left uncut to give the effect of a single sheet printed on both sides.

The traditional writing materials comprise a brush and India ink, with long rolls of soft paper. Writing begins at the upper right and runs in vertical columns, down the page and from right to left. Consequently the beginning of a book corresponds to the "Finis" of a European book. Letters are written on long strips of paper with the columns at right angles to the long dimension of the strip. The completed letter is rolled, beginning at the end, then pressed flat, to be unrolled as read. In writing an address, the narrow envelope is held with the long dimension vertical. The postage stamp occupies the upper left corner; when the envelope is turned to bring the long edge in a horizontal position the stamp appears in the place expected by international usage.

The Japanese read omnivorously. Prior to the war the number of books in print was very great; and while public libraries do not play an important role, books circulate rapidly via second-hand bookstores. Once read, a book is resold for a few sen less than it cost. As for newspapers, Japanese dailies lead the world in circulation. Rigid censorship of all printed matter is traditional and the public has read only such ideas and information as the government approved. In the cities, English-language books circulate briskly, since all graduates of middle schools know a smattering of English.

FINE ARTS.—Calligraphy underlies all drawing and painting and stands first among the fine arts; the same word means "to write" and "to draw." Specimens of the brush-writing of noted artists or of famous men become collectors' items at high prices. Painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, drama, ceramics and lacquer work, prose

13 Dr. A. K. Ch'iu of Harvard-Yenching Institute reported to the American Oriental Society in 1946 that 1,918,870 different Japanese-published books were extant in 1940.
literature, pantomime dancing, ritual and ceremony, and formal
garden design all attain high aesthetic standards in terms of cultural
patterns quite different from those of Occidental arts. The sophis­
ticated simplicity that characterizes most Japanese arts appears also
in the rituals of old-time etiquette. Uninformed reporters from the
Occident sometimes mistake this conscious striving after simplicity
for inability to devise complex forms. For example, the Japanese
have been alleged to lack inventiveness because their houses con­
tain so little furniture; actually they achieve aesthetic perfection by
meticulous elimination of every superfluous object and every need­
less detail.

Uniquely original Japanese arts are not numerous; they include
the pantomime drama called No, the seventeen-syllable poetic epi­
grams known as haiku, the designing of gardens by specialized artists,
who have been known to sign a finished garden as a Western artist
signs a canvas, and the formal tea-ritual. In all of these arts the key­
note is sophisticated simplicity. For example, both the No and the
haiku aim to suggest a compact emotional situation with utmost
economy of material. Consequently the tiny haiku are well-nigh
untranslatable, as one instance shows:

\[
\begin{align*}
Asagao ni & \quad \text{By morning-glory} \\
Tsurube torarete & \quad \text{Well-bucket captured} \\
Morai midzu & \quad \text{Borrow water!}
\end{align*}
\]

The picture is that of a sentimental maid, impressed by the morning-
 glory that has entwined the ropes of the well-bucket overnight, go­
ing to a neighbor's well rather than disturb the plant. Only in the
Japanese original can the economy of words be appreciated.

Appreciation of the native arts, like sensitivity to natural scenic
beauty, has been cultivated most successfully among the people.
Coolie laborers bow reverently before a beautiful natural panorama
and quote poetry unembarrassed. The feeling for art is akin to the
mystery that surrounds kami and no clear line can be drawn between
Japanese aestheticism and religion.

Occidental arts are imitated eagerly but without the facility that
marked the adoption of Western technology. Thanks to the phono­
graph, however, European music has attained not only popularity
but appreciation—and this among a people who a quarter-century
ago seemed incapable of hearing intervals other than those of the ancient five-toned scale.

EDUCATION.—Although universal compulsory education was advocated in Japan centuries ago, temple schools cared for most of those who desired formal education. The Imperial University of Kyōto, founded in the eighth century A.D., admitted only sons of the nobility. With the return of students sent abroad to acquire Occidental knowledge at the time of the Restoration, public schools were organized on Western models.

Primary school is compulsory for both sexes through six grades. A five-year middle school provides for those who pass rigorous entrance examinations, with alternative courses in technical, commercial, agricultural, and normal schools. Part-time continuation schools for employed young people were organized in the 1930s. Higher education of women was restricted narrowly and despite recent expansion it falls far short of that provided for men. Middle-school graduates are eligible for the entrance examinations of the three-year junior colleges that prepare for the five-year university courses. During the first two thirds of the modern period, private universities suffered disabilities in competing with the Imperial universities. Most private schools, however, were profit-making commercial ventures; the quality of their work can be estimated. The government finally forced the more mercenary schools out of business.

In the modern period, Japanese society has been a planned society, with education as a major tool of social control. Schools are designed to produce specific kinds of persons in predetermined numbers for the service of the state. Policies actually maintained, whether stated explicitly or followed implicitly, include the following:

1. Conformity, not freedom, is the goal. The despised ideal of academic freedom, attributed to disorderly, unplanned democracies, is shunned and feared by administrators and teachers alike. Only an inarticulate minority desire freedom.

2. Education aims to maintain class domination and further expansion of the Empire for the benefit of the oligarchy, not for the general good.

3. The masses of the people are to be literate but docile and un-
thinking. Small numbers of highly trained experts are to be prepared for service in the government and the great corporations. An excess of intellectuals might breed revolution. Hence the types of schools, the numbers of each type, and the numbers of students admitted to each, are limited strictly.

(4) Indoctrination of the orthodox ideology is attained by an official monopoly of textbooks, curriculum, visual education, and radio. All textbook copyrights automatically become the property of the Ministry of Education.

(5) Control of normal schools and strict inspection of classroom teaching in all schools insure conformity on the part of the teaching staff.

(6) A Bureau of Educational Reform is charged specifically with "thought control" of students.

(7) To insure that women shall become the mothers of good soldiers, higher education of girls is limited. Girls' textbooks are simpler than those of boys for the corresponding grade; hence women are usually unable to pass the entrance examinations to the universities.

(8) Teachers receive low pay but high status in local communities. Their loyalty to the central administration is insured by frequent shifts of locality.

(9) Foreign geography and history are practically inaccessible to primary school students. Shintō myths are taught as history. In even the higher schools the social sciences, except for economics and biased history, are taboo. Shūshin, euphoniously translated "Morals" but really a blend of platitudes and superpatriotism, is a required subject at all levels.

(10) Physical exercise is stressed, and military training is compulsory for boys. In the 1930s a determined effort was made to suppress baseball, soccer, basketball and other Occidental games that inculcate sportsmanship; they were replaced by judō (which Americans call jiu jitsu), kendo (fencing), and other ancient sports that fostered the mentality of win or die.¹⁴

¹⁴ A vivid, accurate account appears in Lamott's Nippon: the Crime and Punishment of Japan (New York, 1944). Under the American occupation the teaching of "militarism" has been banned, Shūshin courses were banned temporarily, athletics have been remodeled, and textbooks are being rewritten. Despite purges of teachers, it is not demonstrated that the old teachers can learn new ways
The educational system manifests both American and German influences, but the indoctrinated ideology is Kōdō, the Shintō doctrine of the Imperial Way. German influence appears in the limitation of higher education and in university organization. The strenuous curriculum of the higher schools combines Chinese classical studies with Occidental languages and science. This heavy curriculum, together with the intense struggle to gain admission, places a heavy strain on students, as indicated by a high number of student suicides. Since families sacrifice rigorously to keep a boy in school, failure means loss of face for the family, to be atoned in suicide. Despite relentless efforts of the army and the police to purge all liberal teachers, a number of forward-looking minds manage to survive. At best, however, the schools offer a warped view of the world.

Local governmental units are responsible for financing the schools, but have no voice in policy or in the selection of teachers.

Politics and Governance.—Traditionally, government has two aspects: one, the mundane business of political control, the other a system of cosmic magic centered in the Emperor as embodiment of the kami of the sun goddess and the Imperial Ancestors. Secluded from the vulgar eye and remote from the storms of politics, the Emperor as super-father maintains the psychological unity of the great nation-household. In China’s history an emperor was regarded as a representative of heaven; Japan’s Emperor, however, is kami, indistinguishable from heaven and the gods. No mere vehicle of greater powers, his person sums up and incorporates the mystical kami of the nation.

The mystical status of the Emperor has served the interests both of status quo and revolution. Standpatters have been able to point with pride to the fact of Imperial sanction of an existing order; revolutionaries, on occasion, have been able to revolt on behalf of the Emperor, that he might be freed from the sinister machinations of evil leaders of a decadent clique. Japanese never have revolted against their Emperor; the purpose of civil war has been capture of the Emperor, whose sanction gave effect to whatever measures the victorious faction desired. From behind the scenes the dominant clique ordered the Emperor to issue certain commands, edicts, and rescripts; when he divinely uttered these as sacred words, the clique
fell on their faces before him and joined all his loyal subjects in obedience.

The political, judicial, legislative, executive, and military activities of government have been patterned after Occidental forms in the modern period. Many observers have insisted that all this Western façade is merely another polite fiction. Partisan allegiance, for example, is not what it seems to be. Both on and giri channel loyalty and allegiance of every sort toward individuals or families; loyalty to principle or to an abstract ideal is inconceivable and nothing in Japanese history offers precedent therefor. Political parties mouth all the Occidental slogans of their craft without the slightest interest in what the slogans mean. Parties dissolve and regroup regardless of previous platforms; the key to this confusion is study of the personal and kuni loyalties of individuals. Japanese government is magically sanctioned government by men, never impersonal government by laws. “Written law is not something permanent, guaranteeing rights and privileges to individuals, but simply a temporary expression of the opinion of the official class as to what is good for the nation at a given moment.” 15 Deep down in his feelings the commoner prefers to leave such matters to “those above,” just as in family council he has his say and then accepts without question the decision of the head. To him obedience is the right and proper habit of life.

The Constitution of 1881, copied from the Prussian constitution, aimed to perpetuate the ruling oligarchy, not to insure popular rights. Although it established a bicameral Diet, the Emperor alone could give effect to legislation and his decisions were controlled by an unofficial, often anonymous, inner circle. Of the cabinet, only the ministers of army and navy had the right of direct access to the Emperor. Since these two always were officers on active duty and subject to orders from headquarters, a premier who questioned army and navy policies speedily faced a cabinet crisis. Should an unruly Diet fail to pass a budget bill, that of the preceding year automatically took effect—a fact that enabled the military to maintain effective though camouflaged control of government.

The “police state” has been a reality in Japan for more than three centuries. Secret police, uniformed police, “thought police,” mili-

tary police, and gendarmes practiced all the ancient feudal devices of control plus whatever could be learned from Europe's tyrants. Their objectives were to care for the people, to maintain the Imperial dignity, and to control ideas. For example, they boasted of their skill in opening mail without leaving a trace. In the 1920s they opened and copied the first six letters of any correspondence with a foreigner. If these were adjudged innocuous, subsequent correspondence was sampled. Later this censorship became total; for example, publishers who had always hired dummy editors to serve jail terms came to the end of their resources. While the efficient apprehension of nonpolitical criminals accounts for most of the orderliness of the Japanese population, the real efforts of the police centered on persons suspected of "dangerous thoughts"—democratic leanings, socialist or communist sympathies, liberalism, labor union activities, or interest in the social sciences.

Courts assume that the Emperor's police make no mistakes. Accused persons are deemed guilty unless they prove their innocence. On occasion legal counsel and jury trial may be permitted, but one may be arrested, held in jail for months, tried, and convicted without knowing the charge or hearing of the trial until informed of the sentence. A prisoner who asks on what charge he is convicted may receive a blow on the mouth as his sole reply. The rare defendant who proves his innocence receives a suspended sentence lest the police lose face.

Procurators and judges, who are not lawyers, are appointed from civil service panels of specially trained men, and the status of lawyers is low. Legal technicalities and citation of precedents rarely delay court procedure; the intent of the law and the state of official opinion outweigh the text. It suffices that the general public know only that certain acts and ideas are forbidden. The fact of arrest prejudices the case against the prisoner; presumably the police know what they are doing. To a considerable extent this is true, for the police are a nation-wide organization relatively free from local corruption and influence.

16 Statement to the author at the time by a ranking police officer. Is it cricket to smile when Military Government imports American police officers to "bring the Japanese police up to date"? Of course Japan now has a new "democratic police" force who carry clubs instead of swords and who wear uniforms not too different from those of G.I. Joe.
While the centralized organization of the modern government utilizes older elements developed in the feudal regime, one of the first steps in the Restoration of 1868 was designed to end the divisive kuni system and to reorient local loyalties toward the Emperor. Kuni boundaries supposedly vanished when the feudatories returned their fiefs to the Emperor in 1868. New administrative divisions called ken (prefectures) were established with studied disregard of the former kuni. Each ken is administered by a governor nominated by the Premier from the high ranking civil service personnel; he administers the ken as a branch of the central government, not as a locally self-governing unit. Since all governors are under the Home Ministry, this portfolio stands preeminent in the Cabinet. While the minor divisions have been changed repeatedly, in general ken are subdivided into shi (cities) and gun (counties). In turn the gun are divided into machi or towns and mura or townships. The English translations imply a misleading parallel with American civil divisions. The metropolitan areas (Tōkyō, Osaka, Kyōto) are not ken but fall into a separate category. Each ken has its assembly and council, which are consultative, not administrative or legislative. Shi and other local units are administered by mayors or other officials chosen by local bodies with approval of “those higher-up”; these men are not civil service appointees but usually are selected from the list of retired officials because of their experience and contacts. Most of the national bureaus—for example, the police and the Ministry of Agriculture—operate directly in local communities through their own personnel or through ken governors and mayors.

In every branch and at every level of government a highly trained civil service bureaucracy consistently wields power. The bureaucratic tradition goes back to feudal days when the Shōguns developed a bureaucracy to control the local feudal lords. In the 1930s the modern bureaucracy numbered about 450,000. The planned scarcity of highly educated men enhances the prestige of the civil service; the educational system channels the very ablest men into the bureaucracy. There are carefully graded ranks of civil service with appropriate titles, court privileges, and other perquisites of office. Outside of the Zaibatsu financial groups, the civil service includes nearly all of the men with administrative experience and “know-how”; consequently, whoever governs Japan is forced to
rely on this reservoir of specialized knowledge. When in the 1920s business seemed to be gaining control of the government, the militarists inveighed against the bureaucracy. But when the army regained the upper hand they were powerless to govern without the bureaucrats. Consequently they used the civil service for their own ends.17

The scope of bureaucratic influence is very wide, for the government owns and operates not only schools and postal services, but also telephones, telegraphs, banks, railways, insurance and savings banking for the common people, arsenals, various public utilities, and monopolies of tobacco, camphor, and salt. Heavy industries and water transportation, while not operated directly by the government, are subsidized and officials make the final decisions. This makes jobs for bureaucrats. On the whole, civil service morale is high and rewards are in prestige rather than in high salaries; the bureaucrats regard themselves as arms of the Emperor just as do the army and navy. A detail sometimes unnoticed by foreign political scientists is the power that prestige-rewards for public service place in the hands of officials who control the granting of decorations, court honors, and similar coveted tokens of recognition.

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION.—In the long course of the Tokugawa regime (c.1600–1864) Japan’s economy moved from a feudal to a monetary basis. Despite frantic efforts to retain feudal usages, both daimyō and samurai found rice incomes inadequate to new urban luxuries. Irresistibly the control of wealth shifted from the feudal aristocracy to merchants, bankers, and money lenders who shrewdly backed the antifeudal Restoration of 1864–1868. The new government rewarded its supporters by giving them control of the nascent Occidental-type industrial and financial enterprises. Thus arose the Zaibatsu, the fewer than fifteen families who own 80 percent of Japan’s fluid capital and most of the producing equipment.18 Each of these great houses tended to develop a separate industrial empire consisting of mines, factories, steamship lines, banks, warehouses,

17 Apparently the American military government did the same thing. They also needed men with “the know-how” and turned to the bureaucrats.

18 Zaibatsu, a slang term, means “money crowd.” The four largest are: Mitsui, Iwasaki (corporate name, Mitsubishi), Sumitomo, and Yasuda. The Imperial Household really was the largest Zaibatsu; the public did not know this and never dubbed it a Zaibatsu. General MacArthur ordered the Zaibatsu to dissolve. How this will work out is not clear at the time of writing.
textile mills, land, and other enterprises. Most of these industries receive fat governmental subsidies, either directly or through tax reductions, tariffs, and similar devices.

Zaibatsu patterns of organization show little originality. They modified and adopted the general scheme of the defunct feudal duchies—the only pattern of organization that Japanese know how to operate. In the new far-flung commercial and industrial enterprises the workers are analogous to feudal serfs, the technicians and salesmen occupy a position comparable to the samurai, and administrative officers even bear the same name as did their feudal counterparts, the bantō. With an autocratic head and a semisecret house law, each owning family parallels the proud house of a daimyō; this resemblance is not accidental but asserts a positive claim to social prestige.

Modern Japanese industry exhibits four main patterns of organization: (1) Small household industries produce consumption goods for the domestic market, goods made and sold by one family. (2) Handicraft and household industries that accept apprentices to live in the household supply traditional consumer goods that require special raw materials and skills, such as pottery, paper, and lacquer ware. An entrepreneur called a toiya supplies raw materials, finances production, and buys the finished product. (3) Workshops with five to fifty employees produce both native and Occidental-type consumer goods such as hosiery, bicycles, pencils, rayon cloth, or electrical gadgets for both domestic and export markets, and these also work through a toiya. (4) Factories with 100 or more workers produce Western-type capital goods and producers’ goods for both foreign and domestic markets. In equipment and technology these companies approach Occidental standards.

The first two types of enterprises are basically household industries, dependent on hand labor and traditional tools. In the second type, occasional machines of modern design speed production—for example, rice mills and lathes. The workers, often relatives, may live together or in adjoining houses. The third type clings to the household pattern despite its unwieldiness for the larger unit. Power machines are used; a single machine tool installed in a frame building may provide the nucleus of such a shop. Many of these concerns operate in rural towns, financed by a peasant who has risen to a
small landowner or money lender and thus accumulated a little capital. Operations may be seasonal to take advantage of part-time labor from peasant families. The fourth type has outgrown the household model and patterns after the West, but retains the paternal-feudal ideology. Workers may or may not be related but often hail from the same kuni. Some companies provide dormitories and welfare services; more frequently perhaps, workers shift for themselves and live under the worst of slum conditions. Labor unions first attained importance in the early 1920s, but police and legal restrictions combined to prevent the survival of any union whose activities went beyond mutual aid, hospitalization, or similar benefits.

Against the psychological heritage of feudalism the idea of free enterprise and the idea of communism are deemed equally radical. Both are strange, foreign, and subversive of Kōdō, Japan's "Imperial Way." Management and workers alike hesitate to act except on orders "from above."

Since the military controlled the government throughout the modern period, economic development was oriented toward war. Those heavy industries essential to war but normally unprofitable under Japanese conditions—such as arsenals, steel, heavy chemicals, motor vehicles, airplanes, light metals—were developed by the government or with governmental subsidy and protection. In free competition with foreign enterprise such industries might not survive. Private industries on a sound and profitable basis have included cotton textiles, paper, foodstuffs, and other consumer-oriented production.

In general, industries producing native-type consumer goods follow traditional patterns of technology, finance, labor utilization, and distribution. Industries oriented to the export market and to services copied from the Occident tend to follow the Occident in mechanization. Financing and control represent a combination of Western ideas with traditional practices, and something like this applies to labor utilization. Distribution in such industries follows Western models, especially German practices, since the bulk of the product must be sold competitively in foreign markets. Government support plays a large part in nearly all such industries, and here too German influence can be traced. Government influence also restricts popular consumption habits to traditional goods; except in the larger cities, imported goods rarely appear in stores, and many
Japanese-made products for the export market are unobtainable in Japan. Nevertheless the Japanese urban standard of living has risen well above standards prevailing in China, India, and other Asiatic countries—a situation evident not only in better nutrition, but in general use of bicycles, electric lights, cameras, beer and liquors, transportation and communication, Occidental-style clothing, education, the press and printed matter, public water supplies, public health and medicine.

The peasant, however, fares but little better than under feudalism. The tremendous increase in statistical tokens of national wealth makes slight difference in his lot. His household numbers six or seven persons and they cultivate less than two and a half acres of land. A field approximates an American city lot in area, and consequently he measures land in tsubo, a unit equal to $35\frac{1}{2}$ square feet. Often his fields are scattered at varying distances from the hamlet where he lives. Rent and taxes take from 40 to $65\%$ percent of all that he produces; even with the help of sidelines such as silk cocoons and part-time factory labor by his family he faces mounting debts on which usurers collect interest averaging 15 percent per annum. Illness or other crisis may force the sacrifice of a daughter, who is contracted out to a factory or to a brothel under terms that amount to sale.19

Like peasants everywhere he wants more land. More than two thirds of Japan’s peasants rent all or part of their fields. Those who own land hold an undue proportion of hillside fields; the good rice land is beyond their means. Only since the Restoration has anyone been able to obtain a title to land. At that time the government attempted to establish titles in the interest of the actual cultivators. The legal work, however, was done hurriedly and considerable injustice resulted—as for example, when village lands were allotted to the family that happened to be cultivating them at the moment, although by ancient custom they had been worked in rotation by different families. A money tax replaced the feudal exactions in kind; the proceeds of this tax were used to retire the government bonds issued to former daimyō in compensation for their expropriated fiefs. A few ex-daimyō, by devious political maneuverings, managed

19 Currency inflation in the 1940s probably helped the peasants; black markets paid them high prices for food. Presumably debts were paid off. Such prosperity, however, is ephemeral; there still are too many mouths for the land.
to emerge from the Restoration as large-scale landlords; but most of the fiefs passed into peasant hands. The new land tenure did not solve the problem of farm tenancy; it merely shifted the fortunes of individuals.

The Japanese landlord, however, must be understood against a Japanese background and not interpreted in terms of Europe’s great landholders. All holdings, by Occidental standards, are infinitesimal. Ownership of more than 25 acres puts one among the top $9\frac{3}{4}\%$ of one percent of Japan’s landholders. Only six hundredths of one percent of all landowners hold more than 122 acres. Fifty percent of all landowners hold less than 1.236 acres; 75 percent of all landowners have less than 2.43 acres. Superficially, this looks like a wide distribution of ownership. If a large holder be defined in Japanese terms, however, the picture is more sinister, for a few “large” owners control the livelihood of a good many peasants.

In 1935, 3,415 individuals each owned 50 chô (122.5 acres) or more of cultivated land. Although they constituted but sixty-six thousandths of one percent of the landowning class, they owned a total of 980,000 acres—about 7 percent of all the cultivated land—on which lived more than 620,000 tenant farmer households. Thus about 16 percent of all tenant families were under the control of this small number of landlords.20

About 20 percent of all landowners do not cultivate their holdings. They work for salaries, operate shops, lend money, run hotels and brothels, and some are officials. Their holdings average under seven acres each. They represent a step above the peasant, a step achieved by careful management of a small inheritance, by working at some nonfarm occupation and renting out their land, with purchase of more land as savings accrue. Many of them illustrate the Occidental saying that “the poorer a landlord, the meaner he is.” Much of the misery of the tenant farmer is explainable by the fact that he rents from a landlord who aims to support two households—his own and the tenant’s—on land where one household formerly lived precariously.

The tenant ekes out a livelihood by making straw rope or mats in

20 Quoted from S. Wakukawa, “The Japanese Farm Tenancy System,” in Japan’s Prospect (ed. Haring), p. 137. Data of land ownership and tenancy from the same source.
the wintertime, working for other farmers, earning wages in small near-by factories, or by such occupations as he can find in addition to farming. For example, a tenant farmer also sold fish in a small mura near the Japan Sea and his daily schedule was recorded.\textsuperscript{21} Four days a week in summer he worked his land; three days weekly he dealt in fish. On "fish days" he arose long before dawn, dug 75–100 pounds of snow from a hillside cave where he had stored it in winter, wrapped the snow in straw mats, loaded it on his back and trotted eighteen miles to the Japan Sea where he traded most of the snow for fish. Packing the fish in the remaining snow, he set off at a dog trot for home, 2,200 feet above the sea. Going the rounds of the mura he sold most of the fish, and when his daily profits exceeded a yen (50¢) he was a happy man. Toward the end of July his snow would give out; thereafter he would rise at 3 A.M. and climb a mountain 8,000 feet up, where he could get snow from the high gullies. With this added distance, he would cover a total of over fifty miles before he finished at night.

Income taxes bear heavily on the rural population. A tenant who takes in 300 yen pays 35 percent in income tax; an urban merchant pays 12.5 percent and a manufacturer pays but 1.1 percent. The great corporations usually receive subsidies instead of paying taxes. The peasant has borne the burden of modernization and militarism; he has paid for the battleships, airplanes, and propaganda brochures, for the factories and luxuries of the Zaibatsu; his sons die for the glory of the Emperor. Even if adequate medical and dental care were accessible he could not afford them. His children, however, attend school and usually he has one electric lamp in his cottage. The government provides agricultural advisors and experiment stations help him select seed and reforest his hillside land. His younger sons make their way in the army or in the cities, but they bring their families to crowd his household and attenuate his meals when times are bad. Otherwise modern Japan has passed him by.

The Japanese nation, throughout the modern period, has been in transition from a feudal order to a new alignment whose pattern is not yet clear. By militaristic regimentation under an efficient bureaucracy Occidental patterns of governance and industrial economy have been enforced without changing the basic patterns of

\textsuperscript{21} By the present author, from daily observation and interviews, 1924–25.
personality and social organization. By indoctrination and liberal use of professional thugs—a process that became increasingly gall­­ing—the people were led to sacrifice for a dream of world con­­quest. Despite opposition from a minority, popular support for that war was inevitable in a society that inculcated obedience and backed precept with force.

The old order symbolized by Kōdō doctrine, however, failed to afford psychological security. In his deepest feelings many a Japa­­nese anticipated—and dreaded—a catastrophe whose outcome he could not foresee. The fear of democracy was based in a repressed intimation that inevitably a new order would come. The apparent acceptance of the American occupation involved a feeling of relief—relief that the catastrophe had come and that a spectacular father­­figure had accepted responsibility for instituting the new order. Whether such a new order can endure unless numerous able admin­­istrators are trained in the ways of democratic action is debatable. It will be much easier for the Japanese to undergo conversion to any ready­made system of ideas that promises security. Democracy is not a ready­made system, and the art of personal autonomy and individual social responsibility is hard to learn.

SUGGESTED READINGS


