LAND AND CLIMATE.—The most important of China's natural resources is her agricultural land, since about 70 to 80 percent of her population are farmers. Buck and his associates (Land Utilization in China, Chicago, 1937, pp. 161–74) divide China proper into eight agricultural areas totaling 1,320,000 square miles or about 41 percent of the land area of the country. These eight areas are divided into two groups. The three northern areas, covering roughly Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, Hopei, Shantung, Hunan, northern Kiangsu and Anhwei and much of Inner Mongolia, comprise the wheat region. The five southern areas, covering roughly Szechwan, Hupei, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and all provinces south of the Yangtze, comprise the rice region. Twenty-five to 27 percent of the gross area of the two regions is cultivated and about 90 percent of the cultivated land is devoted to crops, in contrast to the United States where 42 percent of the cultivated land is in crops and 47 percent in pasture.

Taking China as a whole, rice and wheat together occupy more than half the total crop area, being grown in almost equal proportions. Other crops include millet, maize, kaoliang, soy beans, barley, and cotton. Manchuria raises little wheat or rice but produces about 40 percent of China's kaoliang, 37 percent of her soy beans and 20 percent of her corn.

Only Manchuria and two of the four Inner Mongolian provinces produce a surplus of goods above the local requirements. The largest net imports for China as a whole have for many years been rice, wheat, and sugar. In 1932 these items in American dollars amounted to $34,800,000, $24,955,000, and $14,235,000, respectively. With

1 The author is greatly indebted to Dr. M. J. Herskovits, who has read the galleys and given many valuable suggestions.
the return of Formosa to China, China’s position with relation to sugar will be materially improved.

Tea was the eighth largest item among Chinese exports in 1936, but the importance of China as a producer of tea for the world market has declined steadily during the last fifty years, due to the development of tea plantations in India and Ceylon. Hunan is the largest tea-producing province in China.

Silk is another product for which China was once famous, but its production and export has also suffered severe setbacks due to foreign competition. In 1860, China supplied half of the world’s export silk; by 1936 most of the market had been captured by Japan. The Yangtze delta produces the most silk, with Canton second.

Cotton is grown in the basins of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, the former accounting for about two thirds of the commercial crop. China is the third largest producer of cotton, ranking next to the United States and India.

The climate of China is one of extremes. The winter monsoons begin early in December, bringing a period of cold dry winds and radiant skies. The ports are ice bound and the earth is frozen to a considerable depth. In the summer, with low pressure areas spreading out from Indo-China, the southern monsoons bring a period of moist wind, heat, and heavy rains. Spring in China is a short season of blustering wind, rain and persistent fog along the coasts. Autumn is the most delightful season, clear and windless with gentle sunshine.

MINERAL RESOURCES.—Coal is China’s most abundant mineral resource, almost every province having some deposits. The greatest concentrations occur in Shansi, Shensi, Kansu, and Honan, these four provinces together accounting for over 80 percent of the total reserves in China proper. Unfortunately, much of the coal is of poor quality and some of the deposits are too deep or in too thin veins to make mining profitable. The only fields likely to supply coal suitable for metallurgical purposes are those of Hopei, Liaoning, and Shansi in the north and Kwangsi in the south.

Actual coal production in the various provinces is not proportional to the reserves and has been much influenced by the use of modernized equipment. Thus in 1940 the Kailan Mining Company in Hopei, a Sino-British concern, produced over 60 percent of the
total for that province. Hopei as a whole, although it has 1 percent of China's coal reserves, produced three times as much as Shansi, with half the reserves. The Japanese government-owned Fushan Coal Mines produced over 74 percent of the total output for that province.

Iron is much less abundant than coal. The total reserves of iron ore in China amount to about 950,000,000 to 970,000,000 tons, distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Location</th>
<th>Average Percentage Iron</th>
<th>Actual Reserves (Tons)</th>
<th>Potential Reserves (Tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Archean ores (Manchuria)</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>295,000,000</td>
<td>477,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oolitic sedimentary ores (near Peiping, Hopei)</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>28,000,000</td>
<td>64,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact metamorphic ores (along the Yangtze, from Kiangsu to Hupei)</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>73,000,000</td>
<td>9,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other types of sedimentary ores (Shansi)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>5,100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>396,000,000</td>
<td>555,700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This estimate means something over two tons per capita as compared with 37.9 tons in the United States. A more serious matter is that the Manchurian deposits, which comprise over three-quarters of the total, are low in iron and high in objectionable impurities, such as silica. In even the better ore bodies, the iron percentage seldom averages over 40, although thin beds may be richer. Large blocks of ore have been included in the estimates which would not be classed as ore at all in other countries, for the metallic content is too low for profitable operation.

Tin ranks second to iron among China's metal resources and is more important commercially. No estimates of tin reserves are available, but for a long time China has been the fourth largest
world producer. Most of the tin comes from the Kochiu district in southeastern Yunnan. This province accounts for about 90 percent of the total output, but small amounts are produced in Kwangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kiangsi, and Manchuria.

Copper has been mined in China since the seventh century B.C., but never in large quantities. The peak of production was in the time of Emperor Chien Lung (1775), when the output reached 7,000 tons a year, mostly from Yunnan. Since that time it has steadily diminished until, in the 1930s, it amounted to only 500 tons for the whole of China. Small reserves are to be found in many provinces.

Antimony is a unique feature of China’s mineral wealth, 70–80 percent of the entire world output coming from there. About 90 percent of the deposits are in Hunan province, with estimated reserves of 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 tons.

Tungsten is an important metal in Chinese economy. China produces at least 40 percent of the total supply and dominates the world market. Reserves, estimated at 949,000 metric tons are found in three provinces: Kiangsi, Hunan, and Kwangtung.

Manganese has been mined in five provinces: Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Liaoning. The total reserve is estimated at 22,000,000 tons of ore with an average metallic content of forty-five percent.

Lead and zinc are found in many parts of China, but few known deposits are large enough to justify modern operations. The principal producing provinces are Hunan (by far the most important), Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kweichow.

Silver has been used in China for many centuries but her reserves of this metal are insignificant. Gold deposits are found mainly in Northern Manchuria, near the Siberian border, Outer Mongolia, and the Tibetan borderland. The two former areas produce the bulk of China's gold, about 180,000 to 190,000 Chinese ounces per annum.

Salt is China’s most important nonmetallic mineral. She produces between 3,500,000 and 4,000,000 metric tons yearly, 80 percent of this by the evaporation of sea water. This industry is carried on mainly in Liaoning, Hopei, and northern Kiangsu provinces.

Cement, made from limestone and clay, has become economically important in recent years. China proper produced 15,247,000 bar-
rels in 1940; Manchuria, 19,000,000 barrels in 1937 (last date for which figures are available). Ninety-five percent of all production was in less than a dozen modern cement works.

China clay is important as the raw material for porcelain. It occurs mainly in Anhwei and Fukien provinces, but is also found in several other areas, including Manchuria. Between 1932 and 1934 China produced 860,000 to 965,000 metric tons, or about 25 percent of the world’s total.

Mercury, sulphur, gypsum, and alum are produced in small quantities and a 340,000 ton deposit of nickel ore is reported from the eastern border of Tibet.2

Bauxite, chief commercial source of aluminum, has recently been discovered in China. A recent estimate of reserves give 271,000,000 tons for Shantung and 461,000,000 for Manchuria and Kansu.3 These estimates may be too optimistic.

Magnesite may assume commercial importance in the future. Deposits of over 1,000,000 tons are reported from Manchuria.

Oil is not an important resource, China’s known oil reserves being only about 206,000,000 metric tons of petroleum and 314,750,000 metric tons of shale oil.4 The total, including the inferior shale oil reserve, is equivalent to 3,645,000,000 barrels.5 At the present per capita rate of consumption in the United States, this would meet the needs of China’s population for less than two years. Most of the existing oil fields are difficult of access and the amount of oil produced has been very small. In 1936 it was only 677,481 barrels, of which China proper produced 2,613 and Manchuria 674,868.6

Water power is confined to native water mills and is thus negligible. However, there is considerable potential. The latest estimate puts the total for the whole of China, excluding Tibet, Sinkiang, and Outer Mongolia, at 64,696,000 kilowatts a year at the minimum flow.7 About 60 percent of this power potential comes from the Yangtze Valley and about 20 percent from the Southwest International waterways. Admittedly there are serious difficulties in the way of utilizing this potential, but the Yangtze gorges alone would

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3 Ibid.
5 Chuh-Yueh Li, Mining and National Defense (Shanghai, 1944), p. 45.
7 Ibid., p. 645.
have a generating capacity of 10,600,000 kilowatts a year, twice as much as the present total of TVA, Grand Coulee, Boulder and Bonneville.

Population

No exact figure on China's total population is available. Ta Chen regards the gross figure of 400,000,000 as being substantially correct.8 Buck thinks it is somewhere between 400,000,000 and 600,000,000.9 On the other hand, a great deal about the essential features of the population has been uncovered through a number of surveys and regional studies in recent years, although the resultant findings do not entirely agree.

Birth and Death Rates.—Ta Chen’s estimate of the country’s crude birth rate is 38.0 per 1,000 population. Compared with the United States (18.9, 1940), Italy (23.5, 1939) the Philippine Islands (32.7, 1937), and even the British Provinces of India (34.1, 1938), China's birth rate is high, but compared with such countries as Egypt (43.4, 1938), Mexico (43.2, 1940), and the U.S.S.R. (44.1, 1921-25), its figures are low.

Ta Chen’s estimate of China’s crude death rate is 33.0 per 1,000 population. This differs considerably from the figure obtained by Buck, which is 27.1. According to Buck’s estimate the natural increase is 11.2 per 1,000 and it will take less than sixty-five years for the population to double itself; according to Ta Chen the natural increase is 5.0 per 1,000, and it will take 139 years for the population to double itself.

By either estimate, the rate of natural increase is not among the highest of the world. It is higher than France (-0.8, 1938), England and Wales (0.3, 1940), Belgium (1.9, 1939), Sweden (3.6, 1940) and a few other European countries; but much lower than Mexico (22.0, 1940), U.S.S.R. (20.0, 1921-25). Ta Chen’s figure puts it below Japan (9.3, 1938) and the United States (8.1, 1940), and about the same as Norway (5.6, 1940), Hungary (5.2, 1940), and Latvia (4.6, 1939). This remarkably low rate of natural population increase is certainly not consistent with popular conception, but

8 See the discussion by Ta Chen, Population in Modern China (Chicago, 1946), pp. 4-5.
9 J. L. Buck, Land Utilization in China, p. 363.
it is not a matter for optimism. In most countries where the rate of natural increase is low, the result has been achieved by low birth and death rates; China on the other hand has achieved it by high birth and death rates.

Infant mortality is high in China. According to Ta Chen's estimate it is 275 per 1,000 live births and is the highest in the literate world. According to Buck's survey the figure is much lower (156), but still puts China the sixth highest and way above the United States and Scandinavia. Buck's survey reveals a slight difference in infant mortality rate between North China where it is 155, and South China where it is 157. But in Ta Chen's tabulation of returns from different parts of China it appears to vary widely, between 122.6 (Nanking) and 555 (Canton). Chen is of the opinion that the variation is caused by inaccuracy in the sources. However, some such real differences may actually exist, although the exact extent is hard to determine. For example, infanticide is generally assumed to prevail in all China, but this is highly doubtful. The practice is far from being universal. Nor is it resorted to the same degree in different localities or within the same locality at different times. It is also generally known that during a famine infanticide tends to increase.

Life Expectancy.—The life expectancy of Chinese is among the lowest of the literate world. According to Buck's study it is as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{SEX} & \text{AGE} & 0 & 5 & 10 & 20 & 50 & 60 \\
\hline
\text{Male} & 34.85 & 47.58 & 47.05 & 40.74 & 26.84 & 14.19 \\
\text{Female} & 34.63 & 46.95 & 46.00 & 40.08 & 28.05 & 15.22 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

With good reason Buck regards this as an overoptimistic picture because,

It must be re-emphasized that the experience on which the life tables were constructed is simply that of a population observed during the enumeration years. The life tables organize this experience as if it were the experience of a generation passing through life. Actually the two are the same only if the risk of death remains unchanged for nearly 100 years. In

\[\text{Land Utilization in China, p. 389.}\]
China any generation must be exposed in some degree to the risks of famine, war, flood and epidemic.\(^{11}\)

For this reason the data obtained under Ta Chen are particularly valuable. Chen has separated his data for Cheng Kung, Yunnan, into two groups: those which exclude deaths due to cholera epidemic in one of the enumeration years and those which include them. The two life-tables are as follows:

### Expectation of Life in Years ($e_x$) at Selected Ages for Cheng Kung, Yunnan (Excluding Deaths Due to Cholera Epidemic of 1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Abridged from Ta Chen, Population in Modern China, pp. 105-7.*

### Expectation of Life in Years ($e_x$) at Selected Ages for Cheng Kung, Yunnan (Including Deaths Due to Cholera Epidemic of 1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be clear that, excluding the deaths due to the cholera epidemic, the average expectation of life as a whole becomes higher than Buck's figures, but including those deaths, it becomes lower.

The Chinese picture of life expectation is interesting when compared with certain other countries. At birth the expectation of life in China is only higher than that in India (26.91 m. and 26.56 f.) but lower than other literate countries including Japan (42.06 m. and 43.20 f.) and the United States (59.31 m. and 62.83 f.). As the individual grows, the life expectation in China increases, until at ten years it is only about ten years shorter than in Britain and the United States. At twenty the difference is less than ten years.

**HEALTH.**—There are two things which bear most on the matter of health: nutrition and disease. The figure generally used in the West for the standard minimum intake of energy value for an adult male is 3,000 calories. After considering such factors as smaller size

and lower metabolism of the Chinese, Buck regards the figure 2,800 calories as a more reasonable substitute.

After computing the individuals as adult-male units according to Atwater's factors, Buck has found about 29 percent of the localities studied to be below the minimum standard.

**Daily Intake of Calories per Adult-Male Unit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>No. of Localities</th>
<th>No. of Adult-Male Units</th>
<th>Intake of Calories</th>
<th>No. of Localities below standard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>13,341</td>
<td>3,295</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat region</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6,996</td>
<td>3,186</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice region</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6,375</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Rice Region is much better off than the Wheat Region because a smaller percentage of its localities are below the minimum standard. Within the Rice Region the Rice-tea, the southwestern Rice, and the Yangtze Rice-wheat areas enjoy the highest intakes of calories. On the other hand, "in the Winter Wheat-kaoliang Area, where the average intake is 20 percent above the modest standard of 2,800 calories, consumption in eleven of the thirty-three localities where studies were made falls below it; and the average calorie intake in one of these is only one-half of the minimum."

The extreme variation often reflects the "actual state of relative prosperity" because, as a whole, the Chinese peasant is so close to the poverty line.

In comparison with the diet of 224 urban and rural families in the United States, Buck has found the Chinese diet extraordinarily high in seed products (91.8 percent: 38.2 percent) and very low in animal products (2.3 percent: 39.2 percent). It is also very low in milk, eggs, green leafy vegetables and fruits, which are classed as protective foods.

Other features of Chinese diet are a fat supply of 9 percent of the total calories consumed, which is below the recommended minimum; seventeen out of 136 localities are deficient in protein; and there is, in general, a markedly low calcium intake, averaging little more than one-half the standard of 0.8 gram. But the intake of phosphorous and iron is generally above the standard.

There is no doubt that many diseases are prevalent in China but
the exact extent of their incidence is hard to determine. Buck has shown that the five most important were smallpox, dysentery, typhoid, tuberculosis, and cholera, in the order named. An epidemic is liable to take a large toll of the population. In Cheng Kung, Yunnan, a community of about 70,000, Ta Chen counted 1,002 dead in a cholera outbreak in 1942. The percentage of the toll in West Town, Yunnan, was even higher, when the same epidemic took over 150 lives out of about 8,000.

Figures of the National Health Administration on the 1936 incidence of certain diseases in three large cities may be profitably reproduced here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Nanking (pop. 1,000,000)</th>
<th>Shanghai (pop. 3,400,000)</th>
<th>Peiping (pop. 1,500,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dysentery</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>1,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typhoid</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diphtheria</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallpox</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cerebrospinal meningitis</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarlet fever</td>
<td></td>
<td>593</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is not clear whether the figures represented the numbers of cases treated in institutions or whether they were the total incidence of such diseases in those cities. Whatever the case may be, one has to observe that a much smaller incidence of such diseases in the modern West would have made the headlines in all newspapers but that they practically passed unnoticed in national China.

There is even less information concerning the incidence of less fatal or slowly fatal diseases. For example, the Kala-Azar Research Station at Tsingkiangpu, northern Kiangsu, recorded in 1936 an attendance of 28,938; but it is estimated that more than 200,000 people in that one endemic area were suffering from the disease. Malaria sometimes breaks out in the form of an epidemic. In the fall of 1936 the Central Field Health Station examined 1,008 children under twelve years of age in nine hsien (districts) in Anhwei and Kiangsu for spleen and parasite indices and found 78 percent of them suffering from subtertian infection. Tracoma is observed everywhere.

CURRENT POPULATION TRENDS.—As observed earlier, there is a
considerable difference between two leading writers as regards the natural rate of increase of China's population, but neither estimate puts China among the highest group. After a survey in 1929-1933 of 137 districts in 21 provinces, Buck found that, for all areas as a whole, 58 percent showed an increase, 35 percent, a decrease, and 7 percent, no change. The increase is greater in the Rice Region, being 60 percent of the localities surveyed as compared with 53 percent in the Wheat Region. Thirty-one percent of the localities in the Rice Region showed a decrease and nine percent showed no change while 42 percent of the localities in the Wheat Region showed a decrease and five percent showed no change.

The most important evidence given for the increase was "increase of buildings," and the most important evidence given for the decrease was bandit trouble, disease, famine, or drought. Immigration has been given as evidence for increase in 18 percent of the localities but actually other data show that it often resulted in net loss of population for the rural areas. In a sample study of 206,274 residents and nonresidents Buck found that, if those migrants who made round trips during the survey year were disregarded, there was a net loss of 48 males per 10,000 total male population. In this the North showed a net loss of 133 per 10,000 whereas the South indicated a net gain of 32.

In 1936 a survey was conducted by the National Agricultural Research Bureau on the outward movements of entire families in 1,001 hsien of 22 provinces. It was found that for a three-year period 5 percent of the families emigrated. Among emigrant families those with three acres or less (that is to say, below the median size of 3.3 acres in the survey) represented 86 percent.

The recent war with Japan saw much heavier movements of the population. Between July, 1937 and September, 1944, after the fall of Changsha, it was estimated that 3,400,000 persons emigrated from 24 leading cities and 10,750,000 persons from seventeen occupied provinces (including Manchuria). The former represented about 25 percent of the total population in those cities and the latter represented about 5 percent of the total working population of the occupied provinces excluding the cities referred to above.12

Whether the wartime migration will stimulate the permanent

rate of migration is not possible to tell. Nor do we have any concise information as to whether it has meant an increase or decrease of the birth rate. No exact figures on war casualties are available. From the start of the war to June, 1944, roughly 9.7 percent of the total males of the district of Cheng Kung, Yunnan, was drafted. If we use this percentage as a rough measure and apply it to the entire male population of the country we shall have something like 20,000,000 draftees. Supposing half of them to be casualties, we shall see that they can be made up by five to ten years of peace.

Economics

The vast majority of Chinese are still rural farm people. Buck’s study of 168 hsien, 173 localities in 19 provinces in 1929–1933 has shown that, for all regions, 79 percent of the population are in farm villages and hamlets. An additional 11 percent of the population investigated are inhabitants of market towns, some of whom are also tillers of the soil. Manufacturing holds a relatively unimportant place in China’s economy. The total labor force engaged in modern manufacturing was, by 1933, about 1,200,000. Even granting further increases by 1937 it could not have been more than 2,000,000.13 This is about 0.5 of the total population, compared with 10,000,000 wage earners engaged in manufacturing or 7.6 percent of the population in the United States in 1939.

Land Utilization.—The most important factor in agriculture is land. As pointed out before, the proportion of cultivated land to the total area of China excluding Outer Mongolia and Farther Tibet is about 11 percent but in agricultural China the figure is raised to about 25 to 27 percent. This compares favorably with Russia (12 percent, 1928), Japan proper (17.2 percent), Great Britain (22.5 percent) and the U.S. (22.6 percent), but unfavorably with Germany (43.8 percent), Italy (44.6 percent), and British India (46.3 percent). (The data for this section is based largely on Buck’s Land Utilization in China.)

Within this agricultural China the agricultural resources are intensively utilized relative to the population. The average density of

population per square mile of gross area of the country is 504, but that per square mile of crop area is 1,485. The density is much higher in the Rice Region (1,746) than the Wheat Region (1,128), and varies between the low (858) of the unfavorable Spring Wheat Area to the high (2,636) of the very favorable Southwestern Rice Area.

As a result of this high density of population the average size of the farm is very small. The usual size of a farm is 4.0 acres; the mean crop area, 3.76 acres. In the Wheat Region the usual size is about 5.5 acres; in the Rice Region, about 3.0 acres. The extremes are 0.6 acres to 18.6 in the south and 1.2 acres to 78.0 acres in the north. For the entire country the extreme averages are 0.8 to 42.7 acres.

The mean size of China's crop area compares favorably with only that of Japan (2.67 acres); it falls far below that of Germany (21.59 acres, 1933), Denmark (39.74 acres, 1919), England and Wales (63.18, 1924), and the United States (156.85 acres, 1930).

The picture of agricultural production presents some interesting features. After converting all products into grain-equivalent and after computing twelve months of man labor each year on a farm into man-equivalent, it is found that the average production of grain-equivalent per man-equivalent for all localities is 1,400 kilograms. The figure is lower in the Wheat Region and higher in the Rice Region. In the Spring Wheat area the figure is only 787 kilograms while in the Southwestern Rice area it is 1,830 kilograms.

Considering the fact that farms are smaller in the south than in the north, these production figures are a contradiction, because the production of grain-equivalent per man-equivalent is lowest on the small farms (833 kilograms) and highest on the very large farms (2,073 kilograms). But this is not hard to explain. We have merely to realize that land productivity is higher in the Rice Region than in the Wheat Region. For when we compare the production of grain-equivalent per capita in the different regions according to the size of farms we find that within the same size group the figures are progressively higher as we move from the Spring Wheat Area through Winter Wheat-millet, Winter Wheat-kaoliang, Yangtze Rice-wheat, Rice-tea, Szechwan Rice, Double-Cropping Rice to Southwestern Rice areas. Farms of the most economic-size are,
then, the very large group in which the farm business is on the scale of 13.02 acres per farm. Only a little over 7 percent of the 16,786 farms studied were found to be in this group.

Compared with an estimate for the United States of 20,000 kilograms of grain-equivalent per man-equivalent, the Chinese figure of 1,400 kilograms is pathetic. Yet a fact not commonly appreciated is that, in terms of per acre crop yields, China has a place higher than the United States in both rice and wheat. Compared with the United States, China produces an average of 67 bushels of rice per acre as against 47 bushels, and an average of 16 bushels of wheat per acre, as against 14 bushels. In both yields China is below Italy and Japan; in wheat, both Japan and Italy are below Great Britain and Germany. The United States has a higher yield per acre than China in barley, corn, Irish potatoes, and cotton, although in the last-named crop China's per-acre yield compares favorably with that of the United States (168 bushels as compared with 177 bushels).

It is thus obvious that, while there is some room for improvement, China's agriculture has reached a very intensive state. This has been achieved at the expense of a tremendous amount of cheap labor which works the land not only by double-cropping but also by the modification of physical conditions through private and government irrigation, drainage, terracing, and to a smaller extent, through fertilization.

The pressure of population is equally obvious in the picture of land ownership. In this respect, however, there is some popular misunderstanding. Over 93 percent of China's farm land is privately owned. According to current belief, China is a country where most land is owned by a small number of landlords who do not till their soil but suck the blood of their tenants. But Buck's survey 14 has shown that, in the Wheat Region, which includes most of north China, only 12.7 percent of the farms are rented. In the Rice Region, which includes most of south and central China, the corresponding figure is 40.3 percent. The tenancy figure for all China

14 Buck, Land Utilization in China, p. 192. In certain local areas of Kwangtung clans own up to 40 percent of all farm land in the area (see H. S. Chen, Landlord and Peasant in China, New York, 1936). H. T. Fei is of the opinion that Yunnan province is also characterized by clan ownership of land, but the proportions shown by his examples of clan owned land never came to as high as those in Kwangtung (see his Earthbound China, Chicago, 1945).
is 28.7 percent. In some local areas the percentage of farms rented is sometimes as high as 99 percent and in others as low as zero. Buck estimates that over one-half of the farmers are owners, less than one-third part-owners, and 17 percent are tenants.

It does not follow, of course, that we should dismiss the problem by saying that the extent of farm tenancy in China is no greater than in many other countries. For when we look at the comparative picture the size of farms by ownership changes drastically. For all China, the size of farms of owners is 4.22 acres, of part-owners, 4.25 acres and of tenants, 3.56 acres. The difference in size of farms privately owned and those rented is less than one-fifth. This difference is smaller in the Wheat Region than in the Rice Region. In the Winter Wheat-kaoliang area the owners and part-owners even have smaller sized farms than tenants, the three figures being 5.34, 5.73 and 6.40 acres.

The landlord may be a working farmer who resides in the same village as his tenant, he may be a nonfarming resident in the same village as his tenant, or he may be a resident in some town or city. In the last case he is known as an absentee landlord and his only relation with his tenant is the collection of rent. He or his family members may collect the rent, or he may, if he is a big owner, appoint an agent to do so.

In proportion to the tenants' returns the amount of rent is high. There are three generally recognized types of rent systems: (a) the landlord and the tenant share the risk and the former receives a fixed proportion of the crop; (b) the landlord receives a payment in kind stipulated in advance; and (c) the landlord receives a payment in cash stipulated in advance. Buck has found in his studies that roughly one-half of all lease contracts run on the cash payment system, one-quarter on crop payment system and somewhat less than one-quarter on a share-the-risk system. Two percent of the tenants are croppers.

Generally the rent is between 40 to 50 percent of what the tenant produces in the case of share and crop systems and between 6 and 11 percent of the price of the land in the case of the cash system. Wide variation exists. Thus in Kwangtung province, on very poor land the landlord receives about 20 percent of the produce but on better lands his share may amount to over 70 percent. In one local
area the rent to the landlord amounts to 50 percent of the income from crop but an extralegal and yet customary extortion from a bandit organization called “black ticket fee” took up another 30 percent of the income, thus reducing the tenant’s net return to about one-fifth of what he produced. In some villages of Yunnan the rent apparently varies around the figure of 50 percent of the produce.

The relation between tenants and landlords is uneven throughout the country. In certain areas, especially southern Kiangsu, Fukien, and Kwangtung provinces a system prevails whereby the surface (namely, the right to cultivation) and subsoil (namely, the title to the land) are dissociated. Where this system is found, the tenant, who is the surface holder, has permanent claim over the land he cultivates and cannot be ousted by the landlord. In Kwangtung province there are also hereditary tenants known as Sia-Wu (servile family) who pay rent and perform additional free services to the landlord in exchange for the security of the land. Where there is collectively owned land, the tenant may be in a very favorable position. In one Yunnan village, Fei has found that those who rent land owned by their own clan are particularly fortunate. “The poorer households have a traditional right of occupancy and, though they are theoretically bound to pay fees fixed for that privilege, the treasurer will have difficulty in dispossessing them for delinquency in payment or for any other reason.” 15 Fei seems to think that it is virtually impossible to dispossess members of the owning group, but this is not true elsewhere. In Kwangtung clan-owned lands are usually in the hands of an “oligarchy” composed of a few powerful families, who were as hard on the member tenants as on anybody else and shared the spoils among themselves. 16 When agricultural conditions are unfavorable and competition for land is not keen, or in places where there are only a few absentee landlords controlling large areas, the relationship between landlord and tenants tends to be amiable. The reverse is true in areas where land is exceptionally fertile and there is much absentee control.

In spite of the heavy rent, some renters of land are no worse off than some owners. Fei (p. 77) says that, in some Yunnan villages,

15 Fei, *Earthbound China*, p. 78.
"the holders of relatively large properties, as well as the landless and small owners, tend to expand the amount of land under their management through renting rather than through purchasing land . . . those who rent land are not necessarily landless or even poor people; the rich rent land too. This is because tenants can enjoy a profit even if they operate their rented land by hired labor." This is contrary to the generally accepted impression that tenants are worse off than part-owners; the latter, worse off than owners.

**Handicraft Industries.**—These are present, in one form or another, in practically every village, market town, district city, or metropolitan center of the country. These industries are carried on by farmers and their families as a side line during the slack season, and by itinerant craftsmen who may stay in a village for a couple of weeks or for several months. The work is done in the shops which line the streets of many towns and cities and which also serve as the dwelling places of the workers. It is also carried on under an arrangement known as the merchant-employer system. Under this system the merchant supplies the raw materials and, if necessary, the tools, but the people work in their own homes at a piece wage. Often the home workers finish only a part of the product, which is completed at the establishment of the merchant-entrepreneur. Nankai Institute of Economics studied this system in Kaoyang, Hopei. I have seen it operating in many parts of China, including South Manchuria and Western Yunnan.

The extent of handicraft manufacturing is problematic since few figures have ever been collected. On the basis of the data collected by Buck and Chen, I have estimated the total number of home-industry workers in agricultural China to be 22,660,000, and in urban China, 2,000,000, including 1,000,000 apprentices. If we add to this about 1,200,000 laborers in native mines, we then come to a grand total of about 25,000,000, or roughly 5 percent of the total population.  

Before contact with the West, handicrafts were the only industries in the country. They are still important. A strong evidence for

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17 Enormous local variations exist. In their study of Kaoyang, Hopei, H. D. Fong and his associates estimated that there were about 110,400 handloom workers among a population of 154,130 which brought the percentage of handicraft or non-farm subsidiary workers to 71. (H. D. Fong, *Rural Industries in China*, Tientsin, 1933, pp. 49, 58). Kaoyang probably topped the entire country in this respect.
this is the place occupied by them in the export trade. In 1931 sixteen groups of products of principal rural industries made up 12.6 percent of the country's total export. In 1932 both the total export and the export of rural handicraft products declined, but the percentage occupied by the latter was increased to 16.6 percent.

The list referred to above does not include cotton goods and mining. In 1930 handlooms accounted for 78.5 percent of cotton yarn consumed in China. Native collieries were estimated to produce about 25 percent of China's annual coal output before the war, and native mines of all kinds were said to produce 30 to 40 percent of the total mineral products in China.

MODERN INDUSTRIES.—Modern manufacturing has been present in the country for only the last hundred years. Unlike Western Europe, which has produced machinery for its growing industries, China has to import her machinery from abroad. For this reason the net import has been used as an index of the extent of the country's industrialization. Between 1887 and 1890, the imports of machinery amounted to 382,000 Hk. taels. Between 1906 and 1910 the figure rose to 6,406,000 and between 1931 and 1934 it rose to 35,376,000. An analysis of the principal categories gives a clearer picture: in 1918 these were prime movers valued at 646,000 Hk. taels and textile machinery, at 1,650,000 Hk. taels. Both imports rose tremendously in the years which followed and by 1934 the two figures were, respectively, 5,274,000, or about nine times the 1918 figure, and 9,118,000 or about six times the 1918 figure. In both cases there were heights and slumps during the intervening years but the main trend is clear. The importation of electrical machinery has shown a continuous upward trend, rising, between 1924

18 The figures on rural products were taken from ibid., p. 19.
19 H. D. Fong, Rural Industries in China, p. 20.
20 In 1934, 24 principal mines in China Proper and 11 principal mines in Manchuria and Jehol produced 26,862,701 short tons of coal. Subtracting this amount from the total coal output for the year—namely 36,079,147 short tons (League of Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1941, p. 132), we get 9,216,446 short tons; that is, about 25.5 percent of the total output of the year. This percentage agrees with that given by D. N. Rowe, "20 to 25 percent" (China among the Powers, p. 58) and also in a broad way with an estimate given in Chinese Economic Journal and Bulletin, Vol. X, No. 4 (April, 1937). In the last-named source about six to seven million tons of coal were attributed to native collieries.
21 H. D. Fong, Industrial Organization in China, p. 27.
and 1934, by four and a half times. The increase in the import of machine tools was also more or less continuous.

In terms of an average for the period of 1928–34, textile machinery accounted for 46.8 percent of the total import of industrial machinery; prime movers, 20.9 percent; electrical machinery, 14.9 percent; and machine tools, 4.5 percent. Textile machinery and power machinery (prime movers and electrical machinery) made up 83.0 percent of the total import of industrial machinery.

This shows the increased use of power in Chinese industries and the great importance of the textiles in China's industrialization. This fact is borne out by a classification of workers. The 1930 government survey covered a total of 1,204,317 industrial workers in 29 cities of 9 provinces. Of these, textile workers composed 47 percent. Foods came second with 14.7 percent. Shanghai, which before the last war had about 40 percent of the country's industries, presented the same picture. In 1931 the textile industry occupied 60.1 percent of all workers in Chinese factories and the food industry occupied 10.9 percent of the workers. In 1933 the two figures, respectively, were 56.0 and 12.7.22

Some interesting facts were compiled by R. H. Tawney in the early thirties on the growth of China's industrialization. The accompanying tabulation is abridged from one of his tables:

**Indices of Industrial Development in China, by Certain Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton mills</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton spindles (thousands)</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>4,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton looms (hundreds)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour mills</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories in Shanghai (over 30 workers)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories in China (over 30 workers, not including Tientsin)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>1,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore production (thousand tons approx.)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>2,003 a</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron production (thousand tons approx.)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>433 a</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHINA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal production (million tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles in China (thousands, approx.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of gasoline (million gallons)</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles of motor roads (thousands, approx.)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports (quantity index)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>165.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports (quantity index)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>188.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steamer entered and cleared (tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td>89,614</td>
<td>150,203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of raw cotton (thousand piculs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>134</td>
<td>2,515</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of bean cake (million piculs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of bean oil (million piculs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>492</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of machinery (million Hk. taels)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another study was made by Nankai Institute of Economics, Tientsin, on the geographic distribution of industrialization. By about 1930 industrialization was concentrated in the six provinces of Kiangsu, Liaoning (South Manchuria), Hopei, Kwangtung, Shantung, and Hupeh, which have 10 percent of the total area and 36.3 percent of the total population. These six provinces had 55 percent of the country’s mining (value of output, 1927), 65 percent of coal (quantity of output, 1928), 64 percent of iron (quantity of ore output, 1928), 93 percent of cotton manufacture (spindles, 1930), 92.6 percent of silk (export value of filature, 1929), 86 percent of beans (export value of oil and cake, 1929), and 87.6 percent of electricity (power capacity, 1929). These six provinces also accounted for 92.5 percent of China’s foreign trade and 84.0 percent of all trade (1929). Lastly, they also had 54.4 percent of China’s railways, (length, 1924), 42 percent of the motor roads (length, 1930) and 42 percent of the telegraphs (length, 1928).23

There is no doubt that modern industries have been gaining im-

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portance. In addition there is also evidence for the increasing size of factories. In Shanghai alone, between 1931 and 1933 the number of factories which employed more than 30 workers and used motive power was increased from 710 to 1,186.24

However, when we look at the size of the country and its potentialities and compare it with some nations of the West, we have to admit that modern industries are, except in certain fields, comparatively insignificant. First, with regard to the entire population, the proportion of workers engaged in modern industries is small. A 1930 government survey numbered them at 1,204,317, of which 92.6 percent were in four provinces: Kiangsu, Kwangtung, Hupeh, and Shantung. Since these four provinces had, according to Nankai Institute's compilation, 82.9 percent of the country's cotton manufacture, 55.2 percent of its electricity, 55.8 percent of all trade and 62.0 percent of foreign trade, it is obvious that the total labor force in modern manufacturing could not be more than double 1,200,000 of the 1930 survey; in fact there is good reason to think that by 1933 the total was still under 2,000,000.25

Even if we add to the industrial workers the estimated 800,000 workers in modern mines, the 22,660,000 in rural industries and the 2,000,000 in urban handicraft shops, the number engaged in manufacturing and mining comes to about 27,460,000 or about 6 percent of the total population. This compares with about 12 percent in the United States (1930), 18 percent in United Kingdom, (1931), 17 percent in France (1931), 20 percent in Germany (1933), 9 percent in Japan (1930), and 4 percent in India (1931).26

Secondly, although import of machinery has increased enormously since 1887, the total amount during each year was insignificant as far as country of origin was concerned. In 1928 the United States accounted for 34.8 percent of the total world export,

24 D. K. Lieu, op. cit., p. 112.
25 In the 1933 survey D. K. Lieu estimated that the total labor force engaged in all types of manufacturing in Shanghai, including factories of all sizes, was about 350,000 (op. cit., pp. 112-3). If we use the proportion obtained through the 1930 government survey, namely, Shanghai had about 30 percent of the total number of industrial laborers, then the grand total for all China would be still about 1,200,000 in 1933.
26 These percentages are only approximate. They are computed from data given by Rvoichi Ishii, Population Pressure and Economic Life in Japan, p. 83, Table XXIX; Japan, Cabinet, Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook, no. 58, 1939, p. 411. Quoted in Ta Chen, Population in Modern China (Chicago, 1946), p. 117.
Great Britain 21.1 percent, Germany 24.1 percent, and France 5.2 percent. China took in only 3.1 percent of the total.\textsuperscript{27}

Thirdly, China's industrialization does not represent Chinese interest alone. Before the war the total capital in modern industries was about U.S. $1,300,000,000, of which only one-quarter was Chinese owned.

Fourthly, while foreign investments occupy a major place in Chinese industries, they are comparatively insignificant with regard to the total foreign investments of most of the creditor countries involved. Britain's Chinese investments represent about 5.9 percent of her foreign investments, and those of the United States, 1.3 percent. Only in the case of Japan and the U.S.S.R. do Chinese investments represent a high proportion of the total foreign holdings.

Lastly, in spite of its growing industrialization, China continued to suffer from a seriously unbalanced trade. In 1935 the net import was about 75 percent over net export. In 1936 exports picked up slightly, so that the net import was about 30 percent over the net export.\textsuperscript{28} Between 1930 and 1936 the export of raw materials and semimanufactured articles had increased by 7 percent and that of manufactured goods by only 2 percent; but while the import of raw materials and semimanufactured articles decreased by 2 percent, that of manufactured articles rose by 11 percent.\textsuperscript{29}

LIVELIHOOD.—In his 1930 work Buck found the average value of family earnings to be about Chinese $291.\textsuperscript{30} In his 1937 work, Buck has raised this figure to about Chinese $367.\textsuperscript{31} This, in the pre-war ratio of about 3.6 to 1, would be U.S. $100. However, we must look at the actual purchasing power rather than figures in currencies. Earlier reports on Chinese rural livelihood were especially pessimistic. In the words of R. H. Tawney, “more than half the families in eastern villages then examined, and more than four-fifths in the northern, had an income below the minimum required


\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Chinese Yearbook, 1937}, pp. 671-72.

\textsuperscript{29} Between 1931 and 1936 the import of machinery (which would be in the manufactured category) decreased rather than increased.


\textsuperscript{31} Buck, \textit{Land Utilization in China}, p. 468.
to support life.” 32 Buck’s larger and later findings were slightly more optimistic. In connection with nutrition, as we have seen, over two-thirds of the families studied have at least an adequate intake of calories for bodily efficiency. But there is no doubt that the lot of the average farmer in China is far from enviable. The bulk of his expenditures goes for food. Cotton is used for most of the clothing. “Even in the Double Cropping Rice Area, where silk is most used, only one out of every nine dress garments is of silk.” Nearly half the farm buildings in China have walls of tamped earth or earth brick; brick walls, representing the best type of construction, are found in 17 percent of all farm buildings in the Wheat Region and 23 percent in the Rice Region; in more than 75 units out of 100, the floors are of earth.33

The number of rooms per person is 1.3, in both of the agricultural regions studied by Buck, with the small farms having fewest rooms, doors, and windows per person. But most of the farms in China “use one or more of their rooms both for family and for farm use.” Bedrooms often serve for storing farm equipment and also as barns. On 12 percent of the farms livestock were kept in bedrooms, and in the kitchen in 3 percent of the large farms but in 7 percent of the small farms.

Only one-fifth of the farmers reported savings of any kind. While this is possibly underreporting, the real situation could not have been very much better if judged by the use of credit. At the average high rate of interest of 32 percent per year, about 39 percent of the farms studied obtained credit. Roughly only one-quarter was for productive purposes and the other three-quarters for food and special occasions like birthdays, weddings, and funerals. The average cost of a wedding ran to about four months’ net family income, while the customary funeral cost about three months’ net family income. A dowry meant almost an equally burdensome outlay. In every area, the cost of a wedding exceeded the total value of a laborer’s yearly earnings.34

Among both rural and city workers overpopulation keeps incomes low. Generally speaking, a high proportion of urban workers have come directly from villages. According to Olga Lang’s find-

ings, at least 30 percent of the workers in craft and other old-fashioned shops in Peiping were unable to support their families even on the bare subsistence level.35

The industrial workers were somewhat better situated. According to Lang's research, the compilation of Nankai Institute of Economics, and the more extensive and intensive investigation under D. K. Lieu, the wages of industrial workers often were two or three times more than those in craft or other old-fashioned shops, but showed a much wider range of variation.

However, here again, cash figures tell us little with reference to the actual business of living. To what extent are the industrial workers better off than craft and other city workers? In this connection two summaries of various inquiries are very useful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Distribution of Living Expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Studies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rickshaw or largely rickshaw families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous city workers families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buck's farm families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial workers' families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unweighted average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban working families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural miscellaneous families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is generally accepted that the lower the standard of living, the higher the percentage expended on food and the less on the other

35 Lang, *Chinese Family and Society*, p. 83.
items, especially "miscellanies." Between the two parts of the tabulation there is a general area of agreement. The figures for farm families under the column "food" practically correspond, as do those under "miscellaneous." If we take the "Urban working families" in Part B to mean the same thing as "Industrial workers' families," in Part A, we find a similar correspondence in the same items. The "rural miscellaneous families" were probably non-farm families; their expenditures were higher for food indicating a lower standard of living than the two classes of people mentioned above. The lowest on the scale are the rickshaw families which expended the highest percentage on food. According to the evidence here presented it would seem probable that modern industrial workers in cities enjoy a somewhat higher standard of living than rural, or other urban, workers.

However, the one outstanding thing is the low standard of living of all workers. In none of the Chinese groups studied was the proportion of income expended for food less than 55 percent. But in Japan, manual workers spent 35.1 percent for food; in the United States farm families spend 39.5 percent for food and semiskilled workers in San Francisco spend 38 percent for food.36

It has often been remarked that Chinese workers have low wages because their rate of efficiency, compared, for example, with American workers is so low that a higher wage would be economically unjustifiable. That the relative efficiency of the Chinese workers is lower than American workers, under present circumstances, cannot be denied. We have seen the low per man-equivalent production of the Chinese farmer compared with the American farmer. In such an urban industry as cotton spinning, it can also be easily shown that the output per worker in China is, even allowing for longer hours, only about a quarter to a third of that in the United States.37

36 In the Japan figure drinks and tobacco were moved from food to miscellaneous. These figures were quoted by S. D. Gamble, How Chinese Families Live in Peiping (New York, 1933), p. 323.
37 The Chinese productivity data are based on H. D. Fong, Cotton Industry and Trade in China (Tientsin, 1932) and the U.S. data are based upon Census of Manufactures, 1935, 1937. I am indebted to Allan D. Searle and C. J. Sterling for their computations.
However, an analysis of labor's share in industrial profit shows a different picture. In 1932 the total output of Shanghai factories covered by Lieu's survey was valued at Chinese $557,690,754; 38 60 percent of it represented raw material, 39 which reduced the net value to Chinese $223,076,300. The wage earners' share in that year was Chinese $37,787,625 or 16.9 percent. 40

In 1931 the output of United States manufactures was valued at U.S. $39,829,888,000. After subtracting the cost of materials, containers, fuel, and purchased energy from the above figure the net value is reduced to U.S. $18,600,532,000. The wage earners' share in that year was U.S. $6,688,541,000, or 35.9 percent. In subsequent years United States wage earners have taken about the same percentage of the nation's industrial receipts. 41

Chinese industrial workers, though enjoying a slightly higher standard of living than farm workers, have not been receiving a fair share of the results of their labor. For this reason the per unit labor cost of Chinese products is lower than that of American products, despite the much lower productivity per worker. In 1931 the labor cost of a short ton of coal in the U.S. was 60 cents (U.S.), while the corresponding figure was 29 cents (U.S.) for China. In textile mills the cost in the U.S. per 100 square yards was $2.84 (U.S.), while the corresponding figure was $1.49 (U.S.) for China. 42

We have then to ask, who has collected the bulk of the industrial profits of China? Not the salaried workers. In the United States they took 16.25 percent of the net income from manufactures in 1931; in Shanghai the figure was only 3.3 percent in 1932. 43 But after deducting salaries and wages from the total net value of the

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88 Lieu, op. cit., pp. 325-35.
89 Ibid., p. 109.
40 D. K. Lieu specified that 60 percent of the value of total output had to be accounted for by raw material. He did not say whether that would cover also such other items as containers, fuel, and purchased energy, which the American figures generally took into consideration.
41 Computed from Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 809. The percentages quoted in H. B. Parkes, Recent America (New York, 1941) are somewhat different because the total income (net) quoted was smaller.
42 I am indebted to Searle and Sterling for this information.
43 The value of total output figure pertained to 1932, but the numbers of salaried workers as well as wage earners pertained to 1933. In 1933 there were, in the factories covered by the survey, 17,592 salaried workers and 214,736 wage earners. The salary payments of 1932 amounted to Chinese $7,175,753.00 and wage payments of 1932, $37,787,625.00.
output we find 80 percent of it went to capital.44 The Shanghai factories included in the 1933 survey, it will be remembered, were ones employing 30 or more workers and some motive power, and were all Chinese owned. In those days they did not even pay any income tax. Such economic inequality cannot but produce some spectacular contrasts in a country hard pressed by overpopulation. No wonder the manner of life of some privileged Chinese is so extravagant as to amaze not only Chinese but Americans.

There have been, and are, only two classes of any importance in China. On the one hand there are those who may be designated as the literati-gentry-bureaucrat; the other group comprises illiterate peasants and city workers, who are the majority. The former group is the master; the latter, the subject or servant. During a period of civil disturbance, such as between two dynasties or the one through which China is now passing, military power becomes supreme; then the administering group must be designated literati-gentry-bureaucrat-militarist.

Apart from other considerations, the contrasts in salaries and other income between these two groups are tremendous. Since about 1700 the salary of the magistrate, at the lowest level of the bureaucracy, had been between 600 to 1,200 taels a year.45 But by 1900 the wage of the average skilled worker in Peking (Peiping), which for many centuries had been the national capital, was only about Chinese $68 to $102 a year (counting 200 to 300 days of work per year), or less than one-tenth of a magistrate’s salary.46 Since the coming of the Republic the difference has widened. By about 1930 the vast majority of the industrial and other workers were earning less than Chinese $20 a month, as we have seen earlier, while the magistrate’s regular salary ranged between Chinese $300 to $500 per month. In other words the difference became from 15 to 25 times greater.

Needless to say, the bureaucrats on higher levels than the magis-

44 After deducting the salary and wage payments from the 1932 value of total output minus “raw materials,” we have Chinese $178,012,922.00 or 79.7 percent of the value of the total net receipts.
45 Kung-lu Chen, Chinese History in Modern Times (Shanghai, 1934; in Chinese), I, 8.
trate enjoyed much higher salaries. In the Ch’ing Dynasty, the salary of a provincial governor was 10 to 15 times that of a magistrate; and that of a viceroy 15 to 20 times.\textsuperscript{47} That however, is not the entire story. While the wages of the workers were all that they received, the actual income of the official was far above the quoted figures.

To be sure, not every one in the literati-gentry-bureaucrat-militarist group commanded these high incomes. Many were less fortunate, and many scholars achieved imperial degrees or school or university certificates but did not succeed in entering bureaucracy. However, even the less fortunate bureaucrats earned more than manual workers and all of them had higher aspirations. That is why at one end of the social scale people starve to death or exist like animals, knowing no recreation, no human dignity, while at the other end of the social scale the comparative few have so much comfort that they live like uncrowned kings, without work and without limit to their excesses.

Thus, in terms of reward we must say that there were no lucrative industries in China except the bureaucratic industry. In pre-modern China this “industry” was based upon land tax and upon other legal or illegal levies and graft. In recent decades two more important sources have been added: customs revenues and, secondarily, industrial returns. Since the economic margin of the people as a whole was so low and since the bureaucrats were the only ones with any sizable accumulation of wealth it was only natural for them to enter the new industries when the latter began to appear.

This bureaucratic “industry” determined the character of Chinese urban economy and largely doomed her rural economy. First, in spite of the smallness and the uneconomic nature of the average farms, Chinese peasants pay a higher rate of land tax than American farmers. In Buck’s inquiry, covering 1907 and 1933, it was found that the average tax on all farm land in China was one to three times higher than in the United States.

The extent of levies and graft are hard to determine. However, it was estimated that in 1929 no less than Chinese $300,000,000 worth of property was held by various retired ministers, politicians, and warlords in the treaty port of Tientsin alone, while in June, 1931, the total amount of capital of the 1,100 registered corpora-

\textsuperscript{47} Kung-lu Chen, \textit{loc. cit.}
Tensions in the whole of China was only Chinese $556,000,000.\textsuperscript{48}

Thirdly, the most revealing evidence of the importance of the bureaucratic industry is found in the nature of Chinese urban centers. According to a compilation in 1937, in 21 of 26 provinces the capital was the largest city, far outnumbering the other cities of the same administrative unit. In two provinces the capital was matched in population by one other city. In three provinces it was smaller than one or more other cities of the province; in one of these three it was outranked by Peking, the former national capital; in another of the same group it was outranked by Nanking, the present national capital, and by Shanghai. Taking the country as a whole, Peking outranked all cities except Shanghai; and Nanking, all cities except Shanghai, Peking, and Canton.\textsuperscript{49}

The concentration of urban population in the United States is practically the reverse. According to the 1947 World Almanac, there are fifteen states of the Union in which the state capital is the biggest city of the state; in 9 states it was outranked by one other city of the state; in 5 states, by two others; in 4 states, by three; in 3 states, by four; in 6 states, by five; in one state, by six; in two states, by eight; and in three states, by ten other cities. Even in twelve of the fifteen states in which the capital is the largest city, it is at least matched in size by one to five others. Washington, D.C., the national capital, ranks eleventh among the cities in the United States.

After over half a century of industrialization the bureaucratically dominated nature of Chinese urban economy is still clear. In the United States the cities are both consumption and producing centers. In China they are, in terms of the national economy as a whole, chiefly consumption centers. The chief consumers were and are members of the literati-gentry-bureaucrat (and lately, militarist) group. They are the employers of those peasants and their children who have been crowded out of their villages, and who have no alternative but to accept practically subhuman wages.

It may be asked how such a system managed to work for so many centuries. The answer is that the evils of the system were not as


Serious as they seem at first sight until they were aggravated by huge war indemnities and an unfavorable trade balance. Before China's door was opened wide, the ruling classes collected from the people, but they also spent among the people. Through their urban extravagance they at least disseminated a part of their riches among thousands and millions of other Chinese. But a different picture resulted with the beginning of the unfavorable trade balance. Since imported goods have always been more in line with the consumption habits of the upper classes, it is easy to see that, together with huge indemnities, the same corruption has become much more vicious than before. The same wealth held by officials which used to be redistributed among the people through spending now left the country by way of foreign concessions, treaty ports, and pleasure tours in Europe and America.

Social and Political Organization

The basic unit of the society is the family. The Chinese family is a patrilineal, patrilocal, and, in large measure, patriarchal organization. But a number of features distinguish it from many other patrilineally, patrilocally, and patriarchally organized families. These features may be summarized under one principle: glorification of the father-son relationship at the expense of the husband-wife relationship. This principle is built on a number of secondary patterns, the first on the list being filial piety.

The Family Pattern.—Filial piety means that a son owes everything to his parents. While they are alive it is his duty to support and obey them; after their death it is his duty to continue the support and obedience in the form of elaborate funerals and ancestor worship. The second pattern is, for lack of a better term, estrangement between the sexes. Marriages are arranged, with no freedom of choice whatever. A married couple, by custom, must live under the same roof with the husband's parents. Their duty to his parents are primary, and to each other secondary. Furthermore, there must be practically complete suppression of the expression of erotic life between man and wife. Husbands and wives are seen together only on special occasions. Since the society is patrilineally organized, the second pattern also means inequality between the sexes, accompanied
by high premium on virginity, male dominated rules of divorce, and concubinage.

However, contrary to popular assumption, filial piety is not a one-sided affair in favor of the parents. Father and son are both links in the infinite continuity of the family lineage. Their roles are complementary; thus the sons owe all they have to their progenitor, but whatever the father has also automatically belongs to the sons. The rule of inheritance is, therefore, that sons receive as a matter of course the father’s entire property. The older man cannot make a will in favor of any one else. For the same reason, while the son’s status in early life is determined by the achievement of his father, the father’s status in his later life is determined by that of his sons. It is such features which have prompted me to speak of, elsewhere, father-son identification.\(^{50}\)

This father-son identification leads to the fourth and last secondary pattern of Chinese family, namely, the big family ideal. All men desire to have more than one son. In order to maintain the father-son identification it is necessary to protect the family from the defection of some sons who break away. For this reason a high degree of solidarity among brothers is important. The logical extension of this pattern is the ideal of solidarity among all members of the kinship group.

This being the essential manner of its organization, it is clear that the Chinese family is potentially larger than any modern European or American family which emphasizes the husband-wife relationship, which, according to the Chinese pattern, is suppressed in the interest of the father-son relationship and joint family unity.

Ideal and Reality.—However, a complete glorification of the father-son relationship and suppression of the husband-wife relationship is not practical. Within the Chinese family there is always the duel between these two basic sets of relationships. If the former predominates, the family will be large. If the latter, the conjugal relationship triumphs and the family will be smaller.

Investigations made in recent years have demonstrated conclusively that there is a close and direct correlation between the size of farm and size of household. Buck’s surveys show that on “small” farms the average number of persons per household is 4.4. Extend-\(^{50}\) See F. L. K. Hsu, *Under the Ancestors’ Shadow* (New York, 1948).
ing this to "medium," "medium large," "large," and "very large" farms, the respective numbers of persons per household are, respectively, 5.5, 6.9, 8.3, and 10.1. This has been thought to indicate a close adjustment between land and population.

But if we consider this in terms of population pressure only, we shall be unable to explain why, in spite of the fact that the majority of Chinese farm holdings are below the most economic unit for production, families keep dividing. According to my own observation it is precisely the poorer families which most frequently divide.

Some years ago I ventured to explain it by the differential adherence, between the rich and the poor, to the social ideal of elevating father-son relationship at the expense of husband-wife relationship. In the poorer family the difficulty of living together is easily aggravated by poverty and often overshadows even the wisdom for continued economic cooperation, so that the more a family needs to keep the land intact the more it tends to divide. Here the husband-wife relationship has greater weight for the additional reason that, for the poor man, to secure a wife is a matter of immediate economic consequence. On the other hand, with the wealthier families the social ideal has more weight because that is the mark of prestige and status. Furthermore, men in such families have also no worries about remarriage. When brothers do not actively side with their wives, the family can hold out together longer and the father-son relationship has a greater chance.

We now have some additional evidence in support of this thesis, namely the preponderance of conjugal families among the poorer groups. In her inquiries, Olga Lang confirms the observation that family size increases with social and economic status. But she also gives the following data on 485 north China village families: among farm laborers the percentage of conjugal families was 54; next came peasants, 41 percent; then came middle peasants with 27; among well-to-do peasants the percentage was 17, while among landlords it was 12. Thus the wealthier the family the greater its tendency toward the Chinese large-family ideal, which is not only measured by the number of children born and brought up, but also by the

61 Buck, Land Utilization in China, p. 278.
63 Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, p. 138.
number of collateral kinsmen and their wives and children under the same roof. Lang's data on city families points in the same direction.54 This is why, though China has been regarded as a country of large families, the actual mean or average size is only about 5.2 or even less.55

The extension of the family group is the clan. Contrary to popular assumption, clan in China is not strong. It is better organized in some areas, notably the extreme south and central China. It has form but not substance in the southwest. The external manifestations of a clan are as follows: (a) surname, which all members of the same clan share, but which no longer corresponds to clan; (b) exogamy, which is sometimes ignored; (c) common territory (some villages are composed solely of members of the same clan); (d) clan land, which is common in the extreme south, less common in the southwest, and very rare in the north; and (e) clan temples where common worship of the same ancestors takes place on appointed dates every year. Clan temples are absent in many parts of the country.

For reasons which we have no space to dwell on here, the areas in which the clan organization has been described as strong, and where clans possess large pieces of common land, are often areas where the clan is under the dictatorship of an oligarchy, who appropriate the common goods for furthering their own immediate family interests.56

THE CHANGING FAMILY.—The picture of the Chinese family today is one of contrasts. For the vast majority of peasants there has been little change. As far as they are concerned the family picture as described above is still essentially true. On the other hand, changes have occurred increasingly among the urban population. Some changes are noticeable even in small interior towns.

Changes are taking place faster in some aspects of the traditional pattern than in others. Lang found the vast majority of the students investigated desired freedom of choice in marriage whether for

54 Ibid., p. 142.
56 See H. S. Chen, Landlord and Peasant in China, and F. L. K. Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow.
themselves or for their children. She also found evidence for a change in the husband-wife pattern not only among educated groups, but also among industrial workers in cities. The wife in the new situation has more influence over her husband and children and in many cases controls the family purse. Lastly, there is evidence for change in the father-children relationship. Although the presentation of her material is peculiar, Lang's data do indicate, for example, that college-educated fathers have developed more intimate relationship with their children of both sexes.

These three lines of change will naturally increase the demand for the conjugal rather than the joint type of family. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in the modernized groups, the percentage of conjugal families is higher among the upper class than among the middle class families—a tendency exactly in reverse to that found among the tradition-bound groups.

Certain other aspects of the family pattern have shown little change even in urban areas. The vast majority of students questioned considered the support of parents to be important. Many students and others feel that if they do not live under the same roof with their parents they ought at least to offer them material assistance. In my own observation I have found, on more than one occasion, university professors being severely criticized for neglecting their parents.

The other aspects of the family pattern which have changed but slowly may all be put under the heading: lack of organic relationship between custom and the written law. Modern Chinese law is comparable to the most advanced laws of the West. In the case of family behavior it provides, for example, that parents are free to leave their property to anyone they like by a will. In reality, such property goes to the sons as a matter of course in the vast majority of cases. The law also says that betrothal is not binding unless both parties assent and that men and women have the same right to divorce on specific grounds. Finally, concubinage has been outlawed since 1936. The reality is that only among the highly educated is the view concerning betrothal commensurate with the spirit of the law; the vast majority of women do not go to law even when mis-

57 Lang, op. cit., pp. 303-4; see also pp. 142, 203, 222, 300.
treated; and concubinage goes on as before, even though it is highly disliked among educators and some others.\textsuperscript{58}

**THE VILLAGE AND THE DISTRICT.** Next to family and clan is village. Chinese villages are rarely walled and are usually irregular in shape. The larger ones have a population exceeding 200 households, or approximately 1,000 individuals. The smaller ones may have only 20 households, or fewer than 100 persons. In some villages all or the majority of the families belong to the same clan. More often a village is dominated by members of a few clans.

Most villages are organized in two ways: an organization originated from the central government and a second originated from the indigenous community. The organization of government origin is more or less uniform throughout the country: Every ten families near each other form one Chia; every ten Chia form one Pao; every ten or more Pao form one Hsiang, while a district may be divided into three or more Hsiang.

In each of the subdivisions within the district there is an elected headman (sometimes two), empowered to handle certain affairs of the unit. According to government regulations the functions of this organization are numerous, but only a few definite ones are ever discharged. First, organizing for public safety against bandits and communists; secondly, the keeping of census (which during and since the war has been used by the government for conscription and forced labor); thirdly, the headmen of the Pao and Hsiang often passing judgment on simple cases or serving as mediators in intra-village disputes; fourthly, managing the local schools; and lastly, serving as intermediaries between the people and the government functionaries. In the last function their maneuvers are often to the advantage of the villagers.

The organization originating from the village also covers the entire community. In this matter, villages in different parts of China vary so much that it is better to take a specific example. This example is taken from a community in Yunnan, southwest China, which will be referred to as South Village. The observations pertain to the years 1941 to 1944.

The village is divided into two parts known as Upper and Lower

\textsuperscript{58}In this connection see "Some Problems of Chinese Law in Operation Today," *Far Eastern Quarterly* (May, 1944), pp. 211-21.
South Village. The Upper section is divided into six equal units of the local organization and the lower section is divided into five. Each unit has a head and consists of an approximately equal number of households. Broadly speaking, the chief function of this organization is the handling of matters of public worship. Public ancestor worship takes place once every year in the seventh Moon according to the lunar calendar. The birthday of Buddha is celebrated on the eighth day of the fourth Moon. The women's "blood lake" meeting, to insure safety in child delivery, takes place in the middle of the fifth Moon. The "green crop" meeting, for the purpose of insuring freedom from locusts and other insects, takes place on the first day of the sixth Moon. Besides these, one or more nonperiodic affairs always take place in any given year. These prayer meetings are organized when worms or locusts appear in the fields; when fire has burned down some houses in the village; and when some unexpected or unexplainable accident occurs. In many villages, Japanese bombing was included in the last category.

All these meetings, though different in purpose, are similar in procedure. One or more priests are hired, either locally or from a distant village. They recite the scriptures and perform special rites on a platform in the temple yard. The entire proceeding may last from one to three days and nights. The costs of these events, which are often considerable, come partly from rent collected from communal land and partly by voluntary donation from practically every household in the community. Although occasioned often by a communal crisis, these meetings, with their rituals, music, and feasting, are also an important source of recreation. They also bring the community together so that its solidarity is reaffirmed.

Theoretically these meetings have nothing to do with the Pao organization. Actually they are sometimes sponsored by present or past Pao headmen, who are also chief participants. The personnel in the government organization take part for the simple reason that the local functions are events through which the place of the individual in the community is seen. An individual who has no place in these functions has also no place in the community.

In addition to the local organization we must mention the gentry group as an organized force. There is no local name for this organization and, if questioned, villagers deny its existence. But there is no
question about its reality and its power. In brief, this is a prestige group. To qualify as a member, one must have, in addition to land, some connection with bureaucracy or the army. If a man is neither a bureaucrat nor a militarist, he must have some close relative, a brother, a son, or a son-in-law, who works in the provincial government or the central government, or on higher levels of the army. Members of the gentry associate freely with the magistrate as equals. The latter must profess that he would be guided by their opinion in all important decisions concerning the community.

South Village had no recognized member of the gentry at the time of investigation, but when occasion demanded it, the village was guided by some who were inhabitants in another village and in the district seat. The gentry did a number of things. It was largely responsible for the creation of a lower middle school with about 150 students, a primary school with about 200 students, and a district clinic with one doctor and two nurses trained in the Western style. At the time I left the village, the magistrate, with the help of the members of the gentry, had just paid Chinese $1,000,000 for a house to be made into a hospital with 20 beds.

Whenever there is any friction between the magistrate’s office and some visiting military or civil group the gentry will be the mediator, by virtue of its connection with higher offices. On the other hand, the group certainly perpetuates its own vested interests and, in doing so, maintains a symbiotic relationship with the magistrate. It can influence land taxes or “fix” law suits, or protect anyone from the local law more or less as it pleases.

The district is the basic political unit in the country and is supposedly administered by a magistrate of the people’s choice. But the highest so-called elected official so far is the headman of the Hsiang or subdistrict. Even in this case, popular election is often a myth. In size, districts very considerably; they are classified according to size and importance.

A district always comprises a walled city, where the magistrate resides and administers, and a large number of villages. It may also comprise one or more market towns.

Within the district the magistrate has final authority on all important issues, except that he has to play ball, so to speak, with the local gentry. He has charge of the public safety, collection of land
tax, public works, conscription, and opium suppression. If there is no law court he is the district judge as well.

**CLASS STRUCTURE.**—Before discussing the wider political organization it will be necessary to understand the class structure. In pre-modern China the popularly conceived classes and their ratings were first, scholars; second, farmers; third, craftsmen and laborers; and fourth, merchants.

The actual picture was considerably different. At the very top sat the aristocracy. Then came the literati-bureaucrats on whom rested the practical business of administration and who were literally servants of the imperial households. Then came the gentry, who, in more ways than one, could be classed with the literati-bureaucrats, and heads of important clans. Then came small owners, farmers, and merchants. City and farm laborers came at the bottom of the class scale. Military personnel rated in a number of ways: common soldiers were considered outcasts, but as they rose in rank they became comparable to members of the various classes; at the upper end there would be some military officials enjoying the same social esteem as high bureaucrats, not usually so much because they were great soldiers, but because they were learned and were known as "scholar-generals."

It is, of course, to be understood that the interclass demarcations of this structure were ambiguous at many points. The term bureaucrat could be applied to anyone including the prime minister, the clerk in a district magistrate's office, and anyone with a title. Needless to say, their prestige and privileges varied tremendously. Many heads of clans and members of the gentry would also have bureaucratic connections. Rich merchants would climb socially by purchasing a title, by winning a title through charity or generous contributions to government causes in an emergency, or by sending their sons to tutor schools and halls of examinations. Finally, everyone of any means owned some land or other forms of real estate. In this sense every class above the group termed small-owner farmers would also be landlords.

Following contact with the West, and particularly after the downfall of the imperial dynasty, some changes have occurred. There is no longer an aristocracy recognized as such, but its position is occupied by a much larger group claiming the right to rule
the country and backed, as was the old aristocracy, by armed forces. An equally important change has occurred in the gentry-literati-bureaucrat group. It has broadened to comprise a larger number of persons and more diverse elements, including the literati-reformers, among whom are also professionals such as doctors, architects, accountants, writers, and teachers. There are also bureaucrats who have invested their gains in industries and commerce, and industrialists and modernized merchants who derived their capital by purely business means. Finally there are the compradores, who rose by being agents between Western firms and Chinese customers, or raw material suppliers, and others who rose through missionary assistance.

The outstanding things about this new gentry-literati-bureaucrat group are that, on the one hand, literary achievement per se is no longer as important as before, and on the other, bureaucratic positions share the attraction with industry and commerce. There are even scholars whose chief concern is the improvement of society. But in the minds of the lower classes and even among the literati, all such persons are closely associated with the bureaucracy. Even many professionals, industrialists, and merchants were forced to play ball with bureaucrats on the higher levels to get what they want or to get into the most advantageous business positions.

Some changes have also occurred among the other classes. For example, a new class of technical workers in factories has risen from the ranks of the common industrial workers. These technical workers often commanded, before the war, a wage six to eight times that of the other workers. But the most spectacular change has been in the position of the military. Common soldiers are still without class, but the highest military men have risen above their station in the imperial days. Instead of being the instruments of the rulers, as bureaucrats were, they are now the top rulers.

The most unusual thing about the class structure is that, in its functioning, it exhibits the polar characters of fluidity and rigidity. There is no doubt that social mobility has been considerable in the long run. Nevertheless, at any given point of time the class structure is extremely rigid. The most basic divisions as we see them today are the ruling military and bureaucracy on the one hand and the vast majority of the people on the other. The gulf between them is
great, not only in remuneration but also in power and prestige. As a matter of fact the structure is so rigid that differences between separate classes are often translated into differences between separate statuses within the classes. That is to say, there is not only sharp inequality between the two large divisions, but also among the high military and the bureaucrats.

**Government by Bureaucracy.**—The magistrate is not responsible to the people but to the head of the provinces. Before the Republic, there were a number of intermediary divisions between the province and the district. These have since been abolished. At the head of the province is the governor, appointed by the central government, who administers with the aid of the boards of civil affairs, of education and of finance, and a number of bureaus, including that of police.

Like the magistrate in his district, the governor is the supreme authority in his province. Just before the war with Japan there were twenty-eight provinces in China. Since the war, Manchuria, which formerly comprised three provinces, became nine provinces, thus bringing the total number to 34. But unlike the magistrate the provincial governor is never vested with judiciary function. There is a higher court in every province.

The governor is responsible to the Executive Yuan (Council), the leading organ of the central government. Also responsible to it are the various ministries and bureaus and special municipalities, such as Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, Peiping and Tientsin.

There are four other Yuan: legislative, judiciary, examination and control. The Control Yuan investigates all officials and government organizations and indicts those which fail in integrity or efficiency. The Judiciary Yuan, through the Ministry of Justice, has charge of the Supreme Court in the national capital, the Higher Courts in the provinces, and the District Courts. The chief of the Executive Yuan is the premier, who is nominally responsible to the President of the Republic.

The command of the armed forces is a separate system. Under the Executive Yuan there are Ministries of War and Navy. But the supreme command of the armed forces is vested not in the Executive Yuan, but in a separate organ called the Military Council. When the chairman of the latter council happens to be also the Premier or the
President of the Republic, then the separate powers merge, but not otherwise. For many years one man served as the figurehead Chairman of the Republic, another man served as the chief of the Executive Yuan, while General Chiang Kai-shek was Chairman of the Military Council. Upon the death of the former chairman, Lin Sen, Chiang took over the chairmanship while concurrently holding the reins of the armed forces. For a short period Chiang was also the Chief of the Executive Yuan.

The Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, has been the power behind the government since 1929, when the armies of General Chiang, chief of the party, unified China. Like the administration, the party is organized on three levels: in the national capital, the provincial capitals, and the district seats.

To understand the functioning of the Chinese government one must, however, look into the basis of its power. Before the Revolution of 1911 the power of the ruling group rested upon three things: military force, execution of certain essential functions, and tradition. For the founder of a dynasty the first weapon was military prowess. When a man emerged victorious after successfully eliminating all contending factions in an interdynastic chaos, then tradition would have it that he possessed the Mandate of Heaven. He and his lineal descendants would then be entitled to rule the country until they lost the Mandate.

However, to remain in power the ruling group, with the help of the bureaucracy, had to fulfill certain essential functions. These functions included maintenance of law and order and water control chiefly for purposes of irrigation. Some students insisted that it was primarily water control which gave the ruling group its power and determined the characteristics of the entire Chinese society. There is no doubt that the government's part in water control was economically important at least to a part of the agricultural population.

As long as the ruling group kept the people happy, it possessed the Mandate. When civil disturbances failed to be pacified and famines and other catastrophes became too serious and too frequent,

59 See K. A. Wittfogel, "Economic and Political Features in China's Social Heritage" (mimeographed lecture originally given at the Princeton University Bicentennial Conference on Far Eastern Culture and Society, April 1-3, 1947).
it was a sign that the Mandate of Heaven was withdrawn. Then
the people had the right to revolt and a new ruler with the Mandate
would sooner or later emerge.

The foundation of power of the bureaucracy rested in the execu-
tion of certain essential functions, and also in tradition but particu-
larly in favor. As servants of the ruling group they helped to exe-
cute the essential functions expected of that group. Tradition was
behind them because literacy carried with it a very high premium.
The vast majority of the bureaucrats were members of the literati,
who were regarded as traditionally entitled to rule. However, the
power of the bureaucracy cannot be properly understood without
reference to favor. With relation to the people under their admin-
istration, the bureaucrats literally had absolute power. The magis-
trates, who were really at the tail end of the bureaucracy, were
called "father-mother officials," expressing definite meaning that
while they might love the people like parents they also, like them,
held the power of life and death over their children.

This great power lasted only as long as the bureaucrats remained
in favor with their superiors and the latter in the favor of the em-
peror, who had the final authority. While in favor they had all the
power they wanted and abused it; but this power might be taken
away suddenly, so that overnight a bureaucrat would become the
most miserable wretch in the streets. Throughout the dynastic his-
tories of China ups and downs of individual bureaucrats, and even
of eunuchs, occurred time and again.

Under this pattern of political power, economics had little to do
with the case. Money came after power, not vice versa. After at-
taining power one was in a position to acquire wealth and to pro-
tect it after he got it. A millionaire who had no bureaucratic con-
nection was an easy prey to the man with political power. That is
why the wealth of individual merchants and others could be confis-
cated by imperial decree with comparatively little provocation.

After the fall of the imperial dynasty new factors came into play.
For the upper level of the ruling group, military force has become
increasingly prominent. But while formerly this was an indigenous
matter, now much of it depends upon the place of foreign powers
in China. The traditional Mandate of Heaven idea has been severely
shaken because, while the peasants have the right to revolt, with
the introduction of modern weapons it is hard for unarmed and unorganized common peasants to revolt.

However, the introduction of modern weapons has also brought about other consequences, one of which is the growing influence of financiers. For the first time most implements of war have to be obtained from abroad. Yet extraterritoriality and foreign concessions have enabled Chinese wealth to escape the reach of the government; to get at this wealth, coercion no longer suffices; the money has to be attracted. For this reason wealth has come into the picture as a source of political power for practically the first time in Chinese history. The fact has become particularly manifest since the Kuo-mintang completed its northern expedition under Chiang in 1929.

But this influence has been partially destroyed by the war in two ways: A sky-rocketing inflation and physical devastation have wiped out large fortunes, and war has also seen the end of extraterritoriality and foreign concessions. Chinese fortunes are no longer secure from the grasp of the government. The many decrees during and since the war, whether enforced or not, aiming at fixing prices, government budget, and even confiscation of Chinese savings, whatever their origin, in American banks are good evidence that, once again, in the minds of the ruling group, private wealth is subordinate to political power backed by military force. This political power can determine everything. It can give favors, but it can also deprive anyone of whatever he has by a simple stroke of the pen. To insure this absolute power it has been necessary to initiate, in recent times, along with the sharpening of military power, party activities among and supervision on all levels of the bureaucracy and among such groups as the workers in cities and towns.

The essential key to the functioning of the political organization in recent decades is, therefore, armed force on the part of the top ruling group and favor on the part of the bureaucracy. In the struggle to hold on to their privileges the bureaucrats look to their superiors and their superiors, in turn, to the armed forces, for guidance. The people, instead of being the masters, are actually regarded as servants and inferiors.

The struggle for existence in Chinese bureaucracy has produced two results. On the one hand, the struggle for favored positions has made the capital outlay of being a bureaucrat very large. Just be-
fore the war’s end a commissioner of the Board of Civil Affairs of a certain province celebrated his mother’s birthday. Every one of the magistrates of the province sent him a gold ingot. Not that all of the magistrates wanted or could afford to do so, but if most of them did, the few who did not would evidently be out of favor. The least one could do was follow the crowd. But if one of the magistrates wanted a larger favor it would be logical for him to express his wishes in the form of a larger ingot.

Because the remuneration of being a bureaucrat is much higher than other lines of work in a country hard pressed by poverty, the struggle for entry into the group, as well as for a higher place in it, is very intense. On the other hand, by virtue of this very intensity, the salaries, however large, tend to fall short of expenses. Corruption is the natural answer. As the favors increase, the expenses rise, demanding greater corruption and still larger favors to make sure that the corruption will go unpunished. Thus the cycle perpetuates itself.

The second result is an apathy on the part of the people towards bureaucracy and matters of government concern. Centuries of practical living as servants and inferiors to the administrators have taught the people how to behave, unless too hard pressed.

During and since the war years there has been an awakening among the masses. Looking over the Chinese newspapers for the last three years I have been amazed at the amount of criticism of the government and the bureaucracy. Even some peasants and laborers write (or ask some literate person to write on their behalf) letters to the editors voicing complaints of one sort or another. Literacy has gradually lost some of the aura which used to be its distinction. Undoubtedly a much larger proportion of the population can now read and write, or at least read. However, as long as the age-old master-servant pattern persists it will be a long time before any political party may be said to enjoy popular support in the true sense of the term.

Religion

The so-called “Three Religions” are: Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Considerable amounts of ink have been spilled over the question whether Confucianism is a religion or not. Such argu-
ments are irrelevant, for religion in China does not follow the pattern of interreligious exclusiveness of the West; there is no sharp dividing line as between Christians and Mohammedans, or even between Presbyterians and Baptists. Theological formulations may be argued by a few learned monks or priests but the average man has no interest in such things.

**Chinese Religion in Action.**—The first thing that impresses one on entering a Chinese village or market town is the size and number of the temples. This is particularly true in South and Southwest China. The temples are usually built of bricks, in contrast to the family houses which have earthen walls and thatched roofs. The temples are brightly colored, whereas ordinary houses are gray or brown.

The temples are dedicated to a variety of gods, as the Dragon God or the Goddess of Mercy, or they may be dedicated to dignitaries of the community who were deified after death. In market towns, and particularly in district cities there are usually three other kinds of temples: to the God of Wealth, to Confucius, and to the district patron god, who is equivalent in the spiritual hierarchy to the district magistrate in the political one. Several others may also be found, including temples to the Goddess of Measles and to San Kuan (literally three gods—heaven, earth, and man). In some villages there is one to the Sun God, and in the towns and cities there are frequently temples to the God of Agriculture, or the God of War, or to Lu Chu, the most important Taoist god.

Most of the temples, however, house more than one god. Usually they are sacred to a number of gods or goddesses who are from what would be, judged by Western standards, different religions. Consider, for example, a modest temple of the patron of a town in southwest China. The main altar is dedicated to the patron god, who in this case has the appearance of a warrior. The two side altars are occupied, respectively, by the Goddess of Measles and of Mercy. In front of the main altar are some tablets and images dedicated to the third son of the Dragon God and some lesser spirits. This is by no means atypical. There is one temple in this region which houses Confucius, Laotze (Founder of Taoism), and Buddha. This mixture is seen everywhere in China and indicates that the idea of monotheism is alien to the Chinese.

Identical patterns prevail in ritualistic observance as well as in the
concrete arrangements of the temple. To quote from one of my notebooks:

Today saw old Mrs. Y with two grandsons and three granddaughters in the Pan Chu Temple. Offerings are made to every god (that is, every image) in the whole temple, both inside and outside the main hall. Even the dragons winding around the two main pillars of the main entrance received a share of the “food and money.”

The old lady first burns paper money in front of the three main shrines. There are four gods occupying these shrines. As the paper burns she kneels down to koutou fifty times to each of the four gods.

When these gestures of homage are over, she takes some of the food offered at the main shrines and puts it in a tray. She takes this tray and offers it in front of every other image in the temple one by one. In front of each image the procedure is as follows: She offers the tray by lifting it up with both hands to a position over her head. She lays it on the table. She burns some paper money. She kneels to koutou eight or more times. She prays only to the first four gods as she kneels to koutou.

The old lady on this occasion went to express gratitude and to report to the local patron god on the third day after the birth of a grandson; but she wanted to make sure that all gods, whether directly concerned or not, would be pleased, so that the child would grow up well. The yearly cycle of offerings to the gods observed in the same community reflects a similar attitude. Altogether thirty-four days of ritual observances are recorded for the community throughout the year. These include the birthdays of thirty different gods and one occasion on which all gods are worshiped.

During any emergency, such as an epidemic, drought, earthquake, or even after Japanese air raids, prayer meetings take place at which numerous gods and spirits are invoked. At one of these meetings, one scripture contained 608 gods with specific titles, including Jesus Christ and Mohammed, who are called sages and are subordinate to the Jade Emperor, the supreme ruler of heaven. Then the scripture goes on as follows:

In addition to the above the following gods are hereby invoked: Gods of ten directions; all fairies and sages; all fairy warriors and soldiers; ten extreme god kings; gods of sun, moon and nine principal stars; three officers and four sages; the stars of five directions; gods guarding four

60 F. L. K. Hsu, *Under the Ancestors' Shadow*, Chapter VIII.
heavenly gates; thirty-six thunder gods guarding the entire heaven; twenty-eight principal stars of the Zodiac; gods for subjugating evil ghosts; god king of flying heaven; great long life Buddha; gods of Tien Kan and Ti Tze; great sages of Trigrams and Nine Stars; secondary officials of five directions; secondary officials of ten directions; gate gods and kitchen gods; godly generals in charge of year, month, day and hour; gods and spirits in charge of four seas, nine rivers, five mountains, four corners; of hills, woods, all rivers and lakes, wells and springs, ditches and creeks, twelve river sources; every and all gods; Cheng Hwangs and their inferiors; local patron gods; minor local officials; gods of roads and bridges; of trees and lumber; spiritual officers and soldiers under the command of priests; all spirits in charge of protecting the taboos, commands, scriptures and the right way of religion.

THE SPIRIT WORLD.—The Chinese believe strongly in an afterlife; in their conception, the spirits of the dead are closely bound to earth and interested in human affairs. The spirit world is divided into three parts: first, the Upper Heaven, ruled over by an Emperor with an extensive hierarchy of gods beneath him; second, the Western Heaven, where Buddha is the supreme ruler, also with a large group of high gods all of whom are subordinate to the ruler of the Upper Heaven (the exact relationship of the Upper and Western Heavens is never clearly expressed); and third, the Lower Spirit World where the spirits of the dead enter and are processed according to their record on earth. A ruler with ten judges working under him goes over the records. Those who have led good lives are rewarded with titles, leisure, and comfort. Exemplary characters may become gods in the Upper or Western Heavens or may be reincarnated into another existence on earth in which they attain honor and luxury. The wicked are punished by severe tortures, such as being sawed in half or boiled in oil. They may be banished permanently into hell, or reincarnated into another life beset with poverty and degradation, or they may be reincarnated as worms or rats or other lowly animals.

In broad outline this concept is not far different from that held by Western society, but the spirit world and the world of humans is more closely allied in China than in the West. The Emperor of China was known as the Son of Heaven and many heroes of history and legend are considered to be gods reincarnated. New gods are continually being created and many return to earth in reincarna-
tion. The emperor, as son of Heaven, has power over both humans and spirits. Even high bureaucrats, by virtue of the power vested in them by the emperor or because they are gods incarnate, have power over the lesser spirits.

Most important in this link between heaven and earth is the belief that spiritual reward or punishment may come in one's lifetime as well as after death, or may be visited upon one's children. Thus death by lightning, sudden and violent illnesses, as cholera, and serious accidents are generally regarded as punishments originating from the spirit world. For this reason the most important measure against epidemics and accidents is the prayer meeting, in which hired priests invoke the mercy of the superior deities who are presumed to have ordered the disasters as punishment against the community. Conversely, wealth and good fortune are usually held to be rewards originating from the spirit world in payment for good deeds performed by the recipient or his ancestors.

Thus the spirit world and the human world are counterparts of one another. The spirit world is based upon and functional to the existence of the world of humans, and the human world is in turn supervised and guided by the spirit world. They exchange personnel. They endorse the same virtues and condemn similar evils; they express mutual approval or disapproval. In the popular mind the spiritual hierarchy is a part of the social order just as much as the bureaucratic and political hierarchy is. That is why it is irrelevant or even erroneous to speak of different religions in China. To the Chinese there is only a spiritual order which stands as firm as the social order. As there is no question of a community living under two social orders, so it is inconceivable that there should be two spiritual orders. If two religions are both true, they must find their place in the existing hierarchy. A creed for which this adjustment cannot be made is destined to be disregarded or forgotten.

ANCESTOR WORSHIP.—The basic religion of China is ancestor worship, but, here again, it is a mistake to regard the cult as a separate religion, for it is part of the larger, all-inclusive structure. The ancestors have gone through the life-death routine of all human beings; that is, they have died and been processed by the Lower Spirit World. They may have been so good that they were received directly into one of the Heavens. Also they may have been rein-
carnated. If they were evildoers they may have been doomed to eternal punishment; but ancestors, in so far as their descendants are concerned, are different from all other human beings. To their descendants, ancestors are all great men and women with a glorious past and an exalted status. One may believe that someone else's ancestors are in hell, or reincarnated in some base animal form, but no true descendant believes that such a thing could happen to his own ancestors.

To understand this cult one must take cognizance of the family organization and the father-son identification. Between the father and the son there is not only a complete community of interest, but complete social identification. The son not only inherits all his father possesses but he is judged by his father's achievements. Conversely, the father not only has complete rights over his son's wealth but, when the son has reached maturity, the father is evaluated by his son's abilities. When we realize that a particular father and son are but a link in the infinity of many generations in any given family line, we see how the father-son identification becomes the foundation for the religious cult of ancestor worship.

The basic assumptions of the cult are threefold. First, the living owe everything to the departed ancestors, who are, therefore, regarded as persons of great magnitude. Since death only puts the relationship on a somewhat different level, and since the dead have the same needs as the living (namely, food, money, housing, and so on) it is necessary for the descendants to provide for them as if they were alive. Secondly, while the ancestors have already made their imprint on the fate of the descendants, their actions in the spirit world continue to affect the living. Conversely, the actions of the living descendants have bearing on the spirits of the ancestors. Thirdly, the interest of the ancestors is confined to their own descendants, particularly lineal ones. They concern themselves not only with ceremonial occasions—weddings, division of the family, birth of sons—but also take action in emergencies, as when a deserving descendant is about to be flunked by the chief reader in an imperial examination. On ceremonial occasions the presence of the ancestors is recognized by offerings of incense and food. But on occasions of emergency, the ancestors intervene in the form of apparitions.
Thus the ancestral cult shows the same close interrelation between spirit world and human world and the same close correlation between religious structure and social organization. As the family is the foundation of the wider society, so ancestor worship forms the link between the individual and the supernatural.

MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES.—It is easy to understand why Western missionaries encounter difficulties in their efforts to win China for Christianity. First, the Chinese fail to see any reason why one religious cult should be adhered to, exclusive of all others. "All religions are for the good of mankind," say the Chinese, who are practical about their gods. They have gods for measles, eye disease, safe birth, fertility, agriculture, fire, and for astronomical phenomena such as the sun and the moon. It is hard for them to conceive of an all-inclusive god who alone is omnipresent and supersedes all others. Furthermore, the Chinese deduce their belief in spirits from their experience in life and living and shun theological arguments.

I have no intention of showing that conversion of Chinese to Christianity is impossible, nor do I wish to belittle what Christianity has done for China. Schools for women and coeducation were first started by missionaries. Abolishment of foot-binding has long been one of their objects of reform. Many orphanages and institutions for the mentally and physically defective have been sponsored and supported by missions. Missionary universities, such as that at Nanking, have contributed greatly to the study of China's agricultural economy; West China Union contributed most to dentistry in China; Yenching, the ace of missionary universities, has made large contributions to China's sociological sciences; and Peiping Union Medical, one of the finest institutions of its kind, was started as a missionary adventure and later supported by the Rockefeller Foundation.

But after a thousand years of intermittent efforts and over three centuries of concentrated efforts, the results today cannot be described as impressive. No one knows the exact number of church members in China, but even the most zealous have never put the figure higher than 3,000,000, or less than one percent of the total population. Of this number, about 400,000 are Protestants and the rest Catholics.61

61 It has also been pointed out that the figures represent great increases for both
It may, of course be argued that quantitative strength is not as important as qualitative. Numerous stories of conversion, some of which are practically like legends and miracles, have been published and told by missionaries, but the following excerpt presents the other side of the picture, ignored in missionary chronicles.

In the first half of 1947, *Hsin Min Pao*, a small newspaper in Peiping, opened a column under the general title "How to Conquer Poverty" and asked for public contributions. A large number of responses were subsequently published. One of these expressed a deep feeling of depression, which struck the sympathy of another reader, who wrote the editor as follows:

**Dear Sir:** I have read a number of your letters in this column and am particularly in sympathy with Mr. X. Now if we look at the conditions of society today, we may ask, who can really conquer poverty? Although Mr. X has a job and his monthly salary is a little over Chinese $90,000, this is only adequate to take care of himself. If he desires to support his family and accumulate some savings, it will be impossible. Nowadays rice and fuel are as expensive as pearls. Relatives cannot help continuously; nor are friends in a position to help each other. The proverb has it that incidental help can lift one from an emergency, but it cannot take him out of poverty. If we placed ourselves in Mr. X's position we shall agree that it will be impossible for Mrs. X to take up some job, since they have some small children and a nursing baby. But of course human beings cannot wait for their own extinction and not do anything about it.

I would like to offer my own experience. About twenty years ago I was in a similar plight. Then the times were good. I had a big family, I had no selling skill and I was unfit as a heavy manual laborer. So a friend introduced me to the Catholic Church at XX, where they have a Woman's Home. I took my wife and three small children to this Home to pledge their faith in the creed (Catholicism). I did some work elsewhere. I visited them once a week, bringing them some gift every time. In that enclosure they studied characters, learned the scriptures, and worshipped God. At first they were very unhappy and bored. But after some days they felt all right. They got to know other inmates and fell in with the routine. The children no longer craved for home, since they had lots of other children to play with. They had three meals a day. The food was not too good, but having lived in poverty, that was not unbearable. Those women who had nursing babies usually got a little more food. Generally

a person could be eligible for Baptism three months after admission. There was no male in the Home. All teachers and other officers were nuns. Boys over six years of age were not admitted. Those admitted did not have to bring their own bedding.

In short, this is one of the ways of meeting an emergency. Just get Baptized and don’t worry about the rest. The proverb says: “The Supreme Ruler of Upper Heaven will not starve even a blind sparrow.” He will certainly not starve us, who are human beings, the most exalted of all living creatures, and are all children of God.

Don’t be afraid of poverty. Ask God’s mercy. If, three or four months after Mrs. X and her children have been admitted to the Home, Mr. X has found a good job, then he can at once ask for their discharge. If Mr. X cannot get a good job, then just let them stay there and save worries. Don’t you think this is wise?

Another way out is to go to the Relief Department of the Bureau of Social Welfare of the Municipal Government. Mr. X should write to them describing his present plight. In conclusion I would say that Mr. X’s difficulties are temporary. Just struggle hard for another few years and the children will grow up. They will then become independent members of society and understand the hardship of the times. Then they will surely be filial to their parents and support them.

My last word is, Mr. X, more patience for the sake of your children.

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No one can fairly say what percentage of the less than 3,000,000 Chinese Christians are such rice-bowl converts. I can point out a number of great churchmen, both native and missionary, whose sacrifice, achievement, and integrity are unquestionable. The reverse side of the picture, however, has not been sufficiently emphasized, nor squarely examined, and it applies, not only to poor people like Liu, quoted above, but also to some men and women who have had the opportunities of advanced education.

So far as my personal experience and observation go, missionary activities in China today suffer from the following defects. First, there is no doubt that there has been a drop in the quality of missionaries going out to China in the last century. Many missionary teachers have been underqualified, particularly at the university

62 Translated from Hsin Min Pao, Peiping, April 6, 1947. The original letter was written in not very fluent Chinese.
level. With a few outstanding exceptions, those who can find suitable posts in their home countries do not go abroad. For others, missionary positions have become merely job opportunities. Since these people do not have the dedication to the work of the earlier missionaries, desire for comfort and power tend to overshadow their real mission.

Recently I studied some of the missionary chronicles of recent years and also those of the period of the Boxer Uprising in 1900, when a large number of Western missionaries were massacred by rebels. In the older pictures, the missionaries, men, wives and children, dressed in Chinese costume. In the more recent pictures, the missionaries might have been in London, Paris, or New York. Dress, however, is only one of the indications of the way in which the manners and standard of living of the modern missionaries differ from those of the vast population whom they are trying to win for Christ.

A second defect lies in the fact that, being without deep conviction, many of the missionary personnel become overly susceptible to the backward environment in which they work. Thus a British lady missionary, coming from the home of liberty, slapped the face of an old servant who talked back to her.\(^6\) I, personally, have seen similar happenings in Western Yunnan and my wife has seen them in central China. Because it is common for Chinese masters to manhandle their servants, and bureaucrats their subjects, the modern missionary feels that there is no reason why he should not do likewise.

A third defect is most fundamental. This is the failure to recognize the priority in importance of society over individual religion, especially in China. The traditional missionary line is that the key to conversion is the heart and, therefore, all hope is focused on individual salvation. But there can be no real happiness for the few when the vast majority are in misery. Particularly with the Chinese, who are accustomed to deduce the existence of the spirit world from the existence of the world of humans, such missionary tactics cannot but fall wide of the mark.

As a result, in all missionary institutions that I know, particularly on the higher education level, the tendency is for missionaries to cling to a few selected Chinese converts with whom they have

achieved mutual understanding and who can provide them with a perfect sense of mastery and justification of their missionary work. But the student converts who are favorite protégés of missionaries are often extremely unpopular with the other students. They are regarded as opportunists who frequently turn out to be lesser Christians than others who have never been baptized.

The final defect is that missionary work in China has never achieved Chinese financial support and has, so far, been largely dependent on donations from abroad. It has been said that this was due to the poverty of the country. However, when the people are eager and interested, they do spend often excessive amounts on things which are quite removed from matters of bare existence. Poor Chinese families spend several months' income on a funeral or a wedding. They also spend large sums on matters of communal concern. In one southwestern community, for example, during the cholera epidemic of 1942, the total publicly announced expenditure for nineteen prayer meetings for combating the epidemic was Chinese $43,175. This amount represented, according to my calculation, the average monthly expenditure of 39 to 79 average families of the locality. The most significant thing about it was that, although the locality contains some outstandingly wealthy families, two of which spent, respectively, Chinese $300,000 and Chinese $1,000,000 for funerals, the largest single donation in these prayer meetings was Chinese $2,400. This means that the major part of the fund came, not from a few top families, but from many humble contributors. Moreover, the entire fund was collected and expended within a month.

To bear permanent fruit in China, the missionary movement must have indigenous financial support. Only when people contribute to a cause of their own accord will they take such a cause seriously. And this brings us back to the earlier observation that society comes before religion. It would be fantastic to expect missionaries to shoulder the entire burden of social reform in China. But it will perhaps be wise for missionaries and those in charge of missionary policy-making to think less in terms of individual conversion and more in terms of the social forces which shape the individual converts.
Education

Until recent times the illiteracy rate in China has been extraordinarily high. The number of persons who could read and write probably did not exceed one percent of the population. School education was a privilege of the few. The idea of universal literacy, if such a thing had ever been suggested, would have sounded absurd, not only to the administrators but to the people as well.

Because of this situation, scholarship has been accorded a more exalted position in China than anywhere else in the world. The written word has been regarded as sacred. All over the country there were Societies for the Protection of Lettered Papers, whose members collected every piece of waste paper on which there were written characters. These papers were burned to prevent the sacred words from being defiled.

The state provided no public education of any sort, except on the highest level for scholars who had already advanced themselves through the imperial examinations. Education was a private affair. A wealthy family in a village might decide to hire a tutor for the benefit of its own sons but allow sons of relatives and neighbors to attend the lessons also. Sometimes several families in the community would form a tutor-school jointly, sharing the salary and keep of the teacher. Or an elderly scholar might decide to form a tutor-school of his own, charging the parents of his students a sum for tuition each year. In all cases the ability to pay determined the amount of tuition.

The Chinese tutor-school was a very simple affair. It usually consisted of two rooms: the outer one, where a tablet in honor of Confucius was located, served as the entrance and also held some desks and benches; in the inner room was the teacher’s desk and chair, set upon a platform facing rows of desks and benches for the pupils.

Upon entering the school, each pupil would make a gesture of homage to the tablet of Confucius, repeating the gesture every time he left or entered the school. Then the children would read or write from seven or eight in the morning to four or five in the afternoon. Sometimes there were night classes, lasting two or three hours. There were no intermissions, except for lunch and supper. The
main part of the schoolwork consisted in reading, reciting from memory, practicing caligraphy, composing couplets, poetry, and essays. The textbooks were the standard classics, beginning with the Three Character Classics and going on to the Confucian Analects. Free thought was not encouraged. The pupils not only had to learn the texts by heart, but also the comments and interpretations of well-known and accepted scholars through the centuries. None of the books was indexed. When a pupil became sufficiently advanced to compose an essay of his own, he was expected to be able to draw freely, from memory, texts, comment, and interpretations from various books. A scholar who had to refer to a book before he could quote from it was a very poor scholar indeed.

This was a tremendous feat, for by the middle of the last imperial dynasty the known number of Chinese classics came to hundreds of thousands of volumes. No scholar amounted to anything unless he knew by heart at least several hundred. One of the usual sayings in praise of a genius was that he could "recite from memory what he had read only once." This sort of education encouraged great perseverance but it killed most, if not all, initiative. Instead of looking to the future, scholars looked to the past for inspiration and material for thought. If scholars and reformers wanted their new ideas accepted, they had to pretend that those ideas were taken from some great men of the past.

Parents had close supervision over the schools. Teachers could not teach anything or use any method that was not agreeable to the parents. It would be no exaggeration to say that the school was a mere appendage to the family. Those fathers who were literate would make secret tests of the literary qualifications of the teachers from time to time. Teachers were sometimes dismissed for not being strict and severe enough with their pupils.

School and state met only in the imperial examinations. These were arranged at four levels: the first was held every year in every district; the second, every three years at every provincial capital; the third, every three years in the national capital; and the last, at the Emperor's Court immediately after the completion of the third examination. These were not civil service examinations in the Western sense, because they were based on the classical training, and successful candidates were not automatically entitled to any def-
inite or permanent position. On the other hand, success was an almost absolute prerequisite to most offices, especially the higher ones, such as ministers or their assistants. Successful candidates in the third and fourth examinations were more sure of being appointed to offices.

Competition became progressively stiffer. No exact data on the relative numbers of successful and unsuccessful candidates for the district examinations are known. At the provincial examinations the ratio was often something like 10,000 unsuccessful candidates to 100 successful ones. Since each province had a fixed quota according to its total population, but not according to the number of scholars, the competition was less keen in border provinces, such as Yunnan where there were comparatively few scholars, than in central and coastal provinces, such as Kiangsu and Hupei, where the degree of literacy was higher. Less than 300 candidates emerged triumphant from the third examination at the national capital. The fourth examination at the Emperor’s Court was a sort of check-up on the third.

Thus Chinese education in former times was not merely for the few; it was also an education for bureaucracy, not for citizenship. In view of the fact that bureaucracy always benefits from and supports the existing order, there is little wonder that this education was focused on the past and uninterested in the future.

MODERN SCHOOLS.—Modern education had its start shortly after the Opium War of 1841. The first schools were founded by the Manchu government either for the purpose of training interpreters or for producing a few men with some knowledge of the technical sciences. In 1872 the first group of thirty chosen boys was sent to study in the United States. Later other students were sent to England, France, and Germany to study naval subjects and ship construction.

After the Sino-Japanese War of 1892 more schools were established along military and technical lines. The main idea then was to form a blend in education in which “Chinese learning would be the foundation and Western learning would be the use.” None of these institutions and movements, which were under fire from bureaucrats and aristocrats alike, bore much fruit. Nevertheless, they blazed the trail, for in 1905 the old examination system was
definitely abolished by an imperial edict and a Ministry of Education was set up which had the function of promoting and administering institutions of higher learning. A commissioner of education in each province carried on the same function with relation to other schools.

At this time there were five notable colleges, among them St. John's and Nanking, both missionary schools. Schools of the modern type appeared in the provinces much earlier. Through the promotion of Kang Yu-wei, Liang Chi-chao, and their associates, 19 schools, 24 associations, and 8 newspapers were founded in 1897–99 in Hunan, Kiangsu, Kwangtung, Peiping, Kwangsi, Shen, Hupei, Chekiang, and Fukien. Although the purpose of some of the associations was nonscholarly and the scale of the schools and newspapers was small, their establishment represented a spontaneous movement. During the same period, the number of Chinese students abroad increased tremendously. By the end of 1905 there were 8,000 or more Chinese students in Japan. By 1907, according to official statistics, there were 1,500,000 students in the secondary and primary schools in the provinces. Many of the schools were private; and, of these, the most notable were founded and financed by Yeh Ch'eng-chung, who began life as a peddler on the Whangpoo River, and Yang Sze-sheng, a mason. In 1899 Yeh contributed over 200,000 taels and a large estate for a middle school which bore his name. In 1904–5 Yang gave considerably more than this for the founding of a primary school and a middle school called Pootung.

Of course, modern education could not be developed merely by increasing the enrollment and the number of schools. In the first place, the spirit of most government schools was far from modern. Their main emphasis was loyalty to the emperor, reverence to Confucius, as well as endeavor in industrial pursuits. Secondly, most students and their parents regarded the new school education in the traditional light, as merely another gateway to bureaucracy.

More important changes came with the Revolution of 1911. These included alteration of the curriculum, enlargement of school facilities, increase of emphasis on handicraft and physical exercise, introduction of coeducation in primary schools, and the elimination of the classics from the lower schools. With the Second Revolution of 1926–27 and the assumption of power by the Kuomintang,
came further changes, including greater compulsory registration of all schools (indicating greater centralization), an emphasis on vocational education, and a popular movement against illiteracy.

Before the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan in 1937, there were about 2,000 straight middle schools, 800 normal schools for the training of teachers and 400 vocational schools. As the war progressed over one-third of these schools were in Japanese-occupied territory. But the number of secondary schools in Free China was increased to 2,483 in 1940–41 and to 2,819 in the following year. The total enrollment of secondary schools was 622,800 in the year 1939–40, of which over 80 percent were in middle schools and a little over 10 percent in normal schools.64

There were many more elementary schools and pupils. In the year 1937–38 there were 229,911 such schools with over 12,800,000 pupils. About 2,500,000 pupils graduated from the elementary schools during that year. The figures for 1938–39 and for 1939–40 were similar, showing slight decreases rather than increases. What percentage of the pre-war elementary schools were in occupied territory and whether the 1937–38 figures represented large increases or decreases over the pre-war years is unknown.

The number of Christian middle schools was 255 by 1942. One hundred thirty-three of them maintained also elementary schools. The total enrollment was 53,673 by the same year. No figures on Catholic schools for the same year were available; it is reported that in 1935 there were 480 with an enrollment of 26,263 students, of which about 17,000 were males and 9,000 females. It is presumed that a number of these were elementary schools. The number of pupils in missionary establishments thus came to less than 0.5 percent of the total enrollment of all secondary and elementary schools in the country.

The subjects taught in Chinese schools were similar to those in American schools. The classes in civics were based upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's *Three People's Principles*. Many Chinese graduates who entered American universities suffered no particular disadvantages because of their educational foundation. In terms of the ratio between the numbers of teachers and students, the Chinese schools

64 These and other similar figures are extracted from *China Yearbook*, 1938, and *China Handbook*, 1937–43.
appear to be better off than those in the United States. However, Chinese schools in different parts of the country vary tremendously in quality. The average graduate from such famous schools as Nankai in Tientsin is apt to be far ahead of the average graduate from schools in interior provinces like Szechuan and Yunnan.

**Mass Education Movement.**—One of the greatest needs in Chinese education is a change in the attitudes toward schooling, so that the people will feel that education, instead of being a privilege for the few, designed solely for the purpose of admitting the scholar to the bureaucracy, is the right of every human being and designed to further good citizenship for all. This attitude is far from being established, but a beginning has been made. First, the much larger number of people who have attended schools than ever before cannot but have a broadening effect. Scarcity always creates the illusion of special value for the scarce item. Secondly, mass education is something unique in Chinese history.

The exact figures on literacy in contemporary China are not obtainable. Sample studies in selected communities show that among men, this varies between 5 and 30 percent, and that among women it varies between 0.5 and 4 percent. In 1938 over 80 percent of the total population were illiterate. The mass education movement concerns itself with about 40 percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 45.

Both government and private initiative attacked the problem, the government through a system of Hsiang (subdistrict) nucleus schools, and Pao (one-tenth of a subdistrict) people's schools. It claims that, since 1938 and up to 1942, roughly one-fourth of those between the ages of 15 and 45 have been educated. Having seen a number of Hsiang and Pao schools, I wonder how realistic it was to deduct from the total number of illiterates those between the ages of 6 and 15. All such schools which I have seen in various parts of the country included children within this latter age bracket. The exactness of the government figures is dubious, but there is no doubt that some effort and some progress have been made.

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65 *China Handbook, 1937–43.* Ta Chen's findings in Kunming city, the capital of Yunnan province, shows that 41.1 percent of the males and 75.4 percent of the females have never been to school. For Kunming hsiien, which included some semi-rural areas, the percentage of illiteracy for males and for females was raised to 49.6 and 79.8 respectively. These figures pertain to 1942, five years after the area had been subject to a tremendous outside influence due to the war against Japan. See Ta Chen, *Population in Modern China,* p. 123.
The private efforts were represented at their best by James Yen in Ting Hsien, Hopei province. Other efforts were made in Kiangsu, Shantung, Chekiang, and Kiangsi provinces, but Yen’s work was on a larger scale, developing the most elaborate theoretical groundwork and receiving the most attention at home and abroad. It is based on Yen’s diagnosis that the masses of China suffer from four “illnesses”: poverty, ignorance, poor health, and selfishness. To combat these, he designed a fourfold program: (1) improvement of livelihood, (2) literacy, (3) public hygiene and (4) civics. The main technique is demonstration and participation. For improvement of livelihood the peasants are taught how to use better seeds, fertilizers, and marketing techniques, and how to breed farm animals, including pigs and poultry. Peasants are taught to use the Thousand Characters, a simplified written Chinese corresponding more or less to Basic English. For betterment of public health, a system of public medical centers are organized which not only treat illnesses but also teach peasants the fundamentals of hygiene and child care. For training in civics Ting Hsien became an experiment in popular self-government. Yen employed a large number of assistants, many of whom had received their training in philosophy, political science, sociology and economics, agriculture, entomology and other technical subjects, either in China or abroad. The entire project was financed largely by voluntary contributions from abroad.

There is no doubt that Yen’s work provided numerous benefits for the people of Ting Hsien, and that it brought about an awakening among the intelligentsia to the existence of rural problems. But two general criticisms can be made. First, from our analysis of the economic situation, it is clear that rural livelihood is closely linked with urban development. The lack of industrial development, together with age-old tradition, is at the root of a corrupt bureaucracy which keeps the country in a feudal state and effectively prevents it from solving its problems. A nation is not a mere conglomeration of districts and villages. Even if Yen has found a complete solution of all the recognized problems of the village, as indicated in the program, we are still far from being in sight of a solution of those

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66 For an eloquent exposition of the program and its ideals, see P. S. Buck, *Tell the People* (New York, 1945).
problems for the nation as a whole. What is more, without taking into account the organic nature of the nation as a whole there can be no real or permanent solution of the village or district problems as separate entities.

The second criticism is a financial one. Yen’s results in Ting Hsien were achieved with the assistance of a large number of graduates from Chinese and Western universities and with large amounts of money donated chiefly from abroad. One must ask how other districts in China can afford such a program. Of course, Yen’s idea was that his work was an experiment, the results of which would serve as a model for others. However, most rural work stations have so far claimed to be similar but smaller experiments. Because this costly attack on the observed problems has no roots among the masses of the people, there grew up an untenable slogan that college students should go back to villages to improve the life and conditions of the peasants, while, at the same time, they would have to live under more or less the same conditions that they were trying to improve. The basic trouble is that without some strong incentive, such as religious fanaticism or the exigencies of war, it is impossible to persuade people to give up comforts and a high standard of living in favor of a life of hardship and discomfort. The Mass Education Movement, as James Yen founded and promoted it, has reached a dead end. For results commensurate with the expenses and personnel involved, it will have to find new definitions of methodology and a new approach.

HIGHER LEARNING.—Shortly after the turn of the century a national university was established in Peking by imperial decree, but it was an institution of higher learning in form only. By 1905 there were five institutions of higher learning of some standing, two of which were missionary establishments. The three indigenous ones were Peiyang University, Tientsin; Nanyang College, Shanghai; and Shansi College, Taiyuan. By 1928 there were 74 institutions of higher learning in the country. By 1936 the number went up to 108. The war against Japan destroyed some of them, but by 1944 the total number was 137, nearly 40 percent more than in 1936. The total enrollment is unknown. The Ministry of Education’s figures on those who have passed the entrance examinations each year is indicative of the actual enrollment. Between 1931 and
1936 the number was about 40,000 per year; in 1940 the figure was raised to 50,000.\(^\text{67}\)

If we compare the available enrollment figures for the primary schools, middle schools, and institutions of higher learning, we get a rough ratio of 12:6:0.5. That is to say, there are twelve primary school pupils to six middle school pupils, and six middle school pupils to half a college student. The comparable ratio in the United States in 1930–40, the last normal years before the war, is 21:7:1.4.\(^\text{68}\)

Thus there are more middle school pupils in China than in the United States, compared with the enrollment of the other levels. Also it is not true, as generally believed, that, in proportion to elementary and secondary enrollments, the college and university enrollments are larger in China than in the United States.

But when we consider the expenditure per pupil in the three types of institutions in China and in the West, the Chinese figure becomes fantastic. According to reports of the League of Nations for the year 1930, the expenditure per pupil in the lower primary schools was $3.50 to $4; in higher primary schools, $17; in middle schools, $60; in normal and professional schools, $120, but in colleges and universities, $600 to $800 (all Chinese national dollars). The ratio between the lower primary schools and the colleges is about 1:200. In the West the ratio is about 1:10.

The same picture is seen in the relative salaries of university professors and schoolteachers in the two countries. In China the earnings of the former group are generally 15 or more times those of the primary schoolteachers. In the United States the corresponding figures are generally 3:1 to 5:1.

The same overemphasis on higher education is shown in the expenses of Chinese students abroad. In 1930 there were 50,032 Chinese students attending institutions of higher learning in Japan, Europe, and the United States. If we take the low estimate of Chinese $3,000 to $4,000 (corresponding to U.S. $900 to $1,200, before World War II) as being the annual expenditure per student, we have a total of about Chinese $15,000,000 to $20,000,000. In 1934 the total budgeted expenditure of all registered universities and colleges in China was only Chinese $24,480,000.


In view of the country’s traditional background this emphasis on higher education is natural. For centuries bureaucracy offered the only really lucrative opportunities, as the attainment of a higher degree through the system of imperial examinations was essential to a place in this bureaucracy. Since the abolition of the examination system, and since, in the popular mind, degrees in the modern educational scale are equated with the old imperial honors, the emphasis on higher education is easily understood.

This situation has resulted in serious unemployment among modern educated Chinese. Unemployment was most acute in the years between 1925 and the outbreak of hostilities with Japan and is present again since the Japanese surrender. Unemployment among the literati is nothing new to China. Before 1911, Peking and the various provincial capitals had thousands of scholars waiting for official posts. The situation became worse after the 1911 Revolution, for at this time the bureaucratic offices were reduced while the number of students on all levels increased. There are few opportunities in industry or commerce to absorb the increasing numbers of new literati who crowd government departments, bureaus, and, as second choice, institutions of higher learning. The government and its bureaucracy being what they are, the talents of those fortunate enough to receive appointments are not put to good use.

Those who are eager to help China have wondered why students with excellent academic records and general worthiness should either become corrupt and inefficient officials or disillusioned money-makers; they have concluded that the younger generation is selfish and irresponsible. The difficulty lies, however, in the training and conflicting standards to which the young Chinese is exposed. He has been brought up in a background which stresses success and the need to bring honor and wealth to his family and his relatives. He was educated in schools modeled on those of Western industrialism, in which the economic incentive is dominant. He may have spent several years in Europe or America where financial gain is the measure of the worth of the individual. However, when he returns to China to take up his life work, he is expected to discard the monetary incentive and assume a totally different attitude toward life and success. Nothing can be so absurd. This folly has already
been demonstrated in connection with the college-student-return-to-village movement.

It has been generally believed that the government's effort at centralization of schools and especially of institutions of higher learning was opposed by educators and students, and that the national universities were unpopular. As a matter of fact, faculties and students in the government-controlled universities are for the most part better qualified than those in private universities. Moreover, more teachers and students apply, respectively, for posts and for enrollment in government universities than in private ones. Even more significant is the fact that some private universities are eager to be taken over by the government. In 1946 students and faculty members of China University in Peiping organized into an Association for Nationalization of China University. Early in 1947, Ta Hsia University in Shanghai organized a similar campaign.

The key to this situation is the lack of permanent financial backing in all Chinese universities. With the exception of National Tsing Hua University in Peiping, which was built and founded on the American share of the Boxer Indemnity Funds, no university in China has an endowment which makes it self-sufficient. In fact, because of the poverty of the country, the vast majority of colleges have no endowment whatsoever. The government universities, because they are founded and operated on taxes, have greater security and can therefore afford better equipment and attract more highly qualified teachers.

In spite of the political and civil disturbances, bureaucratic corruption, poverty, lack of facilities, student strikes, and the devastations of war, the institutions of higher learning have, in the last two or three decades, made tremendous progress, particularly when one considers the tradition-bound background from which they are slowly emerging. Chinese researches have achieved international reputation in geology, linguistics, philology, history, certain branches of medicine, agricultural economy, and social anthropology. There are even Chinese inventions in certain applied branches of the natural sciences.
Acculturation

Many centuries before its first contact with the West, acculturation had been going on in China in varying degrees of rapidity at different stages of its history. For the most part, it was a one-sided operation, as the various ethnic groups, even when they came as conquerors, took on the culture of the Chinese rather than imposing their own ways upon the conquered people. In spite of the great climatic differences and regional diversities of the country, there is a very real and fundamental unity in its culture. To be sure the dialects may vary so greatly that people from some districts will not be able to understand those from others, but there are certain things, such as the kinship nomenclature, which are universal in their basic pattern. In spite of local differences in customs and manners there are many things, particularly the universality of the family structure, which give unity to the culture. Unless we make the unlikely assumption that all inhabitants of China are descendants of the original Chinese, we must assume that the present basic unity is a result of sinification, or absorption of other ethnic groups through acculturation.

Not all the ethnic groups which have inhabited the country and maintained more or less close contact with the Chinese have become completely sinified, however. When the Republic was founded after the Revolution of 1911, the popular slogan was, "A Republic of Five Races," meaning the Hans (original Chinese, who arrived in early times from Central Asia), Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Tibetans. In recent years a sixth group, the Miaoos, has been added. The actual number of ethnic groups to be found in China is, of course, much larger than this.

Most of the original inhabitants were absorbed in early times by the invading Hans from Central Asia; a few in the border regions to the east and south have remained more or less culturally independent. The Min Chias of the southwest and the Manchus of the northeast are examples of nearly complete sinification. The former group has only its language to show its non-Chinese origin. The Manchus came into contact with the Chinese as conquerors. While their political power lasted, they constructed rigid barriers against
assimilation in an attempt to maintain their cultural identity. Even so, they accepted so much of Chinese culture that, as soon as their political domination ended, the Manchus differed little from the Chinese except in such matters as their head-dresses and the unbound feet of the older women. On the other hand, the Chinese took over from the Manchus a number of cultural items, including gowns for males and females.

Other conquerors have ended their rule differently. The Ch’itans (founders of the Liao dynasty), the Jurchens (founders of the Chin dynasty), and the Mongols (founders of the great Yuan dynasty) all more or less effectively resisted sinification. When their political power was lost, the majority of them left the mainland and joined their tribal brothers. Culturally they remained apart from the Chinese, even though there was mutual influence.69

A number of other ethnic groups have remained outside the orbit of Chinese culture, but most of them maintain some kind of contact with the Chinese in the form of trading, or tenant-landlord relationship, or management of the local government. In this group may be mentioned many branches of the Miao, Lo Los, Yis, Tibetans, Nakhis, Shans, Mohammedans, Yus, and others. The relationship between the majority of these ethnic groups and the Chinese is cordial, and there is little question of racial superiority or inferiority. The Mohammedans, who have a religion as aggressive and monotheistic as Christianity, are the only group which has had constant friction with the Chinese.

CONTACT WITH THE WEST.—With the coming of Europeans and Americans to the East, the situation changed. Westerners visited China long before the middle of the nineteenth century, but it was after the Opium War with Britain in 1841 that the government and people were forced to give serious attention to the problem of the West. Hitherto Chinese culture had not been seriously challenged. Even under Mongol or Manchu domination, there was no thought, by Chinese scholars and others, of any change in the age-old Confucian traditions; such an idea would have been considered monstrous. But with military defeats and definite signs of economic and

technological superiority in the West, some Chinese leaders and thinkers became alarmed. Many of those who initiated and promoted the cause of radical economic and political Westernization did so at the risk of their lives and the lives of their families and relatives. The preaching of such changes was regarded as treason.

The arguments of those who opposed the new ways were simple enough. Chinese culture and sagely teaching were the best in the world. Historically, the Chinese had always civilized their barbarian invaders; the reverse had never happened. To adopt the ways of barbarians was contrary to the Confucian teaching and would also affect the ancestral laws. Thus such changes would be both illogical and unfilial.

To break down the opposition, the reformers had to resort to half-measures and propose changes only in technological fields, but not in customs, government and traditional ways and ideals of life. Some tried to crush the opposition by pointing out that their arguments were absurd even in the light of the Confucian classics. However, the opponents to change had the political vested interests and the apathy of the people to support them. Seldom have autocratic groups given up even a little of their power without a bloody struggle. Many intellectuals were arrested and executed as a result of their somewhat radical ideas. But nevertheless the West came closer and closer. More missionaries came to China, more gunboats, more soldiers, more merchants, more diplomats, more commodities, including British opium. There were more military setbacks and concessions. All these things led to the Boxer Uprising of 1900, which the Manchu rulers endorsed but which marked the end of all serious thought of shutting the West out of China.

It is impossible to deal with all the phases of acculturation in modern China in this short space. I can only go into a few selected aspects of the problem.

LAW.—China had written law long before any of the European countries, but in the nineteenth century the progressive countries of the West were far in the lead in matters of legal administration. The most important principles of the Chinese system of justice at that time were: (1) the principle of restitution and even revenge, in which an eye was actually taken for an eye; (2) the emphasis on family and political status. For example, if a father killed a son,
even with malicious intent, the punishment was often light. If a son killed a father, even accidentally, the punishment was extreme, often death by being cut into minute pieces. The same principle held with regard to crimes involving superiors and inferiors in the bureaucracy.

The judges had too much power; in all litigation, all plaintiffs, defendants and witnesses had to prostrate themselves before them. Torture was not only resorted to as punishment but openly as a means of extorting confessions. Prisons were literally hells on earth and the prisoners were at the complete mercy of greedy jailers.

By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century, Chinese written law had been transformed into one of the most up-to-date bodies of law in the world, based upon the best of Western law. It is now practically free of the old familial influence, so that the son is no longer a lesser human being than his father. It is free of the domination of the Christian Church, so that the sexes are completely equal, with equal rights to property and divorce. The principle of divorce by mutual consent, which has been fought in England and the United States, was arrived at in Chinese written law with the greatest of ease. In addition, prisons have been remodeled, corporal punishment and koutouing in courtrooms have been abolished.

However the law in practice is closely dependent upon the people who come before it, express opinion about it, and operate it. The people are guided by customs and traditions, which do not change as quickly as written law. For this reason there has been a sharp conflict between the spirit of the law and of the customs. Elsewhere I have described the situation as follows:

The spirit of modern law demands uniformity; the customs of a land so vast and so poorly equipped with means of communication as China are bound to be highly diversified. The law has abolished concubinage; the people regard concubinage as a matter of course. The law prescribes that no private individual has the right to commit violence against any other individual; the people regard beating of slave-girls and apprentices as something inherent in the order of nature. The law says that social or sexual intercourse between unmarried adults is entirely their own concern; the people look upon any unrelated two persons of different sex having close contact with each other as having committed adultery and
are to be treated as such, with violence sometimes endangering the lives of both parties.\textsuperscript{70}

Some of these contrasts and conflicts are particularly sharp in the interior provinces and villages. The operators of the law resolve the conflicts, not by strict enforcement of the law, but by a spirit of compromise. For example, mistreatment is admitted as grounds for divorce, but this is interpreted in the light of the education and standing of the parties involved. If both parties are college educated, a slap on the face might be admitted as constituting maltreatment; if they are not highly educated, and particularly if the wife is illiterate, divorce is not granted even if the mistreatment is of a more violent nature. The judges, in applying such a sliding scale, are actually protecting the ignorant women to whom divorce usually means ruin.

Nevertheless, much hardship, misery, and violence have resulted from the difference between the written law, on the one hand, and custom and tradition on the other. The written law has scored victories because the legislative bodies so far do not represent the entire population. Some of the legislators are progressive elements of the intelligentsia. Some of them are bureaucrats, whose main interest in this instance has been to make China look as modern as any advanced Western country. But there is no doubt that the law, once written and enacted, serves as a guiding influence. There is equally no doubt that its sphere of operation is daily widening in many respects.

\textbf{Students.—}The break from the past has been more complete in education than in law, as has been shown previously, and the change is largely of Western origin. The old schools offered training for bureaucracy; the new institutions provide training for citizenship and for the various trades and professions. Because of the undeveloped state of the country's industry and commerce, and because the attraction of bureaucracy is still great, the products of the new schools, like those of the old ones, are still largely unable to fulfill their functions adequately.

However, the trend toward practical subjects has been noticeable, especially in recent years. This point is demonstrated by a

study of university enrollments. Before 1937 the most popular subject in the curricula were arts and literature. By 1940, this had changed. According to Quenten Pan, dean of National Tsing Hua University, Peiping, the vast majority of the science students enrolled in the practical branches of the sciences.

Comparing students of today with their predecessors, one cannot help but be impressed with the broadening interests of the newer generation. The old-fashioned scholars lived in a narrow world of Confucian classics and bureaucratic wire-pulling. Modern students have active views on Christianity and other religious matters, on the liberation of the Chinese people, the future of the peasant, humanity, politics, romantic love, and on the different schools of philosophy and literature and their bearing on life. According to the inquiries of Olga Lang, the most popular authors in contemporary China are those who write social fiction, including Lu Hsun, Pa Chin and Lao She. Only one of the popular authors, Ping Hsin, is nonpolitical and writes of things not dealing with existing social conditions. Among foreign authors the Russians Maxim Gorki and Anton Chekhov are the most popular, with Goethe, Dumas, and Bernard Shaw coming next. In the nonfiction field Marx’s *Das Kapital*, Engel’s *Origin of the Family*, and H. G. Wells’s *Outline of History* have been found to be the most popular. Lang further found that of the 350 Christian informants questioned only 32 mentioned the Bible.\(^{71}\)

Since the revolution, students have not merely expressed their views by reading and writing; they have participated in rural reform projects, beaten up traitors and other officials who were believed to have unnecessarily given away the country’s rights, marched to the capital in protest against the nonresistance policy toward Japan, organized newspapers, established factories, led strikes, staged lectures to the masses, helped the universities to move equipment and men over several thousand miles on a land route to the southwest when the Japanese occupied the coastal provinces, and joined the guerilla forces against the enemy. Of course, in their youthful enthusiasm they made many blunders. Sometimes their actions were instigated by ambitious politicians. Some became reactionary bureaucrats. But as a whole, the students

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\(^{71}\) Olga Lang, *Chinese Family and Society*, pp. 275–77.
are that portion of the people who have taken an active part in counterbalancing the autocratic power of the government. They have helped to waken the masses to their rights and responsibilities.

FAMILY RELATIONSHIP.—The outstanding changes in family relationship pertain to parental authority and the position of women. As is the case in other fields, the changes in the cultural patterns concern the comparatively few educated people more than they do the vast majority, but the new patterns have come to stay and will propagate themselves.

The relationship between father and son is fast becoming a matter of companionship rather than the old one of authority and submission. However, there does not seem to be any outright desire to override the persons of the older generation. Olga Lang has found a hesitation among students to criticize their parents, although there is dissatisfaction, couched in comparatively mild terms, against the older man’s conservative political views, his gambling and frequenting of brothels, and so on. As far as can be observed, the age-old father-son identification remains an important factor in shaping the personality of the young.

The rise in the position of the educated women has been spectacular. Within less than three decades the women who were once confined to their homes, illiterate and with bound feet, are now enjoying a position comparable to that of their American sisters. They are admitted to most professions, including medicine, law, and the diplomatic service. They have equal rights with men before the law. Although the percentage of women in schools was only about 10.3 of the total enrollment by 1932, the vast majority of the educational institutions are coeducational.

RECREATION AND SPORT.—Fifty years ago there was no Sunday in China. Regular holidays only occurred on festivals, New Years, and the end of the harvest. Now a Sunday holiday is a matter of course for a large number of city workers in modernized establishments and for all government offices. The moving picture has become so popular that Hollywood now makes films with subtitles in Chinese script. In contemporary China there are movie fans, sport fans, stamp collectors, match cover collectors, and a host of other hobbyists of recent Western origin. Drama in Western style has become very popular. Student amateur groups produce well-
known plays like *Lady Windermere's Fan*, and *Salome* in Chinese. Chinese opera in the traditional style has remained popular, but even here, operatic themes, sequences, and stage production have been drastically changed as a result of Western influence, much to the distaste of the orthodox connoisseurs. After a tour in the United States, where he received an honorary degree from one of the colleges, Mei Lan-fang, the first actor of China, tried to introduce the violin on the Chinese stage, without much success, however.

Social dancing has become popular, not only among the intelligentsia but also among merchants and other city dwellers. Dancing is not unusual in the best circles, but, on the other hand, some dance halls are little more than brothels. Because of the old patterns of segregation of the sexes, and because dancing has been taken up in the brothels, there have been violent attacks upon the pastime on moral grounds; some city authorities have attempted to put a ban on it, but without much success.

Through social dancing and the movies, jazz music has gained a foothold. The tunes which are popular in the United States are soon taken up by the younger people in the Chinese cities also. But in areas where the movies and dancing have not penetrated, the foot-pedaled organ is a popular instrument. I sang to the tune of such an organ 29 years ago under the leadership of a teacher in a market-town school in Manchuria. During the long war years numerous Chinese composers have arisen who combine Chinese themes with Western technique. Group singing has become widespread.

Music of the classical Western type is less appreciated. There is one conservatory at Nanking staffed largely by Europeans. Before the war there was a symphony orchestra in Shanghai and another in Hankow. In addition, a number of the missionary universities have college orchestras which are able to perform such numbers as the *William Tell Overture* or *Poet and Peasant*. They also have glee clubs and choirs. For several years Handel's *Messiah* was performed by a choir of over a hundred singers under the auspices of Yenching University at Peiping. However, because of the lack of cultural background for the appreciation of classical European music, this type of music has little appeal even for the intelligentsia of China. Kreisler, Moiseiwitsch, Heifetz, Elman, Szigeti, Feuermann,
and many other fine soloists who have toured China have drawn only limited audiences.

In sports the change has been revolutionary. There was no organized sport in old China. Ice-skating and wrestling were done by professionals for the entertainment of the officials and aristocracy. The gentleman scholar was one who did not have to move a finger. Since the coming of modern schools, the pursuit of sports has become part of the regular curriculum. Tennis, basketball, football (soccer), volley ball, track, baseball, skating are all usual in Chinese schools and colleges. There are also interschool, intercollege, and intercity sports events. There are North China Meetings, South China Meetings, as well as National Meetings. In addition, China has been a regular participant in the Far Eastern Olympics, competing with athletes from Japan, the Philippine Islands, and recently, India. Since the early thirties China has also participated in the World Olympics.

LIVING CONDITIONS.—Agriculture, on which the livelihood of over 90 percent of the population directly depends, has remained very much in its traditional state. This means that, for the vast majority, there has been little or no change in the basic means of subsistence.

For the educated and most of the urban population, on the other hand, there has been considerable change in living conditions. They are becoming conscious of the importance of vitamins and a balanced diet. The drinking of coffee and milk is a developing urban habit. Although most European and American foods are not generally popular and are only eaten occasionally as a novelty, ice cream and dairy products have become widely accepted in the cities.

For the educated and some of the urban population there has also been a change in manner of dress. Twenty years ago European costume was rare, even in big cities like Tientsin and Mukden. Today European dress is seen even in the small market town of the interior. Leather shoes have become common and are worn even in the small villages by both adults and children. Even the students who still wear the Chinese costume are shod in leather shoes of Western style. Chinese women, however, have not taken to European dress as the Japanese women have. The Chinese woman who
wears European dress is rare in China on any level of society and, even when living abroad, Chinese women usually prefer to wear their traditional costume. In the United States only the second generation wear American clothes.

In the matter of housing there has again been little change for the majority of the people. In the cities and among the wealthier families, Western-style houses are becoming prevalent. In the five or six years just before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, Nanking witnessed the biggest boom in house construction in the history of any Chinese city. I toured all sections of the capital in 1937 and saw not one house of the traditional type which had been built within the last six or seven years.

Of course, many of the public buildings which have been built in recent decades exhibit a sort of marriage between Chinese and Western styles. This is true of Peiping Union Medical College, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation; and also of the National Library and Yenching University in Peiping; and of Wuhan University in Hankow and Ginling’s Women’s College in Nanking. These buildings have the appearance of traditional Chinese palaces, but are equipped with the most up-to-date conveniences of the West. In most of the wealthier homes there are modern toilets, bathrooms, electric lights, running water, wooden floors, and soft chairs and sofas, in contrast to the old-style hard, square wooden chairs and benches.

Considering the size of the country and the population, improvements in transportation have been negligible. But these changes affect a much larger number of people than the previous items discussed. Up to 1945 there were about 80,000 miles of highways of all sorts and about 13,000 miles of railways, mainly concentrated in North and East China and Manchuria. The Yangtze River is navigable up to Hankow for ocean vessels (595 miles from the sea) and up to Chungking by special steamers (1,427 miles from the sea). Before the war a large number of British, Japanese, and Chinese modern vessels plied this river, as well as traveling between the coastal ports of Dairen, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Foochow, Swatow, and Hong Kong. Air service is comparatively recent but now connects all the large cities.
Nowadays not only the wealthy and educated, the bureaucrat, merchant, and militarist travel by these modern means, but also thousands and thousands of peasants and laborers, in search of more fertile soil, better work, or more profitable markets for their wares. However, China's unfortunate masses travel only for necessity, rarely for pleasure, except occasionally for important visits to relatives. Travel is not a pleasure but a dreary toil, as anyone can understand who has visited the steerage class of any steamer plying Oriental waters or seen the teeming coaches of Chinese railways. Yet even the poor peasant who sees no reason for sending his daughter to school now takes a train or a bus if he must travel instead of making the laborious trip by foot or by donkey as in the old days.

I could mention hundreds of other items which have come to be accepted in the context of Chinese culture; among them, fountain pens, eye glasses, watches, and rubber and leather shoes have come to be in general use in the most remote parts of the country.

COMMUNISM.—The 1911 Revolution changed the form of government and made China into a “republic” with a president and a cabinet who were supposed to be responsible to the two houses of parliament which were supposed to represent the people. But this was a change in form rather than in substance. The old bureaucratic machinery remained, with much the same personnel. The members of parliament, instead of being elected by the people, won their chance to sit in the impressive buildings at the capital by licking the boots of the president and his immediate satellites. The masses continued in the old subservient way, not only at the mercy of the president but also of minor bureaucrats and military Commanders.

The second revolution of 1927, led by the Kuomintang, which has since become the dominant party, unified the country politically and militarily more successfully than any government since the downfall of the Manchu dynasty, but the same bureaucratic machinery still administered the country. While the Manchu dynasty lasted, all power was vested, ultimately, in the emperor or the dowager. When the dynasty fell, the final source of power rested with a number of independent militarists who were practically little kings within their own domains. After the ascension
of the Kuomintang the source of power was broadened. It was vested in a much larger number of members of the party who form the inner cliques and who are backed by armed forces.

Some new names came to high places in the government, only to reappear year after year, if not in the same high places, in different places of equal importance. The bureaucrat who is powerful in the party or who has the favor of the supreme leader is assured of his place in the sun. Even the Control Yuan, which supposedly has the power of impeachment, has been repeatedly shown to be powerless in the case of erring but favored high officials. Not even the office of the magistrate has ever been filled by popular election. The people are organized, ruled, told what to do and how much to pay. They do not know why they must do certain things or to what use the taxes which they pay are put.

The outstanding phenomenon of political acculturation in modern China is the growth and rise of the Communist Party. It is popularly believed that China is a country in which most of the land belongs to landlords who suck the blood of the tenants who do the actual tilling of the soil. Dr. Sun, founder of the Republic, who was born in Kwangtung province where the tenancy figure is exceedingly high, was under this impression when he specified in his program that “all tillers must own their own soil.” Both American and British journalists merely repeated this popular belief.72

From my own analysis of land tenancy, I believe that it is not a main cause for complaint and dissatisfaction among the peasants and not the main reform instituted by Communists. In spite of some reported abuses, the real strength of Chinese Communists lies in their drastic reduction of state expenditures, of the cost of keeping armed forces, and particularly in the fact that their administrative personnel, regardless of rank, maintain much the same standard of living as the common citizen. By reducing expenditures the Reds have been able to lower taxation and curb corruption, thus reducing the financial burden of the peasants. By lowering their own standard of living to meet that of the common people, they give the peasants for the first time a feeling that there is some affinity between themselves and the functionaries of the government. The

curtailing of luxuries among officials does away with the usual incentives for corruption, makes crushing taxation unnecessary, and destroys the conditions which have enabled usury to flourish. Thus with the people gaining an increasing share in the local government, the Reds, in spite of the obviously autocratic nature of their administration on the higher levels, have made possible a degree of social and economic equality which has never before been known in Chinese history but which is also the universal demand of our times. This demand is the most outstanding contribution of the West to culture, not only in China, but in most of the world.

Conclusions

In a short survey on so vast and complex a country as China it is impossible to do more than touch upon a few salient features. The most urgent problems of today are the alleviation of poverty and the establishment of a truly democratic government.

Poverty is partly a result of overpopulation. Birth control has been suggested as a solution, but until the standard of living is raised (it is now among the lowest of all literate countries), it will be almost impossible to introduce methods of birth control among the Chinese peasants. The standard of living can only be raised through industrialization.

Many factors have hampered industrialization in China. Before 1942, unfair foreign competition through such things as a nominal tariff on foreign goods under the “Unequal Treaties” was one of them. But since the abolition of the “Unequal Treaties,” two indigenous factors have remained paramount. First, the family, with its emphasis on father-son identification and the big family ideal, was essentially conservative and frowned upon new ideas and ways which could not be fitted into the traditional scheme of things. It bred an intense feeling for the family as an in-group and prevented wider cooperation.

A second and more basic factor is the nature of the government structure. The bureaucracy, on which the government rests, enjoys such liberal economic privileges that it absorbs whatever small margin the people achieve in the economy. In addition it had dug deep into the flesh of the people by pseudo-legal practices and out-
right corruption. It would not be far wide of the mark to say that no public funds are safe.

Furthermore, since it is upheld primarily by military force, the government has never provided the people with any framework of security. In this respect the members of the bureaucracy are no more secure than the rest. The success or failure, whether social or economic, of the individual has always depended upon the pleasure or displeasure of the top rulers. Under the emperor a favored eunuch could amass a tremendous fortune, but anyone who incurred the displeasure of the emperor could find even his hard-earned and well-deserved wealth confiscated overnight.

The Revolution of 1911, which changed the form of the government, did not change its substance. The Revolution of 1927 achieved a little more, but only under the necessity of buttressing the military power of the government. When such necessity is removed, because inflation and war have destroyed the importance of accumulated wealth, the same traditional government attitude toward the people returns.

Because of the backwardness of the economic conditions and because of an indifferent bureaucracy and government, the drastic changes which have occurred in education have produced a tragic dilemma. On the one hand, the various lines of constructive work in the country urgently need competent men. On the other hand, a large number of graduates of modern institutions find that their training has failed to prepare them to fit into the existing order. Some go into various organizations for reform; some are fortunate enough to find opportunities in professional work or research; but many become disillusioned moneymakers. Others fall in line with things as they are and become the most corrupt of bureaucrats. Finally many drift about in confusion and despair because they find no compromise between what they want to do and what they have to do.

The situation in China today, with its contrast between the poverty and misery of the people and the corruption and indifference of the bureaucracy and government, can be truly described as a conflict of cultures. For in a genuine sense, the changes and the resulting chaos which have come about in China since the middle of the last century have come through contact with the West. In pre-
modern China there was a sort of internal equilibrium, in spite of the despotic and extravagant ruling group and a corrupt and as a whole irresponsible bureaucracy. The bureaucracy taxed the people harshly but they also spent almost exclusively among the people. The emperors and his descendants had absolute power, but if they went too far the people had the strength and the occasion to revolt and overthrow them. In modern China this old equilibrium has been destroyed and a new one has not yet been worked out. In this situation the bureaucracy, including the military, have extorted from the people more harshly than before, but the sums thus collected have largely left the country by way of treaty ports, concessions, unfavorable trade balance, and all kinds of official tours to Europe and America for pleasure or propaganda, and for technical investigation by politicians who often have not had an elementary course in the subject they are dispatched to investigate. The top ruling group has also more absolute power than before over the people, because they have learned some methods of organization and secret police from the West; at the same time, ordinary citizens have less strength and occasion to exert their rights, because the introduction of modern weapons has made it impractical for unarmed masses to defend themselves against organized tyranny. Under these circumstances, the undoubted integrity, brilliance, and patriotic endeavors of some individual officials and others, high and low, inside and outside the party, have meant little.

Of course, it is a mistake to equate the present government with any previous one. Even two indigenous dynasties in pre-modern times were never exactly alike. The Kuomintang, notwithstanding its manifold shortcomings, has been instrumental in creating a degree of political consciousness among the people and has brought about advances in urban industrialization, in public finance, and in international relations within the very short period of 1929 to 1937. And Chinese society today is a very different entity from before. Never before has Chinese culture been so seriously challenged. Never before have the Chinese people even conceived of any modification in their age-old traditions and institutions. Today there is no longer the question of change or no change, but of how much change. The outstanding battle among the intelligentsia and others has been waged between those who urge complete Westernization and those who
preach a surgical combination of the best of the East and of the West. In the light of the science of culture either position must be modified to be tenable. Cultures achieve permanent change by processes of integration but not by complete dropping of what has existed for centuries or by a fortuitous combination of the new and the old.

The present conflict between the government and the Communist forces is but an outward expression of the culture crisis. But so also are the runaway inflation, the unemployment of the educated, the increasing number of suicides, which has alarmed some newspapers, the student strikes and demonstrations, the impoverished universities, the clashes between police and soldiers, and the numerous difficulties and crimes arising out of differences between customs and the written law. The armed conflicts between government and Communist forces overshadows the others because it is of more immediate and decisive importance.

The duration of the culture crisis and the shape of the integration to come will depend, on the one hand, upon how truly the contending factions understand the importance of the active interest and support of the masses as a basic key to success and consolidation of their powers, and on the other, upon how wisely the United States will exercise her responsibilities as the most important stabilizing factor in the world today.

SUGGESTED READINGS

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